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THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/newworldofislarn00stod_0 


THE 

NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


BY 


X.  • 

V'v 


LOTHROP  STODDARD,  A.M.,  Ph.D.  (Harv.) 

AUTHOR  OF  “THE  RISING  TIDE  OF  COLOR,” 

“THE  STAKES  OF  THE  WAR,” 

“PRESENT  DAY  EUROPE:  ITS  NATIONAL  STATES  OF  MIND,” 

II  THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  IN  SAN  DOMINGO,”  ETC. 


^WITH  MAP 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 

1921 


Copyright,  1921,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 


Published  September,  1921, 


THE  SCRIBNER  PRESS 


I 


PREFACE  '  72/ 

The  entire  world  of  Islam  is  to-day  in  profound  fer¬ 
ment.  From  Morocco  to  China  and  from  Turkestan 
to  the  Congo,  the  250,000,000  followers  of  the  Prophet 
Mohammed  are  stirring  to  new  ideas,  new  impulses,  new 
aspirations.  A  gigantic  transformation  is  taking  place 
whose  results  must  affect  all  mankind. 

This  transformation  was  greatly  stimulated  by  the 
late  war.  But  it  began  long  before.  More  than  a  hun¬ 
dred  years  ago  the  seeds  were  sown,  and  ever  since  then 
it  has  been  evolving;  at  first  slowly  and  obscurely;  later 
more  rapidly  and  perceptibly;  until  to-day,  under  the 
stimulus  of  Armageddon,  it  has  burnt  into  sudden  and 
startling  bloom. 

The  story  of  that  strange  and  dramatic  evolution  I 
have  endeavored  to  tell  in  the  following  pages.  Con¬ 
sidering  in  turn  its  various  aspects — religious,  cultural, 
political,  economic,  social — I  have  tried  to  portray  their 
genesis  and  development,  to  analyze  their  character,  and 
to  appraise  their  potency.  While  making  due  allowance 
for  local  differentiations,  the  intimate  correlation  and 
underlying  unity  of  the  various  movements  have  ever 
been  kept  in  view. 

Although  the  book  deals  primarily  with  the  Moslem 
world,  it  necessarily  includes  the  non-Moslem  Hindu 


V 


VI 


PREFACE 


elements  of  India.  The  field  covered  is  thus  virtually 
the  entire  Near  and  Middle  East.  The  Far  East  has 
not  been  directly  considered,  but  parallel  developments 
there  have  been  noted  and  should  always  be  kept  in 
mind. 


Brookline,  Mass., 
May  8,  1921. 


Lothrop  Stoddard. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction:  The  Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Old 

Islamic  World .  3 

THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

CHAPTER 

I.  The  Mohammedan  Revival .  25 

II.  Pan-Islamism .  45 

III.  The  Influence  of  the  West .  90 

IV.  Political  Change . 131 

V.  Nationalism . 157 

VI.  Nationalism  in  India . 239 

VII.  Economic  Change . 268 

VIII.  Social  Change . 296 

IX.  Social  Unrest  and  Bolshevism . 323 

Conclusion . 355 

Index . 357 

MAP 

The  World  of  Islam . at  end  of  volume 


THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


* 


THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  THE  OLD 
ISLAMIC  WORLD 

The  rise  of  Islam  is  perhaps  the  most  amazing  event  in 
human  history.  Springing  from  a  land  and  a  people  alike 
previously  negligible,  Islam  spread  within  a  century  over 
half  the  earth,  shattering  great  empires,  overthrowing 
long-established  religions,  remoulding  the  souls  of  races, 
and  building  up  a  whole  new  world — the  world  of  Islam. 

The  closer  we  examine  this  development  the  more 
extraordinary  does  it  appear.  The  other  great  religions 
won  their  way  slowly,  by  painful  struggle,  and  finally 
triumphed  with  the  aid  of  powerful  monarchs  converted 
to  the  new  faith.  Christianity  had  its  Constantine, 
Buddhism  its  Asoka,  and  Zoroastrianism  its  Cyrus,  each 
lending  to  his  chosen  cult  the  mighty  force  of  secular 
authority.  Not  so  Islam.  Arising  in  a  desert  land 
sparsely  inhabited  by  a  nomad  race  previously  undis¬ 
tinguished  in  human  annals,  Islam  sallied  forth  on  its 
great  adventure  with  the  slenderest  human  backing  and 
against  the  heaviest  material  odds.  Yet  Islam  triumphed 
with  seemingly  miraculous  ease,  and  a  couple  of  genera¬ 
tions  saw  the  Fiery  Crescent  borne  victorious  from  the 
Pyrenees  to  the  Himalayas  and  from  the  deserts  of  Central 
Asia  to  the  deserts  of  Central  Africa. 

3 


4  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


This  amazing  success  was  due  to  a  number  of  con¬ 
tributing  factors,  chief  among  them  being  the  character 
of  the  Arab  race,  the  nature  of  Mohammed’s  teaching, 
and  the  general  state  of  the  contemporary  Eastern  world. 
Undistinguished  though  the  Arabs  had  hitherto  been, 
they  were  a  people  of  remarkable  potentialities,  which 
were  at  that  moment  patently  seeking  self-realization. 
For  several  generations  before  Mohammed,  Arabia  had 
been  astir  with  exuberant  vitality.  The  Arabs  had  out¬ 
grown  their  ancestral  paganism  and  were  instinctively 
yearning  for  better  things.  Athwart  this  seething  fer¬ 
ment  of  mind  and  spirit  Islam  rang  like  a  trumpet-call. 
Mohammed,  an  Arab  of  the  Arabs,  was  the  very  incarna¬ 
tion  of  the  soul  of  his  race.  Preaching  a  simple,  austere 
monotheism,  free  from  priestcraft  or  elaborate  doctrinal 
trappings,  he  tapped  the  well-springs  of  religious  zeal 
always  present  in  the  Semitic  heart.  Forgetting  the 
chronic  rivalries  and  blood-feuds  which  had  consumed 
their  energies  in  internecine  strife,  and  welded  into  a  glow¬ 
ing  unity  by  the  fire  of  their  new-found  faith,  the  Arabs 
poured  forth  from  their  deserts  to  conquer  the  earth  for 
Allah,  the  One  True  God. 

Thus  Islam,  like  the  resistless  breath  of  the  sirocco, 
the  desert  wind,  swept  out  of  Arabia  and  encountered — 
a  spiritual  vacuum.  Those  neighboring  Byzantine  and 
Persian  Empires,  so  imposing  to  the  casual  eye,  were 
mere  dried  husks,  devoid  of  real  vitality.  Their  religions 
were  a  mockery  and  a  sham.  Persia’s  ancestral  cult  of 
Zoroaster  had  degenerated  into  “Magism” — a  pompous 
priestcraft,  tyrannical  and  persecuting,  hated  and  secretly 
despised.  As  for  Eastern  Christianity,  bedizened  with 
the  gewgaws  of  paganism  and  bedevilled  by  the  mad- 


INTRODUCTION 


5 


dening  theological  speculations  of  the  decadent  Greek 
mind,  it  had  become  a  repellent  caricature  of  the  teachings 
of  Christ.  Both  Magism  and  Byzantine  Christendom 
were  riven  by  great  heresies  which  engendered  savage 
persecutions  and  furious  hates.  Furthermore,  both  the 
Byzantine  and  Persian  Empires  were  harsh  despotisms 
which  crushed  their  subjects  to  the  dust  and  killed  out 
all  love  of  country  or  loyalty  to  the  state.  Lastly,  the 
two  empires  had  just  fought  a  terrible  war  from  which 
they  had  emerged  mutually  bled  white  and  utterly  ex¬ 
hausted. 

Such  was  the  world  compelled  to  face  the  lava-flood  of 
Islam.  The  result  was  inevitable.  Once  the  disciplined 
strength  of  the  East  Roman  legions  and  the  Persian 
cuirassiers  had  broken  before  the  fiery  onslaught  of  the 
fanatic  sons  of  the  desert,  it  was  all  over.  There  was  no 
patriotic  resistance.  The  down-trodden  populations  pas¬ 
sively  accepted  new  masters,  while  the  numerous  heretics 
actually  welcomed  the  overthrow  of  persecuting  core¬ 
ligionists  whom  they  hated  far  worse  than  their  alien 
conquerors.  In  a  short  time  most  of  the  subject  peoples 
accepted  the  new  faith,  so  refreshingly  simple  compared 
with  their  own  degenerate  cults.  The  Arabs,  in  their 
turn,  knew  how  to  consolidate  their  rule.  They  were  no 
bloodthirsty  savages,  bent  solely  on  loot  and  destruction. 
On  the  contrary,  they  were  an  innately  gifted  race,  eager 
to  learn  and  appreciative  of  the  cultural  gifts  which  older 
civilizations  had  to  bestow.  Intermarrying  freely  and 
professing  a  common  belief,  conquerors  and  conquered 
rapidly  fused,  and  from  this  fusion  arose  a  new  civilization 
— the  Saracenic  civilization,  in  which  the  ancient  cultures 
of  Greece,  Rome,  and  Persia  were  revitalized  by  Arab 


6  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


vigor  and  synthesized  by  the  Arab  genius  and  the  Islamic 
spirit.  For  the  first  three  centuries  of  its  existence 
(circ.  650-1000  A.  D.)  the  realm  of  Islam  was  the  most 
civilized  and  progressive  portion  of  the  world.  Studded 
with  splendid  cities,  gracious  mosques,  and  quiet  universi¬ 
ties  where  the  wisdom  of  the  ancient  world  was  preserved 
and  appreciated,  the  Moslem  East  offered  a  striking  con¬ 
trast  to  the  Christian  West,  then  sunk  in  the  night  of  the 
Dark  Ages. 

However,  by  the  tenth  century  the  Saracenic  civili¬ 
zation  began  to  display  unmistakable  symptoms  of  decline. 
This  decline  was  at  first  gradual.  Down  to  the  terrible 
disasters  of  the  thirteenth  century  it  still  displayed  vigor 
and  remained  ahead  of  the  Christian  West.  Still,  by  the 
year  1000  A.  D.  its  golden  age  was  over.  For  this  there 
were  several  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  that  inveterate 
spirit  of  faction  which  has  always  been  the  bane  of  the 
Arab  race  soon  reappeared  once  more.  Rival  clans  strove 
for  the  headship  of  Islam,  and  their  quarrels  degenerated 
into  bloody  civil  wars.  In  this  fratricidal  strife  the  fervor 
of  the  first  days  cooled,  and  saintly  men  like  Abu  Bekr 
and  Omar,  Islam’s  first  standard-bearers,  gave  place  to 
worldly  minded  leaders  who  regarded  their  position  of 
“ Khalifa”1  as  a  means  to  despotic  power  and  self- 
glorification.  The  seat  of  government  was  moved  to 
Damascus  in  Syria,  and  afterward  to  Bagdad  in  Meso¬ 
potamia.  The  reason  for  this  was  obvious.  In  Mecca 
despotism  was  impossible.  The  fierce,  free-born  Arabs 
of  the  desert  would  tolerate  no  master,  and  their  innate 
democracy  had  been  sanctioned  by  the  Prophet,  who  had 
explicitly  declared  that  all  Believers  were  brothers.  The 

1 1,  e.,  “Successor.”  Anglicized  into  the  word  “Caliph.” 


INTRODUCTION 


7 


Meccan  caliphate  was  a  theocratic  democracy.  Abu 
Bekr  and  Omar  were  elected  by  the  people,  and  held 
themselves  responsible  to  public  opinion,  subject  to  the 
divine  law  as  revealed  by  Mohammed  in  the  Koran. 

But  in  Damascus,  and  still  more  in  Bagdad,  things  were 
different.  There  the  pure-blooded  Arabs  were  only  a 
handful  among  swarms  of  Syrian  and  Persian  converts 
and  “Neo-Arab”  mixed-bloods.  These  people  were  filled 
with  traditions  of  despotism  and  were  quite  ready  to 
yield  the  caliphs  obsequious  obedience.  The  caliphs,  in 
their  turn,  leaned  more  and  more  upon  these  complaisant 
subjects,  drawing  from  their  ranks  courtiers,  officials,  and 
ultimately  soldiers.  Shocked  and  angered,  the  proud 
Arabs  gradually  returned  to  the  desert,  while  the  govern¬ 
ment  fell  into  the  well-worn  ruts  of  traditional  Oriental 
despotism.  When  the  caliphate  was  moved  to  Bagdad 
after  the  founding  of  the  Abbaside  dynasty  (750  A.  D.), 
Persian  influence  became  preponderant.  The  famous 
Caliph  Haroun-al-Rashid,  the  hero  of  the  Arabian 
Nights ,  was  a  typical  Persian  monarch,  a  true  successor 
of  Xerxes  and  Chosroes,  and  as  different  from  Abu  Bekr 
or  Omar  as  it  is  possible  to  conceive.  And,  in  Bagdad, 
as  elsewhere,  despotic  power  was  fatal  to  its  possessors. 
Under  its  blight  the  “successors”  of  Mohammed  became 
capricious  tyrants  or  degenerate  harem  puppets,  whose 
nerveless  hands  were  wholly  incapable  of  guiding  the  great 
Moslem  Empire. 

The  empire,  in  fact,  gradually  went  to  pieces.  Shaken 
by  the  civil  wars,  bereft  of  strong  leaders,  and  deprived 
of  the  invigorating  amalgam  of  the  unspoiled  desert 
Arabs,  political  unity  could  not  endure.  Everywhere 
there  occurred  revivals  of  suppressed  racial  or  particu- 


8  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


larist  tendencies.  The  very  rapidity  of  Islam’s  expansion 
turned  against  it,  now  that  the  well-springs  of  that 
expansion  were  dried  up.  Islam  had  made  millions  of 
converts,  of  many  sects  and  races,  but  it  had  digested 
them  very  imperfectly.  Mohammed  had  really  converted 
the  Arabs,  because  he  merely  voiced  ideas  which  were 
obscurely  germinating  in  Arab  minds  and  appealed  to 
impulses  innate  in  the  Arab  blood.  When,  however, 
Islam  was  accepted  by  non-Arab  peoples,  they  instinc¬ 
tively  interpreted  the  Prophet’s  message  according  to  their 
particular  racial  tendencies  and  cultural  backgrounds, 
the  result  being  that  primitive  Islam  was  distorted  or 
perverted.  The  most  extreme  example  of  this  was  in 
Persia,  where  the  austere  monotheism  of  Mohammed  was 
transmuted  into  the  elaborate  mystical  cult  known  as 
Shiism,  which  presently  cut  the  Persians  off  from  full 
communion  with  the  orthodox  Moslem  world.  The  same 
transmutive  tendency  appears,  in  lesser  degree,  in  the 
saint-worship  of  the  North  African  Berbers  and  in  the 
pantheism  of  the  Hindu  Moslems — both  developments 
which  Mohammed  would  have  unquestionably  exe¬ 
crated. 

These  doctrinal  fissures  in  Islam  were  paralleled  by  the 
disruption  of  political  unity.  The  first  formal  split  oc¬ 
curred  after  the  accession  of  the  Abbasides.  A  member 
of  the  deposed  Ommeyyad  family  fled  to  Spain,  where  he 
set  up  a  rival  caliphate  at  Cordova,  recognized  as  lawful 
not  only  by  the  Spanish  Moslems  but  by  the  Berbers  of 
North  Africa.  Later  on  another  caliphate  was  set  up  in 
Egypt — the  Fatimite  caliphate,  resting  its  title  on  descent 
from  Mohammed’s  daughter  Fatima.  As  for  the  Abba- 
side  caliphs  of  Bagdad,  they  gradually  declined  in  power, 


INTRODUCTION 


9 


until  they  became  mere  puppets  in  the  hands  of  a  new 
racial  element,  the  Turks. 

Before  describing  that  shift  of  power  from  Neo-Arab 
to  Turkish  hands  which  was  so  momentous  for  the  history 
of  the  Islamic  world,  let  us  first  consider  the  decline  in 
cultural  and  intellectual  vigor  that  set  in  concurrently 
with  the  disruption  of  political  and  religious  unity  during 
the  later  stages  of  the  Neo-Arab  period. 

The  Arabs  of  Mohammed’s  day  were  a  fresh,  unspoiled 
people  in  the  full  flush  of  pristine  vigor,  eager  for  adven¬ 
ture  and  inspired  by  a  high  ideal.  They  had  their  full 
share  of  Semitic  fanaticism;  but,  though  fanatical,  they 
were  not  bigoted;  that  is  to  say,  they  possessed,  not  closed, 
but  open  minds.  They  held  firmly  to  the  tenets  of  their 
religion,  but  this  religion  was  extremely  simple.  The 
core  of  Mohammed’s  teaching  was  theism  plus  certain 
practices.  A  strict  belief  in  the  unity  of  God ;  an  equally 
strict  belief  in  the  divine  mission1  of  Mohammed  as  set 
forth  in  the  Koran,  and  certain  clearly  defined  duties — 
prayer,  ablutions,  fasting,  almsgiving,  and  pilgrimage — 
these,  and  these  alone,  constituted  the  Islam  of  the  Arab 
conquerors  of  the  Eastern  world. 

So  simple  a  theology  could  not  seriously  fetter  the 
Arab  mind,  alert,  curious,  eager  to  learn,  and  ready  to 
adjust  itself  to  conditions  ampler  and  more  complex  than 
those  prevailing  in  the  parched  environment  of  the  desert. 
Now,  not  only  did  the  Arabs  relish  the  material  advan- 


1  To  be  carefully  distinguished  from  divinity.  Mohammed  not  only 
did  not  make  any  pretensions  to  divinity,  but  specifically  disclaimed  any 
such  attributes.  He  regarded  himself  as  the  last  of  a  series  of  divinely 
inspired  prophets,  beginning  with  Adam  and  extending  through  Moses 
and  Jesus  to  himself,  the  mouthpiece  of  God’s  last  and  most  perfect  revela¬ 
tion. 


10  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tages  and  luxuries  of  the  more  developed  societies  which 
they  had  conquered;  they  also  appreciated  the  art,  litera¬ 
ture,  science,  and  ideas  of  the  older  civilizations.  The 
effect  of  these  novel  stimuli  was  the  remarkable  cultural 
and  intellectual  flowering  which  is  the  glory  of  Saracenic 
civilization.  For  a  time  thought  was  relatively  free  and 
produced  a  wealth  of  original  ideas  and  daring  specula¬ 
tions.  These  were  the  work  not  only  of  Arabs  but  also 
of  subject  Christians,  Jews,  and  Persians,  many  of  them 
being  heretics  previously  depressed  under  the  iron  bands 
of  persecuting  Byzantine  orthodoxy  and  Magism. 

Gradually,  however,  this  enlightened  era  passed  away. 
Reactionary  forces  appeared  and  gained  in  strength. 
The  liberals,  who  are  usually  known  under  the  general 
title  of  “  Motazelites,”  not  only  clung  to  the  doctrinal 
simplicity  of  primitive  Islam,  but  also  contended  that  the 
test  of  all  things  should  be  reason.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  conservative  schools  of  thought  asserted  that  the  test 
should  be  precedent  and  authority.  These  men,  many  of 
them  converted  Christians  imbued  with  the  traditions  of 
Byzantine  orthodoxy,  undertook  an  immense  work  of 
Koranic  exegesis,  combined  with  an  equally  elaborate 
codification  and  interpretation  of  the  reputed  sayings  or 
fl Traditions”  of  Mohammed,  as  handed  down  by  his 
immediate  disciples  and  followers.  As  the  result  of  these 
labors,  there  gradually  arose  a  Moslem  theology  and 
scholastic  philosophy  as  rigid,  elaborate,  and  dogmatic 
as  that  of  the  mediaeval  Christian  West. 

Naturally,  the  struggle  between  the  fundamentally 
opposed  tendencies  of  traditionalism  and  rationalism  was 
long  and  bitter.  Yet  the  ultimate  outcome  was  almost 
a  foregone  conclusion.  Everything  conspired  to  favor 


INTRODUCTION 


11 


the  triumph  of  dogma  over  reason.  The  whole  historic 
tradition  of  the  East  (a  tradition  largely  induced  by  racial 
and  climatic  factors1 * Ill)  was  toward  absolutism.  This 
tradition  had  been  interrupted  by  the  inrush  of  the  wild 
libertarianism  of  the  desert.  But  the  older  tendency 
presently  reasserted  itself,  stimulated  as  it  was  by  the 
political  transformation  of  the  caliphate  from  theocratic 
democracy  to  despotism. 

This  triumph  of  absolutism  in  the  field  of  government 
in  fact  assured  its  eventual  triumph  in  all  other  fields  as 
well.  For,  in  the  long  run,  despotism  can  no  more  tolerate 
liberty  of  thought  than  it  can  liberty  of  action.  Some  of 
the  Damascus  caliphs,  to  be  sure,  toyed  with  Motazelism, 
the  Ommeyyads  being  mainly  secular-minded  men  to 
whom  freethinking  was  intellectually  attractive.  But 
presently  the  caliphs  became  aware  of  liberalism’s  political 
implications.  The  Motazelites  did  not  confine  themselves 
to  the  realm  of  pure  philosophic  speculation.  They  also 
trespassed  on  more  dangerous  ground.  Motazelite  voices 
were  heard  recalling  the  democratic  days  of  the  Meccan 
caliphate,  when  the  Commander  of  the  Faithful,  instead 
of  being  an  hereditary  monarch,  was  elected  by  the  peo¬ 
ple  and  responsible  to  public  opinion.  Some  bold  spirits 
even  entered  into  relations  with  the  fierce  fanatic  sects  of 


1  The  influence  of  environment  and  heredity  on  human  evolution  in 
general  and  on  the  history  of  the  East  in  particular,  though  of  great  im¬ 
portance,  cannot  be  treated  in  a  summary  such  as  this.  The  influence  of 

climatic  and  other  environmental  factors  has  been  ably  treated  by  Pro¬ 
fessor  Ellsworth  Huntington  in  his  various  works,  such  as  The  Pulse  of 
Asia  (Boston,  1907);  Civilization  and  Climate  (Yale  Univ.  Press,  1915), 
and  World-Power  and  Evolution  (Yale  Univ.  Press,  1919).  See  also  chap. 

Ill  in  Arminius  Vamb6ry — Der  Islam  im  neunzehnten  Jahrhundert.  Eine 
culturgeschichtliche  Studie  (Leipzig,  1875).  For  a  summary  of  racial  in¬ 
fluences  in  Eastern  history,  see  Madison  Grant — The  Passing  of  the  Great 
Race  (N.  Y.,  1916). 


12  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


inner  Arabia,  like  the  Kharijites,  who,  upholding  the 
old  desert  freedom,  refused  to  recognize  the  caliphate 
and  proclaimed  theories  of  advanced  republicanism. 

The  upshot  was  that  the  caliphs  turned  more  and  more 
toward  the  conservative  theologians  as  against  the  liberals, 
just  as  they  favored  the  monarchist  Neo- Arabs  in  prefer¬ 
ence  to  the  intractable  pure-blooded  Arabs  of  the  desert. 
Under  the  Abbasides  the  government  came  out  frankly 
for  religious  absolutism.  Standards  of  dogmatic  ortho¬ 
doxy  were  established,  Motazelites  were  persecuted  and 
put  to  death,  and  by  the  twelfth  century  A.  D.  the  last 
vestiges  of  Saracenic  liberalism  were  extirpated.  The 
canons  of  Moslem  thought  were  fixed.  All  creative 
activity  ceased.  The  very  memory  of  the  great  Motaze- 
lite  doctors  faded  away.  The  Moslem  mind  was  closed, 
not  to  be  reopened  until  our  own  day. 

By  the  beginning  of  the  eleventh  century  the  decline  of 
Saracenic  civilization  had  become  so  pronounced  that 
change  was  clearly  in  the  air.  Having  lost  their  early 
vigor,  the  Neo- Arabs  were  to  see  their  political  power  pass 
into  other  hands.  These  political  heirs  of  the  Neo-Arabs 
were  the  Turks.  The  Turks  were  a  western  branch  of 
that  congeries  of  nomadic  tribes  which,  from  time  imme¬ 
morial,  have  roamed  over  the  limitless  steppes  of  Eastern 
and  Central  Asia,  and  which  are  known  collectively  under 
the  titles  of  “Uralo-Altaic”  or  “ Turanian”  peoples. 
The  Arabs  had  been  in  contact  with  the  Turkish  nomads 
ever  since  the  Islamic  conquest  of  Persia,  when  the 
Moslem  generals  found  the  Turks  beating  restlessly  against 
Persia’s  northeastern  frontiers.  In  the  caliphate’s  palmy 
days  the  Turks  were  not  feared.  In  fact,  they  were  pres¬ 
ently  found  to  be  very  useful.  A  dull-witted  folk  with 


INTRODUCTION 


13 


few  ideas,  the  Turks  could  do  two  things  superlatively 
well — obey  orders  and  fight  like  devils.  In  other  words, 
they  made  ideal  mercenary  soldiers.  The  caliphs  were  de¬ 
lighted,  and  enlisted  ever-larger  numbers  of  them  for  their 
armies  and  their  body-guards. 

This  was  all  very  well  while  the  caliphate  was  strong, 
but  when  it  grew  weak  the  situation  altered.  Rising 
everywhere  to  positions  of  authority,  the  Turkish  mer¬ 
cenaries  began  to  act  like  masters.  Opening  the  eastern 
frontiers,  they  let  in  fresh  swarms  of  their  countrymen, 
who  now  came,  not  as  individuals,  but  in  tribes  or 
“hordes’’  under  their  hereditary  chiefs,  wandering  about 
at  their  own  sweet  will,  settling  where  they  pleased,  and 
despoiling  or  evicting  the  local  inhabitants. 

The  Turks  soon  renounced  their  ancestral  paganism  for 
Islam,  but  Islam  made  little  change  in  their  natures. 
In  judging  these  Turkish  newcomers  we  must  not  con¬ 
sider  them  the  same  as  the  present-day  Ottoman  Turks 
of  Constantinople  and  Asia  Minor.  The  modern  Osmanli 
are  so  saturated  with  European  and  Near  Eastern  blood, 
and  have  been  so  leavened  by  Western  and  Saracenic  ideas, 
that  they  are  a  very  different  people  from  their  remote 
immigrant  ancestors.  Yet,  even  as  it  is,  the  modern 
Osmanli  display  enough  of  those  unlovely  Turanian 
traits  which  characterize  the  unmodified  Turks  of  Central 
Asia,  often  called  “Turkomans,”  to  distinguish  them  from 
their  Ottoman  kinsfolk  to  the  west. 

Now,  what  was  the  primitive  Turkish  nature?  First 
and  foremost,  it  was  that  of  the  professional  soldier. 
Discipline  was  the  Turk’s  watchword.  No  originality 
of  thought,  and  but  little  curiosity.  Few  ideas  ever 
penetrated  the  Turk’s  slow  mind,  and  the  few  that  did 


14  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


penetrate  were  received  as  military  orders,  to  be  obeyed 
without  question  and  adhered  to  without  reflection. 
Such  was  the  being  who  took  over  the  leadership  of  Islam 
trom  the  Saracen’s  failing  grasp. 

No  greater  misfortune  could  have  occurred  both  for 
Islam  and  for  the  world  at  large.  For  Islam  it  meant  the 
rule  of  dull-witted  bigots  under  which  enlightened  progress 
was  impossible.  Of  course  Islam  did  gain  a  great  acces¬ 
sion  of  warlike  strength,  but  this  new  power  was  so 
wantonly  misused  as  to  bring  down  disastrous  repercus¬ 
sions  upon  Islam  itself.  The  first  notable  exploits  of  the 
immigrant  Turkish  hordes  were  their  conquest  of  Asia 
Minor  and  their  capture  of  Jerusalem,  both  events  taking 
place  toward  the  close  of  the  eleventh  century.1  Up 
to  this  time  Asia  Minor  had  remained  part  of  the  Christian 
world.  The  original  Arab  flood  of  the  seventh  century, 
after  overrunning  Syria,  had  been  stopped  by  the  barrier 
of  the  Taurus  Mountains;  the  Byzantine  Empire  had 
pulled  itself  together;  and  thenceforth,  despite  border 
bickerings,  the  Byzantine-Saracen  frontier  had  remained 
substantially  unaltered.  Now,  however,  the  Turks  broke 
the  Byzantine  barrier,  overran  Asia  Minor,  and  threatened 
even  Constantinople,  the  eastern  bulwark  of  Christendom. 
As  for  Jerusalem,  it  had,  of  course,  been  in  Moslem  hands 
since  the  Arab  conquest  of  637  A.  D.,  but  the  caliph  Omar 
had  carefully  respected  the  Christian  “Holy  Places,”  and 
his  successors  had  neither  persecuted  the  local  Christians 
nor  maltreated  the  numerous  pilgrims  who  flocked  peren¬ 
nially  to  Jerusalem  from  eveiy  part  of  the  Christian  world. 

1  The  Turkish  overrunning  of  Asia  Minor  took  place  after  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  Byzantine  army  in  the  great  battle  of  Manzikert,  1071  A.  D. 
The  Turks  captured  Jerusalem  in  1076. 


INTRODUCTION 


15 


But  the  Turks  changed  all  this.  Avid  for  loot,  and  filled 
with  bigoted  hatred  of  the  “  Misbelievers/’  they  sacked 
the  holy  places,  persecuted  the  Christians,  and  rendered 
pilgrimage  impossible. 

The  effect  of  these  twin  disasters  upon  Christendom, 
occurring  as  they  did  almost  simultaneously,  was  tremen¬ 
dous.  The  Christian  West,  then  at  the  height  of  its 
religious  fervor,  quivered  with  mingled  fear  and  wrath. 
Myriads  of  zealots,  like  Peter  the  Hermit,  roused  all 
Europe  to  frenzy.  Fanaticism  begat  fanaticism,  and  the 
Christian  West  poured  upon  the  Moslem  East  vast  hosts 
of  warriors  in  those  extraordinary  expeditions,  the  Cru¬ 
sades. 

The  Turkish  conquest  of  Islam  and  its  counterblast, 
the  Crusades,  were  an  immense  misfortune  for  the  world. 
They  permanently  worsened  the  relations  between  East 
and  West.  In  the  year  1000  A.  D.  Christian-Moslem 
relations  were  fairly  good,  and  showed  every  prospect  of 
becoming  better.  The  hatreds  engendered  by  Islam’s 
first  irruption  were  dying  away.  The  frontiers  of  Islam 
and  Christendom  had  become  apparently  fixed,  and 
neither  side  showed  much  desire  to  encroach  upon  the 
other.  The  only  serious  debatable  ground  was  Spain, 
where  Moslem  and  Christian  were  continually  at  hand¬ 
grips;  but,  after  all,  Spain  was  mutually  regarded  as  a 
frontier  episode.  Between  Islam  and  Christendom,  as  a 
whole,  intercourse  was  becoming  steadily  more  friendly 
and  more  frequent.  This  friendly  intercourse,  if  con¬ 
tinued,  might  ultimately  have  produced  momentous 
results  for  human  progress.  The  Moslem  world  was  at 
that  time  still  well  ahead  of  western  Europe  in  knowledge 
and  culture,  but  Saracenic  civilization  was  ossifying, 


16  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


whereas  the  Christian  West,  despite  its  ignorance,  rude¬ 
ness,  and  barbarism,  was  bursting  with  lusty  life  and 
patently  aspiring  to  better  things.  Had  the  nascent 
amity  of  East  and  West  in  the  eleventh  century  continued 
to  develop,  both  would  have  greatly  profited.  In  the 
West  the  influence  of  Saracenic  culture,  containing,  as  it 
did,  the  ancient  learning  of  Greece  and  Rome,  might  have 
awakened  our  Renaissance  much  earlier,  while  in  the 
East  the  influence  of  the  mediaeval  West,  with  its  abound¬ 
ing  vigor,  might  have  saved  Moslem  civilization  from  the 
creeping  paralysis  which  was  overtaking  it. 

But  it  was  not  to  be.  In  Islam  the  refined,  easy-going 
Saracen  gave  place  to  the  bigoted,  brutal  Turk.  Islam 
became  once  more  aggressive — not,  as  in  its  early  days, 
for  an  ideal,  but  for  sheer  blood-lust,  plunder,  and  destruc¬ 
tion.  Henceforth  it  was  war  to  the  knife  between  the 
only  possible  civilization  and  the  most  brutal  and  hope¬ 
less  barbarism.  Furthermore,  this  war  was  destined  to 
last  for  centuries.  The  Crusades  were  merely  Western 
counter-attacks  against  a  Turkish  assault  on  Christendom 
which  continued  for  six  hundred  years  and  was  definitely 
broken  only  under  the  walls  of  Vienna  in  1 683 .  N aturally , 
from  these  centuries  of  unrelenting  strife  furious  hatreds 
and  fanaticisms  were  engendered  which  still  envenom 
the  relations  of  Islam  and  Christendom.  The  atrocities 
of  Mustapha  Kemaks  Turkish  “ Nationalists”  and  the 
atrocities  of  the  Greek  troops  in  Asia  Minor,  of  which  we 
read  in  our  morning  papers,  are  in  no  small  degree  a 
“carrying  on”  of  the  mutual  atrocities  of  Turks  and 
Crusaders  in  Palestine  eight  hundred  years  ago. 

With  the  details  of  those  old  wars  between  Turks  and 
Christians  this  book  has  no  direct  concern.  The  wars 


INTRODUCTION 


17 


themselves  should  simply  be  noted  as  a  chronic  barrier 
between  East  and  West.  As  for  the  Moslem  East,  with 
its  declining  Saracenic  civilization  bowed  beneath  the 
brutal  Turkish  yoke,  it  was  presently  exposed  to  even 
more  terrible  misfortunes.  These  misfortunes  were  also  of 
Turanian  origin.  Toward  the  close  of  the  twelfth  century 
the  eastern  branches  of  the  Turanian  race  were  welded 
into  a  temporary  unity  by  the  genius  of  a  mighty  chieftain 
named  Jenghiz  Khan.  Taking  the  sinister  title  of  “The 
Inflexible  Emperor,”  this  arch-savage  started  out  to  loot 
the  world.  He  first  overran  northern  China,  which  he 
hideously  ravaged,  then  turned  his  devastating  course 
toward  the  west.  Such  was  the  rise  of  the  terrible 
“Mongols,”  whose  name  still  stinks  in  the  nostrils  of 
civilized  mankind.  Carrying  with  them  skilled  Chinese 
engineers  using  gunpowder  for  the  reduction  of  fortified 
cities,  Jenghiz  Khan  and  his  mounted  hosts  proved  every¬ 
where  irresistible.  The  Mongols  were  the  most  appalling 
barbarians  whom  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Their  object 
was  not  conquest  for  settlement,  not  even  loot,  but  in 
great  part  a  sheer  satanic  lust  for  blood  and  destruction. 
They  revelled  in  butchering  whole  populations,  destroying 
cities,  laying  waste  countrysides — and  then  passing  on  to 
fresh  fields. 

Jenghiz  Khan  died  after  a  few  years  of  his  westward 
progress,  but  his  successors  continued  his  work  with 
unabated  zeal.  Both  Christendom  and  Islam  were 
smitten  by  the  Mongol  scourge.  All  eastern  Europe  was 
ravaged  and  rebarbarized,  the  Russians  showing  ugly 
traces  of  the  Mongol  imprint  to  this  day.  But  the  woes 
of  Christendom  were  as  nothing  to  the  woes  of  Islam. 
The  Mongols  never  penetrated  beyond  Poland,  and  west- 


18  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ern  Europe,  the  seat  of  Western  civilization,  was  left 
unscathed.  Not  so  Islam.  Pouring  down  from  the  north¬ 
east,  the  Mongol  hosts  whirled  like  a  cyclone  over  the 
Moslem  world  from  India  to  Egypt,  pillaging,  murdering, 
and  destroying.  The  nascent  civilization  of  mediaeval 
Persia,  just  struggling  into  the  light  beneath  the  incubus 
of  Turkish  harryings,  was  stamped  flat  under  the  Mongol 
hoofs,  and  the  Mongols  then  proceeded  to  deal  with  the 
Moslem  culture-centre — Bagdad.  Bagdad  had  declined 
considerably  from  the  gorgeous  days  of  Haroun-al- 
Rashid,  with  its  legendary  million  souls.  However,  it 
was  still  a  great  city,  the  seat  of  the  caliphate  and  the 
unquestioned  centre  of  Saracenic  civilization.  The  Mon¬ 
gols  stormed  it  (1258  A.  D.),  butchered  its  entire  popula¬ 
tion,  and  literally  wiped  Bagdad  off  the  face  of  the  earth. 
And  even  this  was  not  the  worst.  Bagdad  was  the  capital 
of  Mesopotamia.  This  “Land  between  the  Rivers”  had, 
in  the  very  dawn  of  history,  been  reclaimed  from  swamp 
and  desert  by  the  patient  labors  of  half-forgotten  peoples 
who,  with  infinite  toil,  built  up  a  marvellous  system  of 
irrigation  that  made  Mesopotamia  the  perennial  garden 
and  granary  of  the  world.  Ages  had  passed  and  Mesopo¬ 
tamia  had  known  many  masters,  but  all  these  conquer¬ 
ors  had  respected,  even  cherished,  the  irrigation  works 
which  were  the  source  of  all  prosperity.  These  works 
the  Mongols  wantonly,  methodically  destroyed.  The 
oldest  civilization  in  the  world,  the  cradle  of  human  cul¬ 
ture,  was  hopelessly  ruined;  at  least  eight  thousand  years 
of  continuous  human  effort  went  for  naught,  and  Mesopo¬ 
tamia  became  the  noisome  land  it  still  remains  to-day, 
parched  during  the  droughts  of  low  water,  soaked  to 
fever-stricken  marsh  in  the  season  of  river-floods,  ten- 


INTRODUCTION 


19 


anted  only  by  a  few  mongrel  fellahs  inhabiting  wretched 
mud  villages,  and  cowed  by  nomad  Bedouin  browsing 
their  flocks  on  the  sites  of  ancient  fields. 

The  destruction  of  Bagdad  was  a  fatal  blow  to  Saracenic 
civilization,  especially  in  the  east.  And  even  before  that 
dreadful  disaster  it  had  received  a  terrible  blow  in  the 
west.  Traversing  North  Africa  in  its  early  days,  Islam 
had  taken  firm  root  in  Spain,  and  had  so  flourished  there 
that  Spanish  Moslem  culture  was  fully  abreast  of  that  in 
the  Moslem  East.  The  capital  of  Spanish  Islam  was 
Cordova,  the  seat  of  the  Western  caliphate,  a  mighty 
city,  perhaps  more  wonderful  than  Bagdad  itself.  For 
centuries  Spanish  Islam  lived  secure,  confining  the  Chris¬ 
tians  to  the  mountainous  regions  of  the  north.  As 
Saracen  vigor  declined,  however,  the  Christians  pressed 
the  Moslems  southward.  In  1213  Spanish  Islam  was 
hopelessly  broken  at  the  tremendous  battle  of  Las  Navas 
de  Tolosa.  Thenceforth,  for  the  victorious  Christians 
it  was  a  case  of  picking  up  the  pieces.  Cordova  itself 
soon  fell,  and  with  it  the  glory  of  Spanish  Islam,  for  the 
fanatical  Christian  Spaniards  extirpated  Saracenic  civili¬ 
zation  as  effectually  as  the  pagan  Mongols  were  at  that 
time  doing.  To  be  sure,  a  remnant  of  the  Spanish  Mos¬ 
lems  held  their  ground  at  Granada,  in  the  extreme  south, 
until  the  year  Columbus  discovered  America,  but  this  was 
merely  an  episode.  The  Saracen  civilization  of  the  West 
was  virtually  destroyed. 

Meanwhile  the  Moslem  East  continued  to  bleed  under 
the  Mongol  scourge.  Wave  after  wave  of  Mongol  raiders 
passed  over  the  land,  the  last  notable  invasion  being  that 
headed  by  the  famous  (or  rather  infamous)  Tamerlane, 
early  in  the  fifteenth  century.  By  this  time  the  western 


20  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Mongols  had  accepted  Islam,  but  that  made  little  differ¬ 
ence  in  their  conduct.  To  show  that  Tamerlane  was  a 
true  scion  of  his  ancestor  Jenghiz  Khan,  it  may  be  re¬ 
marked  that  his  foible  was  pyramids  of  human  skulls,  his 
prize  effort  being  one  of  70,000  erected  after  the  storming 
of  the  Persian  city  of  Ispahan.  After  the  cessation  of 
the  Mongol  incursions,  the  ravaged  and  depopulated 
Moslem  East  fell  under  the  sway  of  the  Ottoman  Turks. 

The  Ottoman  Turks,  or  “Osmanli,”  were  originally 
merely  one  of  the  many  Turkish  hordes  which  entered 
Asia  Minor  after  the  downfall  of  Byzantine  rule.  They 
owed  their  greatness  mainly  to  a  long  line  of  able  sultans, 
who  gradually  absorbed  the  neighboring  Turkish  tribes 
and  used  this  consolidated  strength  for  ambitious  con¬ 
quests  both  to  east  and  west.  In  1453  the  Osmanli 
extinguished  the  old  Byzantine  Empire  by  taking  Con¬ 
stantinople,  and  within  a  century  thereafter  they  had 
conquered  the  Moslem  East  from  Persia  to  Morocco,  had 
subjugated  the  whole  Balkan  peninsula,  and  had  ad¬ 
vanced  through  Hungary  to  the  walls  of  Vienna.  Unlike 
their  Mongol  cousins,  the  Ottoman  Turks  built  up  a 
durable  empire.  It  was  a  barbarous  sort  of  empire,  for 
the  Turks  understood  very  little  about  culture.  The  only 
things  they  could  appreciate  were  military  improvements. 
These,  however,  they  thoroughly  appreciated  and  kept 
fully  abreast  of  the  times.  In  their  palmy  days  the 
Turks  had  the  best  artillery  and  the  steadiest  infantry  in 
the  world,  and  were  the  terror  of  Europe. 

Meantime  Europe  was  awakening  to  true  progress  and 
higher  civilization.  While  the  Moslem  East  was  sinking 
under  Mongol  harryings  and  Turkish  militarism,  the 
Christian  West  was  thrilling  to  the  Renaissance  and  the 


INTRODUCTION 


21 


discoveries  of  America  and  the  water  route  to  India. 
The  effect  of  these  discoveries  simply  cannot  be  over¬ 
estimated.  When  Columbus  and  Vasco  da  Gama  made 
their  memorable  voyages  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth 
century,  Western  civilization  was  pent  up  closely  within 
the  restricted  bounds  of  west-central  Europe,  and  was 
waging  a  defensive  and  none-too-hopeful  struggle  with  the 
forces  of  Turanian  barbarism.  Russia  lay  under  the  heel 
of  the  Mongol  Tartars,  while  the  Turks,  then  in  the  full 
flush  of  their  martial  vigor,  were  marching  triumphantly 
up  from  the  southeast  and  threatening  Europe’s  very 
heart.  So  strong  were  these  Turanian  barbarians,  with 
Asia,  North  Africa,  and  eastern  Europe  in  their  grasp,  that 
Western  civilization  was  hard  put  to  it  to  hold  its  own. 
Western  civilization  was,  in  fact,  fighting  with  its  back  to 
the  wall — the  wall  of  a  boundless  ocean.  We  can  hardly 
conceive  how  our  mediaeval  forefathers  viewed  the  ocean. 
To  them  it  was  a  numbing,  constricting  presence;  the 
abode  of  darkness  and  horror.  No  wonder  mediaeval 
Europe  was  static,  since  it  faced  on  ruthless,  aggressive 
Asia,  and  backed  on  nowhere.  Then,  in  the  twinkling  of 
an  eye,  the  sea-wall  became  a  highway,  and  dead-end 
Europe  became  mistress  of  the  ocean — and  thereby 
mistress  of  the  world. 

The  greatest  strategic  shift  of  fortune  in  all  human 
history  had  taken  place.  Instead  of  fronting  hopelessly 
on  the  fiercest  of  Asiatics,  against  whom  victory  by  direct 
attack  seemed  impossible,  the  Europeans  could  now  flank 
them  at  will.  Furthermore,  the  balance  of  resources 
shifted  in  Europe’s  favor.  Whole  new  worlds  were  un¬ 
masked  whence  Europe  could  draw  limitless  wealth  to 
quicken  its  home  life  and  initiate  a  progress  that  would 


22  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


soon  place  it  immeasurably  above  its  once-dreaded  Asiatic 
assailants.  What  were  the  resources  of  the  stagnant 
Moslem  East  compared  with  those  of  the  Americas  and 
the  Indies?  So  Western  civilization,  quickened,  ener¬ 
gized,  progressed  with  giant  strides,  shook  off  its  mediaeval 
fetters,  grasped  the  talisman  of  science,  and  strode  into 
the  light  of  modern  times. 

Yet  all  this  left  Islam  unmoved.  Wrapping  itself  in 
the  tatters  of  Saracenic  civilization,  the  Moslem  East 
continued  to  fall  behind.  Even  its  military  power 
presently  vanished,  for  the  Turk  sank  into  lethargy  and 
ceased  to  cultivate  the  art  of  war.  For  a  time  the  West, 
busied  with  internal  conflicts,  hesitated  to  attack  the 
East,  so  great  was  the  prestige  of  the  Ottoman  name. 
But  the  crushing  defeat  of  the  Turks  in  their  rash  attack 
upon  Vienna  in  1683  showed  the  West  that  the  Ottoman 
Empire  was  far  gone  in  decrepitude.  Thenceforth,  the 
empire  was  harried  mercilessly  by  Western  assaults  and 
was  saved  from  collapse  only  by  the  mutual  jealousies  of 
Western  Powers,  quarrelling  over  the  Turkish  spoils. 

However,  not  until  the  nineteenth  century  did  the 
Moslem  world,  as  a  whole,  feel  the  weight  of  Western 
attack.  Throughout  the  eighteenth  century  the  West 
assailed  the  ends  of  the  Moslem  battle-line  in  eastern 
Europe  and  the  Indies,  but  the  bulk  of  Islam,  from 
Morocco  to  Central  Asia,  remained  almost  immune.  The 
Moslem  world  failed  to  profit  by  this  respite.  Plunged 
in  lethargy,  contemptuous  of  the  European  a  Misbe¬ 
lievers, 7  ?  and  accepting  defeats  as  the  inscrutable  will  of 
Allah,  Islam  continued  to  live  its  old  life,  neither  knowing 
nor  caring  to  know  anything  about  Western  ideas  or 
Western  progress. 


INTRODUCTION 


23 


Such  was  the  decrepit  Moslem  world  which  faced 
nineteenth-century  Europe,  energized  by  the  Industrial 
Revolution,  armed  as  never  before  by  modern  science  and 
invention  which  had  unlocked  nature’s  secrets  and  placed 
hitherto-undreamed-of  weapons  in  its  aggressive  hands. 
The  result  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  One  by  one,  the 
decrepit  Moslem  states  fell  before  the  Western  attack,  and 
the  whole  Islamic  world  was  rapidly  partitioned  among 
the  European  Powers.  England  took  India  and  Egypt, 
Russia  crossed  the  Caucasus  and  mastered  Central  Asia, 
France  conquered  North  Africa,  while  other  European 
nations  grasped  minor  portions  of  the  Moslem  heritage. 
The  Great  War  witnessed  the  final  stage  in  this  process  of 
subjugation.  By  the  terms  of  the  treaties  which  marked 
its  close,  Turkey  was  extinguished  and  not  a  single 
Mohammedan  state  retained  genuine  independence.  The 
subjection  of  the  Moslem  world  was  complete — on  paper. 

On  paper !  For,  in  its  very  hour  of  apparent  triumph, 
Western  domination  was  challenged  as  never  before. 
During  those  hundred  years  of  Western  conquest  a  mighty 
internal  change  had  been  coming  over  the  Moslem  world. 
The  swelling  tide  of  Western  aggression  had  at  last  moved 
the  “ immovable”  East.  At  last  Islam  became  conscious 
of  its  decrepitude,  and  with  that  consciousness  a  vast 
ferment,  obscure  yet  profound,  began  to  leaven  the 
250,000,000  followers  of  the  Prophet  from  Morocco  to 
China  and  from  Turkestan  to  the  Congo.  The  first 
spark  was  fittingly  struck  in  the  Arabian  desert,  the 
cradle  of  Islam.  Here,  at  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  arose  the  Wahabi  movement  for  the  reform  of 
Islam,  which  presently  kindled  the  far-flung  u  Moham¬ 
medan  Revival,”  which  in  its  turn  begat  the  movement 


24  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


known  as  “Pan-Islamism.”  Furthermore,  athwart  these 
essentially  internal  movements  there  came  pouring  a 
flood  of  external  stimuli  from  the  West — ideas  such  as 
parliamentary  government,  nationalism,  scientific  educa¬ 
tion,  industrialism,  and  even  ultramodern  concepts  like 
feminism,  socialism,  Bolshevism.  Stirred  by  the  inter¬ 
action  of  all  these  novel  forces  and  spurred  by  the  cease¬ 
less  pressure  of  European  aggression,  the  Moslem  world 
roused  more  and  more  to  life  and  action.  The  Great  War 
was  a  shock  of  terrific  potency,  and  to-day  Islam  is  seeth¬ 
ing  with  mighty  forces  fashioning  a  new  Moslem  world. 
What  are  those  forces  moulding  the  Islam  of  the  future  ? 
To  their  analysis  and  appraisal  the  body  of  this  book  is 
devoted. 


THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

“Das  Alte  stiirzt,  es  andert  sich  die  Zeit, 

Und  neues  Leben  bliiht  aus  den  Rumen.” 

Schiller:  Wilhelm  Tell. 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL 

By  the  eighteenth  century  the  Moslem  world  had  sunk 
to  the  lowest  depth  of  its  decrepitude.  Nowhere  were 
there  any  signs  of  healthy  vigor;  everywhere  were  stag¬ 
nation  and  decay.  Manners  and  morals  were  alike 
execrable.  The  last  vestiges  of  Saracenic  culture  had 
vanished  in  a  barbarous  luxury  of  the  few  and  an  equally 
barbarous  degradation  of  the  multitude.  Learning  was 
virtually  dead,  the  few  universities  which  survived  fallen 
into  dreary  decay  and  languishing  in  poverty  and  neglect. 
Government  had  become  despotism  tempered  by  anarchy 
and  assassination.  Here  and  there  a  major  despot  like 
the  Sultan  of  Turkey  or  the  Indian  “Great  Mogul” 
maintained  some  semblance  of  state  authority,  albeit 
provincial  pashas  were  forever  striving  to  erect  inde¬ 
pendent  governments  based,  like  their  masters’,  on 
tyranny  and  extortion.  The  pashas,  in  turn,  strove 
ceaselessly  against  unruly  local  chiefs  and  swarms  of 
brigands  who  infested  the  countryside.  Beneath  this 
sinister  hierarchy  groaned  the  people,  robbed,  bullied, 
and  ground  into  the  dust.  Peasant  and  townsman  had 
alike  lost  all  incentive  to  labor  or  initiative,  and  both 
agriculture  and  trade  had  fallen  to  the  lowest  level  com¬ 
patible  with  bare  survival. 

As  for  religion,  it  was  as  decadent  as  everything  else. 

25 


26  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


The  austere  monotheism  of  Mohammed  had  become  over¬ 
laid  with  a  rank  growth  of  superstition  and  puerile 
mysticism.  The  mosques  stood  unfrequented  and  ruin¬ 
ous,  deserted  by  the  ignorant  multitude,  which,  decked 
out  in  amulets,  charms,  and  rosaries,  listened  to  squalid 
fakirs  or  ecstatic  dervishes,  and  went  on  pilgrimages 
to  the  tombs  of  “holy  men/’  worshipped  as  saints 
and  “intercessors”  with  that  Allah  who  had  become  too 
remote  a  being  for  the  direct  devotion  of  these  benighted 
souls.  As  for  the  moral  precepts  of  the  Koran,  they  were 
ignored  or  defied.  Wine-drinking  and  opium-eating  were 
well-nigh  universal,  prostitution  was  rampant,  and  the 
most  degrading  vices  flaunted  naked  and  unashamed. 
Even  the  holy  cities,  Mecca  and  Medina,  were  sink-holes 
of  iniquity,  while  the  “Hajj,”  or  pilgrimage  ordained  by 
the  Prophet,  had  become  a  scandal  through  its  abuses.  In 
fine:  the  life  had  apparently  gone  out  of  Islam,  leaving 
naught  but  a  dry  husk  of  soulless  ritual  and  degrading 
superstition  behind.  Could  Mohammed  have  returned 
to  earth,  he  would  unquestionably  have  anathematized 
his  followers  as  apostates  and  idolaters. 

Yet,  in  this  darkest  hour,  a  voice  came  crying  out  of  the 
vast  Arabian  desert,  the  cradle  of  Islam,  calling  the 
faithful  back  to  the  true  path.  This  puritan  reformer, 
the  famous  Abd-el-Wahab,  kindled  a  fire  which  presently 
spread  to  the  remotest  corners  of  the  Moslem  world, 
purging  Islam  of  its  sloth  and  reviving  the  fervor  of  olden 
days.  The  great  Mohammedan  Revival  had  begun. 

Mahommed  ibn  Abd-el-Wahab  was  born  about  the  year 
1700  A.  D.  in  the  heart  of  the  Arabian  desert,  the  region 
known  as  the  Nejd.  The  Nejd  was  the  one  clean  spot 
in  the  decadent  Moslem  world.  We  have  already  seen 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  27 


how,  with  the  transformation  of  the  caliphate  from  a 
theocratic  democracy  to  an  Oriental  despotism,  the  free- 
spirited  Arabs  had  returned  scornfully  to  their  deserts. 
Here  they  had  maintained  their  wild  freedom.  Neither 
caliph  nor  sultan  dared  venture  far  into  those  vast 
solitudes  of  burning  sand  and  choking  thirst,  where  the 
rash  invader  was  lured  to  sudden  death  in  a  whirl  of 
stabbing  spears.  The  Arabs  recognized  no  master,  wan¬ 
dering  at  will  with  their  flocks  and  camels,  or  settled  here 
and  there  in  green  oases  hidden  in  the  desert’s  heart. 
And  in  the  desert  they  retained  their  primitive  political 
and  religious  virtues.  The  nomad  Bedouin  lived  under 
the  sway  of  patriarchal  “ sheiks”;  the  settled  dwellers 
in  the  oases  usually  acknowledged  the  authority  of  some 
leading  family.  But  these  rulers  possessed  the  slenderest 
authority,  narrowly  circumscribed  by  well-established 
custom  and  a  jealous  public  opinion  which  they  trans¬ 
gressed  at  their  peril.  The  Turks,  to  be  sure,  had  managed 
to  acquire  a  precarious  authority  over  the  holy  cities  and 
the  Red  Sea  littoral,  but  the  Nejd,  the  vast  interior,  was 
free.  And,  in  religion,  as  in  politics,  the  desert  Arabs  kept 
the  faith  of  their  fathers.  Scornfully  rejecting  the  corrup¬ 
tions  of  decadent  Islam,  they  held  fast  to  the  simple  theol¬ 
ogy  of  primitive  Islam,  so  congenial  to  their  Arab  natures. 

Into  this  atmosphere  of  an  older  and  better  age,  Abd- 
el-Wahab  was  born.  Displaying  from  the  first  a  studious 
and  religious  bent,  he  soon  acquired  a  reputation  for 
learning  and  sanctity.  Making  the  Meccan  pilgrimage 
while  still  a  young  man,  he  studied  at  Medina  and  trav¬ 
elled  as  far  as  Persia,  returning  ultimately  to  the  Nejd. 
He  returned  burning  with  holy  wrath  at  what  he  had  seen 
and  determined  to  preach  a  puritan  reformation.  Por 


28  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


years  he  wandered  up  and  down  Arabia,  and  at  last  he 
converted  Mahommed,  head  of  the  great  clan  of  Saud, 
the  most  powerful  chieftain  in  all  the  Nejd.  This  gave 
Abd-el-Wahab  both  moral  prestige  and  material  strength, 
and  he  made  the  most  of  his  opportunities.  Gradually 
the  desert  Arabs  were  welded  into  a  politico-religious 
unity  like  that  effected  by  the  Prophet.  Abd-el-Wahab 
was,  in  truth,  a  faithful  counterpart  of  the  first  caliphs, 
Abu  Bekr  and  Omar.  When  he  died  in  1787  his  disciple, 
Saud,  proved  a  worthy  successor.  The  new  Wahabi 
state  was  a  close  counterpart  of  the  Meccan  caliphate. 
Though  possessing  great  military  power,  Saud  always 
considered  himself  responsible  to  public  opinion  and  never 
encroached  upon  the  legitimate  freedom  of  his  subjects. 
Government,  though  stern,  was  able  and  just.  The 
Wahabi  judges  were  competent  and  honest.  Robbery 
became  almost  unknown,  so  well  was  the  public  peace 
maintained.  Education  was  sedulously  fostered.  Every 
oasis  had  its  school,  while  teachers  were  sent  to  the 
Bedouin  tribes. 

Having  consolidated  the  Nejd,  Saud  was  now  ready  to 
undertake  the  greater  task  of  subduing  and  purifying 
the  Moslem  world.  His  first  objective  was  of  course  the 
holy  cities.  This  objective  was  attained  in  the  opening 
years  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Nothing  could  stand 
against  the  rush  of  the  Wahabi  hosts  burning  with  fanatic 
hatred  against  the  Turks,  who  were  loathed  both  as 
apostate  Moslems  and  as  usurpers  of  that  supremacy  in 
Islam  which  all  Arabs  believed  should  rest  in  Arab  hands. 
When  Saud  died  in  1814  he  was  preparing  to  invade 
Syria.  It  looked  for  a  moment  as  though  the  Wahabis 
were  to  sweep  the  East  and  puritanize  all  Islam  at  a  blow. 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  29 


But  it  was  not  to  be.  Unable  to  stem  the  Wahabi 
flood,  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  called  on  his  powerful  vassal, 
the  famous  Mehemet  Ali.  This  able  Albanian  adventurer 
had  by  that  time  made  himself  master  of  Egypt.  Frankly 
recognizing  the  superiority  of  the  West,  he  had  called  in 
numerous  European  officers  who  rapidly  fashioned  a 
formidable  army,  composed  largely  of  hard-fighting 
Albanian  highlanders,  and  disciplined  and  equipped  after 
European  models.  Mehemet  Ali  gladly  answered  the 
Sultan’s  summons,  and  it  soon  became  clear  that  even 
Wahabi  fanaticism  was  no  match  for  European  muskets 
and  artillery  handled  by  seasoned  veterans.  In  a  short 
time  the  holy  cities  were  recaptured  and  the  Wahabis 
were  driven  back  into  the  desert.  The  nascent  Wahabi 
empire  had  vanished  like  a  mirage.  Wahabism’s  political 
role  was  ended.1 

However,  Wahabism’s  spiritual  role  had  only  just 
begun.  The  Nejd  remained  a  focus  of  puritan  zeal 
whence  the  new  spirit  radiated  in  all  directions.  Even 
in  the  holy  cities  Wahabism  continued  to  set  the  religious 
tone,  and  the  numberless  “Hajjis,”  or  pilgrims,  who  came 
annually  from  eveiy  part  of  the  Moslem  world  returned  to 
their  homes  zealous  reformers.  Soon  the  Wahabi  leaven 
began  to  produce  profound  disturbances  in  the  most  dis¬ 
tant  quarters.  For  example,  in  northern  India  a  Wahabi 
fanatic,  Seyid  Ahmed,2  so  roused  the  Punjabi  Moham- 

1  On  the  Wahabi  movement,  see  A.  Le  Chatelier,  Ulslam  au  dix- 
neuvikme  Sibcle  (Paris,  1888);  W.  G.  Palgrave,  Essays  on  Eastern  Ques¬ 
tions  (London,  1872);  D.  B.  Macdonald,  Muslim  Theology  (London, 
1903);  J.  L.  Burckhardt,  Notes  on  the  Bedouins  and  Wahabys  (2  vols., 
London,  1831);  A.  Chodzko,  “Le  Deisme  des  Wahhabis,”  Journal 
Asiatique ,  IV,  vol.  II,  pp.  168  et  seq. 

2  Not  to  be  confused  with  Sir  Syed  Ahmed  of  Aligarh,  the  Indian  Moslem 
liberal  of  the  mid-nineteenth  century. 


30  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


medans  that  he  actually  built  up  a  theocratic  state,  and 
only  his  chance  death  prevented  a  possible  Wahabi 
conquest  of  northern  India.  This  state  was  shattered  by 
the  Sikhs,  about  1830,  but  when  the  English  conquered 
the  country  they  had  infinite  trouble  with  the  smouldering 
embers  of  Wahabi  feeling,  which,  in  fact,  lived  on,  con¬ 
tributed  to  the  Indian  mutiny,  and  permanently  fanati- 
cized  Afghanistan  and  the  wild  tribes  of  the  Indian 
Northwest  Frontier.1  It  was  during  these  years  that 
the  famous  Seyid  Mahommed  ben  Sennussi  came  from 
his  Algerian  home  to  Mecca  and  there  imbibed  those 
Wahabi  principles  which  led  to  the  founding  of  the  great 
Pan-Islamic  fraternity  that  bears  his  name.  Even  the 
Babbist  movement  in  Persia,  far  removed  though  it 
was  doctrinally  from  Wahabi  teaching,  was  indubitably 
a  secondary  reflex  of  the  Wahabi  urge.2  In  fact,  within  a 
generation,  the  strictly  Wahabi  movement  had  broadened 
into  the  larger  development  known  as  the  Mohammedan 
Revival,  and  this  in  turn  was  developing  numerous 
phases,  chief  among  them  being  the  movement  usually 
termed  Pan-Islamism.  That  movement,  particularly  on 
its  political  side,  I  shall  treat  in  the  next  chapter.  At 
present  let  us  examine  the  other  aspects  of  the  Moham¬ 
medan  Revival,  with  special  reference  to  its  religious  and 
cultural  phases. 

The  Wahabi  movement  was  a  strictly  puritan  reforma¬ 
tion.  Its  aim  was  the  reform  of  abuses,  the  abdlition  of 

1  For  English  alarm  at  the  latent  fanaticism  of  the  North  Indian  Mos¬ 
lems,  down  through  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  see  Sir  W.  W. 
Hunter,  The  Indian  Musalmans  (London,  1872). 

2  For  the  Babbist  movement,  see  Clement  Huart,  La  Religion  de  Bah 
(Paris,  1889);  Comte  Arthur  de  Gobineau,  Trois  Ans  en  Perse  (Paris,  1867). 
A  good  summary  of  all  these  early  movements  of  the  Mohammedan  revival 
is  found  in  Le  Chatelier,  op.  cit. 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  31 


superstitious  practices,  and  a  return  to  primitive  Islam. 
All  later  accretions — the  writings  and  interpretations  of 
the  mediseval  theologians,  ceremonial  or  mystical  inno¬ 
vations,  saint  worship,  in  fact  every  sort  of  change,  were 
condemned.  The  austere  monotheism  of  Mohammed 
was  preached  in  all  its  uncompromising  simplicity,  and 
the  Koran,  literally  interpreted,  was  taken  as  the  sole 
guide  for  human  action.  This  doctrinal  simplification 
was  accompanied  by  a  most  rigid  code  of  morals.  The 
prayers,  fastings,  and  other  practices  enjoined  by  Mo¬ 
hammed  were  scrupulously  observed.  The  most  austere 
manner  of  living  was  enforced.  Silken  clothing,  rich 
food,  wine,  opium,  tobacco,  coffee,  and  all  other  indul¬ 
gences  were  sternly  proscribed.  Even  religious  architec¬ 
ture  was  practically  tabooed,  the  Wahabis  pulling  down 
the  Prophet’s  tomb  at  Medina  and  demolishing  the 
minarets  of  mosques  as  godless  innovations.  The  Waha¬ 
bis  were  thus,  despite  their  moral  earnestness,  excessively 
narrow-minded,  and  it  was  very  fortunate  for  Islam  that 
they  soon  lost  their  political  power  and  were  compelled 
thenceforth  to  confine  their  efforts  to  moral  teaching. 

Many  critics  of  Islam  point  to  the  Wahabi  movement 
as  a  proof  that  Islam  is  essentially  retrograde  and  innately 
incapable  of  evolutionary  development.  These  criticisms, 
however,  appear  to  be  unwarranted.  The  initial  stage 
of  every  religious  reformation  is  an  uncritical  return  to 
the  primitive  cult.  To  the  religious  reformer  the  only 
way  of  salvation  is  a  denial  of  all  subsequent  innovations, 
regardless  of  their  character.  Our  own  Protestant  Ref¬ 
ormation  began  in  just  this  way,  and  Humanists  like 
Erasmus,  repelled  and  disgusted  by  Protestantism’s 
puritanical  narrowness,  could  see  no  good  in  the  move- 


32  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ment,  declaring  that  it  menaced  all  true  culture  and  merely 
replaced  an  infallible  Pope  by  an  infallible  Bible. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  puritan  beginnings  of  the 
Mohammedan  Revival  presently  broadened  along  more 
constructive  lines,  some  of  these  becoming  tinged  with 
undoubted  liberalism.  The  Moslem  reformers  of  the 
early  nineteenth  century  had  not  dug  very  deeply  into 
their  religious  past  before  they  discovered — Motazelism. 
We  have  already  reviewed  the  great  struggle  which  had 
raged  between  reason  and  dogma  in  Islam’s  early  days, 
in  which  dogma  had  triumphed  so  completely  that  the 
very  memory  of  Motazelism  had  faded  away.  Now, 
however,  those  memories  were  revived,  and  the  liberal- 
minded  reformers  were  delighted  to  find  such  striking 
confirmation  of  their  ideas,  both  in  the  writings  of  the 
Motazelite  doctors  and  in  the  sacred  texts  themselves. 
The  principle  that  reason  and  not  blind  prescription  was 
to  be  the  test  opened  the  door  to  the  possibility  of  all 
those  reforms  which  they  had  most  at  heart.  For 
example,  the  reformers  found  that  in  the  traditional 
writings  Mohammed  was  reported  to  have  said:  “I  am 
no  more  than  a  man ;  when  I  order  you  anything  respecting 
religion,  receive  it;  when  I  order  you  about  the  affairs  of 
the  world,  then  I  am  nothing  more  than  man.”  And, 
again,  as  though  foreseeing  the  day  when  sweeping  changes 
would  be  necessary:  “Ye  are  in  an  age  in  which,  if  ye 
abandon  one-tenth  of  that  which  is  ordered,  ye  will  be 
ruined.  After  this,  a  time  will  come  when  he  who  shall 
observe  one-tenth  of  what  is  now  ordered  will  be  re¬ 
deemed.”  1 

Before  discussing  the  ideas  and  efforts  of  the  modem 

1  Mishkat-el-Masabih,  I,  46,  51. 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  33 


Moslem  reformers;  it  might  be  well  to  examine  the  asser¬ 
tions  made  by  numerous  Western  critics;  that  Islam  is 
by  its  very  nature  incapable  of  reform  and  progressive 
adaptation  to  the  expansion  of  human  knowledge.  Such 
is  the  contention  not  only  of  Christian  polemicists,1  but 
also  of  rationalists  like  Renan  and  European  adminis¬ 
trators  of  Moslem  populations  like  Lord  Cromer.  Lord 
Cromer,  in  fact,  pithily  summarizes  this  critical  attitude 
in  his  statement:  “Islam  cannot  be  reformed;  that  is  to 
say,  reformed  Islam  is  Islam  no  longer;  it  is  something 
else.”2 

Now  these  criticisms,  coming  as  they  do  from  close 
students  of  Islam  often  possessing  intimate  personal 
acquaintance  with  Moslems,  deserve  respectful  considera¬ 
tion.  And  yet  an  historical  survey  of  religions,  and 
especially  a  survey  of  the  thoughts  and  accomplishments 
of  Moslem  reformers  during  the  past  century,  seem  to 
refute  these  pessimistic  charges. 

In  the  first  place,  it  should  be  remembered  that  Islam 
to-day  stands  just  about  where  Christendom  stood  in 
the  fifteenth  century,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Reformation. 
There  is  the  same  supremacy  of  dogma  over  reason,  the 
same  blind  adherence  to  prescription  and  authority,  the 
same  suspicion  and  hostility  to  freedom  of  thought  or 
scientific  knowledge.  There  is  no  doubt  that  a  study 
of  the  Mohammedan  sacred  texts,  particularly  of  the 

1  The  best  recent  examples  of  this  polemical  literature  are  the  writings 
of  the  Rev.  S.  M.  Zwemer,  the  well-known  missionary  to  the  Arabs;  espe¬ 
cially  his  Arabia,  the  Cradle  of  Islam  (Edinburgh,  1900),  and  The  Reproach 
of  Islam  (London,  1915).  Also  see  volume  entitled  The  Mohammedan 
World  of  To-day ,  being  a  collection  of  the  papers  read  at  the  Protestant 
Missionary  Conference  held  at  Cairo,  Egypt,  in  1906. 

2  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt ,  vol.  II,  p.  229  (London,  1908).  For  Renan’s 
attitude,  see  his  L'Islamisme  et  la  Science  (Paris,  1883). 


34  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


“sheriat”  or  canon  law,  together  with  a  glance  over 
Moslem  history  for  the  last  thousand  years,  reveal  an 
attitude  on  the  whole  quite  incompatible  with  modern 
progress  and  civilization.  But  was  not  precisely  the 
same  thing  true  of  Christendom  at  the  beginning  of  the 
fifteenth  century  ?  Compare  the  sheriat  with  the  Chris¬ 
tian  canon  law.  The  spirit  is  the  same.  Take,  for 
example,  the  sheriat’s  prohibition  on  the  lending  of  money 
at  interest;  a  prohibition  which,  if  obeyed,  renders  im¬ 
possible  anything  like  business  or  industry  in  the  modern 
sense.  This  is  the  example  oftenest  cited  to  prove  Islam’s 
innate  incompatibility  with  modem  civilization.  But 
the  Christian  canon  law  equally  forbade  interest,  and 
enforced  that  prohibition  so  strictly,  that  for  centuries 
the  Jews  had  a  monopoly  of  business  in  Europe,  while  the 
first  Christians  who  dared  to  lend  money  (the  Lombards) 
were  regarded  almost  as  heretics,  were  universally  hated, 
and  were  frequently  persecuted.  Again,  take  the  matter 
of  Moslem  hostility  to  freedom  of  thought  and  scientific 
investigation.  Can  Islam  show  anything  more  revolting 
than  that  scene  in  Christian  history  when,  less  than 
three  hundred  years  ago,1  the  great  Galileo  was  haled 
before  the  Papal  Inquisition  and  forced,  under  threat  of 
torture,  to  recant  the  damnable  heresy  that  the  earth 
went  round  the  sun  ? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mohammed  reverenced  knowledge. 
His  own  words  are  eloquent  testimony  to  that.  Here 
are  some  of  his  sayings: 

“Seek  knowledge,  even,  if  need  be,  on  the  borders  of 
China.” 

“Seek  knowledge  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave.” 

1  In  the  year  1633. 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  35 


“One  word  of  knowledge  is  of  more  value  than  the 
reciting  of  a  hundred  prayers.’7 

“The  ink  of  sages  is  more  precious  than  the  blood  of 
martyrs.” 

“One  word  of  wisdom,  learned  and  communicated  to  a 
Moslem  brother,  outweighs  the  prayers  of  a  whole  year.” 

“Wise  men  are  the  successors  of  the  Prophet.” 

“God  has  created  nothing  better  than  reason.” 

“  In  truth,  a  man  may  have  prayed,  fasted,  given  alms, 
made  pilgrimage,  and  all  other  good  works;  nevertheless, 
he  shall  be  rewarded  only  in  the  measure  that  he  has  used 
his  common  sense.” 

These  citations  (and  there  are  others  of  the  same 
tenor)  prove  that  the  modem  Moslem  reformers  have 
good  scriptural  backing  for  their  liberal  attitude.  Of 
course  I  do  not  imply  that  the  reform  movement  in 
Islam,  just  because  it  is  liberal  and  progressive,  is  thereby 
ipso  facto  assured  of  success.  History  reveals  too  many 
melancholy  instances  to  the  contrary.  Indeed,  we  have 
already  seen  how,  in  Islam  itself,  the  promising  liberal 
movement  of  its  early  days  passed  utterly  away.  What 
history  does  show,  however,  is  that  when  the  times  fa¬ 
vor  progress,  religions  are  adapted  to  that  progress  by 
being  reformed  and  liberalized.  No  human  society  once 
fairly  on  the  march  was  ever  turned  back  by  a  creed. 
Halted  it  may  be,  but  if  the  progressive  urge  persists,  the 
doctrinal  barrier  is  either  surmounted,  undermined, 
flanked,  or  swept  aside.  Now  there  is  no  possibility  that 
the  Moslem  world  will  henceforth  lack  progressive  in¬ 
fluences.  It  is  in  close  contact  with  Western  civilization 
and  is  being  increasingly  permeated  with  Western  ideas. 
Islam  cannot  break  away  and  isolate  itself  if  it  would. 


36  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Everything  therefore  portends  its  profound  modification. 
Of  course  critics  like  Lord  Cromer  contend  that  this 
modified  Islam  will  be  Islam  no  longer.  But  why  not  ?  If 
the  people  continue  to  call  themselves  Mohammedans  and 
continue  to  draw  spiritual  sustenance  from  the  message 
of  Mohammed,  why  should  they  be  denied  the  name? 
Modern  Christianity  is  certainly  vastly  different  from 
mediaeval  Christianity,  while  among  the  various  Christian 
churches  there  exist  the  widest  doctrinal  variations. 
Yet  all  who  consider  themselves  Christians  are  considered 
Christians  by  all  except  bigots  out  of  step  with  the  times. 

Let  us  now  scrutinize  the  Moslem  reformers,  judging 
them,  not  by  texts  and  chronicles,  but  by  their  words  and 
deeds;  since,  as  one  of  their  number,  an  Algerian,  very 
pertinently  remarks,  “men  should  be  judged,  not  by  the 
letter  of  their  sacred  books,  but  by  what  they  actually 
do.”1 

Modern  Moslem  liberalism,  as  we  have  seen,  received 
its  first  encouragement  from  the  discovery  of  the  old 
Motazelite  literature  of  nearly  a  thousand  years  before. 
To  be  sure,  Islam  had  never  been  quite  destitute  of  liberal 
minds.  Even  in  its  darkest  days  a  few  voices  had  been 
raised  against  the  prevailing  obscurantism.  For  example, 
in  the  sixteenth  century  the  celebrated  El-Gharani  had 
written:  “It  is  not  at  all  impossible  that  God  may  hold 
in  reserve  for  men  of  the  future  perceptions  that  have  not 
been  vouchsafed  to  the  men  of  the  past.  Divine  munifi¬ 
cence  never  ceases  to  pour  benefits  and  enlightenment 
into  the  hearts  of  wise  men  of  every  age.” 2  These  isolated 
voices  from  Islam’s  Dark  Time  helped  to  encourage  the 

1  Ismael  Hamet,  Les  Musulmans  franqais  du  Nord  de  VAfrique  (Paris, 
1906). 

3  Quoted  by  Dr.  Perron  in  his  work  L’Islamisme  (Paris,  1877). 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  37 


modern  reformers,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  every  Moslem  land  had  its  group  of  forward- 
looking  men.  At  first  their  numbers  were,  of  course,  in¬ 
significant,  and  of  course  they  drew  down  upon  them¬ 
selves  the  anathemas  of  the  fanatic  Mollahs1  and  the 
hatred  of  the  ignorant  multitude.  The  first  country 
where  the  reformers  made  their  influence  definitely  felt 
was  in  India.  Here  a  group  headed  by  the  famous  Sir 
Syed  Ahmed  Khan  started  an  important  liberal  move¬ 
ment,  founding  associations,  publishing  books  and  news¬ 
papers,  and  establishing  the  well-known  college  of  Ali¬ 
garh.  Sir  Syed  Ahmed  is  a  good  type  of  the  early  liberal 
reformers.  Conservative  in  temperament  and  perfectly 
orthodox  in  his  theology,  he  yet  denounced  the  current 
decadence  of  Islam  with  truly  Wahabi  fervor.  He  also 
was  frankly  appreciative  of  Western  ideas  and  eager  to 
assimilate  the  many  good  things  which  the  West  had  to 
offer.  As  he  wrote  in  1867:  “We  must  study  European 
scientific  works,  even  though  they  are  not  written  by 
Moslems  and  though  we  may  find  in  them  things  con¬ 
trary  to  the  teachings  of  the  Koran.  We  should  imitate 
the  Arabs  of  olden  days,  who  did  not  fear  to  shake  their 
faith  by  studying  Pythagoras.” 2 

1  The  Mollahs  are  the  Moslem  clergy,  though  they  do  not  exactly  cor¬ 
respond  to  the  clergy  of  Christendom.  Mohammed  was  averse  to  anything 
like  a  priesthood,  and  Islam  makes  no  legal  provision  for  an  ordained 
priestly  class  or  caste,  as  is  the  case  in  Christianity,  Judaism,  Brahmanism, 
and  other  religions.  Theoretically  any  Moslem  can  conduct  religious 
services.  As  time  passed,  however,  a  class  of  men  developed  who  were 
learned  in  Moslem  theology  and  law.  These  ultimately  became  practically 
priests,  though  theoretically  they  should  be  regarded  as  theological  lawyers. 
There  also  developed  religious  orders  of  dervishes,  etc.;  but  primitive 
Islam  knew  nothing  of  them. 

2  From  the  article  by  Leon  Cahun  in  Lavisse  et  Rambeaud,  Histoire 
Generate ,  vol.  XII,  p.  498.  This  article  gives  an  excellent  general  survey 
of  the  intellectual  development  of  the  Moslem  world  in  the  nineteenth 
century. 


38  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


This  nucleus  of  Indian  Moslem  liberals  rapidly  grew  in 
strength,  producing  able  leaders  like  Moulvie  Cheragh 
Ali  and  Syed  Amir  Ali,  whose  scholarly  works  in  faultless 
English  are  known  throughout  the  world.1  These  men 
called  themselves  “  Neo-Mot azelites"  and  boldly  advo¬ 
cated  reforms  such  as  a  thorough  overhauling  of  the 
sheriat  and  a  general  modernization  of  Islam.  Their 
view-point  is  well  set  forth  by  another  of  their  leading 
figures,  S.  Khuda  Bukhsh.  “  Nothing  was  more  distant 
from  the  Prophet's  thought,"  he  writes,  “than  to  fetter 
the  mind  or  to  lay  down  fixed,  immutable,  unchanging 
laws  for  his  followers.  The  Quran  is  a  book  of  guidance 
to  the  faithful,  and  not  an  obstacle  in  the  path  of  their 
social,  moral,  legal,  and  intellectual  progress."  He  la¬ 
ments  Islam's  present  backwardness,  for  he  continues: 
“Modern  Islam,  with  its  hierarchy  of  priesthood,  gross 
fanaticism,  appalling  ignorance,  and  superstitious  prac¬ 
tices  is,  indeed,  a  discredit  to  the  Islam  of  the  Prophet 
Mohammed."  He  concludes  with  the  following  liberal 
confession  of  faith:  “Is  Islam  hostile  to  progress?  I  will 
emphatically  answer  this  question  in  the  negative.  Islam, 
stripped  of  its  theology,  is  a  perfectly  simple  religion. 
Its  cardinal  principle  is  belief  in  one  God  and  belief  in 
Mohammed  as  his  apostle.  The  rest  is  mere  accretion, 
superfluity." 2 

Meanwhile,  the  liberals  were  making  themselves  felt 
in  other  parts  of  the  Moslem  world.  In  Turkey  liberals 
actually  headed  the  government  during  much  of  the 
generation  between  the  Crimean  War  and  the  despotism 

1  Especially  his  best-known  book,  The  Spirit  of  Islam  (London,  1891). 

2  S.  Khuda  Bukhsh,  Essays :  Indian  and  Islamic ,  pp.  20,  24,  284  (London, 
1912). 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  39 


of  Abdul  Hamid,1  and  Turkish  liberal  ministers  like 
Reshid  Pasha  and  Midhat  Pasha  made  earnest  though  un¬ 
availing  efforts  to  liberalize  and  modernize  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Even  the  dreadful  Hamidian  tyranny  could  not 
kill  Turkish  liberalism.  It  went  underground  or  into  exile, 
and  in  1908  put  through  the  revolution  which  deposed  the 
tyrant  and  brought  the  “ Young  Turks”  to  power.  In 
Egypt  liberalism  took  firm  root,  represented  by  men  like 
Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdou,  Rector  of  El  Azhar  University 
and  respected  friend  of  Lord  Cromer.  Even  outlying 
fragments  of  Islam  like  the  Russian  Tartars  awoke  to  the 
new  spirit  and  produced  liberal-minded,  forward-looking 
men.2 

The  liberal  reformers,  whom  I  have  been  describing,  of 
course  form  the  part  of  evolutionary  progress  in  Islam. 
They  are  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word  conservatives, 
receptive  to  healthy  change,  yet  maintaining  their  heredi¬ 
tary  poise.  Sincerely  religious  men,  they  have  faith  in 
Islam  as  a  living,  moral  force,  and  from  it  they  continue 
to  draw  their  spiritual  sustenance. 

There  are,  however,  other  groups  in  the  Moslem  world 
who  have  so  far  succumbed  to  Western  influences  that 
they  have  more  or  less  lost  touch  with  both  their  spiritual 
and  cultural  pasts.  In  all  the  more  civilized  portions  of 
the  Moslem  world,  especially  in  countries  long  under 
European  control  like  India,  Egypt,  and  Algeria,  there 
are  many  Moslems,  Western-educated  and  Western  cul¬ 
ture-veneered,  who  have  drifted  into  an  attitude  vary¬ 
ing  from  easy-going  religious  indifference  to  avowed  ag- 

1  1856  to  1878. 

2  For  the  liberal  movement  among  the  Russian  Tartars,  see  Arminius 
Vambdiry,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands  (London,  1906). 


40  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


nosticism.  From  their  minds  the  old  Moslem  zeal  has 
entirely  departed.  The  Algerian  Ismael  Hamet  well  de¬ 
scribes  the  attitude  of  this  class  of  his  fellow  countrymen 
when  he  writes:  “European  scepticism  is  not  without 
influence  upon  the  Algerian  Moslems,  who,  if  they  have 
kept  some  attachment  for  the  external  forms  of  their 
religion,  usually  ignore  the  unhealthy  excesses  of  the 
religious  sentiment.  They  do  not  give  up  their  religion, 
but  they  no  longer  dream  of  converting  all  those  who  do 
not  practise  it ;  they  want  to  hand  it  on  to  their  children, 
but  they  do  not  worry  about  other  men’s  salvation.  This 
is  not  unbelief;  it  is  not  even  free  thought;  but  it  is  luke¬ 
warmness.”  1 

Beyond  these  tepid  latitudinarians  are  still  other 
groups  of  a  very  different  character.  Here  we  find  com¬ 
bined  the  most  contradictory  sentiments:  young  men 
whose  brains  are  seething  with  radical  Western  ideas — 
atheism,  socialism,  Bolshevism,  and  what  not.  Yet, 
curiously  enough,  these  fanatic  radicals  tend  to  join 
hands  with  the  fanatic  reactionaries  of  Islam  in  a  common 
hatred  of  the  West.  Considering  themselves  the  born 
leaders  (and  exploiters)  of  the  ignorant  masses,  the  radi¬ 
cals  hunger  for  political  power  and  rage  against  that 
Western  domination  which  vetoes  their  ambitious  pre¬ 
tensions.  Hence,  they  are  mostly  extreme  “National¬ 
ists,”  while  they  are  also  deep  in  Pan-Islamic  reactionary 
schemes.  Indeed,  we  often  witness  the  strange  spectacle 
of  atheists  posing  as  Moslem  fanatics  and  affecting  a 
truly  dervish  zeal.  Mr.  Bukhsh  well  describes  this  type 
when  he  writes:  “I  know  a  gentleman,  a  Mohammedan 

1  Ismael  Hamet,  Les  Musulmans  frangais  du  Nord  de  VAfrique,  p.  268 
(Paris,  1906). 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  41 


by  profession ,  who  owes  his  success  in  life  to  his  faith. 
Though,  outwardly,  he  conforms  to  all  the  precepts  of 
Islam  and  occasionally  stands  up  in  public  as  the  cham¬ 
pion  and  spokesman  of  his  coreligionists;  yet,  to  my  utter 
horror,  I  found  that  he  held  opinions  about  his  religion 
and  its  founder  which  even  Voltaire  would  have  rejected 
with  indignation  and  Gibbon  with  commiserating  con¬ 
tempt.”1 

Later  on  we  shall  examine  more  fully  the  activities  of 
these  gentry  in  the  chapters  devoted  to  Pan-Islamism 
and  Nationalism.  What  I  desire  to  emphasize  here  is 
their  pernicious  influence  on  the  prospects  of  a  genuine 
Mohammedan  reformation  as  visualized  by  the  true  re¬ 
formers  whom  I  have  described.  Their  malevolent  de¬ 
sire  to  stir  up  the  fanatic  passions  of  the  ignorant  masses 
and  their  equally  malevolent  hatred  of  everything  West¬ 
ern  except  military  improvements  are  revealed  by  out¬ 
bursts  like  the  following  from  the  pen  of  a  prominent 
“ Young  Turk.”  “Yes,  the  Mohammedan  religion  is  in 
open  hostility  to  all  your  world  of  progress.  Learn,  ye 
European  observers,  that  a  Christian,  whatever  his  posi¬ 
tion,  by  the  mere  fact  that  he  is  a  Christian,  is  in  our 
eyes  a  being  devoid  of  all  human  dignity.  Our  reasoning 
is  simple  and  definitive.  We  say:  the  man  whose  judg¬ 
ment  is  so  perverted  as  to  deny  the  evidence  of  the  One 
God  and  to  fabricate  gods  of  different  kinds,  cannot  be 
other  than  the  most  ignoble  expression  of  human  stu¬ 
pidity.  To  speak  to  him  would  be  a  humiliation  to  our 
reason  and  an  offense  to  the  grandeur  of  the  Master  of 
the  Universe.  The  worshipper  of  false  gods  is  a  monster 
of  ingratitude;  he  is  the  execration  of  the  universe;  to 

1 S.  Khuda  Bukhsh,  op.  cit.,  p.  241. 


42  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


combat  him,  convert  him,  or  annihilate  him  is  the  holiest 
task  of  the  Faithful.  These  are  the  eternal  commands 
of  our  One  God.  For  us  there  are  in  this  world  only 
Believers  and  Misbelievers;  love,  charity,  fraternity  to 
Believers;  disgust,  hatred,  and  war  to  Misbelievers. 
Among  Misbelievers,  the  most  odious  and  criminal  are 
those  who,  while  recognizing  God,  create  Him  of  earthly 
parents,  give  Him  a  son,  a  mother;  so  monstrous  an  aber¬ 
ration  surpasses,  in  our  eyes,  all  bounds  of  iniquity;  the 
presence  of  such  miscreants  among  us  is  the  bane  of  our 
existence;  their  doctrine  is  a  direct  insult  to  the  purity  of 
our  faith;  their  contact  a  pollution  for  our  bodies;  any 
relation  with  them  a  torture  for  our  souls. 

“  While  detesting  you,  we  have  been  studying  your  po¬ 
litical  institutions  and  your  military  organizations.  Be¬ 
sides  the  new  arms  which  Providence  procures  for  us  by 
your  own  means,  you  yourselves  have  rekindled  the  inex¬ 
tinguishable  faith  of  our  heroic  martyrs.  Our  Young 
Turks,  our  Babis,  our  new  fraternities,  all  are  sects  in 
their  varied  forms,  are  inspired  by  the  same  thought,  the 
same  purpose.  Toward  what  end?  Christian  civiliza¬ 
tion?  Never!”1 

Such  harangues  unfortunately  find  ready  hearers  among 
the  Moslem  masses.  Although  the  liberal  reformers  are 
a  growing  power  in  Islam,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
they  are  as  yet  only  a  minority,  an  elite,  below  whom  lie 
the  ignorant  masses,  still  suffering  from  the  blight  of  age¬ 
long  obscurantism,  wrapped  in  admiration  of  their  own 
world,  which  they  regard  as  the  highest  ideal  of  human 


1  Sheikh  Abd-ul-Haak,  in  Sherif  Pasha’s  organ,  Mecheroutiette ,  of  August, 
1912.  Quoted  from:  A.  Servier,  Le  Nationalisme  musulman ,  Constantine, 
Algeria,  1913. 


THE  MOHAMMEDAN  REVIVAL  43 


existence,  and  fanatically  hating  everything  outside  as 
wicked,  despicable,  and  deceptive.  Even  when  compelled 
to  admit  the  superior  power  of  the  West,  they  hate  it 
none  the  less.  They  rebel  blindly  against  the  spirit  of 
change  which  is  forcing  them  out  of  their  old  ruts,  and 
their  anger  is  still  further  heightened  by  that  ubiquitous 
Western  domination  which  is  pressing  upon  them  from 
all  sides.  Such  persons  are  as  clay  in  the  hands  of  the 
Pan-Islamic  and  Nationalist  leaders  who  mould  the  multi¬ 
tude  to  their  own  sinister  ends. 

Islam  is,  in  fact,  to-day  torn  between  the  forces  of 
liberal  reform  and  chauvinistic  reaction.  The  liberals 
are  not  only  the  hope  of  an  evolutionary  reformation, 
they  are  also  favored  by  the  trend  of  the  times,  since  the 
Moslem  world  is  being  continually  permeated  by  Western 
progress  and  must  continue  to  be  thus  permeated  unless 
Western  civilization  itself  collapses  in  ruin.  Yet,  though 
the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  liberals  appears  probable, 
what  delays,  what  setbacks,  what  fresh  barriers  of  war¬ 
fare  and  fanaticism  may  not  the  chauvinist  reactionaries 
bring  about !  Neither  the  reform  of  Islam  nor  the  rela¬ 
tions  between  East  and  West  are  free  from  perils  whose 
ominous  possibilities  we  shall  later  discuss. 

Meanwhile,  there  remains  the  hopeful  fact  that  through¬ 
out  the  Moslem  world  a  numerous  and  powerful  minority, 
composed  not  merely  of  Westernized  persons  but  also  of 
orthodox  conservatives,  are  aware  of  Islam’s  decadence 
and  are  convinced  that  a  thoroughgoing  reformation 
along  liberal,  progressive  lines  is  at  once  a  practical 
necessity  and  a  sacred  duty.  Exactly  how  this  reforma¬ 
tion  shall  be  legally  effected  has  not  yet  been  determined, 
nor  is  a  detailed  discussion  of  technical  machinery  neces- 


44  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


sary  for  our  consideration.1  History  teaches  us  that 
where  the  will  to  reform  is  vitally  present,  reformation 
will  somehow  or  other  be  accomplished. 

One  thing  is  certain:  the  reforming  spirit,  in  its  various 
manifestations,  has  already  produced  profound  changes 
throughout  Islam.  The  Moslem  world  of  to-day  is  vastly 
different  from  the  Moslem  world  of  a  century  ago.  The 
Wahabi  leaven  has  destroyed  abuses  and  has  rekindled 
a  purer  religious  faith.  Even  its  fanatical  zeal  has  not 
been  without  moral  compensations.  The  spread  of  lib¬ 
eral  principles  and  Western  progress  goes  on  apace.  If 
there  is  much  to  fear  for  the  future,  there  is  also  much 
to  hope. 

1  For  such  discussion  of  legal  methods,  see  W.  S.  Blunt,  The  Future  of 
Islam  (London,  1882);  A.  Le  chatelier,  U Islam  au  dix-neuvieme  Sibcle 
(Paris,  1888);  Dr.  Perron,  Ulslamisme  (Paris,  1877);  H.  N.  Brailsford, 
“Modernism  in  Islam,”  The  Fortnightly  Review ,  September,  1908;  Sir 
Theodore  Morison,  “Can  Islam  be  Reformed,”  The  Nineteenth  Century 
and  After,  October,  1908;  M.  Pickthall,  “La  Morale  islamique,”  Revue 
Politique  Internationale,  July,  1916;  XX,  “LTslam  apr&s  la  Guerre,” 
Revue  de  Paris ,  15  January;  1916. 


CHAPTER  n 


PAN-ISLAMISM 

Like  all  great  movements,  the  Mohammedan  Revival 
is  highly  complex.  Starting  with  the  simple,  puritan 
protest  of  Wahabism,  it  has  developed  many  phases, 
widely  diverse  and  sometimes  almost  antithetical.  In 
the  previous  chapter  we  examined  the  phase  looking 
toward  an  evolutionary  reformation  of  Islam  and  a 
genuine  assimilation  of  the  progressive  spirit  as  well  as 
the  external  forms  of  Western  civilization.  At  the  same 
time  we  saw  that  these  liberal  reformers  are  as  yet  only 
a  minority,  an  elite;  while  the  Moslem  masses,  still 
plunged  in  ignorance  and  imperfectly  awakened  from 
their  age-long  torpor,  are  influenced  by  other  leaders  of 
a  very  different  character — men  inclined  to  militant 
rather  than  pacific  courses,  and  hostile  rather  than  re¬ 
ceptive  to  the  West.  These  militant  forces  are,  in  their 
turn,  complex.  They  may  be  grouped  roughly  under 
the  general  concepts  known  as  “Pan-Islamism”  and 
“  Nationalism.”  It  is  to  a  consideration  of  the  first  of 
these  two  concepts,  to  Pan-Islamism,  that  this  chapter 
is  devoted. 

Pan-Islamism,  which  in  its  broadest  sense  is  the  feeling 
of  solidarity  between  all  “True  Believers,”  is  as  old  as 
the  Prophet,  when  Mohammed  and  his  few  followers 
were  bound  together  by  the  tie  of  faith  against  their 

pagan  compatriots  who  sought  their  destruction.  To 

45 


46  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Mohammed  the  principle  of  fraternal  solidarity  among 
Moslems  was  of  transcendent  importance,  and  he  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  implanting  this  so  deeply  in  Moslem  hearts 
that  thirteen  centuries  have  not  sensibly  weakened  it. 
The  bond  between  Moslem  and  Moslem  is  to-day  much 
stronger  than  that  between  Christian  and  Christian. 
Of  course  Moslems  fight  bitterly  among  themselves,  but 
these  conflicts  never  quite  lose  the  aspect  of  family 
quarrels  and  tend  to  be  adjourned  in  presence  of  infidel 
aggression.  Islam’s  profound  sense  of  solidarity  prob¬ 
ably  explains  in  large  part  its  extraordinary  hold  upon 
its  followers.  No  other  religion  has  such  a  grip  on  its 
votaries.  Islam  has  won  vast  territories  from  Christi¬ 
anity  and  Brahmanism,1  and  has  driven  Magism  from 
the  face  of  the  earth; 2  yet  there  has  been  no  single  in¬ 
stance  where  a  people,  once  become  Moslem,  has  ever 
abandoned  the  faith.  Extirpated  they  may  have  been, 
like  the  Moors  of  Spain,  but  extirpation  is  not  apostasy. 

Islam’s  solidarity  is  powerfully  buttressed  by  two  of 
its  fundamental  institutions:  the  “Hajj,”  or  pilgrimage 
to  Mecca,  and  the  caliphate.  Contrary  to  the  general 
opinion  in  the  West,  it  is"  the  Hajj  rather  than  the  cali¬ 
phate  which  has  exerted  the  more  consistently  unifying 
influence.  Mohammed  ordained  the  Hajj  as  a  supreme 
act  of  faith,  and  every  year  fully  100,000  pilgrims  arrive, 
drawn  from  every  quarter  pf  the  Moslem  world.  There, 
before  the  sacred  Kaaba  of  Mecca,  men  of  all  races, 

1  Islam  has  not  only  won  much  ground  in  India,  Brahmanism’s  home¬ 
land,  but  has  also  converted  virtually  the  entire  populations  of  the  great 
islands  of  Java  and  Sumatra,  where  Brahmanism  was  formerly  ascendant. 

2  The  small  Parsi  communities  of  India,  centring  in  Bombay,  are  the 
sole  surviving  representatives  of  Zoroastrianism.  They  were  founded  by 
Zoroastrian  refugees  after  the  Mohammedan  conquest  of  Persia  in  the 
seventh  century  A.  D. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


47 


tongues,  and  cultures  meet  and  mingle  in  an  ecstacy  of 
common  devotion,  returning  to  their  homes  bearing  the 
proud  title  of  “Hajj  is,”  or  Pilgrims — a  title  which  insures 
them  the  reverent  homage  of  their  fellow  Moslems  for  all 
the  rest  of  their  days.  The  political  implications  of  the 
Hajj  are  obvious.  It  is  in  reality  a  perennial  Pan- 
Islamic  congress,  where  all  the  interests  of  the  faith  are 
discussed  by  delegates  from  every  part  of  the  Moham¬ 
medan  world,  and  where  plans  are  elaborated  for  Islam’s 
defense  and  propagation.  Here  nearly  all  the  militant 
leaders  of  the  Mohammedan  Revival  (Abd-el-Wahab, 
Mahommed  ben  Sennussi,  Djemal-ed-Din  el  Afghani, 
and  many  more)  felt  the  imperious  summons  to  their 
task.1 

-'V. 

As  for  the  caliphate,  it  has  played  a  great  historic 
role,  especially  in  its  early  days,  and  we  have  already 
studied  its  varying  fortunes.  Reduced  to  a  mere  shadow 
after  the  Mongol  destruction  of  Bagdad,  it  was  revived 
by  the  Turkish  sultans,  who  assumed  the  title  and  were 
recognized  as  caliphs  by  the  orthodox  Moslem  world.2 
However,  these  sultan-caliphs  of  Stambul3  never  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  winning  the  religious  homage  accorded  their 
predecessors  of  Mecca  and  Bagdad.  In  Arab  eyes,  espe- 

1  Though  Mecca  is  forbidden  to  non-Moslems,  a  few  Europeans  have 
managed  to  make  the  Hajj  in  disguise,  and  have  written  their  impressions. 
Of  these,  Snouck  Hurgronje’s  Mekka  (2  vols.,  The  Hague,  1888)  and  Het 
Mekkaansche  Feest  (Leiden,  1889)  are  the  most  recent  good  works.  Also 
see  Burton  and  Burckhardt.  A  recent  account  of  value  from  the  pen  of  a 
Mohammedan  liberal  is:  Gazanfar  Ali  Khan,  With  the  Pilgrims  to  Mecca; 
The  Great  Pilgrimage  of  A.  H.  1319  (A.  D.  1902),  with  an  Introduction  by 
Arminius  Vamb6ry  (London,  1905). 

2  The  Shiite  Persians  of  course  refused  to  recognize  any  Sunnite  or 
orthodox  caliphate;  while  the  Moors  pay  spiritual  allegiance  to  their  own 
Shereefian  sultans. 

3  The  Turkish  name  for  Constantinople. 


48  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


cially;  the  spectacle  of  Turkish  caliphs  was  an  anach¬ 
ronism  to  which  they  could  never  be  truly  reconciled. 
Sultan  Abdul  Hamid,  to  be  sure,  made  an  ambitious 
attempt  to  revive  the  caliphate’s  pristine  greatness,  but 
such  success  as  he  attained  was  due  more  to  the  general 
tide  of  Pan-Islamic  feeling  than  to  the  inherent  potency 
of  the  caliphal  name.  The  real  leaders  of  modern  Pan- 
Islamism  either  gave  Abdul  Hamid  a  merely  qualified 
allegiance  or  were,  like  El  Sennussi,  definitely  hostile. 
This  was  not  realized  in  Europe,  which  came  to  fear 
Abdul  Hamid  as  a  sort  of  Mohammedan  pope.  Even 
to-day  most  Western  observers  seem  to  think  that  Pan- 
Islamism  centers  in  the  caliphate,  and  we  see  European 
publicists  hopefully  discussing  whether  the  caliphate’s 
retention  by  the  discredited  Turkish  sultans,  its  trans¬ 
ference  to  the  Shereef  of  Mecca,  or  its  total  suppression, 
will  best  clip  Pan-Islam’s  wings.  This,  however,  is  a 
distinctly  short-sighted  view.  The  caliphal  institution 
is  still  undoubtedly  venerated  in  Islam.  But  the  shrewd 
leaders  of  the  modern  Pan-Islamic  movement  have  long 
been  working  on  a  much  broader  basis.  They  realize 
that  Pan-Islamism’s  real  driving-power  to-day  lies  not 
in  the  caliphate  but  in  institutions  like  the  Hajj  and 
the  great  Pan-Islamic  fraternities  such  as  the  Sennussiya, 
of  which  I  shall  presently  speak.1 

Let  us  now  trace  the  fortunes  of  modern  Pan-Islamism. 
Its  first  stage  was  of  course  the  Wahabi  movement. 
The  Wahabi  state  founded  by  Abd-el-Wahab  in  the 

1  On  the  caliphate,  see  Sir  W.  Muir,  The  Caliphate :  Its  Rise,  Decline,  and 
Fall  (Edinburgh,  1915);  Sir  Mark  Sykes,  The  Caliph’s  Last  Heritage 
(London,  1915);  XX,  “L’Islam  apres  la  Guerre,”  Revue  de  Paris,  15 
January,  1916;  “The  Indian  Khilafat  Delegation,”  Foreign  Affairs,  July, 
1920  (Special  Supplement). 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


49 


Nejd  was  modelled  on  the  theocratic  democracy  of  the 
Meccan  caliphs,  and  when  Abd-el-Wahab’s  princely 
disciple,  Saud,  loosed  his  fanatic  hosts  upon  the  holy 
cities,  he  dreamed  that  this  was  but  the  first  step  in  a 
puritan  conquest  and  consolidation  of  the  whole  Moslem 
world.  Foiled  in  this  grandiose  design,  Wahabism,  nev¬ 
ertheless,  soon  produced  profound  political  disturbances 
in  distant  regions  like  northern  India  and  Afghanistan, 
as  I  have  already  narrated.  They  were,  however,  all 
integral  parts  of  the  Wahabi  phase,  being  essentially 
protests  against  the  political  decadence  of  Moslem  states 
and  the  moral  decadence  of  Moslem  rulers.  These  out¬ 
breaks  were  not  inspired  by  any  special  fear  or  hatred 
of  the  West,  since  Europe  was  not  yet  seriously  assail¬ 
ing  Islam  except  in  outlying  regions  like  European  Tur¬ 
key  or  the  Indies,  and  the  impending  peril  was  conse¬ 
quently  not  appreciated. 

By  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  the 
situation  had  radically  altered.  The  French  conquest  of 
Algeria,  the  Russian  acquisition  of  Transcaucasia,  and 
the  English  mastery  of  virtually  all  India,  convinced 
thoughtful  Moslems  everywhere  that  Islam  was  in  deadly 
peril  of  falling  under  Western  domination.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Pan-Islamism  assumed  that  essentially  anti- 
Western  character  wThich  it  has  ever  since  retained. 
At  first  resistance  to  Western  encroachment  was  spo¬ 
radic  and  uncoordinated.  Here  and  there  heroic  fig¬ 
ures  like  Abd-el-Kader  in  Algeria  and  Shamyl  in  the 
Caucasus  fought  brilliantly  against  the  European  in¬ 
vaders.  But,  though  these  paladins  of  the  faith  were 
accorded  wide-spread  sympathy  from  Moslems,  they  re¬ 
ceived  no  tangible  assistance  and,  unaided,  fell. 


50  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Fear  and  hatred  of  the  West,  however,  steadily  grew 
in  intensity,  and  the  seventies  saw  the  Moslem  world 
swept  from  end  to  end  by  a  wave  of  militant  fanaticism. 
In  Algeria  there  was  the  Kabyle  insurrection  of  1871, 
while  all  over  North  Africa  arose  fanatical  “Holy  Men” 
preaching  holy  wars,  the  greatest  of  these  being  the 
Mahdist  insurrection  in  the  Egyptian  Sudan,  which 
maintained  itself  against  England’s  best  efforts  down 
to  Kitchener’s  capture  of  Khartum  at  the  very  end  of 
the  century.  In  Afghanistan  there  was  an  intense  ex¬ 
acerbation  of  fanaticism  awakening  sympathetic  echoes 
among  the  Indian  Moslems,  both  of  which  gave  the 
British  much  trouble.  In  Central  Asia  there  was  a  sim¬ 
ilar  access  of  fanaticism,  centring  in  the  powerful  Nake- 
chabendiya  fraternity,  spreading  eastward  into  Chinese 
territory  and  culminating  in  the  great  revolts  of  the 
Chinese  Mohammedans  both  in  Chinese  Turkestan  and 
Yunnan.  In  the  Dutch  East  Indies  there' was  a  whole 
series  of  revolts,  the  most  serious  of  these  being  the  At- 
chin  War,  which  dragged  on  interminably,  not  being 
quite  stamped  out  even  to-day. 

The  salient  characteristic  of  this  period  of  militant 
unrest  is  its  lack  of  co-ordination.  These  risings  were  all 
spontaneous  outbursts  of  local  populations;  animated,  to 
be  sure,  by  the  same  spirit  of  fear  and  hatred,  and  in¬ 
flamed  by  the  same  fanatical  hopes,  but  with  no  evi¬ 
dence  of  a  central  authority  laying  settled  plans  and 
moving  in  accordance  with  a  definite  programme.  The 
risings  were  inspired  largely  by  the  mystical  doctrine 
known  as  “Mahdism.”  Mahdism  was  unknown  to  prim¬ 
itive  Islam,  no  trace  of  it  occurring  in  the  Koran.  But 
in  the  “traditions,”  or  reputed  shyings  of  Mohammed, 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


51 


there  occurs  the  statement  that  the  Prophet  predicted 
the  coining  of  one  bearing  the  title  of  “El  Mahdi”  1  „ 
who  would  fill  the  earth  with  equity  and  justice.  From 
this  arose  the  wide-spread  mystical  hope  in  the  appear¬ 
ance  of  a  divinely  inspired  personage  who  would  effect 
the  universal  triumph  of  Islam,  purge  the  world  of  infi¬ 
dels,  and  assure  the  lasting  happiness  of  all  Moslems. 
This  doctrine  has  profoundly  influenced  Moslem  history. 
At  various  times  fanatic  leaders  have  arisen  claiming  to 
be  El  Mahdi,  “The  Master  of  the  Hour,”  and  have  won 
the  frenzied  devotion  of  the  Moslem  masses;  just  as  cer¬ 
tain  “Messiahs”  have  similarly  excited  the  Jews.  It 
was  thus  ^natural  that,  in  their  growing  apprehension 
and  impotent  rage  at  Western  aggression,  the  Moslem 
masses  should  turn  to  the  messianic  hope  of  Mahdism. 
Yet  Mahdism,  by  its  very  nature,  could  effect  nothing 
constructive  or  permanent.  It  was  a  mere  straw  fire; 
flaring  up  fiercely  here  and  there,  then  dying  down,  leav¬ 
ing  the  disillusioned  masses  more  discouraged  and  apa¬ 
thetic  than  before. 

Now  all  this  was  recognized  by  the  wiser  supporters 
of  the  Pan-Islamic  idea.  The  impotence  of  the  wildest 
outbursts  of  local  fanaticism  against  the  methodical 
might  of  Europe  convinced  thinking  Moslems  that  long 
preparation  and  complete  co-ordination  of  effort  were 
necessary  if  Islam  was  to  have  any  chance  of  throwing 
off  the  European  yoke.  Such  men  also  realized  that 
they  must  study  Western  methods  and  adopt  much  of 
the  Western  technic  of  power.  Above  all,  they  felt  that 
the  political  liberation  of  Islam  from  Western  domination 
must  be  preceded  by  a  profound  spiritual  regeneration, 

1  Literally,  “he  who  is  guided  aright.” 


52  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


thereby  engendering  the  moral  forces  necessary  both  for 
the  war  of  liberation  and  for  the  fruitful  reconstruction 
which  should  follow  thereafter.  At  this  point  the  ideals 
of  Pan-Islamists  and  liberals  approach  each  other.  Both 
recognize  Islam’s  present  decadence;  both  desire  its 
spiritual  regeneration.  It  is  on  the  nature  of  that  regen¬ 
eration  that  the  two  parties  are  opposed.  The  liberals 
believe  that  Islam  should  really  assimilate  Western  ideas. 
The  Pan-Islamists,  on  the  other  hand,  believe  that  prim¬ 
itive  Islam  contains  all  that  is  necessary  for  regenera¬ 
tion,  and  contend  that  only  Western  methods  and  ma¬ 
terial  achievements  should  be  adopted  by  the  Moslem 
world. 

The  beginnings  of  self-conscious,  systematic  Pan- 
Islamism  date  from  about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  movement  crystallizes  about  two  foci: 
the  new-type  religious  fraternities  like  the  Sennussiya, 
and  the  propaganda  of  the  group  of  thinkers  headed  by 
Djemal-ed-Din.  Let  us  first  consider  the  fraternities. 

Religious  fraternities  have  existed  in  Islam  for  cen¬ 
turies.  They  all  possess  the  same  general  type  of  or¬ 
ganization,  being  divided  into  lodges  (“Zawias”)  headed 
by  Masters  known  as  “Mokaddem,”  who  exercise  a 
more  or  less  extensive  authority  over  the  “Khouan”  or 
Brethren.  Until  the  foundation  of  the  new-type  organ¬ 
izations  like  the  Sennussi,  however,  the  fraternities  ex¬ 
erted  little  practical  influence  upon  mundane  affairs. 
Their  interests  were  almost  wholly  religious,  of  a  mysti¬ 
cal,  devotional  nature,  often  characterized  by  great  aus¬ 
terities  or  by  fanatical  excesses  like  those  practised  by 
the  whirling  and  howling  dervishes.  Such  political  in¬ 
fluence  as  they  did  exert  was  casual  and  local.  Any- 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


53 


thing  like  joint  action  was  impossible,  owing  to  their 
mutual  rivalries  and  jealousies.  These  old-type  fraterni¬ 
ties  still  exist  in  great  numbers,  but  they  are  without 
political  importance  except  as  they  have  been  leavened 
by  the  new-type  fraternities. 

The  new-type  organizations  date  from  about  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  most  important  in  every 
way  being  the  Sennussiya.  Its  founder,  Seyid  Ma- 
hommed  ben  Sennussi,  was  born  near  Mostaganem, 
Algeria,  about  the  year  1800.  As  his  title  “ Seyid’ ’ 
indicates,  he  was  a  descendant  of  the  Prophet,  and  was 
thus  born  to  a  position  of  honor  and  importance.1  He 
early  displayed  a  strong  bent  for  learning  and  piety, 
studying  theology  at  the  Moorish  University  of  Fez 
and  afterward  travelling  widely  over  North  Africa 
preaching  a  reform  of  the  prevailing  religious  abuses.  He 
then  made  the  pilgrimage  to  Mecca,  and  there  his  re¬ 
formist  zeal  was  still  further  quickened  by  the  Wahabi 
teachers.  It  was  at  that  time  that  he  appears  to  have 
definitely  formulated  his  plan  of  a  great  puritan  order, 
and  in  1843  he  returned  to  North  Africa,  settling  in 
Tripoli,  where  he  built  hi§  first  Zawia,  known  as  the 
“Zawia  Baida,”  or  White  Monastery,  in  the  mountains 
near  Derna.  So  impressive  was  his  personality  and  so 
great  his  organizing  ability  that  converts  flocked  to  him 
from  all  over  North  Africa.  Indeed,  his  power  soon 
alarmed  the  Turkish  authorities  in  Tripoli,  and  relations 
became  so  strained  that  Seyid  Mahommed  presently 
moved  his  headquarters  to  the  oasis  of  Jarabub,  far  to 
the  south  in  the  Lybian  desert.  When  he  died  in  1859, 

1  “Seyid”  means  “Lord.”  This  title  is  borne  only  by  descendants  of 
the  Prophet. 


54  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


his  organization  had  spread  over  the  greater  part  of 
North  Africa. 

Seyid  Mahommed's  work  was  carried  on  uninter¬ 
ruptedly  by  his  son,  usually  known  as  Sennussi-el-Mahdi. 
The  manner  in  which  this  son  gained  his  succession  typ¬ 
ifies  the  Sennussi  spirit.  Seyid  Mahommed  had  two 
sons,  El-Mahdi  being  the  younger.  While  they  were 
still  mere  lads,  their  father  determined  to  put  them  to  a 
test,  to  discover  which  of  them  had  the  stronger  faith. 
In  presence  of  the  entire  Zawia  he  bade  both  sons  climb 
a  tall  palm-tree,  and  then  adjured  them  by  Allah  and  his 
Prophet  to  leap  to  the  ground.  The  younger  lad  leaped 
at  once  and  reached  the  ground  unharmed;  the  elder  boy 
refused  to  spring.  To  El-Mahdi,  “who  feared  not  to 
commit  himself  to  the  will  of  God,”  passed  the  right  to 
rule.  Throughout  his  long  life  Sennussi-el-Mahdi  justi¬ 
fied  his  father's  choice,  displaying  wisdom  and  piety  of  a 
high  order,  and  further  extending  the  power  of  the  fra¬ 
ternity.  During  the  latter  part  of  his  reign  he  removed 
his  headquarters  to  the  oasis  of  Jowf,  still  farther  into  the 
Lybian  desert,  where  he  died  in  1902,  and  was  succeeded 
by  his  nephew,  Ahmed-el-Sherif,  the  present  head  of  the 
order,  who  also  appears  to  possess  marked  ability. 

With  nearly  eighty  years  of  successful  activity  behind 
it,  the  Sennussi  Order  is  to-day  one  of  the  vital  factors  in 
Islam.  It  counts  its  adherents  in  every  quarter  of  the 
Moslem  world.  In  Arabia  its  followers  are  very  numer¬ 
ous,  and  it  profoundly  influences  the  spiritual  fife  of  the 
holy  cities,  Mecca  and  Medina.  North  Africa,  however, 
still  remains  the  focus  of  Sennussism.  The  whole  of 
northern  Africa,  from  Morocco  to  Somaliland,  is  dotted 
with  its  Zawias,  or  lodges,  all  absolutely  dependent  upon 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


55 


the  Grand  Lodge,  headed  by  The  Master,  El  Sennussi. 
The  Sennussi  stronghold  of  Jowf  lies  in  the  very  heart  of 
the  Lybian  Sahara.  Only  one  European  eye1  has  ever 
seen  this  mysterious  spot.  Surrounded  by  absolute  des¬ 
ert,  with  wells  many  leagues  apart,  and  the  routes  of 
approach  known  only  to  experienced  Sennussi  guides, 
every  one  of  whom  would  suffer  a  thousand  deaths 
rather  than  betray  him,  El  Sennussi,  The  Master,  sits 
serenely  apart,  sending  his  orders  throughout  North 
Africa. 

The  influence  exerted  by  the  Sennussiya  is  profound. 
The  local  Zawias  are  more  than  mere  “lodges.”  Besides 
the  Mokaddem,  or  Master,  there  is  also  a  “  Wekil,”  or  civil 
governor,  and  these  officers  have  discretionary  authority 
not  merely  over  the  Zawia  members  but  also  over  the 
community  at  large — at  least,  so  great  is  the  awe  inspired 
by  the  Sennussiya  throughout  North  Africa,  that  a  word 
from  Wekil  or  Mokaddem  is  always  listened  to  and 
obeyed.  Thus,  besides  the  various  European  colonial 
authorities,  British,  French,  or  Italian,  as  the  case  may 
be,  there  exists  an  occult  government  with  which  the 
colonial  authorities  are  careful  not  to  come  into  con¬ 
flict. 

On  their  part,  the  Sennussi  are  equally  careful  to  avoid 
a  downright  breach  with  the  European  Powers.  Their 
long-headed,  cautious  policy  is  truly  astonishing.  For 
more  than  half  a  century  the  order  has  been  a  great  force, 
yet  it  has  never  risked  the  supreme  adventure.  In  many 
of  the  fanatic  risings  which  have  occurred  in  various 
parts  of  Africa,  local  Sennussi  have  undoubtedly  taken 
part,  and  the  same  was  true  during  the  Italian  campaign 

1  The  explorer  Dr.  Nachtigal. 


56  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


in  Tripoli  and  in  the  late  war;  but  the  order  itself  has 
never  officially  entered  the  lists. 

In  fact,  this  attitude  of  mingled  cautious  reserve  and 
haughty  aloofness  is  maintained  not  only  toward  Chris¬ 
tians  but  also  toward  the  other  powers  that  be  in 
Islam.  The  Sennussiya  has  always  kept  its  absolute 
freedom  of  action.  Its  relations  with  the  Turks  have 
never  been  cordial.  Even  the  wily  Abdul  Hamid,  at 
the  height  of  his  prestige  as  the  champion  of  Pan-Islam- 
ism,  could  never  get  from  El  Sennussi  more  than  coldly 
platonic  expressions  of  approval,  and  one  of  Sennussi-el- 
Mahdi’s  favorite  remarks  was  said  to  have  been:  “ Turks 
and  Christians:  I  will  break  both  of  them  with  one  and 
the  same  stroke.”  Equally  characteristic  was  his  attitude 
toward  Mahommed  Ahmed,  the  leader  of  the  “Mahdist” 
uprising  in  the  Egyptian  Sudan.  Flushed  with  victory, 
Mahommed  Ahmed  sent  emissaries  to  El  Sennussi,  ask- 
ing  his  aid.  El  Sennussi  refused,  remarking  haughtily: 
aWhat  have  I  to  do  with  this  fakir  from  Dongola?  Am 
I  not  myself  Mahdi  if  I  choose  ?” 

These  Fabian  tactics  do  not  mean  that  the  Sennussi 
are  idle.  Far  from  it.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  cease¬ 
lessly  at  work  with  the  spiritual  arms  of  teaching,  disci¬ 
pline,  and  conversion.  The  Sennussi  programme  is  the 
welding,  first,  of  Moslem  Africa  and,  later,  of  the  whole 
Moslem  world  into  the  revived  “Imamat”  of  Islam’s 
early  days;  into  a  great  theocracy,  embracing  all  True 
Believers — in  other  words,  Pan-Islamism.  But  they  be¬ 
lieve  that  the  political  liberation  of  Islam  from  Christian 
domination  must  be  preceded  by  a  profound  spiritual 
regeneration.  Toward  this  end  they  strive  ceaselessly 
to  improve  the  manners  and  morals  of  the  populations 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


57 


under  their  influence,  while  they  also  strive  to  improve 
material  conditions  by  encouraging  the  better  cultivation 
of  oases,  digging  new  wells,  building  rest-houses  along  the 
caravan  routes,  and  promoting  trade.  The  slaughter  and 
rapine  practised  by  the  Sudanese  Mahdists  disgusted  the 
Sennussi  and  drew  from  their  chief  words  of  scathing 
condemnation. 

All  this  explains  the  order’s  unprecedented  self-re¬ 
straint.  This  is  the  reason  why,  year  after  year  and 
decade  after  decade,  the  Sennussi  advance  slowly,  calmly, 
coldly;  gathering  great  latent  power,  but  avoiding  the 
temptation  to  expend  it  one  instant  before  the  proper 
time.  Meanwhile  they  are  covering  North  Africa  with 
their  lodges  and  schools,  disciplining  the  people  to  the 
voice  of  their  Mokaddems  and  Wekils;  and,  to  the  south¬ 
ward,  converting  millions  of  pagan  negroes  to  the  faith 
of  Islam.1 

1  On  the  Islamic  fraternities  in  general  and  the  Sennussiya  in  particular, 
see  W.  S.  Blunt,  The  Future  of  Islam  (London,  1882) ;  O.  Depont  and  X. 
Coppolani,  Les  Confreries  religieuses  musulmanes  (Paris,  1897);  H.  Duvey- 
rier,  La  Confrerie  musulmane  de  Sidi  Mohammed  hen  Ali  es  Senoussi  (Paris, 
1884) ;  A.  Le  Chatelier,  Les  Confreries  musulmanes  du  Hedjaz  (Paris,  1887) ; 
L.  Petit,  Confreries  musulmanes  (Paris,  1899) ;  L.  Rinn,  Marabouts  et  Khouan 
(Algiers,  1884);  A.  Servier,  Le  Nationalisme  musulman  (Constantine, 
Algeria,  1913);  Simian,  Les  Confreries  islamiques  en  Algerie  (Algiers,  1910); 
Achmed  Abdullah  (himself  a  Sennussi),  “The  Sennussiyehs,”  The  Forum , 
May,  1914;  A.  R.  Colquhoun,  “Pan-Islam,”  North  American  Review, 
June,  1906;  T.  R.  Threlfall,  “Senussi  and  His  Threatened  Holy  War,” 
Nineteenth  Century,  March,  1900;  Captain  H.  A.  Wilson,  “The  Moslem 
Menace,”  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  September,  1907;  .  .  .  “La 
Puissance  de  1’ Islam:  Ses  Confreries  Religieuses,”  Le  Correspondant,  25 
November  and  10  December,  1909.  The  above  judgments,  particularly 
regarding  the  Sennussiya,  vary  greatly,  some  being  highly  alarmist,  others 
minimizing  its  importance.  A  full  balancing  of  the  entire  subject  is  that  of 
Commandant  Binger,  “  Le  Peril  de  T Islam,”  Bulletin  du  Comite  de  l1  Afrique 
frangaise,  1902.  Personal  interviews  of  educated  Moslems  with  El  Sen¬ 
nussi  are  Si  Mohammed  el  Hechaish,  “Chez  les  Senoussia  et  les  Touareg,” 
V Expansion  Coloniale  frangaise,  1900;  Muhammad  ibn  Utman,  Voyage  au 
Pays  des  Senoussia  d,  travers  la  Tripolitaine  (translated  from  the  Arabic), 
Paris,  1903. 


58  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Nothing  better  shows  modern  Islam’s  quickened  vital¬ 
ity  than  the  revival  of  missionary  fervor  during  the  past 
hundred  years.  Of  course  Islam  has  always  displayed 
strong  proselytising  power.  Its  missionary  successes  in 
its  early  days  were  extraordinary,  and  even  in  its  period 
of  decline  it  never  wholly  lost  its  propagating  vigor. 
Throughout  the  Middle  Ages  Islam  continued  to  gain 
ground  in  India  and  China;  the  Turks  planted  it  firmly 
in  the  Balkans;  while  between  the  fourteenth  and  six¬ 
teenth  centuries  Moslem  missionaries  won  notable  tri¬ 
umphs  in  such  distant  regions  as  West  Africa,  the  Dutch 
Indies,  and  the  Philippines.  Nevertheless,  taking  the 
Moslem  world  as  a  whole,  religious  zeal  undoubtedly 
declined,  reaching  low-water  mark  during  the  eighteenth 
century. 

The  first  breath  of  the  Mohammedan  Revival,  however, 
blew  the  smouldering  embers  of  proselytism  into  a  new 
flame,  and  everywhere  except  in  Europe  Islam  began  once 
more  advancing  portentously  along  all  its  far-flung 
frontiers.  Every  Moslem  is,  to  some  extent,  a  born 
missionary  and  instinctively  propagates  his  faith  among 
his  non-Moslem  neighbors,  so  the  work  was  carried  on 
not  only  by  priestly  specialists  but  also  by  multitudes  of 
travellers,  traders,  and  humble  migratory  workers.1  Of 
course  numerous  zealots  consecrated  their  lives  to  the 
task.  This  was  particularly  true  of  the  religious  fra¬ 
ternities.  The  Sennussi  have  especially  distinguished 
themselves  by  their  apostolic  fervor,  and  from  those 
natural  monasteries,  the  oases  of  the  Sahara,  thousands 

1  On  Moslem  missionary  activity  in  general,  see  Jansen,  V erbreitung  des 
I  slams  (Berlin,  1897);  M.  Townsend,  Asia  and  Europe ,  pp.  46-49,  60-61,  81; 
A.  Le  Chatelier,  V Islam  au  dix-neuvikme  Siecle  (Paris,  1888);  various 
papers  in  The  Mohammedan  World  To-day  (London,  1906). 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


59 


of  “Marabouts”  have  gone  forth  with  flashing  eyes  and 
swelling  breasts  to  preach  the  marvels  of  Islam,  devoured 
with  a  zeal  like  that  of  the  Christian  mendicant  friars  of 
the  Middle  Ages.  Islam’s  missionary  triumphs  among 
the  negroes  of  West  and  Central  Africa  during  the  past 
century  have  been  extraordinary.  Every  candid  Euro¬ 
pean  observer  tells  the  same  story.  As  an  Englishman 
very  justly  remarked  some  twenty  years  ago:  “ Moham¬ 
medanism  is  making  marvellous  progress  in  the  interior 
of  Africa.  It  is  crushing  paganism  out.  Against  it 
the  Christian  propaganda  is  a  myth.”1  And  a  French 
Protestant  missionary  remarks  in  similar  vein:  “We  see 
Islam  on  its  march,  sometimes  slowed  down  but  never 
stopped,  toward  the  heart  of  Africa.  Despite  all  obsta¬ 
cles  encountered,  it  tirelessly  pursues  its  way.  It  fears 
nothing.  Even  Christianity,  its  most  serious  rival,  Islam 
regards  without  hate,  so  sure  is  it  of  victory.  While 
Christians  dream  of  the  conquest  of  Africa,  the  Moham¬ 
medans  do  it.”2 

The  way  in  which  Islam  is  marching  southward  is  dra¬ 
matically  shown  by  a  recent  incident.  A  few  years  ago 
the  British  authorities  suddenly  discovered  that  Moham¬ 
medanism  was  pervading  Nyassaland.  An  investigation 
brought  out  the  fact  that  it  was  the  work  of  Zanzibar 
Arabs.  They  began  their  propaganda  about  1900.  Ten 
years  later  almost  every  village  in  southern  Nyassaland 
had  its  Moslem  teacher  and  its  mosque  hut.  Although 

1  T.  R.  Threlfall,  “Senussi  and  His  Threatened  Holy  War,”  Nineteenth 
Century,  March,  1900. 

2  D.  A.  Forget,  L’Islam  et  le  Christianisme  dans  VAfrique  centrale,  p.  65 
(Paris,  1900).  For  other  statements  regarding  Moslem  missionary  activity 
in  Africa,  see  G.  Bonet-Maury,  L’Islamisme  et  le  Christianisme  en  Afrique 
(Paris,  1906);  E.  W.  Blyden,  Christianity,  Islam,  and  the  Negro  Race 
(London,  1887);  Forget,  op.  cit. 


60  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


the  movement  was  frankly  anti-European,  the  British 
authorities  did  not  dare  to  check  it  for  fear  of  reper¬ 
cussions  elsewhere.  Many  European  observers  fear  that 
it  is  only  a  question  of  time  when  Islam  will  cross  the 
Zambezi  and  enter  South  Africa. 

And  these  gains  are  not  made  solely  against  paganism. 
They  are  being  won  at  the  expense  of  African  Christianity 
as  well.  In  West  Africa  the  European  missions  lose  many 
of  their  converts  to  Islam,  while  across  the  continent  the 
ancient  Abyssinian  Church,  so  long  an  outpost  against 
Islam,  seems  in  danger  of  submersion  by  the  rising  Moslem 
tide.  Not  by  warlike  incursions,  but  by  peaceful  pene¬ 
tration,  the  Abyssinians  are  being  Islamized.  “  Tribes 
which,  fifty  or  sixty  years  ago,  counted  hardly  a  Moham¬ 
medan  among  them,  to-day  live  partly  or  wholly  according 
to  the  precepts  of  Islam/’1 

Islam’s  triumphs  in  Africa  are  perhaps  its  most  note¬ 
worthy  missionary  victories,  but  they  by  no  means  tell 
the  whole  story,  as  a  few  instances  drawn  from  other 
quarters  of  the  Moslem  world  will  show.  In  the  previous 
chapter  I  mentioned  the  liberal  movement  among  the 
Russian  Tartars.  That,  however,  was  only  one  phase  of 
the  Mohammedan  Revival  in  that  region,  another  phase 
being  a  marked  resurgence  of  proselyting  zeal.  These 
Tartars  had  long  been  under  Russian  rule,  and  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church  had  made  persistent  efforts  to  convert  them; 
in  some  instances  with  apparent  success.  But  when  the 
Mohammedan  Revival  reached  the  Tartars  early  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  they  immediately  began  laboring 

1  A.  Gu6rinot,  “L’Islam  et  rAbyssinie,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman,  1918. 
Also  see  similar  opinion  of  the  Protestant  missionary  K.  Cederquist, 
“Islam  and  Christianity  in  Abyssinia,”  The  Moslem  World ,  April,  1912. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


61 


with  their  Christianized  brethren,  and  in  a  short  time 
most  of  these  reverted  to  Islam  despite  the  best  efforts  of 
the  Orthodox  Church  and  the  punitive  measures  of  the 
Russian  governmental  authorities.  Tartar  missionaries 
also  began  converting  the  heathen  Turko-Finnish  tribes 
to  the  northward,  in  defiance  of  every  hindrance  from  their 
Russian  masters.1 

In  China,  likewise,  the  nineteenth  century  witnessed 
an  extraordinary  development  of  Moslem  energy.  Islam 
had  reached  China  in  very  early  times,  brought  in  by 
Arab  traders  and  bands  of  Arab  mercenary  soldiers. 
Despite  centuries  of  intermarriage  with  Chinese  women, 
their  descendants  still  differ  perceptibly  from  the  general 
Chinese  population,  and  regard  themselves  as  a  separate 
and  superior  people.  The  Chinese  Mohammedans  are 
mainly  concentrated  in  the  southern  province  of  Yunnan 
and  the  inland  provinces  beyond.  Besides  these  racially 
Chinese  Moslems,  another  centre  of  Mohammedan  popu¬ 
lation  is  found  in  the  Chinese  dependency  of  Eastern  or 
Chinese  Turkestan,  inhabited  by  Turkish  stocks  and 
conquered  by  the  Chinese  only  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
Until  comparatively  recent  times  the  Chinese  Moslems 
were  well  treated,  but  gradually  their  proud-spirited 
attitude  alarmed  the  Chinese  Government,  which  with¬ 
drew  their  privileges  and  persecuted  them.  Early  in  the 
nineteenth  century  the  breath  of  the  Mohammedan 
Revival  reached  China,  as  it  did  every  other  part  of  the 
Moslem  world,  and  the  Chinese  Mohammedans,  inflamed 
by  resurgent  fanaticism,  began  a  series  of  revolts  culmi¬ 
nating  in  the  great  rebellions  which  took  place  about  the 

1  S.  Brobovnikov,  “Moslems  in  Russia,”  The  Moslem  World,  January, 
1911. 


62  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


year  1870,  both  in  Yunnan  and  in  Eastern  Turkestan. 
As  usual,  these  fanaticized  Moslems  displayed  fierce  fight¬ 
ing  power.  The  Turkestan  rebels  found  an  able  leader, 
one  Yakub  Beg,  and  for  some  years  both  Turkestan  and 
Yunnan  were  virtually  independent.  To  many  European 
observers  at  that  time  it  looked  as  though  the  rebels 
might  join  hands,  erect  a  permanent  Mohammedan  state 
in  Western  China,  and  even  overrun  the  whole  empire. 
The  fame  of  Yakub  Beg  spread  through  the  Moslem 
world,  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  honoring  him  with  the  high 
title  of  Commander  of  the  Faithful.  After  years  of  bitter 
fighting,  accompanied  by  frightful  massacres,  the  Chinese 
Government  subdued  the  rebels.  The  Chinese  Moslems, 
greatly  reduced  in  numbers,  have  not  yet  recovered  their 
former  strength;  but  their  spirit  is  still  unbroken,  and 
to-day  they  number  fully  10,000,000.  Thus,  Chinese 
Islam,  despite  its  setbacks,  is  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with 
in  the  future.1 

The  above  instances  do  not  exhaust  the  list  of  Islam’s 
activities  during  the  past  century.  In  India,  for  example, 
Islam  has  continued  to  gain  ground  rapidly,  while  in  the 
Dutch  Indies  it  is  the  same  story.2  European  domination 
actually  favors  rather  than  retards  the  spread  of  Islam, 
for  the  Moslem  finds  in  Western  improvements,  like  the 
railroad,  the  post-office,  and  the  printing-press,  useful 
adjuncts  to  Islamic  propaganda. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  second  originating  centre  of 


1Broomhall,  Islam  in  China  (London,  1910);  Nigar&nd6,  “Notes  sur  les 
MusiiLmans  Chinois,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman,  January,  1907;  paper  on 
Islam  in  China  in  The  Mohammedan  World  To-day  (London,  1906). 

2  See  papers  on  Islam  in  Java  and  Sumatra  in  The  Mohammedan  World 
To-day  (London,  1906);  A.  Cabaton,  Java ,  Sumatra ,  and  the  Dutch  East 
Indies  (translated  from  the  Dutch),  New  York,  1916. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


63 


modem  Pan-Islamism — the  movement  especially  asso¬ 
ciated  with  the  personality  of  Djemal-ed-Din. 

Seyid  Djemal-ed-Din  el- Afghani  was  born  early  in  the 
nineteenth  century  at  Asadabad,  near  Hamadan,  in 
Persia,  albeit,  as  his  name  shows,  he  was  of  Afghan  rather 
than  Iranian  descent,  while  his  title  “  Seyid,”  meaning 
descendant  of  the  Prophet,  implies  a  strain  of  Arab  blood. 
Endowed  with  a  keen  intelligence,  great  personal  magnet¬ 
ism,  and  abounding  vigor,  Djemal-ed-Din  had  a  stormy 
and  checkered  career.  He  was  a  great  traveller,  know¬ 
ing  intimately  not  only  most  of  the  Moslem  world  but 
western  Europe  as  well.  From  these  travels,  supple¬ 
mented  by  wide  reading,  he  gained  a  notable  fund  of 
information  which  he  employed  effectively  in  his  mani¬ 
fold  activities.  A  bom  propagandist,  Djemal-ed-Din  at¬ 
tracted  wide  attention,  and  wherever  he  went  in  Islam 
his  strong  personality  started  an  intellectual  ferment. 
Unlike  El  Sennussi,  he  concerned  himself  very  little  with 
theology,  devoting  himself  to  politics.  Djemal-ed-Din 
was  the  first  Mohammedan  who  fully  grasped  the  im¬ 
pending  peril  of  Western  domination,  and  he  devoted 
his  life  to  warning  the  Islamic  world  of  the  danger  and 
attempting  to  elaborate  measures  of  defense.  By  Euro¬ 
pean  colonial  authorities  he  was  soon  singled  out  as  a 
dangerous  agitator.  The  English,  in  particular,  feared 
and  persecuted  him.  Imprisoned  for  a  while  in  India, 
he  went  to  Egypt  about  1880,  and  had  a  hand  in  the 
anti-European  movement  of  Arabi  Pasha.  When  the 
English  occupied  Egypt  in  1882  they  promptly  expelled 
Djemal,  who  continued  his  wanderings,  finally  reaching 
Constantinople.  Here  he  found  a  generous  patron  in 
Abdul-Hamid,  then  evolving  his  Pan-Islamic  policy. 


64  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Naturally,  the  Sultan  was  enchanted  with  Djemal,  and 
promptly  made  him  the  head  of  his  Pan-Islamic  propa¬ 
ganda  bureau.  In  fact,  it  is  probable  that  the  success 
of  the  Sultan’s  Pan-Islamic  policy  was  largely  due  to 
Djemal’s  ability  and  zeal.  Djemal  died  in  1896  at  an 
advanced  age,  active  to  the  last. 

Djemal-ed-Din’s  teachings  may  be  summarized  as 
follows: 

“The  Christian  world,  despite  its  internal  differences 
of  race  and  nationality,  is,  as  against  the  East  and  espe¬ 
cially  as  against  Islam,  united  for  the  destruction  of  all 
Mohammedan  states. 

“The  Crusades  still  subsist,  as  well  as  the  fanatical 
spirit  of  Peter  the  Hermit.  At  heart,  Christendom  still 
regards  Islam  with  fanatical  hatred  and  contempt.  This 
is  shown  in  many  ways,  as  in  international  law,  before 
which  Moslem  nations  are  not  treated  as  the  equals  of 
Christian  nations. 

“Christian  governments  excuse  the  attacks  and  humil¬ 
iations  inflicted  upon  Moslem  states  by  citing  the  latter’s 
backward  and  barbarous  condition;  yet  these  same  gov¬ 
ernments  stifle  by  a  thousand  means,  even  by  war,  every 
attempted  effort  of  reform  and  revival  in  Moslem  lands. 

“Hatred  of  Islam  is  common  to  all  Christian  peoples, 
not  merely  to  some  of  them,  and  the  result  of  this  spirit 
is  a  tacit,  persistent  effort  for  Islam’s  destruction. 

“Every  Moslem  feeling  and  aspiration  is  caricatured 
and  calumniated  by  Christendom.  ‘The  Europeans  call 
in  the  Orient  “fanaticism”  what  at  home  they  call 
“nationalism”  and  “patriotism.”  And  what  in  the 
West  they  call  “self-respect,”  “pride,”  “national  honor,” 
in  the  East  they  call  “chauvinism.”  What  in  the  West 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


65 


they  esteem  as  national  sentiment,  in  the  East  they  con¬ 
sider  xenophobia/  1 

“From  all  this,  it  is  plain  that  the  whole  Moslem  world 
must  unite  in  a  great  defensive  alliance,  to  preserve  itself 
from  destruction;  and,  to  do  this,  it  must  acquire  the 
technic  of  Western  progress  and  learn  the  secrets  of  Eu¬ 
ropean  power." 

Such,  in  brief,  are  the  teachings  of  Djemal-ed-Din, 
propagated  with  eloquence  and  authority  for  many  years. 
Given  the  state  of  mingled  fear  and  hatred  of  Western 
encroachment  that  was  steadily  spreading  throughout  the 
Moslem  world,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  great  Djemal's  in¬ 
fluence  must  have  been.  And  of  course  Djemal  was 
not  alone  in  his  preaching.  Other  influential  Moslems 
were  agitating  along  much  the  same  lines  as  early  as  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  One  of  these  pioneers 
was  the  Turkish  notable  Aali  Pasha,  who  was  said  to 
remark:  “What  we  want  is  rather  an  increase  of  fanati¬ 
cism  than  a  diminution  of  it."  2  Arminius  Vambery,  the 
eminent  Hungarian  Oriental  scholar,  states  that  shortly 
after  the  Crimean  War  he  was  present  at  a  militant 
Pan-Islamic  gathering,  attended  by  emissaries  from  far 
parts  of  the  Moslem  world,  held  at  Aali  Pasha's  palace.3 

Such  were  the  foundations  upon  which  Sultan  Abdul 
Hamid  built  his  ambitious  Pan-Islamic  structure.  Abdul 
Hamid  is  one  of  the  strangest  personalities  of  modern 

1  Quoted  from  article  by  “X,”  “Le  Pan-Islamisme  et  le  Pan-Turquisme,” 
Revue  du  Monde  musulman,  March,  1913.  This  authoritative  article  is, 
so  the  editor  informs  us,  from  the  pen  of  an  eminent  Mohammedan — “un 
homme  d’et&t  musulman.”  For  other  activities  of  Djemal-ed-Din,  see 
A.  Servier,  Le  Nationalisme  musulman,  pp.  10-13. 

2  Quoted  from  W.  G.  Palgrave,  Essays  on  Eastern  Questions,  p.  Ill 
(London,  1872). 

3  A.  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands ,  p.  351  (London,  190G). 


66  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


times.  A  man  of  unusual  intelligence,  his  mind  was 
yet  warped  by  strange  twists  which  went  to  the  verge 
of  insanity.  Nursing  ambitious,  grandiose  projects,  he 
tried  to  carry  them  out  by  dark  and  tortuous  methods 
which,  though  often  cleverly  Macchiavellian,  were  some¬ 
times  absurdly  puerile.  An  autocrat  by  nature,  he 
strove  to  keep  the  smallest  decisions  dependent  on  his 
arbitrary  will,  albeit  he  was  frequently  guided  by  clever 
sycophants  who  knew  how  to  play  upon  his  supersti¬ 
tions  and  his  prejudices. 

Abdul  Hamid  ascended  the  throne  in  1876  under  very 
difficult  circumstances.  The  country  was  on  the  verge 
of  a  disastrous  Russian  war,  while  the  government  was 
in  the  hands  of  statesmen  who  were  endeavoring  to  trans¬ 
form  Turkey  into  a  modern  state  and  who  had  introduced 
all  sorts  of  Western  political  innovations,  including  a  par¬ 
liament.  Abdul  Hamid,  however,  soon  changed  all  this. 
Taking  advantage  of  the  confusion  which  marked  the 
close  of  the  Russian  war,  he  abolished  parliament  and 
made  himself  as  absolute  a  despot  as  any  of  his  ancestors 
had  ever  been.  Secure  in  his  autocratic  power,  Abdul 
Hamid  now  began  to  evolve  his  own  peculiar  policy, 
which,  from  the  first,  had  a  distinctly  Pan-Islamic  trend.1 
Unlike  his  immediate  predecessors,  Abdul  Hamid  deter¬ 
mined  to  use  his  position  as  caliph  for  far-reaching  po¬ 
litical  ends.  Emphasizing  his  spiritual  headship  of  the 
Mohammedan  world  rather  than  his  political  headship 
of  the  Turkish  state,  he  endeavored  to  win  the  active 
support  of  all  Moslems  and,  by  that  support,  to  intimi- 

1  Abdul  Hamid’s  Pan-Islamic  schemes  were  first  clearly  discerned  by  the 
French  publicist  Gabriel  Charmes  as  early  as  1881,  and  his  warnings  were 
published  in  his  prophetic  book  U Avenir  de  la  Turquie — Le  Panislamisme 
(Paris,  1883). 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


67 


date  European  Powers  who  might  be  formulating  aggres¬ 
sive  measures  against  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Before  long 
Abdul  Hamid  had  built  up  an  elaborate  Pan-Islamic 
propaganda  organization,  working  mainly  by  secretive, 
tortuous  methods.  Constantinople  became  the  Mecca  of 
all  the  fanatics  and  anti-Western  agitators  like  Djemal- 
ed-Din.  And  from  Constantinople  there  went  forth 
swarms  of  picked  emissaries,  bearing  to  the  most  distant 
parts  of  Islam  the  Caliph’s  message  of  hope  and  im¬ 
pending  deliverance  from  the  menace  of  infidel  rule. 

Abdul  Hamid’s  Pan-Islamic  propaganda  went  on  unin¬ 
terruptedly  for  nearly  thirty  years.  Precisely  what  this 
propaganda  accomplished  is  veiy  difficult  to  estimate. 
In  the  first  place,  it  was  cut  short,  and  to  some  extent 
reversed,  by  the  Young-Turk  revolution  of  1908  which 
drove  Abdul  Hamid  from  the  throne.  It  certainly  was 
never  put  to  the  test  of  a  war  between  Turkey  and  a  first- 
class  European  Power.  This  is  what  renders  any  theo¬ 
retical  appraisal  so  inconclusive.  Abdul  Hamid  did  suc¬ 
ceed  in  gaming  the  respectful  acknowledgment  of  his 
spiritual  authority  by  most  Moslem  princes  and  notables, 
and  he  certainly  won  the  pious  veneration  of  the  Moslem 
masses.  In  the  most  distant  regions  men  came  to  regard 
the  mighty  Caliph  in  Stambul  as,  in  very  truth,  the 
Defender  of  the  Faith,  and  to  consider  his  empire  as  the 
bulwark  of  Islam.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  far  cry 
from  pious  enthusiasm  to  practical  performance.  Fur¬ 
thermore,  Abdul  Hamid  did  not  succeed  in  winning 
over  powerful  Pan-Islamic  leaders  like  El  Sennussi,  who 
suspected  his  motives  and  questioned  his  judgment; 
while  Moslem  liberals  everywhere  disliked  him  for  his 
despotic,  reactionary,  inefficient  rule.  It  is  thus  a  very 


68  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


debatable  question  whether,  if  Abdul  Hamid  had  ever 
called  upon  the  Moslem  world  for  armed  assistance  in  a 
“holy  war,”  he  would  have  been  generally  supported. 

Yet  Abdul  Hamid  undoubtedly  furthered  the  general 
spread  of  Pan-Islamic  sentiment  throughout  the  Moslem 
world.  In  this  larger  sense  he  succeeded;  albeit  not  so 
much  from  his  position  as  caliph  as  because  he  incarnated 
the  growing  fear  and  hatred  of  the  West.  Thus  we  may 
conclude  that  Abdul  Hamid’s  Pan-Islamic  propaganda 
did  produce  profound  and  lasting  effects  which  will  have 
to  be  seriously  reckoned  with. 

The  Young-Turk  revolution  of  1908  greatly  complicated 
the  situation.  It  was  soon  followed  by  the  Persian 
revolution  and  by  kindred  symptoms  in  other  parts  of 
the  East.  These  events  brought  into  sudden  prominence 
new  forces,  such  as  constitutionalism,  nationalism,  and 
even  social  unrest,  which  had  long  been  obscurely  germi¬ 
nating  in  Islam  but  which  had  been  previously  denied 
expression.*  We  shall  later  consider  these  new  forces  in 
detail.  The  point  to  be  here  noted  is  their  complicating 
effect  on  the  Pan-Islamic  movement.  Pan-Islamism  was, 
in  fact,  cross-cut  and  deflected  from  its  previous  course, 
and  a  period  of  confusion  and  mental  uncertainty  super¬ 
vened. 

This  interim  period  was  short.  By  1912  Pan-Islamism 
had  recovered  its  poise  and  was  moving  forward  once 
more.  The  reason  was  renewed  pressure  from  the  West. 
In  1911  came  Italy’s  barefaced  raid  on  Turkey’s  African 
dependency  of  Tripoli,  while  in  1912  the  allied  Chris¬ 
tian  Balkan  states  attacked  Turkey  in  the  Balkan  War, 
which  sheared  away  Turkey’s  European  provinces  to 
the  very  walls  of  Constantinople  and  left  her  crippled 


i 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


69 


and  discredited.  Moreover,  in  those  same  fateful  years 
Russia  and  England  strangled  the  Persian  revolution, 
while  France,  as  a  result  of  the  Agadir  crisis,  closed  her 
grip  on  Morocco.  Thus,  in  a  scant  two  years,  the 
Moslem  world  had  suffered  at  European  hands  assaults 
not  only  unprecedented  in  gravity  but,  in  Moslem  eyes, 
quite  without  provocation. 

The  effect  upon  Islam  was  tremendous.  A  flood  of 
mingled  despair  and  rage  swept  the  Moslem  world  from 
end  to  end.  And,  of  course,  the  Pan-Islamic  implication 
was  obvious.  This  was  precisely  what  Pan-Islam’s  agi¬ 
tators  had  been  preaching  for  fifty  years — the  Crusade 
of  the  West  for  Islam’s  destruction.  What  could  be 
better  confirmation  of  the  warnings  of  Djemal-ed-Din? 

The  results  were  soon  seen.  In  Tripoli,  where  Turks 
and  Arabs  had  been  on  the  worst  of  terms,  both  races 
clasped  hands  in  a  sudden  access  of  Pan-Islamic  fervor, 
and  the  Italian  invaders  were  met  with  a  fanatical  fury 
that  roused  Islam  to  wild  applause  and  inspired  Western 
observers  with  grave  disquietude.  “Why  has  Italy 
found  defenseless’  Tripoli  such  a  hornet’s  nest?”  queried 
Gabriel  Hanotaux,  a  former  French  minister  of  foreign 
affairs.  “It  is  because  she  has  to  do,  not  merely  with 
Turkey,  but  with  Islam  as  well.  Italy  has  set  the  ball 
rolling — so  much  the  worse  for  her — and  for  us  all.”1 
The  Anglo-Russian  manhandling  of  Persia  likewise  roused 
much  wrathful  comment  throughout  Islam,2  while  the 

Gabriel  Hanotaux,  “La  Crise  m6diterraneenne  et  F  Islam,”  Revue 
Hebdomadaire,  April  13,  1912. 

2  See  “X,”  “La  Situation  politique  de  la  Perse,”  Revue  du  Monde 
musulman,  June,  1914;  B.  Temple,  “The  Place  of  Persia  in  World-Politics.” 
Proceedings  of  the  Central  Asian  Society ,  May  4,  1910;  W.  M.  Shuster, 
The  Strangling  of  Persia  (New  York,  1912). 


70  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


impending  extinction  of  Moroccan  independence  at 
French  hands  was  discussed  with  mournful  indignation. 

But  with  the  coming  of  the  Balkan  War  the  wrath  of 
Islam  knew  no  bounds.  From  China  to  the  Congo, 
pious  Moslems  watched  with  bated  breath  the  swaying 
battle-lines  in  the  far-off  Balkans,  and  when  the  news  of 
Turkish  disaster  came,  Islam’s  cry  of  wrathful  anguish 
rose  hoarse  and  high.  A  prominent  Indian  Mohammedan 
well  expressed  the  feelings  of  his  coreligionists  every¬ 
where  when  he  wrote:  “The  King  of  Greece  orders  a 
new  Crusade.  From  the  London  Chancelleries  rise  calls 
to  Christian  fanaticism,  and  Saint  Petersburg  already 
speaks  of  the  planting  of  the  Cross  on  the  dome  of 
Sant’  Sophia.  To-day  they  speak  thus;  to-morrow  they 
will  thus  speak  of  Jerusalem  and  the  Mosque  of  Omar. 
Brothers!  Be  ye  of  one  mind,  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
every  True  Believer  to  hasten  beneath  the  Khalifa’s 
banner  and  to  sacrifice  his  life  for  the  safety  of  the 
faith.”1  And  another  Indian  Moslem  leader  thus  ad¬ 
jured  the  British  authorities:  “I  appeal  to  the  present 
government  to  change  its  anti-Turkish  attitude  before 
the  fury  of  millions  of  Moslem  fellow  subjects  is  kindled 
to  a  blaze  and  brings  disaster.”2 

Most  significant  of  all  were  the  appeals  made  at  this 
time  by  Moslems  to  non-Mohammedan  Asiatics  for  sym¬ 
pathy  and  solidarity  against  the  hated  West.  This  was  a 
development  as  unprecedented  as  it  was  startling.  Mo¬ 
hammed,  revering  as  he  did  the  Old  and  New  Testa¬ 
ments,  and  regarding  himself  as  the  successor  of  the 

1  Quoted  from  A.  Vamb6ry,  “Die  turkische  Katastrophe  und  die  Islam- 
welt,”  Deutsche  Revue,  July,  1913. 

2  Shah  Mohammed  Naimatullah,  “Recent  Turkish  Events  and  Moslem 
India,”  Asiatic  Review,  October,  1913. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


71 


divinely  inspired  prophets  Moses  and  Jesus,  had  en¬ 
joined  upon  his  followers  relative  respect  for  Christians 
and  Jews  (“Peoples  of  the  Book”)  in  contrast  with 
other  non-Moslems,  whom  he  stigmatized  as  “Idola¬ 
ters.”  These  injunctions  of  the  Prophet  had  always 
been  heeded,  and  down  to  our  own  days  the  hatred  of 
Moslems  for  Christians,  however  bitter,  had  been  as 
nothing  compared  with  their  loathing  and  contempt  for 
“Idolaters”  like  the  Brahmanist  Hindus  or  the  Bud¬ 
dhists  and  Confucianists  of  the  Far  East. 

The  first  symptom  of  a  change  in  attitude  appeared 
during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  of  1904.  So  great  had 
Islam's  fear  and  hatred  of  the  Christian  West  then  be¬ 
come,  that  the  triumph  of  an  Asiatic  people  over  Euro¬ 
peans  was  enthusiastically  hailed  by  many  Moslems, 
even  though  the  victors  were  “ Idolaters.”  It  was  quite 
in  keeping  with  Pan-Islamism’s  strong  missionary  bent 
that  many  pious  Moslems  should  have  dreamed  of 
bringing  these  heroes  within  the  Islamic  fold.  Efforts  to 
get  in  touch  with  Japan  were  made.  Propagandist 
papers  were  founded,  missionaries  were  selected,  and  the 
Sultan  sent  a  warship  to  Japan  with  a  Pan-Islamic  dele¬ 
gation  aboard.  Throughout  Islam  the  projected  conver¬ 
sion  of  Japan  was  widely  discussed.  Said  an  Egyptian 
journal  in  the  year  1906:  “England,  with  her  sixty  mil¬ 
lion  Indian  Moslems,  dreads  this  conversion.  With  a 
Mohammedan  Japan,  Mussulman  policy  would  change 
entirely.”1  And,  at  the  other  end  of  the  Moslem  world, 
a  Chinese  Mohammedan  sheikh  wrote:  “If  Japan  thinks 
of  becoming  some  day  a  very  great  power  and  making 

1  Quoted  by  F.  Farjanel,  “Le  Japon  et  l'lslam,”  Revue  du  Monde  musul- 
man ,  November,  1906. 


72  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Asia  the  dominator  of  the  other  continents,  it  will  be 
only  by  adopting  the  blessed  religion  of  Islam.”  1 

Of  course  it  soon  became  plain  to  these  enthusiasts 
that  while  Japan  received  Islam’s  emissaries  with  smil¬ 
ing  courtesy,  she  had  not  the  faintest  intention  of  turn¬ 
ing  Mohammedan.  Nevertheless,  the  first  step  had  been 
taken  toward  friendly  relations  with  non-Moslem  Asia, 
and  the  Balkan  War  drove  Moslems  much  further  in  this 
direction.  The  change  in  Moslem  sentiment  can  be 
gauged  by  the  numerous  appeals  made  by  the  Indian 
Mohammedans  at  this  time  to  Hindus,  as  may  be  seen 
from  the  following  sample  entitled  significantly  “The 
Message  of  the  East.”  “Spirit  of  the  East,”  reads  this 
noteworthy  document,  “arise  and  repel  the  swelling  flood 
of  Western  aggression !  Children  of  Hindustan,  aid  us 
with  your  wisdom,  culture,  and  wealth;  lend  us  your 
power,  the  birthright  and  heritage  of  the  Hindu !  Let  the 
Spirit  Powers  hidden  in  the  Himalayan  mountain-peaks 
arise.  Let  prayers  to  the  god  of  battles  float  upward; 
prayers  that  right  may  triumph  over  might;  and  call  to 
your  myriad  gods  to  annihilate  the  armies  of  the  foe!”2 

To  any  one  who  realizes  the  traditional  Moslem  atti¬ 
tude  toward  “Idolaters,”  such  words  are  simply  amaz¬ 
ing.  They  betoken  a  veritable  revolution  in  outlook. 
And  such  sentiments  were  not  confined  to  Indian  Mos¬ 
lems;  they  were  equally  evident  among  Chinese  Moslems 
as  well.  Said  a  Mohammedan  newspaper  of  Chinese 
Turkestan,  advocating  a  fraternal  union  of  all  Chinese 
against  Western  aggression:  “Europe  has  grown  too 
presumptuous.  It  will  deprive  us  of  our  liberty;  it  will 
destroy  us  altogether  if  we  do  not  bestir  ourselves 

1  Farjanel,  supra. 


2  Quoted  by  Vamb6ry,  supra. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


73 


promptly  and  prepare  for  a  powerful  resistance.” 1  Dur¬ 
ing  the  troublous  first  stages  of  the  Chinese  revolution, 
the  Mohammedans,  emerging  from  their  sulky  aloofness, 
co-operated  so  loyally  with  their  Buddhist  and  Confucian 
fellow  patriots  that  Doctor  Sun-Yat-Sen,  the  Republican 
leader,  announced  gratefully:  “The  Chinese  will  never 
forget  the  assistance  which  their  Moslem  fellow  country¬ 
men  have  rendered  in  the  interest  of  order  and  liberty.” 2 

The  Great  War  thus  found  Islam  everywhere  deeply 
stirred  against  European  aggression,  keenly  conscious  of 
its  own  solidarity,  and  frankly  reaching  out  for  Asiatic 
allies  in  the  projected  struggle  against  European  domina¬ 
tion. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  may  at  first  sight  appear 
strange  that  no  general  Islamic  explosion  occurred  when 
Turkey  entered  the  lists  at  the  close  of  1914  and  the 
Sultan-Caliph  issued  a  formal  summons  to  the  Holy  War. 
Of  course  this  summons  was  not  the  flat  failure  which 
Allied  reports  led  the  West  to  believe  at  the  time.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  trouble  in  practically  every 
Mohammedan  land  under  Allied  control.  To  name  only 
a  few  of  many  instances:  Egypt  broke  into  a  tumult 
smothered  only  by  overwhelming  British  reinforcements, 
Tripoli  burst  into  a  flame  of  insurrection  that  drove  the 
Italians  headlong  to  the  coast,  Persia  was  prevented  from 
joining  Turkey  only  by  prompt  Russo-British  interven¬ 
tion,  while  the  Indian  northwest  frontier  was  the  scene 
of  fighting  that  required  the  presence  of  a  quarter  of  a 
million  Anglo-Indian  troops.  The  British  Government 

1  Vambery,  “An  Approach  between  Moslems  and  Buddhists,”  Nineteenth 
Century  and  After ,  April,  1912. 

2  Ibid. 


74  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


has  officially  admitted  that  during  1915  the  Allies’  Asiatic 
and  African  possessions  stood  within  a  hand’s  breadth 
of  a  cataclysmic  insurrection. 

That  insurrection  would  certainly  have  taken  place  if 
Islam’s  leaders  had  everywhere  spoken  the  fateful  word. 
But  the  word  was  not  spoken.  Instead,  influential 
Moslems  outside  of  Turkey  generally  condemned  the 
latter’s  action  and  did  all  in  their  power  to  calm  the 
passions  of  the  fanatic  multitude. 

The  attitude  of  these  leaders  does  credit  to  their  dis¬ 
cernment.  They  recognized  that  this  was  neither  the 
time  nor  the  occasion  for  a  decisive  struggle  with  the 
West.  They  were  not  yet  materially  prepared,  and  they 
had  not  perfected  their  understandings  either  among 
themselves  or  with  their  prospective  non-Moslem  allies. 
Above  all,  the  moral  urge  was  lacking.  They  knew  that 
athwart  the  Khalifa’s  writ  was  stencilled  “Made  in 
Germany.”  They  knew  that  the  “Young-Turk”  clique 
which  had  engineered  the  coup  was  made  up  of  Euro¬ 
peanized  renegades,  many  of  them  not  even  nominal 
Moslems,  but  atheistic  Jews.  Far-sighted  Moslems  had 
no  intention  of  pulling  Germany’s  chestnuts  out  of  the 
fire,  nor  did  they  wish  to  further  Prussian  schemes  of 
world-dominion  which  for  themselves  would  have  meant 
a  mere  change  of  masters.  Far  better  to  let  the  West 
fight  out  its  desperate  feud,  weaken  itself,  and  reveal 
fully  its  future  intentions.  Meanwhile  Islam  could  bide 
its  time,  grow  in  strength,  and  await  the  morrow. 

The  Versailles  peace  conference  was  just  such  a  revela¬ 
tion  of  European  intentions  as  the  Pan-Islamic  leaders 
had  been  waiting  for  in  order  to  perfect  their  pro¬ 
grammes  and  enlist  the  moral  solidarity  of  their  fol- 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


75 


lowers.  At  Versailles  the  European  Powers  showed  un¬ 
equivocally  that  they  had  no  intention  of  relaxing  their 
hold  upon  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  By  a  number  of 
secret  treaties  negotiated  during  the  war,  the  Ottoman 
Empire  had  been  virtually  partitioned  between  the  vic¬ 
torious  Allies,  and  these  secret  treaties  formed  the  basis 
of  the  Versailles  settlement.  Furthermore,  Egypt  had 
been  declared  a  British  protectorate  at  the  very  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  war,  while  the  Versailles  conference  had 
scarcely  adjourned  before  England  announced  an  “  agree¬ 
ment”  with  Persia  which  made  that  country  another 
British  protectorate  in  fact  if  not  in  name.  The  upshot 
was,  as  already  stated,  that  the  Near  and  Middle  East 
were  subjected  to  European  political  domination  as  never 
before. 

But  there  was  another  side  to  the  shield.  During  the 
war  years  the  Allied  statesmen  had  officially  proclaimed 
times  without  number  that  the  war  was  being  fought  to 
establish  a  new  world-order  based  on  such  principles  as 
the  rights  of  small  nations  and  the  liberty  of  all  peoples. 
These  pronouncements  had  been  treasured  and  memor¬ 
ized  throughout  the  East.  When,  therefore,  the  East 
saw  a  peace  settlement  based,  not  upon  these  high  profes¬ 
sions,  but  upon  the  imperialistic  secret  treaties,  it  was 
fired  with  a  moral  indignation  and  sense  of  outraged  jus¬ 
tice  never  known  before.  A  tide  of  impassioned  determi¬ 
nation  began  rising  which  has  already  set  the  entire  East 
in  tumultuous  ferment,  and  which  seems  merely  the  pre¬ 
monitory  ground-swell  of  a  greater  storm.  So  ominous 
were  the  portents  that  even  before  the  Versailles  confer¬ 
ence  had  adjourned  many  European  students  of  Eastern 
affairs  expressed  grave  alarm.  Here,  for  example,  is  the 


76  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


judgment  of  Leone  Caetani,  Duke  of  Sermoneta,  an  Ital¬ 
ian  authority  on  Mohammedan  questions.  Speaking  in 
the  spring  of  1919  on  the  war's  effect  on  the  East,  he 
said:  “The  convulsion  has  shaken  Islamic  and  Oriental 
civilization  to  its  foundations.  The  entire  Oriental 
world,  from  China  to  the  Mediterranean,  is  in  ferment. 
Everywhere  the  hidden  fire  of  anti-European  hatred  is 
burning.  Riots  in  Morocco,  risings  in  Algiers,  discon¬ 
tent  in  Tripoli,  so-called  Nationalist  attempts  in  Egypt, 
Arabia,  and  Lybia  are  all  different  manifestations  of  the 
same  deep  sentiment,  and  have  as  their  object  the  re¬ 
bellion  of  the  Oriental  world  against  European  civiliza¬ 
tion."1 

Those  words  are  a  prophetic  forecast  of  what  has  since 
occurred  in  the  Moslem  world.  Because  recent  events  • 
are  perhaps  even  more  involved  with  the  nationalistic 
aspirations  of  the  Moslem  peoples  than  they  are  with  the 
strictly  Pan-Islamic  movement,  I  propose  to  defer  their 
detailed  discussion  till  the  chapter  on  Nationalism.  We 
should,  however,  remember  that  Moslem  nationalism 
and  Pan-Islamism,  whatever  their  internal  differences, 
tend  to  unite  against  the  external  pressure  of  European 
domination  and  equally  desire  Islam's  liberation  from 
European  political  control.  Remembering  these  facts, 
let  us  survey  the  present  condition  of  the  Pan-Islamic 
movement. 

Pan-Islamism  has  been  tremendously  stimulated  by 
Western  pressure,  especially  by  the  late  war  and  the  re¬ 
cent  peace  settlements.  However,  Pan-Islamism  must 
not  be  considered  as  merely  a  defensive  political  reaction 
against  external  aggression.  It  springs  primarily  from 

1  Special  cable  to  the  New  York  Times ,  dated  Rome,  May  28,  1919. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


77 


that  deep  sentiment  of  unity  which  links  Moslem  to 
Moslem  by  bonds  much  stronger  than  those  which  unite 
the  members  of  the  Christian  world.  These  bonds  are 
not  merely  religious,  in  the  technical  sense;  they  are  so¬ 
cial  and  cultural  as  well.  Throughout  the  Moslem  world, 
despite  wide  differences  in  local  customs  and  regulations, 
the  basic  laws  of  family  and  social  conduct  are  every¬ 
where  the  same.  “The  truth  is  that  Islam  is  more  than 
a  creed,  it  is  a  complete  social  system;  it  is  a  civiliza¬ 
tion  with  a  philosophy,  a  culture,  and  an  art  of  its  own; 
in  its  long  struggle  against  the  rival  civilization  of  Chris¬ 
tendom  it  has  become  an  organic  unit  conscious  of  it¬ 
self.”1 

To  this  Islamic  civilization  all  Moslems  are  deeply 
attached.  In  this  larger  sense,  Pan-Islamism  is  universal. 
Even  the  most  liberal-minded  Moslems,  however  much 
they  may  welcome  Western  ideas,  and  however  strongly 
they  may  condemn  the  fanatical,  reactionaiy  aspects  of 
the  political  Pan-Islamic  movement,  believe  fervently  in 
Islam’s  essential  solidarity.  As  a  leading  Indian  Moslem 
liberal,  The  Aga  Khan,  remarks:  “There  is  a  right  and 
legitimate  Pan-Islamism  to  which  every  sincere  and  be¬ 
lieving  Mohammedan  belongs — that  is,  the  theory  of  the 
spiritual  brotherhood  and  unity  of  the  children  of  the 
Prophet.  The  real  spiritual  and  cultural  unity  of  Islam 
must  ever  grow,  for  to  the  follower  of  the  Prophet  it  is 
the  foundation  of  the  life  and  the  soul.”2 

If  such  is  the  attitude  of  Moslem  liberals,  thoroughly 
conversant  with  Western  culture  and  receptive  to  West- 

1  Sir  T.  Morison,  “England  and  Islam,”  Nineteenth  Century  and  After , 
July,  1919. 

2H.  H.  The  Aga  Khan,  India  in  Transition ,  p.  158  (London,  1918). 


78  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ern  progress,  what  must  be  the  feelings  of  the  Moslem 
masses,  ignorant,  reactionary,  and  fanatical?  Besides 
perfectly  understandable  fear  and  hatred  due  to  Western 
aggression,  there  is,  among  the  Moslem  masses,  a  great 
deal  of  genuine  fanaticism  caused,  not  by  European  po¬ 
litical  domination,  but  by  religious  bigotiy  and  blind 
hatred  of  Western  civilization.1  But  this  fanaticism  has, 
of  course,  been  greatly  inflamed  by  the  political  events  of 
the  past  decade,  until  to-day  religious,  cultural,  and  po¬ 
litical  hatred  of  the  West  have  coalesced  in  a  state  of 
mind  decidedly  ominous  for  the  peace  of  the  world.  We 
should  not  delude  ourselves  into  minimizing  the  danger¬ 
ous  possibilities  of  the  present  situation.  Just  because 
the  fake  “Holy  War”  proclaimed  by  the  Young-Turks 
at  German  instigation  in  1914  did  not  come  off  is  no  rea¬ 
son  for  believing  that  a  real  holy  war  is  impossible.  As 
a  German  staff-officer  in  Turkish  service  during  the  late 
struggle  very  candidly  says:  “The  Holy  War  was  an 
absolute  fiasco  just  because  it  was  not  a  Holy  War.”  2 
I  have  already  explained  how  most  Moslems  saw 
through  the  trick  and  refused  to  budge. 

However,  the  long  series  of  European  aggressions, 
culminating  in  the  recent  peace  settlements  which  sub¬ 
jected  virtually  the  entire  Moslem  world  to  European 
domination,  have  been  steadily  rousing  in  Moslem  hearts 
a  spirit  of  despairing  rage  that  may  have  disastrous  con¬ 
sequences.  Certainly,  the  materials  for  a  holy  war  have 
long  been  heaping  high.  More  than  twenty  years  ago 
Arminius  Vambery,  who  knew  the  Moslem  world  as  few 

1This  hatred  of  Western  civilization,  as  such,  will  be  discussed  in  the 
next  chapter. 

2  Ernst  Paraquin,  formerly  Ottoman  lieutenant-colonel  and  chief  of 
general  staff,  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  January  24,  1920. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


79 


Europeans  have  ever  known  it,  warned  the  West  of  the 
perils  engendered  by  recklessly  imperialistic  policies. 
“As  time  passes,”  he  wrote  in  1898,  “the  danger  of  a 
general  war  becomes  ever  greater.  We  should  not  forget 
that  time  has  considerably  augmented  the  adversary’s 
force  of  resistance.  I  mean  by  this  the  sentiment  of 
solidarity  which  is  becoming  livelier  of  late  years  among 
the  peoples  of  Islam,  and  which  in  our  age  of  rapid  com¬ 
munication  is  no  longer  a  negligible  quantity,  as  it  was 
even  ten  or  twenty  years  ago. 

“It  may  not  be  superfluous  to  draw  the  attention  of 
our  nineteenth  century  Crusaders  to  the  importance  of 
the  Moslem  press,  whose  ramifications  extend  all  over 
Asia  and  Africa,  and  whose  exhortations  sink  more  pro¬ 
foundly  than  they  do  with  us  into  the  souls  of  their  read¬ 
ers.  In  Turkey,  India,  Persia,  Central  Asia,  Java,  Egypt, 
and  Algeria,  native  organs,  daily  and  periodical,  begin 
to  exert  a  profound  influence.  Everything  that  Europe 
thinks,  decides,  and  executes  against  Islam  spreads 
through  those  countries  with  the  rapidity  of  lightning. 
Caravans  carry  the  news  to  the  heart  of  China  and  to  the 
equator,  where  the  tidings  are  commented  upon  in  very 
singular  fashion.  Certain  sparks  struck  at  our  meetings 
and  banquets  kindle,  little  by  little,  menacing  flames. 
Hence,  it  would  be  an  unpardonable  legerity  to  close 
our  eyes  to  the  dangers  lurking  beneath  an  apparent 
passivity.  What  the  Terdjuman  of  Crimea  says  between 
the  lines  is  repeated  by  the  Constantinople  Ikdam ,  and 
is  commented  on  and  exaggerated  at  Calcutta  by  The 
Moslem  Chronicle. 

“Of  course,  at  present,  the  bond  of  Pan-Islamism  is 
composed  of  tenuous  and  dispersed  strands.  But  West- 


80  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ern  aggression  might  easily  unite  those  strands  into  a 
solid  whole,  bringing  about  a  general  war.”  1 

In  the  decades  which  have  elapsed  since  Vambery 
wrote  those  lines  the  situation  has  become  much  more 
tense.  Moslem  resentment  at  European  dominance  has 
increased,  has  been  reinforced  by  nationalistic  aspirations 
almost  unknown  during  the  last  century,  and  possesses 
methods  of  highly  efficient  propaganda.  For  example, 
the  Pan -Islamic  press,  to  which  Vambery  refers,  has 
developed  in  truly  extraordinary  fashion.  In  1900  there 
were  in  the  whole  Islamic  world  not  more  than  200  propa¬ 
gandist  journals.  By  1906  there  were  500,  while  in  1914 
there  were  well  over  1,000.2  Moslems  fully  appreciate 
the  post-office,  the  railroad,  and  other  modern  methods 
of  rapidly  interchanging  ideas.  “Every  Moslem  country 
is  in  communication  with  every  other  Moslem  country: 
directly,  by  means  of  special  emissaries,  pilgrims,  travel¬ 
lers,  traders,  and  postal  exchanges;  indirectly,  by  means 
of  Mohammedan  newspapers,  books,  pamphlets,  leaflets, 
and  periodicals.  I  have  met  with  Cairo  newspapers  in 
Bagdad,  Teheran,  and  Peshawar;  Constantinople  news¬ 
papers  in  Basra  and  Bombay;  Calcutta  newspapers  in 
Mohammerah,  Kerbela,  and  Port  Said.”3  As  for  the 
professional  Pan-Islamic  propagandists,  more  particu¬ 
larly  those  of  the  religious  fraternities,  they  swarm  ev¬ 
erywhere,  rousing  the  fanaticism  of  the  people.  “Travel¬ 
ling  under  a  thousand  disguises — as  merchants,  preachers, 
students,  doctors,  workmen,  beggars,  fakirs,  mountebanks, 

1  A.  Vambery,  La  Turquie  d’aujourd’hui  et  d’avant  Quarante  Ans,  pp.  71, 
72  (Paris,  1898). 

2  A  Servier,  Le  Nationalisme  musulman ,  p.  182. 

3B.  Temple,  “The  Place  of  Persia  in  World-Politics,”  Proceedings  of 
the  Central  Asian  Society ,  May,  1910. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


81 


pretended  fools  or  rhapsodists,  these  emissaries  are  every¬ 
where  well  received  by  the  Faithful  and  are  efficaciously 
protected  against  the  suspicious  investigations  of  the 
European  colonial  authorities.” 1 

Furthermore,  there  is  to-day  in  the  Moslem  world  a 
wide-spread  conviction,  held  by  liberals  and  chauvinists 
alike  (albeit  for  very  different  reasons),  that  Islam  is 
entering  on  a  period  of  Renaissance  and  renewed  glory. 
Says  Sir  Theodore  Morison:  “No  Mohammedan  believes 
that  Islamic  civilization  is  dead  or  incapable  of  further 
development.  They  recognize  that  it  has  fallen  on  evil 
days;  that  it  has  suffered  from  an  excessive  veneration 
of  the  past,  from  prejudice  and  bigotry  and  narrow 
scholasticism  not  unlike  that  which  obscured  European 
thought  in  the  Middle  Ages;  but  they  believe  that  Islam 
too  is  about  to  have  its  Renaissance,  that  it  is  receiving 
from  Western  learning  a  stimulus  which  will  quicken  it 
into  fresh  activity,  and  that  the  evidences  of  this  new 
life  are  everywhere  manifest.”  2 

Sir  Theodore  Morison  describes  the  attitude  of  Moslem 
liberals.  How  Pan-Islamists  with  anti-Western  senti¬ 
ments  feel  is  well  set  forth  by  an  Egyptian,  Yahya  Sid- 
dyk,  in  his  well-known  book,  The  Awakening  of  the  Is¬ 
lamic  Peoples  in  the  Fourteenth  Century  of  the  Hegira .3 
The  book  is  doubly  interesting  because  the  author  has  a 
thorough  Western  education,  holding  a  law  degree  from 
the  French  university  of  Toulouse,  and  is  a  judge  on 
the  Egyptian  bench.  Although  writing  nearly  a  decade 
before  the  cataclysm,  Yahya  Siddyk  clearly  foresaw  the 

1  L.  Rinn,  Marabouts  et  Khouan,  p.  vi. 

2  Sir  T.  Morison,  “England  and  Islam,”  op.  cit. 

3  Yahya  Siddyk,  Le  Reveil  des  Peuples  islamiques  au  quatorzibme  Sibcle 
de  VHegire  (Cairo,  1907).  Also  published  in  Arabic. 


82  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


imminence  of  the  European  War.  “ Behold/7  he  writes, 
“  these  Great  Powers  ruining  themselves  in  terrifying 
armaments;  measuring  each  other’s  strength  with  defiant 
glances;  menacing  each  other;  contracting  alliances 
which  continually  break  and  which  presage  those  terrible 
shocks  which  overturn  the  world  and  cover  it  with  ruins, 
fire,  and  blood!  The  future  is  God’s,  and  nothing  is 
lasting  save  His  Will.” 

Yahya  Siddyk  considers  the  Western  world  degenerate. 
“Does  this  mean,”  he  asks,  “that  Europe,  our  ‘ enlight¬ 
ened  guide/  has  already  reached  the  summit  of  its  evo¬ 
lution  ?  Has  it  already  exhausted  its  vital  force  by  two 
or  three  centuries  of  hyperexertion?  In  other  words:  is 
it  already  stricken  with  senility,  and  will  it  see  itself  soon 
obliged  to  yield  its  civilizing  role  to  other  peoples  less  de¬ 
generate,  less  neurasthenic;  that  is  to  say,  younger,  more 
robust,  more  healthy,  than  itself?  In  my  opinion,  the 
present  marks  Europe’s  apogee,  and  its  immoderate  colo¬ 
nial  expansion  means,  not  strength,  but  weakness.  De¬ 
spite  the  aureole  of  so  much  grandeur,  power,  and  glory, 
Europe  is  to-day  more  divided  and  more  fragile  than  ever, 
and  ill  conceals  its  malaise,  its  sufferings,  and  its  anguish. 
Its  destiny  is  inexorably  working  out !  .  .  . 

“The  contact  of  Europe  on  the  East  has  caused  us  both 
much  good  and  much  evil:  good,  in  the  material  and 
intellectual  sense;  evil,  from  the  moral  and  political  point 
of  view.  Exhausted  by  long  struggles,  enervated  by  a 
brilliant  civilization,  the  Moslem  peoples  inevitably  fell 
into  a  malaise;  but  they  are  not  stricken,  they  are  not 
dead !  These  peoples,  conquered  by  the  force  of  cannon, 
have  not  in  the  least  lost  their  unity,  even  under  the 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


83 


oppressive  regimes  to  which  the  Europeans  have  long 
subjected  them.  .  .  . 

“I  have  said  that  the  European  contact  has  been 
salutary  to  us  from  both  the  material  and  intellectual 
point  of  view.  What  reforming  Moslem  princes  wished  to 
impose  by  force  on  their  Moslem  subjects  is  to-day  real¬ 
ized  a  hundredfold.  So  great  has  been  our  progress  in 
the  last  twenty-five  years  in  science,  letters,  and  art  that 
we  may  well  hope  to  be  in  all  these  things  the  equals  of 
Europe  in  less  than  half  a  century.  .  .  . 

“A  new  era  opens  for  us  with  the  fourteenth  century  of 
the  Hegira,  and  this  happy  century  will  mark  our  Renais¬ 
sance  and  our  great  future!  A  new  breath  animates 
the  Mohammedan  peoples  of  all  races;  all  Moslems  are 
penetrated  with  the  necessity  of  work  and  instruction! 
We  all  wish  to  travel,  do  business,  tempt  fortune,  brave 
dangers.  There  is  in  the  East,  among  the  Mohamme¬ 
dans,  a  surprising  activity,  an  animation,  unknown 
twenty-five  years  ago.  There  is  to-day  a  real  public 
opinion  throughout  the  East.” 

The  author  concludes:  “Let  us  hold  firm,  each  for  all, 
and  let  us  hope,  hope,  hope !  We  are  fairly  launched  on 
the  path  of  progress:  let  us  profit  by  it !  It  is  Europe’s 
very  tyranny  which  has  wTrought  our  transformation ! 
It  is  our  continued  contact  with  Europe  that  favors  our 
evolution  and  inevitably  hastens  our  revival !  It  is 
simply  history  repeating  itself;  the  Will  of  God  fulfilling 
itself  despite  all  opposition  and  all  resistance.  .  .  . 
Europe’s  tutelage  over  Asiatics  is  becoming  more  and 
more  nominal — the  gates  of  Asia  are  closing  against  the 
European !  Surely  we  glimpse  before  us  a  revolution 


84  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


without  parallel  in  the  world’s  annals.  A  new  age  is  at 
hand !” 

If  this  was  the  way  Pan-Islamists  were  thinking  in  the 
opening  years  of  the  century,  it  is  clear  that  their  views 
must  have  been  confirmed  and  intensified  by  the  Great 
War.1  The  material  power  of  the  West  was  thereby 
greatly  reduced,  while  its  prestige  was  equally  sapped  by 
the  character  of  the  peace  settlement  and  by  the  atten¬ 
dant  disputes  which  broke  out  among  the  victors.  The 
mutual  rivalries  and  jealousies  of  England,  France,  Italy, 
and  their  satellites  in  the  East  have  given  Moslems  much 
food  for  hopeful  thought,  and  have  caused  correspond¬ 
ing  disquietude  in  European  minds.  A  French  publicist 
recently  admonished  his  fellow  Europeans  that  “  Islam 
does  not  recognize  our  colonial  frontiers,”  and  added 
warningly,  “the  great  movement  of  Islamic  union  inaugu¬ 
rated  by  Djemal-ed-Din  el- Afghani  is  going  on.”2 

The  menacing  temper  of  Islam  is  shown  by  the  furious 
agitation  which  has  been  going  on  for  the  last  three  years 
among  India’s  70,000,000  Moslems  against  the  dismem¬ 
berment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  This  agitation  is  not 
confined  to  India.  It  is  general  throughout  Islam,  and 
Sir  Theodore  Morison  does  not  overstate  the  case  when 
he  says:  “It  is  time  the  British  public  realized  the  gravity 
of  what  is  happening  in  the  East.  The  Mohammedan 
world  is  ablaze  with  anger  from  end  to  end  at  the  partition 
of  Turkey.  The  outbreaks  of  violence  in  centres  so  far 
remote  as  Kabul  and  Cairo  are  symptoms  only  of  this 

1  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  effect  of  the  Great  War  upon  Asiatic  and 
African  peoples,  see  my  book  The  Rising  Tide  of  Color  against  White 
World-Supremacy  (New  York  and  London,  1920). 

2L.  Massignon,  “L’Islam  et  la  Politique  des  Allies,”  Revue  des  Sciences 
politiques ,  June,  1920. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


85 


f 

wide-spread  resentment.  I  have  been  in  close  touch  with 
Mohammedans  of  India  for  close  upon  thirty  years  and  I 
think  it  is  my  duty  to  warn  the  British  public  of  the  pas¬ 
sionate  resentment  which  Moslems  feel  at  the  proposed 
dismemberment  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  The  diplomats 
at  Versailles  apparently  thought  that  outside  the  Turkish 
homelands  there  is  no  sympathy  for  Turkey.  This  is  a 
disastrous  blunder.  You  have  but  to  meet  the  Mo¬ 
hammedan  now  in  London  to  realize  the  white  heat 
to  which  their  anger  is  rising.  In  India  itself  the  whole 
of  the  Mohammedan  community  from  Peshawar  to  Ar- 
cot  is  seething  with  passion  upon  this  subject.  Women 
inside  the  Zenanas  are  weeping  over  it.  Merchants  who 
usually  take  no  interest  in  public  affairs  are  leaving  their 
shops  and  counting-houses  to  organize  remonstrances  and 
petitions;  even  the  mediaeval  theologians  of  Deoband 
and  the  Nadwatul-Ulama,  whose  detachment  from  the 
modern  world  is  proverbial,  are  coming  from  their  clois¬ 
ters  to  protest  against  the  destruction  of  Islam.”1 

Possibly  the  most  serious  aspect  of  the  situation  is  that 
the  Moslem  liberals  are  being  driven  into  the  camp  of 
political  Pan-Islamism.  Receptive  though  the  liberals 
are  to  Western  ideas,  and  averse  though  they  are  to  Pan- 
Islamism’s  chauvinistic,  reactionary  tendencies,  Europe’s 
intransigeance  is  forcing  them  to  make  at  least  a  tem¬ 
porary  alliance  with  the  Pan-Islamic  and  Nationalist 
groups;  even  though  the  liberals  know  that  anything 
like  a  holy  war  would  dig  a  gulf  between  East  and  West, 
stop  the  influx  of  Western  stimuli,  favor  reactionary 
fanaticism,  and  perhaps  postpone  for  generations  a  mod¬ 
ernist  reformation  of  Islam. 

1  Sir  T.  Morison,  “England  and  Islam,”  op.  cit. 


86  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Perhaps  it  is  symptomatic  of  a  more  bellicose  temper 
in  Islam  that  the  last  few  years  have  witnessed  the  rapid 
spread  of  two  new  puritan,  fanatic  movements — the  Ikh- 
wan  and  the  Salafiya.  The  Ikhwan  movement  began 
obscurely  about  ten  years  ago  in  inner  Arabia — the  Nejd. 
It  is  a  direct  outgrowth  of  Wahabism,  from  which  it  dif¬ 
fers  in  no  essential  respect.  So  rapid  has  been  Ikhwan- 
ism’s  progress  that  it  to-day  absolutely  dominates  the 
entire  Nejd,  and  it  is  headed  by  desert  Arabia’s  most 
powerful  chieftain,  Bin  Saud,  a  descendant  of  the  Saud 
who  headed  the  Wahabi  movement  a  hundred  years  ago. 
The  fanaticism  of  the  Ikhwans  is  said  to  be  extraordi¬ 
nary,  while  their  programme  is  the  old  Wahabi  dream  of 
a  puritan  conversion  of  the  whole  Islamic  world.1  As  for 
the  Salafi  movement,  it  started  in  India  even  more  ob¬ 
scurely  than  Ikhwanism  did  in  Arabia,  but  during  the 
past  few  years  it  has  spread  widely  through  Islam.  Like 
Ikhwanism,  it  is  puritanical  and  fanatical  in  spirit,  its 
adherents  being  found  especially  among  dervish  organi¬ 
zations.2  Such  phenomena,  taken  with  everything  else, 
do  not  augur  well  for  the  peace  of  the  East. 

So  much  for  Pan-Islamism’s  religious  and  political 
sides.  Now  let  us  glance  at  its  commercial  and  industrial 
aspects — at  what  may  be  called  economic  Pan-Islamism. 

Economic  Pan-Islamism  is  the  direct  result  of  the 
permeation  of  Western  ideas.  Half  a  century  ago  the 
Moslem  world  was  economically  still  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
The  provisions  of  the  sheriat,  or  Moslem  canon  law,  such 

1  For  the  Ikhwan  movement,  see  P.  W.  Harrison,  “The  Situation  in 
Arabia,”  Atlantic  Monthly,  December,  1920;  S.  Mylrea,  “The  Politico- 
Religious  Situation  in  Arabia,”  The  Moslem  World,  July,  1919. 

2  For  the  Salafi  movement,  see  “  Wahhabisme — Son  Avenir  sociale  et  le 
Mouvement  salafi,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman,  1919. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


87 


as  the  prohibition  of  interest  rendered  economic  life  in 
the  modern  sense  impossible.  What  little  trade  and  in¬ 
dustry  did  exist  was  largely  in  the  hands  of  native  Chris¬ 
tians  or  Jews.  Furthermore,  the  whole  economic  life  of 
the  East  was  being  disorganized  by  the  aggressive  com¬ 
petition  of  the  West.  Europe’s  political  conquest  of  the 
Moslem  world  was,  in  fact,  paralleled  by  an  economic 
conquest  even  more  complete.  Everywhere  percolated 
the  flood  of  cheap,  abundant  European  machine-made 
goods,  while  close  behind  came  European  capital,  tempt¬ 
ingly  offering  itself  in  return  for  loans  and  concessions 
which,  once  granted,  paved  the  way  for  European  po¬ 
litical  domination. 

Yet  in  economics  as  in  politics  the  very  completeness 
of  Europe’s  triumph  provoked  resistance.  Angered  and 
alarmed  by  Western  exploitation,  Islam  frankly  recognized 
its  economic  inferiority  and  sought  to  escape  from  its 
subjection.  Far-sighted  Moslems  began  casting  about 
for  a  modus  vivendi  with  modern  life  that  would  put 
Islam  economically  abreast  of  the  times.  Western 
methods  were  studied  and  copied.  The  prohibitions  of 
the  sheriat  were  evaded  or  quietly  ignored. 

The  upshot  has  been  a  marked  evolution  toward 
Western  economic  standards.  This  evolution  is  of  course 
still  in  its  early  stages,  and  is  most  noticeable  in  lands 
most  exposed  to  Western  influences  like  India,  Egypt, 
and  Algeria.  Yet  everywhere  in  the  Moslem  world  the 
trend  is  the  same.  The  details  of  this  economic  trans¬ 
formation  will  be  discussed  in  the  chapter  devoted  to 
economic  change.  What  we  are  here  concerned  with  is 
its  Pan-Islamic  aspect.  And  that  aspect  is  very  strong. 
Nowhere  does  Islam’s  innate  solidarity  come  out  better 


88  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


than  in  the  economic  field.  The  religious,  cultural,  and 
customary  ties  which  bind  Moslem  to  Moslem  enable 
Mohammedans  to  feel  more  or  less  at  home  in  every  part 
of  the  Islamic  world,  while  Western  methods  of  transit 
and  communication  enable  Mohammedans  to  travel  and 
keep  in  touch  as  they  never  could  before.  New  types  of 
Moslems — wholesale  merchants,  steamship  owners,  busi¬ 
ness  men,  bankers,  even  factory  industrialists  and  brokers 
— are  rapidly  evolving;  types  which  would  have  been 
simply  unthinkable  a  century,  or  even  half  a  century,  ago. 

And  these  new  men  understand  each  other  perfectly. 
Bound  together  both  by  the  ties  of  Islamic  fraternity 
and  by  the  pressure  of  Western  competition,  they  co¬ 
ordinate  their  efforts  much  more  easily  than  politicals 
have  succeeded  in  doing.  Here  liberals,  Pan-Islamists, 
and  Nationalists  can  meet  on  common  ground.  Here  is 
no  question  of  political  conspiracies,  revolts,  or  holy 
wars,  challenging  the  armed  might  of  Europe  and  risking 
bloody  repression  or  blind  reaction.  On  the  contrary, 
here  is  merely  a  working  together  of  fellow  Moslems  for 
economic  ends  by  business  methods  which  the  West 
cannot  declare  unlawful  and  dare  not  repress. 

What,  then,  is  the  specific  programme  of  economic 
Pan-Islamism ?  It  is  easily  stated:  the  wealth  of  Islam 
for  Moslems.  The  profits  of  trade  and  industry  for  Mos¬ 
lem  instead  of  Christian  hands.  The  eviction  of  West¬ 
ern  capital  by  Moslem  capital.  Above  all,  the  breaking 
of  Europe’s  grip  on  Islam’s  natural  resources  by  the  ter¬ 
mination  of  concessions  in  lands,  mines,  forests,  railways, 
custom-houses,  by  which  the  wealth  of  Islamic  lands  is 
to-day  drained  away  to  foreign  shores. 

Such  are  the  aspirations  of  economic  Pan-Islamism. 


PAN-ISLAMISM 


89 


They  are  wholly  modern  concepts,  the  outgrowth  of  those 
Western  ideas  whose  influence  upon  the  Moslem  world  I 
shall  now  discuss.1 

1  On  the  general  subject  of  economic  Pan-Islamism,  see  A.  Le  Chatelier, 
“Le  Reveil  de  l’lslam — Sa  Situation  6conomique,”  Revue  Economique 
Internationale,  July,  1910;  also  his  article  “Politique  musulmane,”  Revue 
du  Monde  musulman,  September,  1910;  M.  Pickthall,  “La  Morale  isla- 
mique,”  Revue  Politique  international,  July,  1916;  S.  Khuda  Bukhsh, 
Essays:  Indian  and  Islamic  (London,  1912). 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST 

The  influence  of  the  West  is  the  great  dynamic  in  the 
modern  transformation  of  the  East.  The  ubiquitous  im¬ 
pact  of  Westernism  is  modifying  not  merely  the  Islamic 
world  but  all  non-Moslem  Asia  and  Africa/  and  in  subse¬ 
quent  pages  we  shall  examine  the  effects  of  Western 
influence  upon  the  non-Moslem  elements  of  India.  Of 
course  Western  influence  does  not  entirely  account  for 
Islam’s  recent  evolution.  We  have  already  seen  that,  for 
the  last  hundred  years,  Islam  itself  has  been  engendering 
forces  which,  however  quickened  by  external  Western 
stimuli,  are  essentially  internal  in  their  nature,  arising 
spontaneously  and  working  toward  distinctive,  original 
goals.  It  is  not  a  mere  copying  of  the  West  that  is  to¬ 
day  going  on  in  the  Moslem  world,  but  an  attempt  at 
a  new  synthesis — an  assimilation  of  Western  methods 
to  Eastern  ends.  We  must  always  remember  that  the 
Asiatic  stocks  whicn  constitute  the  bulk  of  Islam’s  fol¬ 
lowers  are  not  primitive  savages  like  the  African  negroes 
or  the  Australoids,  but  are  mainly  peoples  with  genu¬ 
ine  civilizations  built  up  by  their  own  efforts  from  the 
remote  past.  In  view  of  their  historic  achievements, 
therefore,  it  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  in  the  great  fer¬ 
ment  now  stirring  the  Moslem  world  we  behold  a  real 
Renaissance ,  whose  genuineness  is  best  attested  by  the 

1  For  the  larger  aspects,  see  my  book  The  Rising  Tide  of  Color  against 
White  World-Supremacy  (New  York  and  London,  1920). 

90 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  91 


fact  that  there  have  been  similar  movements  in  former 
times. 

The  modern  influence  of  the  West  on  the  East  is  quite 
unprecedented  in  both  intensity  and  scope.  The  far 
more  local,  partial  influence  of  Greece  and  Rome  cannot 
be  compared  to  it.  Another  point  to  be  noted  is  that  this 
modern  influence  of  the  West  upon  the  East  is  a  very 
recent  thing.  The  full  impact  of  Westernism  upon  the 
Orient  as  a  whole  dates  only  from  about  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Since  then,  however,  the  process 
has  been  going  on  by  leaps  and  bounds.  Roads  and  rail¬ 
ways,  posts  and  telegraphs,  books  and  papers,  methods 
and  ideas,  have  penetrated,  or  are  in  process  of  penetrat¬ 
ing,  every  nook  and  cranny  of  the  East.  Steamships  sail 
the  remotest  seas.  Commerce  drives  forth  and  scatters 
the  multitudinous  products  of  Western  industry  among 
the  remotest  peoples.  Nations  which  only  half  a  century 
ago  lived  the  life  of  thirty  centuries  ago,  to-day  read 
newspapers  and  go  to  business  in  electric  tram-cars. 
Both  the  habits  and  thoughts  of  Orientals  are  being 
revolutionized.  To  a  discussion  of  the  influence  of  the 
West  upon  the  Moslem  world  the  remainder  of  this  book 
will  be  devoted.  The  chief  elements  will  be  separately 
analyzed  in  subsequent  chapters,  the  present  chapter 
being  a  general  survey  of  an  introductory  character. 

The  permeation  of  Westernism  is  naturally  most  ad¬ 
vanced  in  those  parts  of  Islam  which  have  been  longest 
under  Western  political  control.  The  penetration  of  the 
British  “Raj  ”  into  the  remotest  Indian  jungles,  for  exam¬ 
ple,  is  an  extraordinary  phenomenon.  By  the  coinage, 
the  post-office,  the  railroads,  the  administration  of  justice, 
the  encouragement  of  education,  the  relief  of  famine,  and 


92  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


a  thousand  other  ways,  the  great  organization  has  pene¬ 
trated  all  India.  But  even  in  regions  where  European 
control  is  still  nominal,  the  permeation  of  Westernism  has 
gone  on  apace.  The  customs  and  habits  of  the  people 
have  been  distinctly  modified.  Western  material  im¬ 
provements  and  comforts  like  the  kerosene-oil  lamp  and 
the  sewing-machine  are  to-day  part  and  parcel  of  the 
daily  life  of  the  people.  New  economic  wants  have  been 
created;  standards  of  living  have  been  raised;  canons  of 
taste  have  been  altered.1 

In  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  fields,  likewise,  the 
leaven  of  Westernism  is  clearly  apparent.  We  have 
already  seen  how  profoundly  Moslem  liberal  reformers 
have  been  influenced  by  Western  ideas  and  the  spirit  of 
Western  progress.  Of  course  in  these  fields  Westernism 
has  progressed  more  slowly  and  has  awakened  much 
stronger  opposition  than  it  has  on  the  material  plane. 
Material  innovations,  especially  mechanical  improve¬ 
ments,  comforts,  and  luxuries,  make  their  way  much 
faster  than  novel  customs  or  ideas,  which  usually  shock 
established  beliefs  or  ancestral  prejudices.  Tobacco  was 
taken  up  with  extraordinary  rapidity  by  every  race  and 
clime,  and  the  kerosene-lamp  has  in  half  a  century  pene¬ 
trated  the  recesses  of  Central  Asia  and  of  China;  whereas 
customs  like  Western  dress  and  ideas  like  Western  educa¬ 
tion  encounter  many  setbacks  and  are  often  adopted 
with  such  modifications  that  their  original  spirit  is  dena- 


1  On  these  points,  see  Arminius  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern 
Lands  (London,  1906);  also  his  La  Turquie  dlaujourd'hui  et  d’avant 
Quarante  Ans  (Paris,  1898);  C.  S.  Cooper,  The  Modernizing  of  the  Orient 
(New  York,  1914);  S.  Khuda  Bukhsh,  Essays:  Indian  and  Islamic  (Lon¬ 
don,  1912);  A.  J.  Brown,  “Economic  Changes  in  Asia,”  The  Century, 
March,  1904. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  93 


tured  or  perverted.  The  superior  strength  and  skill  of 
the  West  are  to-day  generally  admitted  throughout  the 
East,  but  in  many  quarters  the  first  receptivity  to  West¬ 
ern  progress  and  zeal  for  Western  ideas  have  cooled  or 
have  actually  given  place  to  a  reactionary  hatred  of  the 
very  spirit  of  Western  civilization.1 

Western  influences  are  most  apparent  in  the  upper  and 
middle  classes,  especially  in  the  Western-educated  intelli¬ 
gentsia  which  to-day  exists  in  every  Eastern  land.  These 
elites  of  course  vary  greatly  in  numbers  and  influence, 
but  they  all  possess  a  more  or  less  definite  grasp  of  West¬ 
ern  ideas.  In  their  reactions  to  Westernism  they  are 
sharply  differentiated.  Some,  while  retaining  the  funda¬ 
mentals  of  their  ancestral  philosophy  of  fife,  attempt  a 
genuine  assimilation  of  Western  ideals  and  envisage  a 
higher  synthesis  of  the  spirits  of  East  and  West.  Others 
break  with  their  traditional  pasts,  steep  themselves  in 
Westernism,  and  become  more  or  less  genuinely  West¬ 
ernized.  Still  others  conceal  behind  their  Western  ve¬ 
neer  disillusionment  and  detestation.2 

Of  course  it  is  in  externals  that  Westernization  is 
most  pronounced.  The  Indian  or  Turkish  “intellectual,” 
holding  Western  university  degrees  and  speaking  fluently 
several  European  languages,  and  the  wealthy  prince  or 
pasha,  with  his  motor-cars,  his  racing-stables,  and  his 

1  For  the  effect  of  the  West  intellectually  and  spiritually,  see  Vambery, 
op.  cit. ;  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  Indian  Unrest  (London,  1910);  J.  N.  Far- 
quhar,  Modern  Religious  Movements  in  India  (New  York,  1915);  Rev.  J. 
Morrison,  New  Ideas  in  India:  A  Study  of  Social,  Political,  and  Religious 
Developments  (Edinburgh,  1906);  the  Earl  of  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt , 
especially  vol.  II,  pp.  228-243  (London,  1908). 

2  For  the  Westernized  elites,  see  L.  Bertrand,  Le  Mirage  Orientate 
(Paris,  1910);  Cromer,  op.  cit.;  A.  Metin,  UInde  dlaujourd'hui:  Etude 
Sociale  (Paris,  1918);  A.  Le  Chatelier,  “Politique  musulmane,”  Revue  du 
Monde  musulman,  September,  1910. 


94  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


annual  “cure”  at  European  watering-places,  appear  very 
Occidental  to  the  casual  eye.  Such  men  wear  European 
clothes,  eat  European  food,  and  live  in  houses  partly  or 
wholly  furnished  in  European  style.  Behind  this  fagade 
exists  every  possible  variation  of  inner  life,  from  earnest 
enthusiasm  for  Western  ideals  to  inveterate  reaction. 

These  varied  attitudes  toward  Westernism  are  not 
parked  off  by  groups  or  localities,  they  coexist  among  the 
individuals  of  every  class  and  every  land  in  the  East. 
The  entire  Orient  is,  in  fact,  undergoing  a  prodigious 
transformation,  far  more  sudden  and  intense  than  any¬ 
thing  the  West  has  ever  known.  Our  civilization  is 
mainly  self-evolved;  a  natural  growth  developing  by 
normal,  logical,  and  relatively  gradual  stages.  The  East, 
on  the  contrary,  is  undergoing  a  concentrated  process  of 
adaptation  which,  with  us,  was  spread  over  centuries,  and 
the  result  is  not  so  much  evolution  as  revolution — polit¬ 
ical,  economic,  social,  idealistic,  religious,  and  much  more 
besides.  The  upshot  is  confusion,  uncertainty,  grotesque 
anachronism,  and  glaring  contradiction.  Single  genera¬ 
tions  are  sundered  by  unbridgable  mental  and  spiritual 
gulfs.  Fathers  do  not  understand  sons;  sons  despise 
their  fathers.  Everywhere  the  old  and  the  new  struggle 
fiercely,  often  within  the  brain  or  spirit  of  the  same  indi¬ 
vidual.  The  infinite  complexity  of  this  struggle  as  it 
appears  in  India  is  well  summarized  by  Sir  Valentine 
Chirol  when  he  speaks  of  the  many  “currents  and  cross¬ 
currents  of  the  confused  movement  which  is  stirring  the 
stagnant  waters  of  Indian  fife — the  steady  impact  of 
alien  ideas  on  an  ancient  and  obsolescent  civilization; 
the  more  or  less  imperfect  assimilation  of  those  ideas  by 
the  few;  the  dread  and  resentment  of  them  by  those 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  95 


whose  traditional  ascendancy  they  threaten;  the  disin¬ 
tegration  of  old  beliefs,  and  then  again  their  aggressive 
revival;  the  careless  diffusion  of  an  artificial  system  of 
education,  based  none  too  firmly  on  mere  intellectualism, 
and  bereft  of  all  moral  or  religious  sanction;  the  applica¬ 
tion  of  Western  theories  of  administration  and  of  juris¬ 
prudence  to  a  social  formation  stratified  on  lines  of 
singular  rigidity;  the  play  of  modern  economic  forces 
upon  primitive  conditions  of  industry  and  trade;  the 
constant  and  unconscious  but  inevitable  friction  between 
subject  races  and  their  alien  rulers;  the  reverberation  of 
distant  wars  and  distant  racial  conflicts;  the  exaltation 
of  an  Oriental  people  in  the  Far  East.”1  These  lines, 
though  written  about  India,  apply  with  fair  exactitude  to 
every  other  portion  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  to-day. 
As  a  French  writer  remarks  with  special  reference  to  the 
Levant:  “The  truth  is  that  the  Orient  is  in  transforma¬ 
tion,  and  the  Mohammedan  mentality  as  well — though 
not  perhaps  exactly  as  we  might  wish.  It  is  undergoing 
a  period  of  crisis,  wherein  the  past  struggles  everywhere 
against  the  present;  where  ancient  customs,  impaired  by 
modern  innovations,  present  a  hybrid  and  disconcerting 
spectacle.” 2 

To  this  is  largely  due  the  unlovely  traits  displayed  by 
most  of  the  so-called  “Westernized”  Orientals;  the 
“stucco  civilization”3  of  the  Indian  Babu,  and  the  boule- 
vardier  “culture”  of  the  Turkish  “Effendi” — syphilized 

1  Chirol,  op.  tit.,  pp.  321-322. 

2  Bertrand,  op.  tit.,  p.  39.  See  also  Bukhsh,  op.  tit. ;  Farquhar,  op.  tit.; 
Morrison,  op.  tit. ;  R.  Mukerjee,  The  Foundations  of  Indian  Economics 
(London,  1916);  D.  H.  Dodwell,  “Economic  Transition  in  India,”  Econo¬ 
mic  Journal,  December,  1910. 

*  W.  S.  Lilly,  India  and  Its  Problems,  p.  243  (London,  1902). 


96  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


rather  than  civilized.  Any  profound  transformation 
must  engender  many  worthless  by-products,  and  the 
contemporary  Westernization  of  the  Orient  has  its  dark 
as  well  as  its  bright  side.  The  very  process  of  reform, 
however  necessary  and  inevitable,  lends  fresh  virulence 
to  old  ills  and  imports  new  evils  previously  unknown. 
As  Lord  Cromer  says:  “It  is  doubtful  whether  the  price 
which  is  being  paid  for  introducing  European  civilization 
into  these  backward  Eastern  societies  is  always  recog¬ 
nized  as  fully  as  it  should  be.  The  material  benefits 
derived  from  European  civilization  are  unquestionably 
great,  but  as  regards  the  ultimate  effect  on  public  and 
private  morality  the  future  is  altogether  uncertain/’1 

The  good  and  the  evil  of  Westernization  are  alike 
mostly  clearly  evident  among  the  ranks  of  the  educated 
elites.  Some  of  these  men  show  the  happiest  effects  of 
the  Western  spirit,  but  an  even  larger  number  fall  into 
the  gulf  between  old  and  new,  and  there  miserably 
perish.  Lord  Cromer  characterized  many  of  the  “Eu¬ 
ropeanized”  Egyptians  as  “at  the  same  time  de- 
Moslemized  Moslems  and  invertebrate  Europeans”;2 
while  another  British  writer  thus  pessimistically  de¬ 
scribes  the  superficial  Europeanism  prevalent  in  India: 
“Beautiful  Mogul  palaces  furnished  with  cracked  furni¬ 
ture  from  Tottenham  Court  Road.  That  is  what  we 
have  done  to  the  Indian  mind.  We  have  not  only  made 
it  despise  its  own  culture  and  throw  it  out;  we  have 
asked  it  to  fill  up  the  vacant  spaces  with  furniture  which 
will  not  stand  the  climate.  The  mental  Eurasianism  of 
India  is  appalling.  Such  minds  are  nomad.  They  be¬ 
long  to  no  civilization,  no  country,  and  no  history. 

1  Cromer,  op.  cit.,  vol.  II,  p.  231.  2  Ibid.,  p.  228, 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  97 


They  create  a  craving  that  cannot  be  satisfied,  and 
ideals  that  are  unreal.  They  falsify  life.  They  deprive 
men  of  the  nourishment  of  their  cultural  past,  and  the 
substitutes  they  supply  are  unsubstantial.  .  .  .  We 
sought  to  give  the  Eastern  mind  a  Western  content  and 
environment;  we  have  succeeded  too  well  in  establish¬ 
ing  intellectual  and  moral  anarchy  in  both.”  1 

These  patent  evils  of  Westernization  are  a  prime  cause 
of  that  implacable  hatred  of  everything  Western  which 
animates  so  many  Orientals,  including  some  well  ac¬ 
quainted  with  the  West.  Such  persons  are  precious 
auxiliaries  to  the  ignorant  reactionaries  and  to  the  rebels 
against  Western  political  domination. 

The  political  predominance  of  the  West  over  the  East 
is,  indeed,  the  outstanding  factor  in  the  whole  question 
of  Western  influence  upon  the  Orient.  We  have  already 
surveyed  Europe’s  conquest  of  the  Near  and  Middle 
East  during  the  past  century,  and  we  have  seen  how 
helpless  the  backward,  decrepit  Moslem  world  was  in 
face  of  the  twofold  tide  of  political  and  economic  subju¬ 
gation.  In  fact,  the  economic  phase  was  perhaps  the 
more  important  factor  in  the  rapidity  and  completeness 
of  Europe’s  success.  To  be  sure,  some  Eastern  lands 
were  subjugated  at  a  stroke  by  naked  military  force,  as 
in  the  French  expedition  to  Algiers,  the  Russian  conquest 
of  Central  Asia,  and  the  Italian  descent  upon  Tripoli. 
Much  oftener,  however,  subjection  began  by  the  essen- 

1  J.  Ramsay  Macdonald,  The  Government  of  India,  pp.  171-172  (London, 
1920).  On  the  evils  of  Westernization,  see  further:  Bukhsh,  Cromer, 
Dodwell,  Mukerjee,  already  cited;  Sir  W.  M.  Ramsay,  “The  Turkish 
Peasantry  of  Anatolia,”  Quarterly  Review,  January,  1918;  H.  M.  Hynd- 
man,  The  Awakening  of  Asia  (New  York,  1919);  T.  Rothstein,  Egypt’ s 
Ruin  (London,  1910);  Captain  P.  Azan,  Recherche  d’une  Solution  de  la 
Question  indigene  en  Algerie  (Paris,  1903). 


98  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tially  economic  process  known  as  “ pacific  penetration” — 
the  acquirement  of  a  financial  grip  upon  a  hitherto  inde¬ 
pendent  Oriental  country  by  Western  capital  in  the  form 
of  loans  and  concessions,  until  the  assumption  of  Western 
political  control  became  little  more  than  a  formal  regis¬ 
tration  of  what  already  existed  in  fact.  Such  is  the 
story  of  the  subjection  of  Egypt,  Morocco,  and  Persia, 
while  England’s  Indian  Empire  started  in  a  purely  trad¬ 
ing  venture — the  East  India  Company.  The  tremendous 
potency  of  “ pacific  penetration”  is  often  not  fully  appre¬ 
ciated.  Take  the  significance  of  one  item  alone — rail¬ 
way  concessions.  Says  that  keen  student  of  Weltjpolitik , 
Doctor  Dillon;  “  Railways  are  the  iron  tentacles  of 
latter-day  expanding  Powers.  They  are  stretched  out 
caressingly  at  first.  But  once  the  iron  has,  so  to  say,  en¬ 
tered  the  soul  of  the  weaker  nation,  the  tentacles  swell 
to  the  dimensions  of  brawny  arms,  and  the  embrace 
tightens  to  a  crushing  grip.” 1 

On  the  question  of  the  abstract  rightness  or  wrongness 
of  this  subjection  of  the  East  by  the  West,  I  do  not  pro¬ 
pose  to  enter.  It  has  been  exhaustively  discussed,  pro 
and  con,  and  every  reader  of  these  pages  is  undoubtedly 
familiar  with  the  stock  arguments  on  both  sides.  The 
one  thing  certain  is  that  this  process  of  subjugation  was, 
broadly  speaking,  inevitable.  Given  two  worlds  at  such 
different  levels  as  East  and  West  at  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century — the  West  overflowing  with  vitality 
and  striding  at  the  forefront  of  human  progress,  the  East 
sunk  in  lethargy  and  decrepitude — and  it  was  a  fore¬ 
gone  conclusion  that  the  former  would  encroach  upon 
the  latter. 

1E.  J.  Dillon,  “Persia,”  Contemporary  Review ,  June,  1910. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  99 


What  does  concern  us  in  our  present  discussion  is  the 
effect  of  European  political  control  upon  the  general  proc¬ 
ess  of  Westernization  in  Eastern  lands.  And  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  such  Westernization  was  thereby  great¬ 
ly  furthered.  Once  in  control  of  an  Oriental  country, 
the  European  rulers  were  bound  to  favor  its  Westerniza¬ 
tion  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Mere  self-interest  impelled 
them  to  make  the  country  peaceful  and  prosperous,  in 
order  to  extract  profit  for  themselves  and  reconcile  the 
inhabitants  to  their  rule.  This  meant  the  replacement 
of  inefficient  and  sanguinary  native  despotisms  inhibiting 
progress  and  engendering  anarchy  by  stable  colonial  gov¬ 
ernments,  maintaining  order,  encouraging  industry,  and 
introducing  improvements  like  the  railway,  the  post, 
sanitation,  and  much  more  besides.  In  addition  to  these 
material  innovations,  practically  all  the  Western  govern¬ 
ments  endeavored  to  better  the  social,  intellectual,  and 
spiritual  condition  of  the  peoples  that  had  come  under 
their  control.  The  European  Powers  who  built  up  colo¬ 
nial  empires  during  the  nineteenth  century  were  actuated 
by  a  spirit  far  more  enlightened  than  that  of  former 
times,  when  the  early  colonial  empires  of  Spain,  Portugal, 
Holland,  and  the  English  East  India  Company  had  been 
run  on  the  brutal  and  short-sighted  doctrine  of  sheer 
exploitation.  In  the  nineteenth  century  all  Western  rule 
in  the  Orient  was  more  or  less  impregnated  with  the  ideal 
of  “The  White  Man’s  Burden.”  The  great  empire- 
builders  of  the  nineteenth  century,  actuated  as  they  were 
not  merely  by  self-interest  and  patriotic  ambition  but 
also  by  a  profound  sense  of  obligation  to  improve  the 
populations  which  they  had  brought  under  their  coun¬ 
try’s  sway,  felt  themselves  bearers  of  Western  enlighten- 


100  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ment  and  labored  to  diffuse  all  the  benefits  of  Western 
civilization.  They  honestly  believed  that  the  extension 
of  Western  political  control  was  the  best  and  quickest, 
perhaps  the  only,  means  of  modernizing  the  backward 
portions  of  the  world. 

That  standpoint  is  ably  presented  by  a  British  “  lib¬ 
eral  imperialist,”  Professor  Ramsay  Muir,  who  writes: 
“It  is  an  undeniable  fact  that  the  imperialism  of  the 
European  peoples  has  been  the  means  whereby  European 
civilization  has  been  in  some  degree  extended  to  the 
whole  world,  so  that  to-day  the  whole  world  has  become 
a  single  economic  unit,  and  all  its  members  are  parts  of 
a  single  political  system.  And  this  achievement  brings 
us  in  sight  of  the  creation  of  a  world-order  such  as  the 
wildest  dreamers  of  the  past  could  never  have  antici¬ 
pated.  Without  the  imperialism  of  the  European  peo¬ 
ples  North  and  South  America,  Australia,  South  Africa, 
must  have  remained  wildernesses,  peopled  by  scattered 
bands  of  savages.  Without  it  India  and  other  lands  of 
ancient  civilization  must  have  remained,  for  all  we  can 
see,  externally  subject  to  that  endless  succession  of  wars 
and  arbitrary  despotisms  which  have  formed  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  their  history  through  untold  centuries,  and 
under  which  neither  rational  and  equal  law  nor  political 
liberty,  as  we  conceive  them,  were  practicable  concep¬ 
tions.  Without  it  the  backward  peoples  of  the  earth 
must  have  continued  to  stagnate  under  the  dominance  of 
an  unchanging  primitive  customary  regime,  which  has 
been  their  state  throughout  recorded  time.  If  to-day 
the  most  fruitful  political  ideas  of  the  West — the  ideas  of 
nationality  and  self-government — which  are  purely  prod¬ 
ucts  of  Western  civilization,  are  beginning  to  produce  a 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  101 


healthy  fermentation  in  many  parts  of  the  non-European 
world,  that  result  is  due  to  European  imperialism.”1 

The  ethics  of  modern  imperialism  have  nowhere  been 
better  formulated  than  in  an  essay  by  Lord  Cromer. 
“An  imperial  policy,”  he  writes,  “must,  of  course,  be 
carried  out  with  reasonable  prudence,  and  the  principles 
of  government  which  guide  our  relations  with  whatso¬ 
ever  races  are  brought  under  our  control  must  be  politi¬ 
cally  and  economically  sound  and  morally  defensible. 
This  is,  in  fact,  the  keystone  of  the  imperial  arch.  The 
main  justification  of  imperialism  is  to  be  found  in  the  use 
which  is  made  of  imperial  power.  If  we  make  good  use 
of  our  power,  we  may  face  the  future  without  fear  that 
we  shall  be  overtaken  by  the  Nemesis  which  attended 
Homan  misrule.  If  the  reverse  is  the  case,  the  British 
Empire  will  deserve  to  fall,  and  of  a  surety  it  will  ulti¬ 
mately  fall.”2 

Such  are  the  basic  sanctions  of  Western  imperialism 
as  evolved  during  the  nineteenth  century.  Whether  or 
not  it  is  destined  to  endure,  there  can  be  no  question 
that  this  prodigious  extension  of  European  political  con¬ 
trol  greatly  favored  the  spread  of  Western  influences  of 
every  kind.  It  is,  of  course,  arguable  that  the  East 
would  have  voluntarily  adopted  Western  methods  and 
ideas  even  if  no  sort  of  Western  pressure  had  been  ap¬ 
plied.  But  they  would  have  been  adopted  much  more 
slowly,  and  this  vital  element  of  time  renders  such  argu¬ 
ments  mere  academic  speculation.  For  the  vital,  ex¬ 
panding  nineteenth-century  West  to  have  deliberately 

Ramsay  Muir,  “Europe  and  the  Non-European  World,”  The  New 
Europe,  June  28,  1917. 

2  The  Earl  of  Cromer,  Political  and  Literary  Essays,  p.  5  (London,  1913). 


102  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


restrained  itself  while  the  backward  East  blunderingly 
experimented  with  Westernism,  accepting  and  rejecting, 
buying  goods  and  refusing  to  pay  for  them,  negotiating 
loans  and  then  squandering  and  repudiating  them,  invit¬ 
ing  in  Europeans  and  then  expelling  or  massacring  them, 
would  have  been  against  all  history  and  human  nature. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Western  pressure  was  applied,  as 
it  was  bound  to  be  applied;  and  this  constant,  ubiqui¬ 
tous,  unrelenting  pressure,  broke  down  the  barriers  of 
Oriental  conservatism  and  inertia  as  nothing  else  could 
have  done,  forced  the  East  out  of  its  old  ruts,  and  com¬ 
pelled  it  to  take  stock  of  things  as  they  are  in  a  world  of 
hard  facts  instead  of  reminiscent  dreams.  In  subse¬ 
quent  chapters  we  shall  examine  the  manifold  results  of 
this  process  which  has  so  profoundly  transformed  the 
Orient  during  the  past  hundred  years.  Here  we  will  con¬ 
tinue  our  general  survey  by  examining  the  more  recent 
aspects  of  Western  control  over  the  East  and  the  reac¬ 
tions  of  the  East  thereto. 

In  my  opinion,  the  chief  fallacy  involved  in  criticisms 
of  Western  control  over  Eastern  lands  arises  from 
failure  to  discriminate  between  nineteenth-century  and 
twentieth-century  imperialism.  Nineteenth-century  im¬ 
perialism  was  certainly  inevitable,  and  was  apparently 
beneficial  in  the  main.  Twentieth-century  imperialism 
cannot  be  so  favorably  judged.  By  the  year  1900  the 
Oriental  peoples  were  no  longer  mere  fanatical  obscur¬ 
antists  neither  knowing  nor  caring  to  know  anything 
outside  the  closed  circle  of  their  ossified,  decadent  civili¬ 
zations.  The  East  had  been  going  to  school,  and  wanted 
to  begin  to  apply  what  it  had  been  taught  by  the  West. 
It  should  have  been  obvious  that  these  peoples,  whose 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  103 


past  history  proved  them  capable  of  achievement  and 
who  were  now  showing  an  apparently  genuine  desire  for 
new  progress,  needed  to  be  treated  differently  from  what 
they  had  been.  In  other  words,  a  more  liberal  attitude 
on  the  part  of  the  West  had  become  advisable. 

But  no  such  change  was  made.  On  the  contrary,  in 
the  West  itself,  the  liberal  idealism  which  had  prevailed 
during  most  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  giving  way  to 
that  spirit  of  fierce  political  and  economic  rivalry  which 
culminated  in  the  Great  War.1  Never  had  Europe  been 
so  avid  for  colonies,  for  “ spheres  of  influence,”  for  con¬ 
cessions  and  preferential  markets;  in  fine,  so  “ imperial¬ 
istic,”  in  the  unfavorable  sense  of  the  term.  The  result 
was  that  with  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century 
Western  pressure  on  the  East,  instead  of  being  relaxed, 
was  redoubled;  and  the  awakening  Orient,  far  from  being 
met  with  sympathetic  consideration,  was  treated  more 
ruthlessly  than  it  had  been  for  two  hundred  years.  The 
way  in  which  Eastern  countries  like  Turkey  and  Persia, 
striving  to  reform  themselves  and  protect  their  indepen¬ 
dence,  were  treated  by  Europe’s  new  Realpolitik  would 
have  scandalized  the  liberal  imperialists  of  a  generation 
before.  It  certainly  scandalized  present-day  liberals,  as 
witness  these  scathing  lines  written  in  1912  by  the  well- 
known  British  publicist  Sidney  Low: 

“The  conduct  of  the  Most  Christian  Powers  during 
the  past  few  years  has  borne  a  striking  resemblance  to 
that  of  robber-bands  descending  upon  an  unarmed  and 
helpless  population  of  peasants.  So  far  from  respecting 
the  rights  of  other  nations,  they  have  exhibited  the  most 


1  For  a  full  discussion  of  these  changes  in  Western  ideas,  see  my  Rising 
Tide  of  Color  against  White  World-Supremacy,  especially  chaps.  VI  and  VII. 


104. THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


complete  and  cynical  disregard  for  them.  They  have, 
in  fact,  asserted  the  claim  of  the  strong  to  prey  upon  the 
weak,  and  the  utter  impotence  of  all  ethical  considera¬ 
tions  in  the  face  of  armed  force,  with  a  crude  nakedness 
which  few  Eastern  military  conquerors  could  well  have 
surpassed. 

“The  great  cosmic  event  in  the  history  of  the  last 
quarter  of  a  century  has  been  the  awakening  of  Asia 
after  centuries  of  somnolence.  The  East  has  suddenly 
sprung  to  life,  and  endeavored  to  throw  itself  vigorously 
into  the  full  current  of  Western  progress.  Japan  started 
the  enterprise;  and,  fortunately  for  herself,  she  entered 
upon  it  before  the  new  Western  policy  had  fully  devel¬ 
oped  itself,  and  while  certain  archaic  ideals  about  the 
rights  of  peoples  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties  still  pre¬ 
vailed.  When  the  new  era  was  inaugurated  by  the  great 
Japanese  statesmen  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Europe 
did  not  feel  called  upon  to  interfere.  We  regarded  the 
Japanese  renaissance  with  interest  and  admiration,  and 
left  the  people  of  Nippon  to  work  out  the  difficulties  of 
their  own  salvation,  unobstructed.  If  that  revolution 
had  taken  place  thirty  years  later,  there  would  probably 
have  been  a  different  story  to  tell;  and  New  Japan,  in 
the  throes  of  her  travail,  would  have  found  the  armed 
Great  Powers  at  her  bedside,  each  stretching  forth  a 
mailed  fist  to  grab  something  worth  taking.  Other 
Eastern  countries  which  have  endeavored  to  followT  the 
example  of  Japan  during  the  present  century  have  had 
worse  luck.  During  the  past  ten  years  a  wTave  of  sheer 
materialism  and  absolute  contempt  for  international 
morality  has  swept  across  the  Foreign  Offices  of  Europe, 
and  has  reacted  disastrously  upon  the  various  Eastern 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  105 


nations  in  their  desperate  struggles  to  reform  a  constitu¬ 
tional  system.  They  have  been  attempting  to  carry  out 
the  suggestions  made  to  them  for  generations  by  benevo¬ 
lent  advisers  in  Christendom. 

“Now,  when  they  take  these  counsels  to  heart,  and 
endeavor,  with  halting  steps,  and  in  the  face  of  immense 
obstacles,  to  pursue  the  path  of  reform,  one  might  sup¬ 
pose  that  their  efforts  would  be  regarded  with  sympa¬ 
thetic  attention  by  the  Governments  of  the  West;  and 
that,  even  if  these  offered  no  direct  aid,  they  would  at 
least  allow  a  fair  trial.”  But,  on  the  contrary,  “one 
Great  Power  after  another  has  used  the  opportunity  pre¬ 
sented  by  the  internal  difficulties  of  the  Eastern  coun¬ 
tries  to  set  out  upon  a  career  of  annexation.” 1 

We  have  already  seen  how  rapid  was  this  career  of 
annexation,  extinguishing  the  independence  of  the  last 
remaining  Mohammedan  states  at  the  close  of  the  Great 
War.  We  have  also  seen  how  it  exacerbated  Moslem 
fear  and  hatred  of  the  West.  And  the  West  was  already 
feared  and  hated  for  many  reasons.  In  the  preceding 
chapter  we  traced  the  growth  of  the  Pan-Islamic  move¬ 
ment,  and  in  subsequent  chapters  we  shall  trace  the 
development  of  Oriental  nationalism.  These  politico- 
religious  movements,  however,  by  no  means  exhaust  the 
list  of  Oriental  reactions  to  Westernism.  There  are 
others,  economic,  social,  racial  in  character.  In  view  of 
the  complex  nature  of  the  Orient’s  reaction  against 
Westernism,  let  us  briefly  analyze  the  problem  in  its 
various  constituent  elements. 

Anti-Western  feeling  has  been  waning  in  some  quarters 

1  Sidney  Low,  “The  Most  Christian  Powers,”  Fortnightly  Review , 
March,  1912. 


106  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


and  waxing  in  others  during  the  past  hundred  years. 
By  temperamental  reactionaries  and  fanatics  things 
Western  have,  of  course,  always  been  abhorred.  But, 
leaving  aside  this  intransigeant  minority,  the  attitude  of 
other  categories  of  Orientals  has  varied  greatly  accord¬ 
ing  to  times  and  circumstances.  By  liberal-minded  per¬ 
sons  Western  influences  were  at  first  hailed  with  cor¬ 
diality  and  even  with  enthusiasm.  In  the  opening 
chapter  we  saw  how  the  liberal  reformers  welcomed  the 
Western  concept  of  progress  and  made  it  one  of  the  bases 
of  their  projected  religious  reformation.  And  the  liber¬ 
als  displayed  the  same  attitude  in  secular  matters.  The 
liberal  statesmen  who  governed  Turkey  during  the  third 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  made  earnest  efforts 
to  reform  the  Ottoman  state,  and  it  was  the  same  in 
other  parts  of  the  Moslem  world.  An  interesting  exam¬ 
ple  is  the  attempt  made  by  General  Kheir-ed-Din  to 
modernize  Tunis.  This  man,  a  Circassian  by  birth,  had 
won  the  confidence  of  his  master,  the  Bey,  who  made 
him  vizier.  In  1860  he  toured  Europe  and  returned 
greatly  impressed  with  its  civilization.  Convinced  of 
Europe’s  infinite  superiority,  he  desired  passionately  to 
transplant  Western  ideas  and  methods  to  Tunis.  This 
he  believed  quite  feasible,  and  the  result  would,  so  he 
thought,  be  Tunis’s  rapid  regeneration.  Kheir-ed-Din 
was  not  in  the  least  a  hater  of  the  West.  He  merely 
recognized  clearly  the  Moslem  world’s  peril  of  speedy 
subjection  to  the  West  if  it  did  not  set  its  house  rapidly 
in  order,  and  he  therefore  desired,  in  a  perfectly  legiti¬ 
mate  feeling  of  patriotism,  to  press  his  country  along  the 
road  of  progress,  that  it  might  be  able  to  stand  alone 
and  preserve  its  independence. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  107 


So  greatly  was  the  Bey  impressed  by  Kheir-ed-Din ’s 
report  that  he  gave  him  a  free  hand  in  his  reforming  en¬ 
deavors.  For  a  short  time  Kheir-ed-Din  displayed  great 
activity,  though  he  encountered  stubborn  opposition 
from  reactionary  officials.  His  work  was  cut  short  by 
his  untimely  death,  and  Tunis,  still  unmodernized,  fell 
twenty  years  later  under  the  power  of  France.  Kheir- 
ed-Din,  however,  worked  for  posterity.  In  order  to 
rouse  his  compatriots  to  the  realities  of  their  situation 
he  published  a  remarkable  book,  The  Surest  Means  oj 
Knowing  the  State  oj  Nations.  This  book  has  profoundly 
influenced  both  liberals  and  nationalists  throughout  the 
Near  East,  especially  in  North  Africa,  where  it  has  be¬ 
come  the  bible  of  Tunisian  and  Algerian  nationalism. 
In  his  book  Kheir-ed-Din  shows  his  coreligionists  the 
necessity  of  breaking  with  their  attitude  of  blind  admira¬ 
tion  for  the  past  and  proud  indifference  to  everything 
else,  and  of  studying  what  is  going  on  in  the  outer  world. 
Europe’s  present  prosperity  is  due,  he  asserts,  not  to 
natural  advantages  or  to  religion,  but  “to  progress  in 
the  arts  and  sciences,  which  facilitate  the  circulation  of 
wealth  and  exploit  the  treasures  of  the  earth  by  an 
enlightened  protection  constantly  given  to  agriculture, 
industry,  and  commerce:  all  natural  consequences  of 
justice  and  liberty — two  things  wrhich,  for  Europeans, 
have  become  second  nature.”  In  past  ages  the  Moslem 
world  was  great  and  progressive,  because  it  was  then 
liberal  and  open  to  progress.  It  declined  through  big¬ 
otry  and  obscurantism.  But  it  can  revive  by  reviving 
the  spirit  of  its  early  days. 

I  have  stressed  the  example  of  the  Tunisian  Kheir-ed- 
Din  rather  than  the  better-known  Turkish  instances 


108  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


because  it  illustrates  the  general  receptivity  of  mid¬ 
nineteenth-century  Moslem  liberals  to  Western  ideas 
and  their  freedom  from  anti-Western  feeling.1  As  time 
passed,  however,  many  of  these  erstwhile  liberals,  disil¬ 
lusioned  with  the  West  for  various  reasons,  notably 
European  aggression,  became  the  bitterest  enemies  of 
the  West,  hating  the  very  spirit  of  Western  civilization.2 

This  anti-Western  feeling  has,  of  course,  been  greatly 
exacerbated  since  the  beginning  of  the  present  century. 
As  an  influential  Mohammedan  wrote  just  before  the 
Great  War:  “The  events  of  these  last  ten  years  and  the 
disasters  which  have  stricken  the  Mohammedan  world 
have  awakened  in  its  bosom  a  sentiment  of  mutual  cor¬ 
diality  and  devotion  hitherto  unknown,  and  a  unanimous 
hatred  against  all  its  oppressors  has  been  the  ferment 
which  to-day  stirs  the  hearts  of  all  Moslems.”3  The 
bitter  rancor  seething  in  many  Moslem  hearts  shows  in 
outbursts  like  the  following,  from  the  pen  of  a  popular 
Turkish  writer  at  the  close  of  the  Balkan  Wars:  “We 
have  been  defeated,  we  have  been  shown  hostility  by 
the  outside  world,  because  we  have  become  too  delib¬ 
erative,  too  cultured,  too  refined  in  our  conceptions  of 
right  and  wrong,  of  humanity  and  civilization.  The 
example  of  the  Bulgarian  army  has  taught  us  that  every 

1  On  this  point  see’  also  A.  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands 
(London,  1906);  W.  S.  Blunt,  The  Future  of  Islam  (London,  1882);  also  the 
two  articles  by  Leon  Cahun  on  intellectual  and  social  developments  in 
the  Islamic  world  during  the  nineteenth  century  in  Lavisse  et  Rambaud, 
Histoire  Generate ,  vol.  XI,  chap.  XV;  vol.  XII,  chap.  XIV. 

2  See  A.  Vamb&ry,  Der  Islam  im  neunzehnten  Jahrhundert ,  chap.  VI 
(Leipzig,  1875). 

3  “La  Situation  politique  de  la  Perse,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman, 
June,  1914.  As  already  stated,  the  editor  vouches  for  this  anonymous 
writer  as  a  distinguished  Mohammedan  official — “un  homme  d’6t£t 
musulman.” 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  109 


soldier  facing  the  enemy  must  return  to  the  days  of  bar¬ 
barism,  must  have  a  thirst  of  blood,  must  be  merciless 
in  slaughtering  children  and  women,  old  and  weak,  must 
disregard  others’  property,  life,  and  honor.  Let  us 
spread  blood,  suffering,  wrong,  and  mourning.  Thus 
only  may  we  become  the  favorites  of  the  civilized  world 
like  King  Ferdinand’s  army.”  1 

The  Great  War  itself  was  hailed  by  multitudes  of 
Moslems  as  a  well-merited  Nemesis  on  Western  arro¬ 
gance  and  greed.  Here  is  how  a  leading  Turkish  news¬ 
paper  characterized  the  European  Powers:  “They  would 
not  look  at  the  evils  in  their  own  countries  or  elsewhere, 
but  interfered  at  the  slightest  incident  in  our  borders; 
every  day  they  would  gnaw  at  some  part  of  our  rights 
and  our  sovereignty;  they  would  perform  vivisection  on 
our  quivering  flesh  and  cut  off  great  pieces  of  it.  And 
we,  with  a  forcibly  controlled  spirit  of  rebellion  in  our 
hearts  and  with  clinched  but  powerless  fists,  silent  and 
depressed,  would  murmur  as  the  fire  burned  within: 
‘Oh,  that  they  might  fall  out  with  one  another!  Oh, 
that  they  might  eat  one  another  up !  ’  And  lo !  to-day 
they  are  eating  each  other  up,  just  as  the  Turk  wished 
they  would.”  2 

Such  anti-Western  sentiments  are  not  confined  to 
journalists  or  politicians;  they  are  shared  by  all  classes, 
from  princes  to  peasants.  Each  class  has  its  special  rea- 


1  Ahmed  Emin,  The  Development  of  Modern  Turkey  as  Measured  by  Its 
Press,  p.  108  (Columbia  University  Ph.D.  Thesis,  New  York,  1914). 

2  The  Constantinople  Tanine.  Quoted  from  The  Literary  Digest,  Octo¬ 
ber  24,  1914,  p.  784.  This  attitude  toward  the  Great  War  and  the  Euro¬ 
pean  Powers  was  not  confined  to  Mohammedan  peoples;  it  was  common 
to  non-white  peoples  everywhere.  For  a  survey  of  this  feeling  through¬ 
out  the  world,  see  my  Rising  Tide  of  Color  against  White  World-Supremacy, 
pp.  13-16. 


110  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


sons  for  hating  European  political  control.  The  native 
princes,  even  when  maintained  upon  their  thrones  and 
confirmed  in  their  dignities  and  emoluments,  bitterly 
resent  their  state  of  vassalage  and  their  loss  of  limitless, 
despotic  power.  “  Do  you  know,  I  can  hardly  buy  a  pen 
or  a  sword  for  myself  without  asking  the  Resident  for  per¬ 
mission  ?”  remarked  an  Indian  rajah  bitterly.  His  atti¬ 
tude  was  precisely  that  of  Khedive  Tewfik  Pasha,  who, 
in  the  early  days  of  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt, 
while  watching  a  review  of  British  troops,  said  to  one  of 
his  ministers:  “Do  you  suppose  I  like  this?  I  tell  you,  I 
never  see  an  English  sentinel  in  my  streets  without  long¬ 
ing  to  jump  out  of  my  carriage  and  strangle  him  with 
my  own  hands.”  1  The  upper  classes  feel  much  the  same 
as  their  sovereigns.  They  regret  their  former  monopoly 
of  privilege  and  office.  This  is  especially  true  of  the 
Western-educated  intelligentsia ,  who  believe  that  they 
should  hold  all  government  posts  and  resent  bitterly  the 
reservation  of  high-salaried  directive  positions  for  Euro¬ 
peans.  Of  course  many  intelligent  liberals  realize  so 
fully  the  educative  effect  of  European  control  that  they 
acquiesce  in  a  temporary  loss  of  independence  in  order 
to  complete  their  modernization  and  ultimately  be  able 
to  stand  alone  without  fear  of  reaction  or  anarchy.  How¬ 
ever,  these  liberals  are  only  a  small  minority,  hated  by 
their  upper-class  fellows  as  time-servers  and  renegades, 
and  sundered  by  an  immense  gulf  from  the  ignorant 
masses. 

At  first  sight  we  might  think  that  the  masses  would, 
on  the  whole,  be  favorably  disposed  toward  European 

1  Both  the  above  instances  are  taken  from  C.  S.  Cooper,  The  Modern¬ 
izing  of  the  Orient ,  pp.  339-340  (New  York,  1914). 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  111 


political  control.  Despite  certain  economic  disadvan¬ 
tages  that  Westernization  has  imposed,  the  masses  have 
unquestionably  gained  most  by  European  rule.  For¬ 
merly  exploited  ruthlessly  by  both  princes  and  upper 
classes,  the  peasants  and  town  workers  are  to-day  as¬ 
sured  peace,  order,  justice,  and  security  for  their  land- 
holdings  and  the  fruits  of  their  toil.  Now  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  think  that  the  masses  are  insensible  to  all 
this.  The  fact  is,  they  do  recognize  the  benefits  of 
European  rule.  Nevertheless,  the  new  rulers,  while  tol¬ 
erated  and  even  respected,  are  never  beloved.  Further¬ 
more,  as  the  generation  which  knew  the  old  regime  dies 
off,  its  evils  are  forgotten,  and  the  younger  generation, 
taking  present  benefits  for  granted,  murmurs  at  the  flaws 
in  the  existing  order,  and  lends  a  readier  ear  to  native 
agitators  extolling  the  glories  of  independence  and  ideal¬ 
izing  the  “good  old  times.” 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that,  despite  all  its  short¬ 
comings,  the  average  Oriental  hankers  after  the  old  way 
of  life.  Even  when  he  recognizes  the  good  points  of  the 
new,  he  nevertheless  yearns  irrationally  for  the  old.  “A 
Moslem  ruler  though  he  oppress  me  and  not  a  kafir 1 
though  he  work  me  weal”  is  a  Moslem  proverb  of  long 
standing.  Every  colonial  administration,  no  matter 
how  enlightened,  runs  counter  to  this  ineradicable  aver¬ 
sion  of  Moslems  for  Christian  rule.  A  Russian  admin¬ 
istrator  in  Central  Asia  voices  the  sentiments  of  European 
officials  generally  when  he  states:  “Pious  Moslems  cannot 
accommodate  themselves  to  the  government  of  Giaours.”2 

Furthermore,  it  must  be  remembered  that  most  Ori- 

1  An  “  Unbeliever  ” — in  other  words,  a  Christian. 

2  Quoted  by  A.  Woeikof,  Le  Turkestan  russe  (Paris,  1914). 


112  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


entals  either  do  not  recognize  much  benefit  in  European 
rule,  or,  even  though  they  do  recognize  considerable 
benefits,  consider  these  more  than  offset  by  many  points 
which,  in  their  eyes,  are  maddening  annoyances  or  bur¬ 
dens.  The  veiy  things  which  we  most  pride  ourselves 
on  having  given  to  the  Orient — peace,  order,  justice, 
security — are  not  valued  by  the  Oriental  anywhere  near 
as  highly  as  we  might  expect.  Of  course  he  likes  these 
things,  but  he  would  prefer  to  get  less  of  them  if  what  he 
did  get  was  given  by  native  rulers,  sharing  his  preju¬ 
dices  and  point  of  view.  Take  the  single  factor  of  jus¬ 
tice.  As  an  English  writer  remarks:  “The  Asiatic  is  not 
delighted  with  justice  per  se;  indeed,  the  Asiatic  really 
cares  but  little  about  it  if  he  can  get  sympathy  in  the 
sense  in  which  he  understands  that  misunderstood  word. 
.  .  .  This  is  the  real  reason  why  every  Asiatic  in  his 
heart  of  hearts  prefers  the  rule  of  his  own  nationality, 
bad  though  it  be,  to  the  most  ideal  rule  of  aliens.  For 
when  he  is  ruled  by  his  own  countrymen,  he  is  dealt 
with  by  people  who  understand  his  frailties,  and  who, 
though  they  may  savagely  punish  him,  are  at  least  in 
sympathy  with  the  motives  which  prompt  his  delin¬ 
quencies.’ J  1 

Take  again  the  matter  of  order.  The  average  Oriental 
not  only  does  not  appreciate,  but  detests,  our  well-regu¬ 
lated,  systematic  manner  of  life.  Accustomed  as  he  has 
been  for  centuries  to  a  slipshod,  easy-going  existence, 
in  which,  if  there  was  much  injustice,  there  was  also  much 
favoritism,  he  instinctively  hates  things  like  sanitary 
measures  and  police  regulations.  Accustomed  to  a  wide 
“personal  liberty”  in  the  anarchic  sense,  he  is  not  will- 

1  B.  L.  Putnam  Weale,  The  Conflict  of  Color,  p.  193  (London,  1910). 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  113 

ing  to  limit  this  liberty  for  the  common  weal.  He  wants 
his  own  way,  even  though  it  involves  possible  dangers 
to  himself — dangers  which  may  always  be  averted  by 
bribery,  favoritism,  or  violence.  Said  an  American  who 
had  listened  to  a  Filipino’s  glowing  words  on  indepen¬ 
dence:  “What  could  you  do,  if  you  were  independent, 
that  you  cannot  do  now?”  “I  could  build  my  house 
there  in  the  middle  of  the  street,  if  I  wanted  to.”  “But 
suppose  your  neighbor  objected  and  interfered?”  “I 
would  ‘get’  him.”  “But  suppose  he  ‘got’  you?”  A 
shrug  of  the  shoulders  was  the  only  answer.1 

The  fact  is  that  the  majority  of  Orientals,  despite  the 
considerable  penetration  of  Western  ideas  and  methods 
that  has  been  going  on  for  the  last  century,  still  love 
their  old  ruts  and  hate  to  be  budged  out  of  them.  They 
realize  that  Western  rule  furthers  more  than  anything 
else  the  Westernization  of  their  social  system,  their  tra¬ 
ditional  manner  of  life,  and  they  therefore  tend  to  react 
fanatically  against  it.  Every  innovation  imposed  by 
the  colonial  authorities  is  apt  to  rouse  the  most  pur¬ 
blind  resistance.  For  example,  compulsory  vaccination 
was  bitterly  opposed  for  years  by  the  natives  of  Algeria. 
The  French  officials  pointed  out  that  smallpox,  hitherto 
rampant,  was  being  rapidly  extirpated.  The  natives  re¬ 
plied  that,  in  their  opinion,  it  was  merely  a  crafty  scheme 
for  sterilizing  them  sexually  and  thus  make  room  for 
French  colonists.  The  officials  thereupon  pointed  to  the 
census  figures,  which  showed  that  the  natives  were  in¬ 
creasing  at  an  unprecedented  rate.  The  natives  merely 
shrugged  their  shoulders  and  continued  to  inveigh  against 
the  innovation. 

Quoted  from  H.  H.  Powers,  The  Great  Peace ,  p.  82  (New  York,  1918). 


114  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


This  whole  matter  has  been  well  summarized  by  a 
French  writer  with  a  wide  knowledge  of  Mohammedan 
lands.  Says  Louis  Bertrand: 

“  In  reality,  all  these  peoples,  indisposed  as  they  are  by 
their  traditions,  customs,  and  climates  to  live  according 
to  our  social  ideal,  hate  to  endure  the  constraint  of  our 
police,  of  our  administration — in  a  word,  of  any  sort  of 
regulated  government,  no  matter  how  just  and  honest. 
Delivered  from  the  most  anarchic  and  vexatious  of  tyr¬ 
annies,  they  remain  in  spirit  more  or  less  like  our  vaga¬ 
bonds,  always  hoping  to  escape  from  the  gendarmes.  In 
vain  do  we  point  out  to  the  Arabs  of  North  Africa  that, 
thanks  to  the  protection  of  France,  they  are  no  longer 
pillaged  by  Turkish  despots  nor  massacred  and  tortured 
by  rival  tribes.  They  see  only  one  thing:  the  necessity 
of  paying  taxes  for  matters  that  they  do  not  understand. 
We  shall  never  realize  the  rage,  the  fury,  aroused  in  our 
Algerian  towns  by  the  simple  health  department  ordi¬ 
nance  requiring  the  emptying  of  a  garbage-can  at  a  fixed 
hour.  At  Cairo  and  elsewhere  I  have  observed  the  same 
rebellious  feelings  among  the  donkey-boys  and  cab- 
drivers  subjected  to  the  regulations  of  the  English  police¬ 
man. 

“But  it  is  not  merely  our  municipal  and  administra¬ 
tive  regulations  which  they  find  insupportable;  it  is  all 
our  habits,  taken  en  bloc — in  a  word,  the  order  which 
regulates  our  civilized  fife.  For  instance:  on  the  railway¬ 
line  from  Jaffa  to  Jerusalem  the  train  stops  at  a  station 
beside  which  stands  the  tomb  of  a  holy  man.  The 
schedule  calls  for  a  stop  of  a  minute  at  most.  But  no 
sooner  had  we  arrived  than  what  was  my  stupefaction  to 
see  all  the  Mohammedans  on  the  train  get  off,  spread 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  115 


their  prayer-rugs,  and  tranquilly  begin  their  devotions. 
The  station-master  blew  his  whistle,  the  conductor  yelled 
at  them  that  he  was  going  to  leave  them  behind;  nobody 
budged.  A  squad  of  railway  employees  had  to  be  mo¬ 
bilized,  who,  with  blows  and  curses,  finally  bundled  these 
pious  persons  back  into  the  train  again.  The  business 
lasted  a  good  quarter  of  an  hour,  and  was  not  easy. 
The  more  vigorous  of  the  worshippers  put  up  an  ener¬ 
getic  resistance. 

“The  above  is  only  a  casual  instance,  chosen  at  ran¬ 
dom.  What  is  certain  is  that  these  peoples  do  not  yet 
understand  what  we  mean  by  exactitude,  and  that  the 
concept  of  a  well-regulated  existence  has  not  yet  pene¬ 
trated  their  heads.  ” 1 

What  has  just  been  written  of  course  applies  primarily 
to  the  ignorant  masses.  But  this  attitude  of  mind  is 
more  or  less  common  to  all  classes  of  Oriental  peoples. 
The  habits  of  centuries  are  not  easily  transformed.  In 
fact,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  upper  classes  were 
able  to  enjoy  most  fully  the  capricious  personal  liberty 
of  the  unmodified  East,  and  that,  therefore,  though  they 
may  be  better  able  to  understand  the  value  of  Western¬ 
ization,  they  have  in  one  sense  the  most  to  lose.2 

In  fact,  for  all  Orientals,  high  and  low  alike,  the  “good 
old  times”  had  charms  which  they  mournfully  regret. 
For  the  prince,  the  pasha,  the  courtier,  existence  was 
truly  an  Oriental  paradise.  To  be  sure,  the  prince 
might  at  any  moment  be  defeated  and  slain  by  a  rival 
monarch;  the  pasha  strangled  at  his  master’s  order; 

1L.  Bertrand,  Le  Mirage  oriental ,  pp.  441-442  (Paris,  1910). 

2  On  this  point  see  the  very  interesting  essay  by  Meredith  Townsend 
entitled  “The  Charm  of  Asia  for  Asiatics,”  in  his  book  Asia  and  Europe, 

pp.  120-128. 


116  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


the  courtier  tortured  through  a  superior’s  whim.  But, 
meanwhile,  it  was  “life,”  rich  and  full.  “Each  of  these 
men  had  his  own  character  and  his  own  renown  among 
his  countrymen,  and  each  enjoyed  a  position  such  as  is 
now  unattainable  in  Europe,  in  which  he  was  released 
from  laws,  could  indulge  his  own  fancies,  bad  or  good, 
and  was  fed  every  day  and  all  day  with  the  special  flat¬ 
tery  of  Asia — that  willing  submissiveness  to  mere  voli¬ 
tion  which  is  so  like  adoration,  and  which  is  to  its  recipi¬ 
ents  the  most  intoxicating  of  delights.  Each,  too,  had 
his  court  of  followers,  and  every  courtier  shared  in  the 
power,  the  luxury,  and  the  adulation  accruing  to  his 
lord.  The  power  was  that  of  life  and  death ;  the  luxury 
included  possession  of  every  woman  he  desired;  the  adula¬ 
tion  was,  as  I  have  said,  almost  religious  worship.”  1 
But,  it  may  be  asked,  what  about  the  poor  man,  ex¬ 
ploited  by  this  hierarchy  of  capricious  despots?  What 
had  he  to  gain  from  all  this?  Well,  in  most  cases,  he 
got  nothing  at  all;  but  he  might  gain  a  great  deal.  Life 
in  the  old  Orient  was  a  gigantic  lottery.  Any  one,  how¬ 
ever  humble,  who  chanced  to  please  a  great  man,  might 
rise  to  fame  and  fortune  at  a  bound.  And  this  is  just 
what  pleases  the  Eastern  temperament;  for  in  the  East, 
“luck”  and  caprice  are  more  prized  than  the  “security” 
cherished  in  the  West.  In  the  Orient  the  favorite  stories 
are  those  narrating  sudden  and  amazing  shifts  of  fortune 
— beggars  become  viziers  or  viziers  become  beggars,  and 
all  in  a  single  night.  To  the  majority  of  Orientals  it  is 
still  the  uncertainties  of  life,  and  the  capricious  favor  of 
the  powerful,  which  make  it  most  worth  living;  not  the 
sure  reward  of  honesty  and  well-regulated  labor.  All 

1  Townsend,  op.  tit.,  p.  104. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  117 


these  things  made  the  life  of  the  Orient  infinitely  inter¬ 
esting  to  all.  And  it  is  precisely  this  gambler’s  interest 
which  Westernization  has  more  or  less  destroyed.  As  an 
English  writer  very  justly  remarks  a  propos  of  modern 
Egypt:  “Our  rule  may  be  perfect,  but  the  East  finds  it 
dull.  The  old  order  was  a  ragged  garment,  but  it  was 
gay.  Its  very  vicissitude  had  a  charm.  ‘  Ah !  yes/  said 
an  Egyptian  to  a  champion  of  English  rule,  ‘but  in  the 
old  days  a  beggar  might  sit  at  the  gate,  and  if  he  were 
found  pleasing  in  the  eyes  of  a  great  lady,  he  might  be 
a  great  man  on  the  morrow.’  There  is  a  natural  and  in¬ 
evitable  regret  for  the  gorgeous  and  perilous  past,  when 
favor  took  the  place  of  justice,  and  fife  had  great  heights 
and  depths — for  the  Egypt  of  Joseph,  Haroun-al-Rashid, 
and  Ismail  Pasha.  We  have  spread  the  coat  of  broad¬ 
cloth  over  the  radiant  garment.”1 

Saddened  and  irritated  by  the  threatened  loss  of  so 
much  that  they  hold  dear,  it  is  not  strange  that  many 
Eastern  conservatives  glorify  the  past  as  a  sort  of  Golden 
Age,  infinitely  superior  to  anything  the  West  can  pro¬ 
duce,  and  in  this  they  are  joined  by  many  quondam 
liberals,  disillusioned  with  Westernism  and  flying  into 
the  arms  of  reaction.  The  result  is  a  spirit  of  hatred 
against  everything  Western,  which  sometimes  assumes 
the  most  extravagant  forms.  Says  Louis  Bertrand: 
“During  a  lecture  that  I  attended  at  Cairo  the  speaker 
contended  that  France  owed  Islam  (1)  its  civilization  and 
sciences;  (2)  half  of  its  vocabulary;  (3)  all  that  was  best 
in  the  character  and  mentality  of  its  population,  seeing 
that,  from  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  Revolution  of  1789, 

1  H.  Spender,  “England,  Egypt,  and  Turkey,”  Contemporary  Review , 
October,  1906. 


118  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


all  the  reformers  who  labored  for  its  enfranchisement — 
Albigensians,  Vaudois,  Calvinists,  and  Camisards — were 
probably  descendants  of  the  Saracens.  It  was  nothing 
less  than  the  total  annexation  of  France  to  Morocco.” 
Meanwhile,  “it  has  become  the  fashion  for  fervent 
(Egyptian)  nationalists  to  go  to  Spain  and  meditate  in 
the  gardens  of  the  Alcazar  of  Seville  or  in  the  patios  of 
the  Alhambra  of  Granada  on  the  defunct  splendors  of 
Western  Islam.”  1 

Even  more  grotesque  are  the  rhapsodies  of  the  Hindu 
wing  of  this  Golden  Age  school.  These  Hindu  enthu¬ 
siasts  far  outdo  the  wildest  flights  of  their  Moslem  fel¬ 
lows.  They  solemnly  assert  that  Hindustan  is  the 
nursery  and  home  of  all  true  religion,  philosophy,  cul¬ 
ture,  civilization,  science,  invention,  and  everything  else; 
and  they  aver  that  when  India’s  present  regrettable 
eclipse  is  past  (an  eclipse  of  course  caused  entirely  by 
English  rule)  she  is  again  to  shine  forth  in  her  glory  for 
the  salvation  of  the  whole  world.  Employing  to  the  full 
the  old  adage  that  there  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun, 
they  have  “discovered”  in  the  Vedas  and  other  Hindu 
sacred  /texts  “irrefutable”  evidence  that  the  ancient 
Hindu  sages  anticipated  all  our  modern  ideas,  including 
such  up-to-date  matters  as  bomb-dropping  aeroplanes 
and  the  League  of  Nations.2 

All  this  rhapsodical  laudation  of  the  past  will,  in  the 
long  run,  prove  futile.  The  East,  like  the  West,  has  its 

1  Bertrand,  pp.  209,  210. 

2  For  discussion  of  this  Hindu  attitude  see  W.  Archer,  India  and  the 
Future  (London,  1918);  Young  and  Ferrers,  India  in  Conflict  (London, 
1920).  Also  see  Hindu  writings  of  this  nature:  H.  Maitra,  Hinduism: 
The  World-Ideal  (London,  1916);  A.  Coomaraswamy,  The  Dance  of  Siva 
(New  York,  1918);  M.  N.  Chatterjee,  “The  World  and  the  Next  War,” 
Journal  of  Race  Development,  April,  1916. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  119 


peculiar  virtues;  but  the  East  also  has  its  special  faults, 
and  it  is  the  faults  which,  for  the  last  thousand  years, 
have  been  gaining  on  the  virtues,  resulting  in  backward¬ 
ness,  stagnation,  and  inferiority.  To-day  the  East  is 
being  penetrated — and  quickened — by  the  West.  The 
outcome  will  never  be  complete  Westernization  in  the 
sense  of  a  mere  wholesale  copying  and  absolute  transfor¬ 
mation;  the  East  will  always  remain  fundamentally  it¬ 
self.  But  it  will  be  a  new  self,  the  result  of  a  true  as¬ 
similation  of  Western  ideas.  The  reactionaries  can  only 
delay  this  process,  and  thereby  prolong  the  Orient’s 
inferiority  and  weakness. 

Nevertheless,  the  reactionary  attitude,  though  unin¬ 
telligent,  is  intelligible.  Westernization  hurts  too  many 
cherished  prejudices  and  vested  interests  not  to  arouse 
chronic  resistance.  This  resistance  would  occur  even  if 
Western  influences  were  all  good  and  Westerners  all 
angels  of  light.  But  of  course  Westernization  has  its 
dark  side,  while  our  Western  culture-bearers  are  ani¬ 
mated  not  merely  by  altruism,  but  also  by  far  less  worthy 
motives.  This  strengthens  the  hand  of  the  Oriental 
reactionaries  and  lends  them  the  cover  of  moral  sanc¬ 
tions.  In  addition  to  the  extremely  painful  nature  of 
any  transformative  process,  especially  in  economic  and 
social  matters,  there  are  many  incidental  factors  of  an 
extremely  irritating 'nature. 

To  begin  with,  the  mere  presence  of  the  European, 
with  his  patent  superiority  of  power  and  progress,  is  a 
constant  annoyance  and  humiliation.  This  physical 
presence  of  the  European  is  probably  as  necessary  to 
the  Orient’s  regeneration  as  it  is  inevitable  in  view  of 
the  Orient’s  present  inferiority.  But,  however  benefi- 


120  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

> 

cial,  it  is  none  the  less  a  source  of  profound  irritation. 
These  Europeans  disturb  everything,  modify  customs, 
raise  living  standards,  erect  separate  “ quarters”  in  the 
cities,  where  they  form  “extraterritorial”  colonies  ex¬ 
empt  from  native  law  and  customary  regulation.  An 
English  town  rises  in  the  heart  of  Cairo,  a  “Little  Paris” 
eats  into  Arabesque  Algiers,  while  European  Pera  flaunts 
itself  opposite  Turkish  Stambul. 

As  for  India,  it  is  dotted  with  British  “enclaves.” 
“The  great  Presidency  towns,  Calcutta,  Bombay,  Ma¬ 
dras,  are  European  cities  planted  on  Indian  soil.  All  the 
prominent  buildings  are  European,  though  in  some  of 
the  more  recent  ones  an  endeavor  has  been  made  to 
adopt  what  is  known  as  the  ‘  Indo-Saracenic  ’  style  of 
architecture.  For  the  rest,  the  streets  are  called  by 
English  names,  generally  the  names  of  bygone  viceroys 
and  governors,  or  of  the  soldiers  who  conquered  the  land 
and  quelled  the  mutiny — heroes  whose  effigies  meet  you 
at  every  turn.  The  shops  are  English  shops,  where 
English  or  Eurasian  assistants  traffic  in  English  goods. 
English  carriages  and  motors  bowl  along  the  macad¬ 
amized  or  tarred  roads  of  Old  England.  On  every  hand 
there  is  evidence  of  the  instinctive  effort  to  reproduce, 
as  nearly  as  the  climate  will  permit,  English  conditions 
of  life.  .  .  .  Almost  the  whole  life  of  the  people  of 
India  is  relegated  to  the  back  streets,  not  to  say  the 
slums — frankly  called  in  Madras,  the  Black  Town.  There 
are  a  few  points — clubs  and  gymkhanas  specially  estab¬ 
lished  to  that  end — where  English  men,  and  even  women, 
meet  Indian  men,  and  even  women,  of  the  wealthier 
classes,  on  a  basis  of  social  equality.  But  few  indeed  are 
the  points  of  contact  between  the  Asian  town  and  the 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  121 


European  city  which  has  been  superimposed  upon  it. 
The  missionary,  the  Salvation  Army  outpost,  perhaps 
the  curiosity-hunting  tourist,  may  go  forth  into  the 
bazaars;  but  the  European  community  as  a  whole  cares 
no  more  for  the  swarming  brown  multitudes  around  it 
than  the  dwellers  on  an  island  care  for  the  fishes  in  the 
circumambient  sea.”  1  And  what  is  true  of  the  great 
towns  holds  good  for  scores  of  provincial  centres,  “  sta¬ 
tions,”  and  cantonments.  The  scale  may  be  smaller, 
but  the  type  is  the  same. 

The  European  in  the  Orient  is  thus  everywhere  pro¬ 
foundly  an  alien,  living  apart  from  the  native  life.  And 
the  European  is  not  merely  an  aloof  alien;  he  is  a  ruling 
alien  as  well.  Always  his  attitude  is  that  of  the  superior, 
the  master.  This  attitude  is  not  due  to  brutality  or 
snobbery;  it  is  inherent  in  the  very  essence  of  the  situa¬ 
tion.  Of  course  many  Europeans  have  bad  manners, 
but  that  does  not  change  the  basic  reality  of  the  case. 
And  this  reality  is  that,  whatever  the  future  may  bring, 
the  European  first  established  himself  in  the  Orient  be¬ 
cause  the  West  was  then  infinitely  ahead  of  the  East; 
and  he  is  still  there  to-day  because,  despite  all  recent 
changes,  the  East  is  still  behind  the  West.  Therefore  the 
European  in  the  Orient  is  still  the  ruler,  and  so  long  as 
he  stays  there  must  continue  to  rule — justly,  temper¬ 
ately,  with  politic  regard  for  Eastern  progress  and  liberal 
devolution  of  power  as  the  East  becomes  ripe  for  its  lib¬ 
eral  exercise — but,  nevertheless,  rule.  Wherever  the  Oc¬ 
cidental  has  established  his  political  control,  there  are 
but  two  alternatives:  govern  or  go.  Furthermore,  in  his 
governing,  the  Occidental  must  rule  according  to  his  own 

1  Archer,  pp.  11,  12. 


122  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


lights;  despite  all  concessions  to  local  feeling,  he  must, 
in  the  last  analysis,  act  as  a  Western,  not  as  an  Eastern, 
ruler.  Lord  Cromer  voices  the  heart  of  all  true  colonial 
government  when  he  says:  “In  governing  Oriental  races 
the  first  thought  must  be  what  is  good  for  them,  but  not 
necessarily  what  they  think  is  good  for  them.”  1 

Now  all  this  is  inevitable,  and  should  be  self-evident. 
Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains  that  even  the  most  en¬ 
lightened  Oriental  can  hardly  regard  it  as  other  than 
a  bitter  though  salutary  medicine,  while  most  Orientals 
feel  it  to  be  humiliating  or  intolerable.  The  very  vir¬ 
tues  of  the  European  are  prime  causes  of  his  unpopu¬ 
larity.  For,  as  Meredith  Townsend  well  says:  “The 
European  is,  in  Asia,  the  man  who  will  insist  on  his 
neighbor  doing  business  just  after  dinner,  and  being  exact 
when  he  is  half-asleep,  and  being  ‘  prompt  ’  just  when  he 
wants  to  enjoy, — and  he  rules  in  Asia  and  is  loved  in 
Asia  accordingly.”  2 

Furthermore,  the  European  in  the  Orient  is  disliked 
not  merely  as  a  ruler  and  a  disturber,  but  also  as  a  man 
of  widely  different  race.  This  matter  of  race  is  very 
complicated,3  but  it  cuts  deep  and  is  of  fundamental 
importance.  Most  of  the  peoples  of  the  Near  and  Mid¬ 
dle  East  with  which  our  present  discussion  is  concerned 
belong  to  what  is  known  as  the  “brown”  category  of 
the  human  species.  Of  course,  in  strict  anthropology, 
the  term  is  inexact.  Anthropologically,  we  cannot  set 
off  a  sharply  differentiated  group  of  “brown”  types  as  a 
“brown  race,”  as  we  can  set  off  the  “white”  types  of 

1  Cromer,  Political  and  Literary  Essays,  p.  25. 

2  Townsend,  Asia  and  Europe ,  p.  128. 

3 1  have  dealt  with  it  at  length  in  my  Rising  Tide  of  Color  against  White 
W  orld-Supremacy. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  123 


Europe  as  a  “ white  race”  or  the  “ yellow”  Mongoloid 
types  of  the  Far  East  as  a  “ yellow  race.”  This  is  be¬ 
cause  the  Near  and  Middle  East  have  been  racially  a 
vast  melting-pot,  or  series  of  melting-pots,  wherein  con¬ 
quest  and  migration  have  continually  poured  new  hetero¬ 
geneous  elements,  producing  the  most  diverse  ethnic 
amalgamations.  Thus  to-day  some  of  the  Near  and 
Middle  Eastern  peoples  are  largely  white,  like  the  Per¬ 
sians  and  Ottoman  Turks;  others,  like  the  southern 
Indians  and  Yemenite  Arabs,  are  largely  black;  while 
still  others,  like  the  Himalayan  and  Central  Asian  peo¬ 
ples,  have  much  yellow  blood.  Again,  as  there  is  no 
brown  racial  type-norm,  as  there  are  white  and  yellow 
type-norms,  so  there  is  no  generalized  brown  culture 
like  those  possessed  by  yellows  and  whites.  The  great 
brown  spiritual  bond  is  Islam,  yet  in  India,  the  chief  seat 
of  brown  population,  Islam  is  professed  by  only  one-fifth 
of  the  inhabitants.  Lastly,  while  the  spiritual  fron¬ 
tiers  of  the  Moslem  world  coincide  mainly  with  the  eth¬ 
nic  frontiers  of  the  brown  world,  Islam  overlaps  at 
several  points,  including  some  pure  whites  in  eastern  Eu¬ 
rope,  many  true  yellows  in  the  Far  East,  and  multitudes 
of  negroes  in  Africa. 

Nevertheless,  despite  these  partial  modifications,  the 
terms  “ brown  race”  and  “brown  world”  do  connote 
genuine  realities  which  science  and  politics  alike  recog¬ 
nize  to  be  essentially  true.  There  certainly  is  a  funda¬ 
mental  comity  between  the  brown  peoples.  This  comity 
is  subtle  and  intangible  in  character;  yet  it  exists,  and 
under  certain  circumstances  it  is  capable  of  momentous 
manifestations.  Its  salient  feature  is  the  instinctive 
recognition  by  all  Near  and  Middle  Eastern  peoples  that 


124  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


they  are  fellow  “Asiatics/7  however  bitter  may  be  their 
internecine  feuds.  This  instinctive  “Asiatic77  feeling  has 
been  noted  by  historians  for  more  than  two  thousand 
years,  and  it  is  true  to-day  as  in  the  past. 

The  great  racial  divisions  of  mankind  are  the  most 
fundamental,  the  most  permanent,  the  most  ineradica¬ 
ble  things  in  human  experience.  They  are  not  mere 
diverse  colorations  of  skin.  Matters  like  complexion, 
stature,  and  hair-formation  are  merely  the  outward, 
visible  symbols  of  correlative  mental  and  spiritual  dif¬ 
ferences  which  reveal  themselves  in  sharply  contrasted 
temperaments  and  view-points,  and  which  translate 
themselves  into  the  infinite  phenomena  of  divergent 
group-life. 

Now  it  is  one  of  these  basic  racial  lines  of  cleavage 
which  runs  between  “East77  and  “West.77  Broadly 
speaking,  the  Near  and  Middle  East  is  the  “brown 
world,77  and  this  differentiates  it  from  the  “white  world77 
of  the  West  in  a  way  which  never  can  be  really  obliter¬ 
ated.  Indeed,  to  attempt  to  obliterate  the  difference  by 
racial  fusion  would  be  the  maddest  of  follies.  East  and 
West  can  mutually  quicken  each  other  by  a  mutual 
exchange  of  ideas  and  ideals.  They  can  only  harm  each 
other  by  transfusions  of  blood.  To  unite  physically 
would  be  the  greatest  of  disasters.  East  and  West  have 
both  given  much  to  the  world  in  the  past,  and  promise 
to  give  more  in  the  future.  But  whatever  of  true  value 
they  are  to  give  can  be  given  only  on  condition  that 
they  remain  essentially  themselves.  Ethnic  fusion  would 
destroy  both  their  race-souls  and  would  result  in  a  dreary 
mongrelization  from  which  would  issue  nothing  but  de¬ 
generation  and  decay. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  125 


Both  East  and  West  instinctively  recognize  the  truth 
of  this,  and  show  it  by  their  common  contempt  for  the 
“ Eurasian” — the  mongrel  offspring  of  unions  between 
the  two  races.  As  Meredith  Townsend  well  says:  “The 
chasm  between  the  brown  man  and  the  white  is  un¬ 
fathomable/ has  existed  in  all  ages,  and  exists  still  ev¬ 
erywhere.  No  white  man  marries  a  brown  wife,  no 
brown  man  marries  a  white  wife,  without  an  inner  sense 
of  having  been  false  to  some  unintelligible  but  irresisti¬ 
ble  command.”  1 

The  above  summary  of  the  political,  economic,  social, 
and  racial  differences  between  East  and  West  gives  us  a 
fair  idea  of  the  numerous  cross-currents  which  complicate 
the  relations  of  the  two  worlds  and  which  hinder  West¬ 
ernization.  The  Westernizing  process  is  assuredly  going 
on,  and  in  subsequent  chapters  we  shall  see  how  far- 
reaching  is  its  scope.  But  the  factors  just  considered  will 
indicate  the  possibilities  of  reaction  and  will  roughly  assign 
the  limits  to  which  Westernization  may  ultimately  extend. 

One  thing  is  certain:  Western  political  control  in  the 
Orient,  however  prolonged  and  however  imposing  in 
appearance,  must  ever  rest  on  essentially  fragile  founda¬ 
tions.  The  Western  rulers  will  always  remain  an  alien 
caste;  tolerated,  even  respected,  perhaps,  but  never 
loved  and  never  regarded  as  anything  but  foreigners. 
Furthermore,  Western  rule  must  necessarily  become  more 
precarious  with  the  increasing  enlightenment  of  the  sub¬ 
ject  peoples,  so  that  the  acquiescence  of  one  generation 
may  be  followed  by  the  hostile  protest  of  the  next.  It 
is  indeed  an  unstable  equilibrium,  hard  to  maintain  and 
easily  upset. 


1  Townsend,  p.  97. 


126  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


The  latent  instability  of  European  political  control 
over  the  Near  and  Middle  East  was  dramatically  shown 
by  the  moral  effect  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  Down 
to  that  time  the  Orient  had  been  so  helpless  in  face  of 
European  aggression  that  most  Orientals  had  come  to 
regard  Western  supremacy  with  fatalistic  resignation. 
But  the  defeat  of  a  first-class  European  Power  by  an 
Asiatic  people  instantly  broke  the  spell,  and  all  Asia  and 
Africa  thrilled  with  a  wild  intoxication  which  we  can 
scarcely  conceive.  A  Scotch  missionary  thus  describes 
the  effect  of  the  Japanese  victories  on  northern  India, 
where  he  was  stationed  at  the  time:  “A  stir  of  excite¬ 
ment  passed  over  the  north  of  India.  Even  the  remote 
villagers  talked  over  the  victories  of  Japan  as  they  sat 
in  their  circles  and  passed  round  the  huqqa  at  night. 
One  of  the  older  men  said  to  me,  ‘ There  has  been  nothing 
like  it  since  the  mutiny/  A  Turkish  consul  of  long  ex¬ 
perience  in  Western  Asia  told  me  that  in  the  interior  you 
could  see  everywhere  the  most  ignorant  peasants  ‘tin¬ 
gling  ’  with  the  news.  Asia  was  moved  from  end  to 
end,  and  the  sleep  of  the  centuries  was  finally  broken. 
It  was  a  time  when  it  was  ‘good  to  be  alive/  for  a  new 
chapter  was  being  written  in  the  book  of  the  world’s 
history.”  1 

Of  course  the  Russo-Japanese  War  did  not  create  this 
new  spirit,  whose  roots  lay  in  the  previous  epoch  of  sub¬ 
tle  changes  that  had  been  going  on.  The  Russo- Japa- 

1  Rev.  C.  F.  Andrews,  The  Renaissance  in  India ,  p.  4  (London,  1911). 
For  other  similar  accounts  of  the  effect  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  upon 
Oriental  peoples  generally,  see  A.  M.  Low,  “Egyptian  Unrest,”  The 
Forum ,  October,  1906;  F.  Farjanel,  “Le  Japon  et  l’Islam,”  Revue  du  Monde 
musulman,  November,  1906;  “Oriental  Ideals  as  Affected  by  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,”  American  Review  of  Reviews ,  February,  1905;  A.  Vam- 
bery,  “Japan  and  the  Mahometan  World,”  Nineteenth  Century  and  After , 
April,  1905;  Yahya  Siddyk,  op.  cit.}  p.  42.  / 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  127 


nese  War  was  thus  rather  the  occasion  than  the  cause  of 
the  wave  of  exultant  self-confidence  which  swept  over 
Asia  and  Africa  in  the  year  1904.  But  it  did  dramatize 
and  clarify  ideas  that  had  been  germinating  half-uncon- 
sciously  in  millions  of  Oriental  minds,  and  was  thus  the 
sign  manual  of  the  whole  nexus  of  forces  making  for  a 
revivified  Orient. 

Furthermore,  this  new  temper  profoundly  influenced 
the  Orient’s  attitude  toward  the  series  of  fresh  European 
aggressions  which  then  began.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that 
just  when  the  Far  East  had  successfully  resisted  Euro¬ 
pean  encroachment,  the  Near  and  Middle  East  should 
have  been  subjected  to  European  aggressions  of  unpar¬ 
alleled  severity.  We  have  already  noted  the  furious 
protests  and  the  unwonted  moral  solidarity  of  the  Mos¬ 
lem  world  at  these  manifestations  of  Western  Realpolitik. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  know  exactly  how  much  of 
this  defiant  temper  was  due  to  the  heartening  example 
of  Japan.  Certainly  our  ultraimperialists  of  the  West 
were  playing  a  dangerous  game  during  the  decade  be¬ 
tween  1904  and  1914.  As  Arminius  Vambery  remarked 
after  the  Italian  raid  on  Tripoli:  “The  more  the  power 
and  authority  of  the  West  gains  ground  in  the  Old  World, 
the  stronger  becomes  the  bond  of  unity  and  mutual 
interest  between  the  separate  factions  of  Asiatics,  and 
the  deeper  burns  the  fanatical  hatred  of  Europe.  Is  it 
wise  or  expedient  by  useless  provocation  and  unnecessary 
attacks  to  increase  the  feeling  of  animosity,  to  hurry  on 
the  struggle  between  the  two  worlds,  and  to  nip  in  the 
bud  the  work  of  modern  culture  which  is  now  going  on 
in  Asia?”  1 

1  A.  Vambery,  “An  Approach  between  Moslems  and  Buddhists,” 
Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  April,  1912. 


128  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


The  Great  War  of  course  immensely  aggravated  an 
already  critical  situation.  The  Orient  suddenly  saw  the 
European  peoples,  who,  in  racial  matters,  had  hitherto 
maintained  something  like  solidarity,  locked  in  an  inter¬ 
necine  death-grapple  of  unparalleled  ferocity;  it  saw 
those  same  peoples  put  one  another  furiously  to  the  ban 
as  irreconcilable  foes;  it  saw  white  race-unity  cleft  by 
moral  and  political  gulfs  which  white  men  themselves 
continuously  iterated  would  never  be  filled.  The  one 
redeeming  feature  of  the  struggle,  in  Oriental  eyes,  was  the 
liberal  programme  which  the  Allied  statesmen  inscribed 
upon  their  banners.  But  when  the  war  was  over  and 
the  Allies  had  won,  it  promptly  leaked  out  that  at  the 
very  time  when  the  Allied  leaders  were  making  their 
liberal  speeches  they  had  been  negotiating  a  series  of 
secret  treaties  partitioning  the  Near  East  between  them 
in  a  spirit  of  the  most  cynical  imperialism;  and  in  the 
peace  conferences  that  closed  the  war  it  was  these  secret 
treaties,  not  the  liberal  speeches,  which  determined  the 
Oriental  settlement,  resulting  (on  paper  at  least)  in  the 
total  subjugation  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  to  Euro¬ 
pean  political  control. 

The  wave  of  wrath  which  thereupon  rolled  over  the 
East  was  not  confined  to  furious  remonstrance  like  the 
protests  of  pre-war  days.  There  was  a  note  of  immedi¬ 
ate  resistance  and  rebellion  not  audible  before.  This  re¬ 
bellious  temper  has  translated  itself  into  warlike  action 
which  has  already  forced  the  European  Powers  to  abate 
some  of  their  extreme  pretensions  and  which  will  un¬ 
doubtedly  make  them  abate  others  in  the  near  future. 
The  details  of  this  post-war  unrest  will  be  discussed  in 
later  chapters.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  the  Great 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  WEST  129 


War  has  shattered  European  prestige  in  the  East  and 
has  opened  the  eyes  of  Orientals  to  the  weaknesses  of 
the  West.  To  the  Orient  the  war  was  a  gigantic  course 
of  education.  For  one  thing,  millions  of  Orientals  and 
negroes  were  taken  from  the  remotest  jungles  of  Asia 
and  Africa  to  serve  as  soldiers  and  laborers  in  the  White 
Man’s  War.  Though  the  bulk  of  these  auxiliaries  were 
used  in  colonial  operations,  more  than  a  million  of  them 
were  brought  to  Europe  itself.  Here  they  killed  white 
men,  raped  white  women,  tasted  white  luxuries,  learned 
white  weaknesses — and  went  home  to  tell  their  people 
the  whole  story.1  Asia  and  Africa  to-day  know  Europe 
as  they  never  knew  it  before,  and  we  may  be  sure  that 
they  will  make  use  of  their  knowledge.  The  most  seri¬ 
ous  factor  in  the  situation  is  that  the  Orient  realizes 
that  the  famous  Versailles  “ Peace”  which  purports  to 
have  pacified  Europe  is  no  peace,  but  rather  an  uncon- 
structive,  unstatesmanlike  futility  that  left  old  sores  un¬ 
healed  and  even  dealt  fresh  wounds.  Europe  to-day  lies 
debilitated  and  uncured,  while  Asia  and  Africa  see  in 
this  a  standing  incitement  to  rash  dreams  and  violent 
action. 

Such  is  the  situation  to-day:  an  East,  tom  by  the  con¬ 
flict  between  new  and  old,  facing  a  West  riven  with  dis¬ 
sension  and  sick  from  its  mad  follies.  Probably  never 
before  have  the  relations  between  the  two  worlds  con¬ 
tained  so  many  incalculable,  even  cataclysmic,  possi¬ 
bilities.  The  point  to  be  here  noted  is  that  this  strange 

1  For  the  effect  of  the  war  on  Asia  and  Africa,  see  A.  Demangeon,  Le 
Dedin  de  V Europe  (Paris,  1920);  H.  M.  Hyndman,  The  Awakening  of 
Asia  (New  York,  1919);  E.  D.  Morel,  The  Black  Man’s  Burden  (New  York, 
1920);  F.  B.  Fisher,  India’s  Silent  Revolution  (New  York,  1919);  also,  my 
Rising  Tide  of  Color  against  White  World-Supremacy. 


130  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


new  East  which  now  faces  us  is  mainly  the  result  of 
Western  influences  permeating  it  in  unprecedented  fash¬ 
ion  for  the  past  hundred  years.  To  the  chief  elements 
in  that  permeation  let  us  now  turn. 


CHAPTER  IV 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 

The  Orient’s  chief  handicap  has  been  its  vicious  political 
tradition.  From  earliest  times  the  typical  form  of  gov¬ 
ernment  in  the  East  has  been  despotism — the  arbitrary 
rule  of  an  absolute  monarch,  whose  subjects  are  slaves, 
holding  their  goods,  their  honors,  their  very  lives,  at  his 
will  and  pleasure.  The  sole  consistent  check  upon 
Oriental  despotism  has  been  religion.  Some  critics  may 
add  “  custom  but  it  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  for  in 
the  East  custom  always  acquires  a  religious  sanction. 
The  mantle  of  religion  of  course  covers  its  ministers,  the 
priests  forming  a  privileged  caste.  But,  with  these 
exceptions,  Oriental  despotism  has  usually  known  no 
bounds;  and  the  despot,  so  long  as  he  respected  religion 
and  the  priesthood,  has  been  able  to  act  pretty  much  as 
he  chose.  In  the  very  dawn  of  history  we  see  Pharaoh 
exhausting  all  Egypt  to  gratify  his  whim  for  a  colossal 
pyramid  tomb,  and  throughout  history  Oriental  life  has 
been  cursed  by  this  fatal  political  simplicity. 

Now  manifold  human  experience  has  conclusively 
proved  that  despotism  is  a  bad  form  of  government  in 
the  long  run.  Of  course  there  is  the  legendary  “  benevo¬ 
lent  despot” — the  “ father  of  his  people,”  surrounded  by 
wise  counsellors  and  abolishing  evils  by  a  nod  or  a  stroke 
of  the  pen.  That  is  all  very  well  in  a  fairy-tale.  But 

in  real  life  the  “benevolent  despot”  rarely  happens  and 

131 


132  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


still  more  rarely  succeeds  himself.  The  “  father  of  his 
people”  usually  has  a  pompous  son  and  a  vicious  grand¬ 
son,  who  bring  the  people  to  ruin.  The  melancholy 
trinity — David,  Solomon,  Rehoboam — has  reappeared 
with  depressing  regularity  throughout  history. 

Furthermore,  even  the  benevolent  despot  has  his 
limitations.  The  trouble  with  all  despots,  good  or  bad, 
is  that  their  rule  is  entirely  'personal.  Everything,  in 
the  last  analysis,  depends  on  the  despot’s  personal  will. 
Nothing  is  fixed  or  certain.  The  benevolent  despot  him¬ 
self  may  discard  his  benevolence  overnight,  and  the 
fate  of  an  empire  may  be  jeopardized  by  the  monarch’s 
infatuation  for  a  woman  or  by  an  upset  in  his  digestion. 

We  Occidentals  have,  in  fact,  never  known  “  despot¬ 
ism,”  in  its  simon-pure,  Oriental  sense;  not  even  under 
the  Roman  Empire.  Indeed,  we  can  hardly  conceive 
what  it  means.  When  we  speak  of  a  benevolent  despot 
we  usually  think  of  the  “ enlightened  autocrats”  of 
eighteenth-century  Europe,  such  as  Frederick  the  Great. 
But  these  monarchs  were  not  “ despots”  as  Orientals 
understand  it.  Take  Frederick,  for  example.  He  was 
regarded  as  absolute.  But  his  subjects  were  not  slaves. 
Those  proud  Prussian  officers,  starched  bureaucrats, 
stiff-necked  burghers,  and  stubborn  peasants  each  had 
his  sense  of  personal  dignity  and  legal  status.  The  un¬ 
questioning  obedience  which  they  gave  Frederick  was 
given  not  merely  because  he  was  their  king,  but  also  be¬ 
cause  they  knew  that  he  was  the  hardest-working  man 
in  Prussia  and  tireless  in  his  devotion  to  the  state.  If 
Frederick  had  suddenly  changed  into  a  lazy,  depraved, 
capricious  tyrant,  his  “ obedient”  Prussians  would  have 
soon  showed  him  that  there  were  limits  to  his  power. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


133 


In  the  Orient  it  is  quite  otherwise.  In  the  East  “  there 
lies  upon  the  eyes  and  foreheads  of  all  men  a  law  which 
is  not  found  in  the  European  decalogue;  and  this  law  runs: 
‘Thou  shalt  honor  and  worship  the  man  whom  God 
shall  set  above  thee  for  thy  King:  if  he  cherish  thee, 
thou  shalt  love  him;  and  if  he  plunder  and  oppress  thee 
thou  shalt  still  love  him,  for  thou  art  his  slave  and  his 
chattel.’”1  The  Eastern  monarch  may  immure  himself 
in  his  harem,  casting  the  burdens  of  state  upon  the  shoul¬ 
ders  of  a  grand  vizier.  This  vizier  has  thenceforth 
limitless  power;  the  life  of  every  subject  is  in  his  hands. 
Yet,  any  evening,  at  the  pout  of  a  dancing-girl,  the 
monarch  may  send  from  his  harem  to  the  vizier’s  palace 
a  negro  “mute,”  armed  with  the  bowstring.  And  when 
that  black  mute  arrives,  the  vizier,  doffing  his  robe  of 
office,  and  with  neither  question  nor  remonstrance,  will 
bare  his  neck  to  be  strangled.  That  is  real  despotism — 
the  despotism  that  the  East  has  known. 

Such  is  the  political  tradition  of  the  Orient.  And  it  is 
surely  obvious  that  under  such  a  tradition  neither  ordered 
government  nor  consistent  progress  is  possible.  Eastern 
history  is,  in  fact,  largely  a  record  of  sudden  flowerings 
and  equally  sudden  declines.  A  strong,  able  man  cuts 
his  way  to  power  in  a  period  of  confusion  and  decay. 
He  must  be  strong  and  able,  or  he  would  not  win  over 
other  men  of  similar  nature  struggling  for  the  coveted 
prize.  His  energy  and  ability  soon  work  wonders.  He 
knows  the  rough-and-ready  way  of  getting  things  done. 
His  vigor  and  resolution  supply  the  driving-power  re¬ 
quired  to  compel  his  subordinates  to  act  with  reasonable 
efficiency,  especially  since  incompetence  or  dishonesty 
1 T.  Morison,  Imperial  Rule  in  India ,  p.  43  (London,  1899). 


134  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


are  punished  with  the  terrible  severity  of  the  Persian 
king  who  flayed  an  unjust  satrap  alive  and  made  the  skin 
into  the  seat  of  the  official  chair  on  which  the  new  satrap 
sat  to  administer  justice. 

While  the  master  lives,  things  may  go  well.  But  the 
master  dies,  and  is  succeeded  by  his  son.  This  son,  even 
assuming  that  he  has  inherited  much  of  his  father’s 
ability,  has  had  the  worst  possible  upbringing.  Raised 
in  the  harem,  surrounded  by  obsequious  slaves  and  de¬ 
signing  women,  neither  his  pride  nor  his  passions  have 
been  effectively  restrained,  and  he  grows  up  a  pompous 
tyrant  and  probably  precociously  depraved.  Such  a 
man  will  not  be  apt  to  look  after  things  as  his  father 
did.  And  as  soon  as  the  master’s  eye  shifts,  things  begin 
to  go  to  pieces.  How  can  it  be  otherwise?  His  father 
built  up  no  governmental  machine,  functioning  almost 
automatically,  as  in  the  West.  His  officers  worked  from 
fear  or  personal  loyalty;  not  out  of  a  patriotic  sense  of 
duty  or  impersonal  esprit  de  corps.  Under  the  grandson, 
matters  get  even  worse,  power  slips  from  his  incompetent 
hands  and  is  parcelled  out  among  many  local  despots,  of 
whom  the  strongest  cuts  his  way  to  power,  assuming  that 
the  decadent  state  is  not  overrun  by  some  foreign  con¬ 
queror.  In  either  eventuality,  the  old  cycle — David,  Sol¬ 
omon,  Rehoboam — is  finished,  and  a  new  cycle  begins — 
with  the  same  destined  end. 

That,  in  a  nutshell,  is  the  political  history  of  the  East. 
It  has,  however,  been  modified  or  temporarily  inter¬ 
rupted  by  the  impact  of  more  liberal  political  influences, 
exerted  sometimes  from  special  Eastern  regions  and 
sometimes  from  the  West.  Not  all  the  Orient  has  been 
given  over  to  unrelieved  despotism.  Here  and  there 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


135 


have  been  peoples  (mostly  mountain  or  pastoral  peoples) 
who  abhorred  despotism.  Such  a  people  have  always 
been  the  Arabs.  We  have  already  seen  how  the  Arabs, 
fired  by  Islam,  established  a  mighty  caliphate  which, 
in  its  early  days,  was  a  theocratic  democracy.  Of 
course  we  have  also  seen  how  the  older  tradition  of 
despotism  reasserted  itself  over  most  of  the  Moslem 
world,  how  the  democratic  caliphate  turned  into  a  des¬ 
potic  sultanate,  and  how  the  liberty-loving  Arabs  re¬ 
tired  sullenly  to  their  deserts.  Political  liberalism,  like 
religious  liberalism,  was  crushed  and  almost  forgotten. 
Almost — not  quite;  for  memories  of  the  Meccan  cali¬ 
phate,  like  memories  of  Motazelism,  remained  in  the 
back  of  men’s  minds,  ready  to  come  forth  again  with 
better  days.  After  all,  free  Arabia  still  stood,  with 
every  Arab  tribesman  armed  to  the  teeth  to  see  that  it 
kept  free.  And  then,  there  was  Islam.  No  court  theo¬ 
logian  could  entirely  explain  away  the  fact  that  Mo¬ 
hammed  had  said  things  like  “All  Believers  are  broth¬ 
ers”  and  “All  Moslems  are  free.”  No  court  chroni¬ 
cler  could  entirely  expunge  from  Moslem  annals  the 
story  of  Islam’s  early  days,  known  as  the  Wakti-Seadet, 
or  “Age  of  Blessedness.”  Even  in  the  darkest  times 
Moslems  of  liberal  tendencies  must  have  been  greatly 
interested  to  read  that  the  first  caliph,  Abu  Bekr,  after 
his  election  by  the  people,  said:  “Oh  nation!  you  have 
chosen  me,  the  most  unworthy  among  you,  for  your 
caliph.  Support  me  as  long  as  my  actions  are  just.  If 
otherwise,  admonish  me,  rouse  me  to  a  sense  of  my  duty. 
Truth  alone  is  desirable,  and  lies  are  despicable.  .  .  . 
As  I  am  the  guardian  of  the  weak,  obey  me  only  so  long 
as  I  obey  the  Sheriat  [Divine  Law].  But  if  you  see 


136  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


that  I  deviate  but  in  the  minutest  details  from  this 
law,  you  need  obey  me  no  more.” 1 

In  fine,  no  subsequent  distortions  could  entirely  ob¬ 
literate  the  fact  that  primitive  Islam  was  the  supreme 
expression  of  a  freedom-loving  folk  whose  religion  must 
necessarily  contain  many  liberal  tendencies.  Even  the 
sheriat,  or  canon  law,  is,  as  Professor  Lybyer  states, 
“  fundamentally  democratic  and  opposed  in  essence  to 
absolutism.”  2  Vambery  well  summarizes  this  matter 
when  he  writes:  “It  is  not  Islam  and  its  doctrines  which 
have  devastated  the  western  portion  of  Asia  and  brought 
about  the  present  sad  state  of  things;  but  it  is  the 
tyranny  of  the  Moslem  Princes,  who  have  wilfully  per¬ 
verted  the  doctrines  of  the  Prophet,  and  sought  and 
found  maxims  in  the  Koran  as  a  basis  for  their  despotic 
rule.  They  have  not  allowed  the  faintest  suspicion  of 
doubt  in  matters  of  religion,  and,  efficaciously  distorting 
and  crushing  all  liberal  principles,  they  have  prevented 
the  dawn  of  a  Moslem  Renaissance.” 3 

In  the  opening  chapter  we  saw  how  Oriental  despot¬ 
ism  reached  its  evil  maximum  in  the  eighteenth  cen¬ 
tury,  and  how  the  Mohammedan  Revival  was  not  merely 
a  puritan  reformation  of  religion  but  was  also  in  part 
a  political  protest  against  the  vicious  and  contempti¬ 
ble  tyrants  who  misruled  the  Moslem  world.  This  in¬ 
ternal  movement  of  political  liberalism  was  soon  cross¬ 
cut  by  another  political  current  coming  in  from  the 
West.  Comparing  the  miserable  decrepitude  of  the  Mos- 

1  Quoted  from  Arminius  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands, 
pp.  305-306  (London,  1906). 

2  A.  H.  Lybyer,  “The  Turkish  Parliament,”  Proceedings  of  the  American 
Political  Science  Association,  vol.  VII,  p.  67  (1910). 

3  Vamb6ry,  op.  cit.,  p.  307. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


137 


lem  East  with  Europe’s  prosperity  and  vigor,  think¬ 
ing  Moslems  were  beginning  to  recognize  their  short¬ 
comings,  and  they  could  not  avoid  the  conclusion  that 
their  woes  were  in  large  part  due  to  their  wretched  gov¬ 
ernments.  Indeed,  a  few  even  of  the  Moslem  princes 
came  to  realize  that  there  must  be  some  adoption  of 
Western  political  methods  if  their  countries  were  to  be 
saved  from  destruction.  The  most  notable  examples 
of  this  new  type  of  Oriental  sovereign  were  Sultan  Mah¬ 
mud  II  of  Turkey  and  Mehemet  Ali  of  Egypt,  both  of 
whom  came  to  power  about  the  beginning  of  the  nine¬ 
teenth  century. 

Of  course  none  of  these  reforming  princes  had  the 
slightest  idea  of  granting  their  subjects  constitutional 
liberties  or  of  transforming  themselves  into  limited 
monarchs.  They  intended  to  remain  absolute,  but  ab¬ 
solute  more  in  the  sense  of  the  “enlightened  autocrat” 
of  Europe  and  less  in  the  sense  of  the  purely  Oriental 
despot.  What  they  wanted  were  true  organs  of  govern¬ 
ment — army,  civil  service,  judiciary,  etc. — which  would 
function  efficiently  and  semi-automatically  as  govern¬ 
mental  machinery,  and  not  as  mere  amorphous  masses 
of  individuals  who  had  to  be  continuously  prodded  and 
punished  by  the  sovereign  in  order  to  get  anything 
done. 

Mahmud  II,  Mehemet  Ali,  and  their  princely  col¬ 
leagues  persisted  in  their  new  policies,  but  the  outcome 
of  these  “reforms  from  above”  was,  on  the  whole,  dis¬ 
appointing.  The  monarchs  might  build  barracks  and 
bureaux  on  European  models  and  fill  them  with  soldiers 
and  bureaucrats  in  European  clothes,  but  they  did  not 
get  European  results.  Most  of  these  “Western-type” 


138  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


officials  knew  almost  nothing  about  the  West  and  were 
therefore  incapable  of  doing  things  in  Western  fashion. 
In  fact,  they  had  small  heart  for  the  business.  Devoid 
of  any  sort  of  enthusiasm  for  ideas  and  institutions  which 
they  did  not  comprehend,  they  applied  themselves  to 
the  work  of  reform  with  secret  ill  will  and  repugnance, 
moved  only  by  blind  obedience  to  their  sovereign’s 
command.  As  time  passed,  the  military  branches  did 
gain  some  modern  efficiency,  but  the  civil  services  made 
little  progress,  adopting  many  Western  bureaucratic 
vices  but  few  or  none  of  the  virtues. 

Meanwhile  reformers  of  quite  a  different  sort  began  to 
appear:  men  demanding  Western  innovations  like  con¬ 
stitutions,  parliaments,  and  other  phenomena  of  modern 
political  life.  Their  numbers  were  constantly  recruited 
from  the  widening  circles  of  men  acquainted  with  West¬ 
ern  ideas  through  the  books,  pamphlets,  and  news¬ 
papers  which  were  being  increasingly  published,  and 
through  the  education  given  by  schools  on  the  Western 
model  which  were  springing  up.  The  third  quarter  of 
the  nineteenth  century  saw  the  formation  of  genuine 
political  parties  in  Turkey,  and  in  1876  the  liberal  groups 
actually  wrung  from  a  weak  sultan  the  grant  of  a  parlia¬ 
ment. 

These  early  successes  of  Moslem  political  liberalism 
were,  however,  followed  by  a  period  of  reaction.  The 
Moslem  princes  had  become  increasingly  alarmed  at 
the  growth  of  liberal  agitation  among  their  subjects  and 
were  determined  to  maintain  their  despotic  authority. 
The  new  Sultan  of  Turkey,  Abdul  Hamid,  promptly 
suppressed  his  parliament,  savagely  persecuted  the  lib¬ 
erals,  and  restored  the  most  uncompromising  despotism. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


139 


In  Persia  the  Shah  repressed  a  nascent  liberal  move¬ 
ment  with  equal  severity,  while  in  Egypt  the  spendthrift 
rule  of  Khedive  Ismail  ended  all  native  political  life 
by  provoking  European  intervention  and  the  imposition 
of  British  rule.  Down  to  the  Young-Turk  revolution 
of  1908  there  were  few  overt  signs  of  liberal  agitation 
in  those  Moslem  countries  which  still  retained  their 
independence.  Nevertheless,  the  agitation  was  there, 
working  underground.  Hundreds  of  youthful  patriots 
fled  abroad,  both  to  obtain  an  education  and  to  conduct 
their  liberal  propaganda,  and  from  havens  of  refuge  like 
Switzerland  these  “  Young-Turks,”  “  Young-Persians,” 
and  others  issued  manifestoes  and  published  revolution¬ 
ary  literature  which  was  smuggled  into  their  homelands 
and  eagerly  read  by  their  oppressed  brethren.1 

As  the  years  passed,  the  cry  for  liberty  grew  steadily 
in  strength.  A  young  Turkish  poet  wrote  at  this  time: 
“All  that  we  admire  in  European  culture  as  the  fruit  of 
science  and  art  is  simply  the  outcome  of  liberty.  Every¬ 
thing  derives  its  light  from  the  bright  star  of  liberty. 
Without  liberty  a  nation  has  no  power,  no  prosperity; 
without  liberty  there  is  no  happiness;  and  without  hap¬ 
piness,  existence,  true  life,  eternal  life,  is  impossible. 
Everlasting  praise  and  glory  to  the  shining  light  of  free¬ 
dom!”2  By  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  keen- 
sighted  European  observers  noted  the  working  of  the 
liberal  ferment  under  the  surface  calm  of  absolutist  re- 

1 A  good  account  of  these  liberal  movements  during  the  nineteenth 
century  is  found  in  Vambery,  “  Freiheitliche  Bestrebungen  im  mosli- 
mischen  Asien,”  Deutsche  Rundschau ,  October,  1893;  a  shorter  summary 
of  Vambery’s  views  is  found  in  his  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands, 
especially  chap.  V.  Also,  see  articles  by  Leon  Cahun,  previously  noted, 
in  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  Histoire  Generate ,  vols.  XI  and  XII. 

2  Vambery,  supra,  p.  332. 


140  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


pression.  Thus,  Arminius  Vambery,  revisiting  Con¬ 
stantinople  in  1896,  was  astounded  by  the  liberal  evolu¬ 
tion  that  had  taken  place  since  his  first  sojourn  in  Turkey 
forty  years  before.  Although  Constantinople  was  sub¬ 
jected  to  the  severest  phase  of  Hamidian  despotism, 
Vambery  wrote:  “The  old  attachment  of  Turkey  for 
the  absolute  regime  is  done  for.  We  hear  much  in 
Europe  of  the  ‘Young-Turk’  Party;  we  hear  even  of  a 
constitutional  movement,  political  emigres,  revolutionary 
pamphlets.  But  what  we  do  not  realize  is  the  ferment 
which  exists  in  the  different  social  classes,  and  which 
gives  us  the  conviction  that  the  Turk  is  in  progress  and 
is  no  longer  clay  in  the  hands  of  his  despotic  potter. 
In  Turkey,  therefore,  it  is  not  a  question  of  a  Young- 
Turk  Party,  because  every  civilized  Ottoman  belongs 
to  this  party.”1 

In  this  connection  we  should  note  the  stirrings  of  un¬ 
rest  that  were  now  rapidly  developing  in  the  Eastern 
lands  subject  to  European  political  control.  By  the 
close  of  the  nineteenth  century  only  four  considerable 
Moslem  states — Turkey,  Persia,  Morocco,  and  Afghan¬ 
istan — retained  anything  like  independence  from  Euro¬ 
pean  domination.  Since  Afghanistan  and  Morocco  were 
so  backward  that  they  could  hardly  be  reckoned  as  civi¬ 
lized  countries,  it  was  only  in  Turkey  and  Persia  that 
genuine  liberal  movements  against  native  despotism 
could  arise.  But  in  European-ruled  countries  like  In¬ 
dia,  Egypt,  and  Algeria,  the  cultural  level  of  the  in¬ 
habitants  was  high  enough  to  engender  liberal  political 
aspirations  as  well  as  that  mere  dislike  of  foreign  rule 

1  Vambery,  La  Turquie  d’aujourd’hui  et  d’avant  Quarante  Ans ,  p.  22 
(Paris,  1898). 


POLITICAL  CHANGE  141 

which  may  be  felt  by  savages  as  well  as  by  civilized 
peoples. 

These  liberal  aspirations  were  of  course  stimulated 
by  the  movements  against  native  despotism  in  Turkey 
and  Persia.  Nevertheless,  the  two  sets  of  phenomena 
must  be  sharply  distinguished  from  each  other.  The 
Turkish  and  Persian  agitations  were  essentially  move¬ 
ments  of  liberal  reform.  The  Indian,  Egyptian,  Al¬ 
gerian,  and  kindred  agitations  were  essentially  move¬ 
ments  for  independence,  with  no  settled  programme  as  to 
how  that  independence  should  be  used  after  it  had  been 
attained.  These  latter  movements  are,  in  fact,  “  na¬ 
tionalist”  rather  than  liberal  in  character,  and  it  is  in 
the  chapters  devoted  to  nationalism  that  they  will  be 
discussed.  The  point  to  be  noted  here  is  that  they  are 
really  coalitions,  against  the  foreign  ruler,  of  men  hold¬ 
ing  very  diverse  political  ideas,  embracing  as  these 
“nationalist”  coalitions  do  not  merely  genuine  liberals 
but  also  self-seeking  demagogues  and  even  stark  reac¬ 
tionaries  who  would  like  to  fasten  upon  their  liberated 
countries  the  yoke  of  the  blackest  despotism.  Of  course 
all  the  nationalist  groups  use  the  familiar  slogans  “free¬ 
dom”  and  “liberty”;  nevertheless,  what  many  of  them 
mean  is  merely  freedom  and  liberty  from  foreign  tute¬ 
lage — in  other  words,  independence.  We  must  always 
remember  that  patriotism  has  no  essential  connection 
with  liberalism.  The  Spanish  peasants,  who  shouted 
“liberty”  as  they  rose  against  Napoleon’s  armies,  greeted 
their  contemptible  tyrant-king  with  delirious  enthusiasm 
and  welcomed  his  glorification  of  absolutism  with  cries 
of  “Long  live  chains!” 

The  period  of  despotic  reaction  which  had  afflicted 


142  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Turkey  and  Persia  since  the  beginning  of  the  last  quarter 
of  the  nineteenth  century  came  dramatically  to  an  end 
in  the  year  1908.  Both  countries  exploded  into  revo¬ 
lution,  the  Turks  deposing  the  tyrant  Abdul  Hamid, 
the  Persians  rising  against  their  infamous  ruler  Mu¬ 
hammad  Ali  Shah,  11  perhaps  the  most  perverted,  cow¬ 
ardly,  and  vice-sodden  monster  that  had  disgraced  the 
throne  of  Persia  in  many  generations.”1  These  revolu¬ 
tions  released  the  pent-up  liberal  forces  which  had  been 
slowly  gathering  strength  under  the  repression  of  the 
previous  generation,  and  the  upshot  was  that  Turkey 
and  Persia  alike  blossomed  out  with  constitutions,  par¬ 
liaments,  and  all  the  other  political  machinery  of  the 
West. 

How  the  new  regimes  would  have  worked  m  normal 
times  it  is  profitless  to  speculate,  because,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  times  were  abnormal  to  the  highest  degree. 
Unfortunately  for  the  Turks  and  Persians,  they  had 
made  their  revolutions  just  when  the  world  was  enter¬ 
ing  that  profound  malaise  which  culminated  in  the 
Great  War.  Neither  Turkey  nor  Persia  were  allowed 
time  to  attempt  the  difficult  process  of  political  trans¬ 
formation.  Lynx-eyed  Western  chancelleries  noted  every 
blunder  and,  in  the  inevitable  weakness  of  transition, 
pounced  upon  them  to  their  undoing.  The  Great  War 
merely  completed  a  process  of  Western  aggression  and 
intervention  which  had  begun  some  years  before. 

This  virtual  absence  of  specific  fact-data  renders 
largely  academic  any  discussion  of  the  much-debated 
question  whether  or  not  the  peoples  of  the  Near  and 
Middle  East  are  capable  of  “ self-government”;  that  is, 

1  W.  Morgan  Shuster,  The  Strangling  of  Persia,  p.  xxi  (New  York,  1912). 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


143 


of  establishing  and  maintaining  ordered,  constitutional 
political  life.  Opinions  on  this  point  are  at  absolute 
variance.  Personally,  I  have  not  been  able  to  make  up 
my  mind  on  the  matter,  so  I  shall  content  myself  with 
stating  the  various  arguments  without  attempting  to 
draw  any  general  conclusion.  Before  stating  these  con¬ 
trasted  view-points,  however,  I  would  draw  attention  to 
the  distinction  which  should  be  made  between  the  Mo¬ 
hammedan  peoples  and  the  non-Mohammedan  Hindus 
of  India.  Moslems  everywhere  possess  the  democratic 
political  example  of  Arabia  as  well  as  a  religion  which, 
as  regards  its  own  followers  at  least,  contains  many 
liberal  tendencies.  The  Hindus  have  nothing  like  this. 
Their  political  tradition  has  been  practically  that  of  un¬ 
relieved  Oriental  despotism,  the  only  exceptions  being 
a  few  primitive  self-governing  communities  in  very  early 
times,  which  never  exerted  any  wide-spread  influence  and 
quickly  faded  away.  As  for  Brahminism,  the  Hindu 
religion,  it  is  perhaps  the  most  illiberal  cult  which  ever 
afflicted  mankind,  dividing  society  as  it  does  into  an  in¬ 
finity  of  rigid  castes  between  which  no  real  intercourse 
is  possible;  each  caste  regarding  all  those  of  lesser  rank 
as  unclean,  polluting  creatures,  scarcely  to  be  distin¬ 
guished  from  animals.  It  is  obvious  that  with  such 
handicaps  the  establishment  of  true  self-government 
will  be  apt  to  be  more  difficult  for  Hindus  than  for  Mo¬ 
hammedans,  and  the  reader  should  keep  this  point  in 
mind  in  the  discussion  which  follows. 

Considering  first  the  attitude  of  those  who  do  not 
believe  the  peoples  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  capable 
of  real  self-government  in  the  Western  sense  either  now 
or  in  the  immediate  future,  we  find  this  thesis  both  ably 


144  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


and  emphatically  stated  by  Lord  Cromer.  Lord  Cro¬ 
mer  believed  that  the  ancient  tradition  of  despotism  was 
far  too  strong  to  be  overcome,  at  least  in  our  time. 
“From  the  dawn  of  history/’  he  asserts,  “Eastern  poli¬ 
tics  have  been  stricken  with  a  fatal  simplicity.  Do  not 
let  us  for  one  moment  imagine  that  the  fatally  simple 
idea  of  despotic  rule  will  readily  give  way  to  the  far 
more  complex  conception  of  ordered  liberty.  The  trans¬ 
formation,  if  it  ever  takes  place  at  all,  will  probably  be 
the  work,  not  of  generations,  but  of  centuries.  .  .  . 
Our  primary  duty,  therefore,  is,  not  to  introduce  a  sys¬ 
tem  which,  under  the  specious  cloak  of  free  institutions, 
will  enable  a  small  minority  of  natives  to  misgovern 
their  countrymen,  but  to  establish  one  which  will  enable 
the  mass  of  the  population  to  be  governed  according  to 
the  code  of  Christian  morality.  A  freely  elected  Egyp¬ 
tian  parliament,  supposing  such  a  thing  to  be  possible, 
would  not  improbably  legislate  for  the  protection  of  the 
slave-owner,  if  not  the  slave-dealer,  and  no  assurance 
can  be  felt  that  the  electors  of  Rajputana,  if  they  had 
their  own  way,  would  not  re-establish  suttee.  Good 
government  has  the  merit  of  presenting  a  more  or  less 
attainable  ideal.  Before  Orientals  can  attain  anything 
approaching  to  the  British  ideal  of  self-government, 
they  will  have  to  undergo  very  numerous  transmigra¬ 
tions  of  political  thought.”  And  Lord  Cromer  concludes 
pessimistically:  “It  will  probably  never  be  possible  to 
make  a  Western  silk  purse  out  of  an  Eastern  sow’s  ear.” 1 

In  similar  vein,  the  veteran  English  publicist  Doctor 
Dillon,  writing  after  the  Turkish  and  Persian  revolu¬ 
tions,  had  little  hope  in  their  success,  and  ridiculed  the 

1  Cromer,  Political  and  Literary  Essays ,  pp.  25-28. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


145 


current  “  faith  in  the  sacramental  virtue  of  constitutional 
government.”  For,  he  continues:  “No  parchment  yet 
manufactured,  and  no  constitution  drafted  by  the  sons 
of  men,  can  do  away  with  the  foundations  of  national 
character.  Flashy  phrases  and  elegant  declamations 
may  persuade  people  that  they  have  been  transmuted; 
but  they  alter  no  facts,  and  in  Persia’s  case  the  facts 
point  to  utter  incapacity  for  self-government.”  Refer¬ 
ring  to  the  Persian  revolution,  Doctor  Dillon  continues: 
“At  bottom,  only  names  of  persons  and  things  have  been 
altered;  men  may  come  and  men  may  go,  but  anarchy 
goes  on  forever.  .  .  .  Financial  support  of  the  new 
government  is  impossible.  For  foreign  capitalists  will 
not  give  money  to  be  squandered  by  filibusters  and 
irresponsible  agitators  who,  like  bubbles  in  boiling  water, 
appear  on  the  surface  and  disappear  at  once.”1 

A  high  French  colonial  official  thus  characterizes  the 
Algerians  and  other  Moslem  populations  of  French 
North  Africa:  “Our  natives  need  to  be  governed.  They 
are  big  children,  incapable  of  going  alone.  We  should 
guide  them  firmly,  stand  no  nonsense  from  them,  and 
crush  intriguers  and  agents  of  sedition.  At  the  same 
time,  we  should  protect  them,  direct  them  paternally, 
and  especially  obtain  influence  over  them  by  the  con¬ 
stant  example  of  our  moral  superiority.  Above  all:  no 
vain  humanitarian  illusions,  both  in  the  interest  of 
France  and  of  the  natives  themselves.”2 

Many  observers,  particularly  colonial  officials,  have 
been  disappointed  with  the  way  Orientals  have  used 


1 E.  J.  Dillon,  “Persia  not  Ripe  for  Self-Government,”  Contemporary 
Review,  April,  1910. 

2  E.  Mercier,  La  Question  indigene,  p.  220  (Paris,  1901). 


146  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


experimental  first  steps  in  self-government  like  Advisory 
Councils  granted  by  the  European  rulers;  have  used 
them,  that  is,  to  play  politics  and  grasp  for  more  power, 
instead  of  devoting  themselves  to  the  duties  assigned. 
As  Lord  Kitchener  said  in  his  1913  report  on  the  state 
of  Egypt:  “Representative  bodies  can  only  be  safely 
developed  when  it  is  shown  that  they  are  capable  of  per¬ 
forming  adequately  their  present  functions,  and  that 
there  is  good  hope  that  they  could  undertake  still  more 
important  and  arduous  responsibilities.  If  representa¬ 
tive  government,  in  its  simplest  form,  is  found  to  be  un¬ 
workable,  there  is  little  prospect  of  its  becoming  more 
useful  when  its  scope  is  extended.  No  government 
would  be  insane  enough  to  consider  that,  because  an 
Advisory  Council  had  proved  itself  unable  to  carry  out 
its  functions  in  a  reasonable  and  satisfactory  manner, 
it  should  therefore  be  given  a  larger  measure  of  power 
and  control.” 1 

These  nationalist  agitations  arise  primarily  among  the 
native  upper  classes  and  Western-educated  elites,  how¬ 
ever  successful  they  may  be  in  inflaming  the  ignorant 
masses,  who  are  often  quite  contented  with  the  material 
benefits  of  enlightened  European  rule.  This  point  is 
well  brought  out  by  a  leading  American  missionary  in 
India,  with  a  lifetime  of  experience  in  that  country, 
who  wrote  some  years  ago:  “The  common  people  of 
India  are,  now,  on  the  whole,  more  contented  with  their 
government  than  they  ever  were  before.  It  is  the  classes, 
rather,  who  reveal  the  real  spirit  of  discontent.  .  .  . 
If  the  common  people  were  let  alone  by  the  agitators, 
there  would  not  be  a  more  loyal  people  on  earth  than 


1  “Egypt,”  No.  1  (1914),  p.  6. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


147 


the  people  of  India.  But  the  educated  classes  are  cer¬ 
tainly  possessed  of  a  new  ambition,  politically,  and  will 
no  longer  remain  satisfied  with  inferior  places  of  responsi¬ 
bility  and  lower  posts  of  emolument.  .  .  .  These  peo¬ 
ple  have  little  or  no  sympathy  with  the  kind  of  govern¬ 
ment  which  is  gradually  being  extended  to  them.  Ulti¬ 
mately  they  do  not  ask  for  representative  institutions, 
which  will  give  them  a  share  in  the  government  of  their 
own  land.  What  they  really  seek  is  absolute  control. 
The  Brahmin  (only  five  per  cent  of  the  community) 
believes  that  he  has  been  divinely  appointed  to  rule  the 
country  and  would  withhold  the  franchise  from  all 
others.  The  Sudra — the  Bourgeois  of  India — would  no 
more  think  of  giving  the  ballot  to  the  fifty  million  Pa¬ 
riahs  of  the  land  than  he  would  give  it  to  his  dog.  It  is 
the  British  power  that  has  introduced,  and  now  main¬ 
tains,  the  equality  of  rights  and  privileges  for  all  the 
people  of  the  land.” 1 

The  apprehension  that  India,  if  liberated  from  British 
control,  might  be  exploited  by  a  tyrannical  Brahmin 
oligarchy  is  shared  not  only  by  Western  observers  but 
also  by  multitudes  of  low-caste  Hindus,  known  collec¬ 
tively  as  the  “  Depressed  Classes.”  These  people  op¬ 
pose  the  Indian  nationalist  agitation  for  fear  of  losing 
their  present  protection  under  the  British  “Raj.”  They 
believe  that  India  still  needs  generations  of  education 
and  social  reform  before  it  is  fit  for  “home  rule,”  much 
less  independence,  and  they  have  organized  into  a  pow¬ 
erful  association,  the  “Namasudra,”  which  is  loyalist 
and  anti-nationalist  in  character. 

1  Rev.  J.  P.  Jones,  “The  Present  Situation  in  India,”  Journal  of  Race 
Development ,  July,  1910. 


148  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

The  Namasudra  view-point  is  well  expressed  by  its 
leader,  Doctor  Nair.  “  Democracy  as  a  catchword,”  he 
says,  “has  already  reached  India  and  is  widely  used. 
But  the  spirit  of  democracy  still  pauses  east  of  Suez, 
and  will  find  it  hard  to  secure  a  footing  in  a  country 
where  caste  is  strongly  intrenched.  ...  I  do  not  want 
to  lay  the  charge  of  oppressing  the  lower  castes  at  the 
door  of  any  particular  caste.  All  the  higher  castes  take 
a  hand  in  the  game.  The  Brahmin  oppresses  all  the 
non-Brahmin  castes.  The  high-caste  non-Brahmin  op¬ 
presses  all  the  castes  below  him.  .  .  .  We  want  a  real 
democracy  and  not  an  oligarchy,  however  camouflaged 
by  many  high-sounding  words.  Moreover,  if  an  oli¬ 
garchy  is  established  now,  it  will  be  a  perpetual  oligarchy. 
We  further  say  that  we  should  prefer  a  delayed  democ¬ 
racy  to  an  immediate  oligarchy,  having  more  trust  in  a 
sympathetic  British  bureaucracy  than  in  an  unsympa¬ 
thetic  oligarchy  of  the  so-called  high  castes  who  have 
been  oppressing  us  in  the  past  and  will  do  so  again  but 
for  the  British  Government.  Our  attitude  is  based,  not 
on  ‘faith’  alone,  but  on  the  instinct  of  self-preserva¬ 
tion.”  1 

Many  Mohammedans  as  well  as  Hindus  feel  that 
India  is  not  ripe  for  self-government,  and  that  the  re¬ 
laxing  of  British  authority  now,  or  in  the  immediate 
future,  would  be  a  grave  disaster  for  India  itself.  The 
Moslem  loyalists  reprobate  the  nationalist  agitation  for 
the  reasons  expressed  by  one  of  their  representative 
men,  S.  Khuda  Bukhsh,  who  remarks:  “Rightly  or 
wrongly,  I  have  always  kept  aloof  from  modem  Indian 
politics,  and  I  have  always  held  that  we  should  devote 

1  Dr.  T.  Madavan  Nair,  “Caste  and  Democracy,”  Edinburgh  Review , 
October,  1918. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


149 


more  attention  to  social  problems  and  intellectual  ad¬ 
vancement  and  less  to  politics,  which,  in  our  present 
condition,  is  an  unmixed  evil.  I  am  firmly  persuaded 
that  we  would  consult  our  interest  better  by  leaving 
politics  severely  alone.  ...  It  is  not  a  handful  of  men 
armed  with  the  learning  and  culture  of  the  West,  but  it 
is  the  masses  that  must  feel,  understand,  and  take  an 
intelligent  interest  in  their  own  affairs.  The  infinitesi¬ 
mal  educated  minority  do  not  constitute  the  population 
of  India.  It  is  the  masses,  therefore,  that  must  be 
trained,  educated,  brought  to  the  level  of  unassailable 
uprightness  and  devotion  to  their  country.  This  goal 
is  yet  far  beyond  measurable  reach,  but  until  we  attain 
it,  our  hopes  will  be  a  chimera,  and  our  efforts  futile 
and  illusory.  Even  the  educated  minority  have  scarcely 
cast  off  the  swaddling-clothes  of  political  infancy,  or 
have  risen  above  the  illusions  of  power  and  the  ambi¬ 
tions  of  fortune.  We  have  yet  to  learn  austerity  of 
principle  and  rectitude  of  conduct.  Nor  can  we  hope 
to  raise  the  standard  of  private  and  public  morality  so 
long  as  we  continue  to  subordinate  the  interest  of  our 
community  and  country  to  our  own.”1 

Such  pronouncements  as  these  from  considerable  por¬ 
tions  of  the  native  population  give  pause  even  to  those 
liberal  English  students  of  Indian  affairs  who  are  con¬ 
vinced  of  the  theoretical  desirability  of  Indian  home 
rule.  As  one  of  these,  Edwyn  Bevan,  says:  “When 
Indian  Nationalists  ask  for  freedom,  they  mean  au¬ 
tonomy;  they  want  to  get  rid  of  the  foreigner.  Our 
answer  as  given  in  the  reforms  is:2  Wes,  autonomy  you 

1  Bukhsh,  Essays:  Indian  and  Islamic ,  pp.  213-214  (London,  1912). 

2 1.  e.,  the  increase  of  self-government  granted  India  by  Britain  as  a 
result  of  the  Montagu-Chelmsford  Report. 


150  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


shall  have,  but  on  one  condition — that  you  have  democ¬ 
racy  as  well.  We  will  give  up  the  control  as  soon  as 
there  is  an  Indian  people  which  can  control  its  native 
rulers;  we  will  not  give  up  the  control  to  an  Indian  oli¬ 
garchy/  This  is  the  root  of  the  disagreement  between 
those  who  say  that  India  might  have  self-government 
immediately  and  those  who  say  that  India  can  only  be¬ 
come  capable  of  self-government  with  time.  For  the 
former,  by  ‘  self-government/  mean  autonomy,  and  it 
is  perfectly  true  that  India  might  be  made  autonomous 
immediately.  If  the  foreign  control  were  withdrawn 
to-day,  some  sort  of  indigenous  government  or  group 
of  governments  would,  no  doubt,  after  a  period  of  con¬ 
fusion,  come  into  being  in  India.  But  it  would  not  be 
democratic  government;  it  would  be  the  despotic  rule 
of  the  stronger  or  more  cunning.”1 

The  citations  just  quoted  portray  the  standpoint  of 
those  critics,  both  Western  and  Oriental,  who  main¬ 
tain  that  the  peoples  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  are 
incapable  of  self-government  in  our  sense,  at  least  to¬ 
day  or  in  the  immediate  future.  Let  us  now  examine 
the  views  of  those  who  hold  a  more  optimistic  attitude. 
Some  observers  stress  strongly  Islam’s  liberal  tendencies 
as  a  foundation  on  which  to  erect  political  structures  in 
the  modern  sense.  Vambery  says:  “ Islam  is  still  the 
most  democratic  religion  in  the  world,  a  religion  favoring 
both  liberty  and  equality.  If  there  ever  was  a  consti¬ 
tutional  government,  it  was  that  of  the  first  Caliphs.”2 
A  close  English  student  of  the  Near  East  declares:  “Tri- 

1  E.  Bevan,  “The  Reforms  in  India,”  The  New  Europe ,  January  29, 
1920. 

2  Vambery,  La  Turquie  d’aujourd’hui  et  d’avant  Quarante  Ana ,  p.  58. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


151 


bal  Arabia  has  the  only  true  form  of  democratic  govern¬ 
ment,  and  the  Arab  tribesman  goes  armed  to  make  sure 
that  it  continues  democratic — as  many  a  would-be 
despot  knows  to  his  cost.”1  Regarding  the  Young- 
Turk  revolution  of  1908,  Professor  Lybyer  remarks: 
“  Turkey  was  not  so  unprepared  for  parliamentary  in¬ 
stitutions  as  might  at  first  sight  appear.  There  lay  hid¬ 
den  some  precedent,  much  preparation,  and  a  strong 
desire,  for  parliamentary  government.  Both  the  re¬ 
ligious  and  the  secular  institutions  of  Turkey  involve 
precedents  for  a  parliament.  Mohammed  himself  con¬ 
ferred  with  the  wisest  of  his  companions.  The  Ulema2 
have  taken  counsel  together  up  to  the  present  time. 
The  Sacred  Law  (Sheriat)  is  fundamentally  democratic 
and  opposed  in  essence  to  absolutism.  The  habit  of 
regarding  it  as  fundamental  law  enables  even  the  most 
ignorant  of  Mohammedans  to  grasp  the  idea  of  a  Consti¬ 
tution.”  He  points  out  that  the  early  sultans  had  their 
“  Divan,”  or  assemblage  of  high  officials,  meeting  regu¬ 
larly  to  give  the  sultan  information  and  advice,  while 
more  recently  there  have  been  a  Council  of  State  and  a 
Council  of  Ministers.  Also,  there  were  the  parliaments 
of  1877  and  1878.  Abortive  though  these  were  and  fol¬ 
lowed  by  Hamidian  absolutism,  they  were  legal  prece¬ 
dents,  never  forgotten.  From  all  this  Professor  Lybyer 
concludes:  “The  Turkish  Parliament  may  therefore  be 
regarded,  not  as  a  complete  innovation,  but  as  an  en¬ 
largement  and  improvement  of  familiar  institutions.” 3 

Regarding  Persia,  the  American  W.  Morgan  Shuster, 

XG.  W.  Bury,  Pan-Islam ,  pp.  202-203  (London,  1919). 

2  The  assembly  of  religious  notables. 

3  A.  H.  Lybyer,  “The  Turkish  Parliament,”  Proceedings  of  the  American 
Political  Science  Association ,  vol.  VII,  pp.  66-67  (1910). 


152  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

.V 

whom  the  Persian  Revolutionary  Government  called  in 
to  organize  the  country’s  finances,  and  who  was  ousted 
in  less  than  a  year  by  Russo-British  pressure,  expresses 
an  optimistic  regard  for  the  political  capacities  of  the 
Persian  people. 

“I  believe,”  he  says,  “that  there  has  never  been  in 
the  history  of  the  world  an  instance  where  a  people 
changed  suddenly  from  an  absolute  monarchy  to  a 
constitutional  or  representative  form  of  government 
and  at  once  succeeded  in  displaying  a  high  standard  of 
political  wisdom  and  knowledge  of  legislative  procedure. 
Such  a  thing  is  inconceivable  and  not  to  be  expected 
by  any  reasonable  person.  The  members  of  the  first 
Medjlis1  were  compelled  to  fight  for  their  very  existence 
from  the  day  that  the  Parliament  was  constituted.  .  .  . 
They  had  no  time  for  serious  legislative  work,  and  but 
little  hope  that  any  measures  which  they  might  enact 
would  be  put  into  effect. 

“The  second  and  last  Medjlis,  practically  all  of  whose 
members  I  knew  personally,  was  doubtless  incompetent 
if  it  were  to  be  judged  by  the  standards  of  the  British 
Parliament  or  the  American  Congress.  It  would  be 
strange  indeed  if  an  absolutely  new  and  untried  govern¬ 
ment  in  a  land  filled  with  the  decay  of  ages  should,  from 
the  outset,  be  able  to  conduct  its  business  as  well  as 
governments  with  generations  and  even  centuries  of 
experience  behind  them.  We  should  make  allowance 
for  lack  of  technical  knowledge;  for  the  important  ques¬ 
tion,  of  course,  is  that  the  Medjlis  in  the  main  repre¬ 
sented  the  new  and  just  ideals  and  aspirations  of  the 
Persian  people.  Its  members  were  men  of  more  than 

1  The  name  of  the  Persian  Parliament. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


153 


average  education;  some  displayed  remarkable  talent, 
character,  and  courage.  .  .  .  They  responded  enthusi¬ 
astically  to  any  patriotic  suggestion  which  was  put 
before  them.  They  themselves  lacked  any  great  knowl¬ 
edge  of  governmental  finances,  but  they  realized  the 
situation  and  were  both  willing  and  anxious  to  put  their 
full  confidence  in  any  foreign  advisers  who  showed  them¬ 
selves  capable  of  resisting  political  intrigues  and  bribery 
and  working  for  the  welfare  of  the  Persian  people. 

“No  Parliament  can  rightly  be  termed  incompetent 
when  it  has  the  support  of  an  entire  people,  when  it 
recognizes  its  own  limitations,  and  when  its  members 
are  willing  to  undergo  great  sacrifices  for  their  nation’s 
dignity  and  sovereign  rights.  .  .  . 

“As  to  the  Persian  people  themselves,  it  is  difficult 
to  generalize.  The  great  mass  of  the  population  is  com¬ 
posed  of  peasants  and  tribesmen,  all  densely  ignorant. 
On  the  other  hand,  many  thousands  have  been  educated 
abroad,  or  have  travelled  after  completing  their  educa¬ 
tion  at  home.  They,  or  at  least  certain  elements  among 
them  which  had  had  the  support  of  the  masses,  proved 
their  capacity  to  assimilate  western  civilization  and 
ideals.  They  changed  despotism  into  democracy  in  the 
face  of  untold  obstacles.  Opportunities  were  equalized 
to  such  a  degree  that  any  man  of  ability  could  occupy 
the  highest  official  posts.  As  a  race  they  showed  dur¬ 
ing  the  past  five  years  an  unparalleled  eagerness  for 
education.  Hundreds  of  schools  were  established  dur¬ 
ing  the  Constitutional  regime.  A  remarkable  free  press 
sprang  up  overnight,  and  fearless  writers  came  forward 
to  denounce  injustice  and  tyranny  whether  from  within 
their  country  or  without.  The  Persians  were  anxious 


154  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


to  adopt  wholesale  the  political,  ethical,  and  business 
codes  of  the  most  modem  and  progressive  nations. 
They  burned  with  that  same  spirit  of  Asiatic  unrest 
which  pervades  India,  which  produced  the  ‘Young- 
Turk’  movement,  and  which  has  more  recently  mani¬ 
fested  itself  in  the  establishment  of  the  Chinese  Re¬ 
public.”1 

Mr.  Shuster  concludes:  “ Kipling  has  intimated  that 
you  cannot  hustle  the  East.  This  includes  a  warning 
and  a  reflection.  Western  men  and  Western  ideals  can 
hustle  the  East,  provided  the  Orientals  realize  that  they 
are  being  carried  along  lines  reasonably  beneficial  to 
themselves.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  moral  appeal  and 
the  appeal  of  race-pride  and  patriotism,  are  as  strong  in 
the  East  as  in  the  West,  though  it  does  not  lie  so  near 
the  surface;  and  naturally  the  Oriental  displays  no  great 
desire  to  be  hustled  when  it  is  along  lines  beneficial  only 
to  the  Westerner.”2 

Indeed,  many  Western  liberals  believe  that  European 
rule,  however  benevolent  and  efficient,  will  never  pre¬ 
pare  the  Eastern  peoples  for  true  self-government;  and 
that  the  only  way  they  will  learn  is  by  trying  it  out 
themselves.  This  view-point  is  admirably  stated  by  the 
well-known  British  publicist  Lionel  Curtis.  Speaking 
of  India,  Mr.  Curtis  says  that  education  and  kindred 
benefits  conferred  by  British  rule  will  not,  of  themselves, 
“  avail  to  prepare  Indians  for  the  task  of  responsible 
government.  On  the  contrary,  education  will  prove  a 
danger  and  positive  mischief,  unless  accompanied  by 
a  definite  instalment  of  political  responsibility.  It  is 

1  Shuster,  The  Strangling  of  Persia ,  pp.  240-246. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  333. 


POLITICAL  CHANGE 


155 


in  the  workshops  of  actual  experience  alone  that  elec¬ 
torates  will  acquire  the  art  of  self-government,  however 
highly  educated  they  may  be. 

“  There  must,  I  urge,  be  a  devolution  of  definite  pow¬ 
ers  on  electorates.  The  officers  of  Government1  must 
give  every  possible  help  and  advice  to  the  new  authori¬ 
ties,  for  which  those  authorities  may  ask.  They  must 
act  as  their  foster-mothers,  not  as  stepmothers.  But  if 
the  new  authorities  are  to  learn  the  art  of  responsible 
government,  they  must  be  free  from  control  from  above. 
Not  otherwise  will  they  learn  to  feel  themselves  respon¬ 
sible  to  the  electorate  below.  Nor  will  the  electorates 
themselves  learn  that  the  remedy  for  their  sufferings 
rests  in  their  own  hands.  Suffering  there  will  be,  and  it 
is  only  by  suffering,  self-inflicted  and  perhaps  long  en¬ 
dured,  that  a  people  will  learn  the  faculty  of  self-help, 
and  genuine  electorates  be  brought  into  being.  .  .  . 

“I  am  proud  to  think  that  England  has  conferred 
immeasurable  good  on  India  by  creating  order  and  show¬ 
ing  Indians  what  orderly  government  means.  But,  this 
having  been  done,  I  do  not  believe  the  system  can  now 
be  continued  as  it  is,  without  positive  damage  to  the 
character  of  the  people.  The  burden  of  trusteeship 
must  be  transferred,  piece  by  piece,  from  the  shoulders 
of  Englishmen  to  those  of  Indians  in  some  sort  able  to 
bear  it.  Their  strength  and  numbers  must  be  devel¬ 
oped.  But  that  can  be  done  by  the  exercise  of  actual 
responsibility  steadily  increased  as  they  can  bear  it.  It 
cannot  be  done  by  any  system  of  school-teaching,  though 
such  teaching  is  an  essential  concomitant  of  the  process. 

“The  goal  now  set  by  the  recent  announcement  of 

1 1,  e.,  the  British  Government  of  India. 


156  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


the  Secretary  of  State1  will  only  be  reached  through 
trouble.  Yet  troublous  as  the  times  before  us  may  be, 
we  have  at  last  reached  that  stage  of  our  work  in  India 
which  is  truly  consonant  with  our  own  traditions.  The 
task  is  one  worthy  of  this  epoch  in  our  history,  if  only 
because  it  calls  for  the  effacement  of  ourselves.” 2 

Mr.  Curtis’s  concluding  words  foreshadow  a  process 
which  is  to-day  actually  going  on,  not  only  in  India  but 
in  other  parts  of  the  East  as  well.  The  Great  War  has 
so  strengthened  Eastern  nationalist  aspirations  and  has 
so  weakened  European  power  and  prestige  that  a  wide¬ 
spread  relaxing  of  Europe’s  hold  over  the  Orient  is  tak¬ 
ing  place.  This  process  may  make  for  good  or  for  ill, 
but  it  is  apparently  inevitable;  and  a  generation  (perhaps 
a  decade)  hence  may  see  most  of  the  Near  and  Middle 
East  autonomous  or  even  independent.  Whether  the 
liberated  peoples  will  misuse  their  opportunities  and 
fall  into  despotism  or  anarchy,  or  whether  they  succeed 
in  establishing  orderly,  progressive,  constitutional  gov¬ 
ernments,  remains  to  be  seen.  We  have  examined  the 
factors,  pro  and  con.  Let  us  leave  the  problem  in  the 
only  way  in  which  to-day  it  can  scientifically  be  left — on 
a  note  of  interrogation. 

1 1,  e.,  the  Montagu-Chelmsford  reforms,  previously  noted. 

2  Lionel  Curtis,  Letters  to  the  People  of  India  on  Responsible  Government , 
pp.  159-160  (London,  1918). 


CHAPTER  V 


NATIONALISM 

The  spirit  of  nationality  is  one  of  the  great  dynamics 
of  modern  times.  In  Europe,  where  it  first  attained 
self-conscious  maturity,  it  radically  altered  the  face  of 
things  during  the  nineteenth  century,  so  that  that  cen¬ 
tury  is  often  called  the  Age  of  Nationalities.  But  na¬ 
tionalism  is  not  merely  a  European  phenomenon.  It 
has  spread  to  the  remotest  corners  of  the  earth,  and  is 
apparently  still  destined  to  effect  momentous  trans¬ 
formations. 

Given  a  phenomenon  of  so  vital  a  character,  the  ques¬ 
tion  at  once  arises:  What  is  nationalism?  Curiously 
enough,  this  question  has  been  endlessly  debated.  Many 
theories  have  been  advanced,  seeking  variously  to  iden¬ 
tify  nationalism  with  language,  culture,  race,  politics, 
geography,  economics,  or  religion.  Now  these,  and  even 
other,  matters  may  be  factors  predisposing  or-  contribut¬ 
ing  to  the  formation  of  national  consciousness.  But,  in 
the  last  analysis,  nationalism  is  something  over  and  above 
all  its  constituent  elements,  which  it  works  into  a  new 
and  higher  synthesis.  There  is  really  nothing  recondite 
or  mysterious  about  nationalism,  despite  all  the  argu¬ 
ments  that  have  raged  concerning  its  exact  meaning. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  nationalism  is  a  state  of  mind.  Na¬ 
tionalism  is  a  belief ,  held  by  a  fairly  large  number  of 

individuals,  that  they  constitute  a  “  Nationality  it 

157 


158  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


is  a  sense  of  belonging  together  as  a  “Nation.”  This 
“Nation,”  as  visualized  in  the  minds  of  its  believers,  is 
a  people  or  community  associated  together  and  organized 
under  one  government,  and  dwelling  together  in  a  dis¬ 
tinct  territory.  When  the  nationalist  ideal  is  realized, 
we  have  what  is  known  as  a  body-politic  or  “State.” 
But  we  must  not  forget  that  this  “State”  is  the  material 
manifestation  of  an  ideal,  which  may  have  pre-existed 
for  generations  as  a  mere  pious  aspiration  with  no  tangi¬ 
ble  attributes  like  state  sovereignty  or  physical  fron¬ 
tiers.  Conversely,  we  must  remember  that  a  state  need 
not  be  a  nation.  Witness  the  defunct  Hapsburg  Empire 
of  Austria-Hungary — an  assemblage  of  discordant  na¬ 
tionalities  which  flew  to  pieces  under  the  shock  of  war. 

The  late  war  was  a  liberal  education  regarding  nation¬ 
alistic  phenomena,  especially  as  applied  to  Europe,  and 
most  of  the  fallacies  regarding  nationality  were  vividly 
disclosed.  It  is  enough  to  cite  Switzerland — a  country 
whose  very  existence  flagrantly  violates  “tests”  like 
language,  culture,  religion,  or  geography,  and  where 
nevertheless  a  lively  sense  of  nationality  emerged  tri¬ 
umphant  from  the  ordeal  of  Armageddon. 

So  familiar  are  these  matters  to  the  general  public 
that  only  one  point  need  here  be  stressed:  the  difference 
between  nationality  and  race.  Unfortunately  the  two 
terms  have  been  used  very  loosely,  if  not  interchange¬ 
ably,  and  are  still  much  confused  in  current  thinking. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  connote  utterly  different  things. 
Nationality  is  a  psychological  concept  or  state  of  mind. 
Race  is  a  physiological  fact,  which  may  be  accurately 
determined  by  scientific  tests  such  as  skull-measurement, 
hair-formation,  and  color  of  eyes  and  skin.  In  other 


NATIONALISM  159 

words,  race  is  what  people  anthropologically  really  are; 
nationality  is  what  people  politically  think  they  are. 

Right  here  we  encounter  a  most  curious  paradox. 
There  can  be  no  question  that,  as  between  race  and 
nationality,  race  is  the  more  fundamental,  and,  in  the 
long  run,  the  more  important.  A  man’s  innate  capacity 
is  obviously  dependent  upon  his  heredity,  and  no  matter 
how  stimulating  may  be  his  environment,  the  potential 
limits  of  his  reaction  to  that  environment  are  fixed  at 
his  birth.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains  that  men  pay 
scant  attention  to  race,  while  nationalism  stirs  them  to 
their  veiy  souls.  The  main  reason  for  this  seems  to  be 
because  it  is  only  about  half  a  century  since  even  savants 
realized  the  true  nature  and  importance  of  race.  Even 
after  an  idea  is  scientifically  established,  it  takes  a  long 
time  for  it  to  be  genuinely  accepted  by  the  public,  and 
only  after  it  has  been  thus  accepted  will  it  form  the 
basis  of  practical  conduct.  Meanwhile  the  far  older 
idea  of  nationality  has  permeated  the  popular  conscious¬ 
ness,  and  has  thereby  been  able  to  produce  tangible 
effects.  In  fine,  our  political  life  is  still  dominated  by 
nationalism  rather  than  race,  and  practical  politics  are 
thus  conditioned,  not  by  what  men  really  are,  but  by 
what  they  think  they  are. 

The  late  war  is  a  striking  case  in  point.  That  war 
is  very  generally  regarded  as  having  been  one  of  “race.” 
The  idea  certainly  lent  to  the  struggle  much  of  its  bit¬ 
terness  and  uncompromising  fury.  And  yet,  from  the 
genuine  racial  standpoint,  it  was  nothing  of  the  kind. 
Ethnologists  have  proved  conclusively  that,  apart  from 
certain  palaeolithic  survivals  and  a  few  historically  re¬ 
cent  Asiatic  intruders,  Europe  is  inhabited  by  only  three 


160  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


stocks:  (1)  The  blond,  long-headed  “ Nordic”  race,  (2) 
the  medium-complexioned,  round-headed  “Alpine”  race, 
(3)  the  brunet,  long-headed  “Mediterranean”  race. 
These  races  are  so  dispersed  and  intermingled  that 
every7  European  nation  is  built  of  at  least  two  of  these 
stocks,  while  most  are  compounded  of  all  three.  Strictly 
speaking,  therefore,  the  European  War  was  not  a  race- 
war  at  all,  but  a  domestic  struggle  between  closely  knit 
blood-relatives. 

Now  all  this  was  known  to  most  well-educated  Euro¬ 
peans  long  before  1914.  And  yet  it  did  not  make  the 
slightest  difference.  The  reason  is  that,  in  spite  of 
everything,  the  vast  majority  of  Europeans  still  believe 
that  they  fit  into  an  entirely  different  race-category. 
They  think  they  belong  to  the  “Teutonic”  race,  the 
“Latin”  race,  the  “Slav”  race,  or  the  “Anglo-Saxon” 
race.  The  fact  that  these  so-called  “races”  simply  do 
not  exist  but  are  really  historical  differentiations,  based 
on  language  and  culture,  which  cut  sublimely  across 
genuine  race-lines — all  that  is  quite  beside  the  point. 
Your  European  may  apprehend  this  intellectually,  but 
so  long  as  it  remains  an  intellectual  novelty  it  will  have 
no  appreciable  effect  upon  his  conduct.  In  his  heart  of 
hearts  he  will  still  believe  himself  a  Latin,  a  Teuton,  an 
Anglo-Saxon,  or  a  Slav.  For  his  blood-race  he  will  not 
stir;  for  his  thought-race  he  will  die.  For  the  glory  of 
the  dolichocephalic  “Nordic”  or  the  brachy cephalic 
“Alpine”  he  will  not  prick  his  finger  or  wager  a  groat; 
for  the  triumph  of  the  “Teuton”  or  the  “Slav”  he  will 
give  his  last  farthing  and  shed  his  heart’s  blood.  In 
other  words:  Not  what  men  really  are,  but  what  they 
think  they  are. 


NATIONALISM 


161 


At  first  it  may  seem  strange  that  in  contemporary 
Europe  thought-race  should  be  all-powerful  while  blood- 
race  is  impotent.  Yet  there  are  very  good  reasons. 
Not  only  has  modem  Europe's  great  dynamic  been 
nationalism,  but  also  nationalism  has  seized  upon  the 
nascent  racial  concept  and  has  perverted  it  to  its  own 
ends.  Until  quite  recent  times  “Nationality"  was  a 
distinctly  intensive  concept,  connoting  approximate  iden¬ 
tity  of  culture,  language,  and  historic  past.  It  was  the 
logical  product  of  a  relatively  narrow  European  outlook. . 
Indeed,  it  grew  out  of  a  still  narrower  outlook  which  had 
contented  itself  with  the  regional,  feudal,  and  dialectic 
loyalties  of  the  Middle  Ages.  But  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  saw  a  still  further  widening  of  the 
European  outlook  to  a  continental  or  even  to  a  world 
horizon.  At  once  the  early  concept  of  nationality  ceased 
to  satisfy.  Nationalism  became  extensive.  It  tended 
to  embrace  all  those  of  kindred  speech,  culture,  and  his¬ 
toric  tradition,  however  distant  such  persons  might  be. 
Obviously  a  new  terminology  was  required.  The  key- 
work  was  presently  discovered — “Race."  Hence  we  get 
that  whole  series  of  'pseudo  “race"  phrases — “Pan- 
Germanism,"  “Pan-Slavism,"  “Pan-Angleism,"  “Pan- 
Latinism,"  and  the  rest.  Of  course  these  are  not  racial 
at  all.  They  merely  signify  nationalism  brought  up  to 
date.  But  the  European  peoples,  with  all  the  fervor  of 
the  nationalist  faith  that  is  in  them,  believe  and  pro¬ 
claim  them  to  be  racial.  Hence,  so  far  as  practical  poli¬ 
tics  is  concerned,  they  are  racial  and  will  so  continue 
while  the  nationalist  dynamic  endures. 

This  new  development  of  nationalism  (the  “racial" 
stage,  as  we  may  call  it)  was  at  first  confined  to  the  older 


162  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


centres  of  European  civilization,  but  with  the  spread  of 
Western  ideas  it  presently  appeared  in  the  most  unex¬ 
pected  quarters.  Its  advent  in  the  Balkans,  for  exam¬ 
ple,  quickly  engendered  those  fanatical  propagandas, 
“Pan-Hellenism,”  “Pan-Serbism,”  etc.,  which  turned 
that  unhappy  region  first  into  a  bear-garden  and  latterly 
into  a  witches’  sabbath. 

Meanwhile,  by  the  closing  decades  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  first  phase  of  nationalism  had  patently 
passed  into  Asia.  The  “Young-Turk”  and  “Young- 
Egyptian”  movements,  and  the  “Nationalist”  stirrings 
in  regions  so  far  remote  from  each  other  as  Algeria, 
Persia,  and  India,  were  unmistakable  signs  that  Asia 
was  gripped  by  the  initial  throes  of  nationalist  self- 
consciousness.  Furthermore,  with  the  opening  years 
of  the  twentieth  century,  numerous  symptoms  pro¬ 
claimed  the  fact  that  in  Asia,  as  in  the  Balkans,  the 
second  or  “racial”  stage  of  nationalism  had  begun. 
These  years  saw  the  definite  emergence  of  far-flung 
“Pan-”  movements:  “Pan-Turanism,”  “Pan-Arabism,” 
and  (most  amazing  of  apparent  paradoxes)  “Pan-Islamic 
Nationalism.” 


I 

Let  us  now  trace  the  genesis  and  growth  of  national¬ 
ism  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  devoting  the  present 
chapter  to  nationalist  developments  in  the  Moslem  world 
with  the  exception  of  India.  India  requires  special 
treatment,  because  there  nationalist  activity  has  been 
mainly  the  work  of  the  non-Moslem  Hindu  element. 
Indian  nationalism  has  followed  a  course  differing  dis- 


NATIONALISM  163 

tinctly  from  that  of  Islam,  and  will  therefore  be  con¬ 
sidered  in  the  following  chapter. 

Before  it  received  the  Western  impact  of  the  nine¬ 
teenth  century,  the  Islamic  world  was  virtually  devoid 
of  self-conscious  nationalism.  There  were,  to  be  sure, 
strong  local  and  tribal  loyalties.  There  was  intense 
dynastic  sentiment  like  the  Turks’  devotion  to  their 
“Padishas,”  the  Ottoman  sultans.  There  was  also 
marked  pride  of  race  such  as  the  Arabs’  conviction  that 
they  were  the  “Chosen  People.”  Here,  obviously,  were 
potential  nationalist  elements.  But  these  elements  were 
as  yet  dispersed  and  uncoordinated.  They  were  not 
yet  fused  into  the  new  synthesis  of  self-conscious  na¬ 
tionalism.  The  only  Moslem  people  which  could  be 
said  to  possess  anything  like  true  nationalist  feeling  were 
the  Persians,  with  their  traditional  devotion  to  their 
plateau-land  of  “Iran.”  The  various  peoples  of  the 
Moslem  world  had  thus,  at  most,  a  rudimentary,  in¬ 
choate  nationalist  consciousness:  a  dull,  inert  unitary 
spirit;  capable  of  development,  perhaps,  but  as  yet 
scarcely  perceptible  even  to  outsiders  and  certainly  un¬ 
perceived  by  themselves. 

Furthermore,  Islam  itself  was  in  many  respects  hos¬ 
tile  to  nationalism.  Islam’s  insistence  upon  the  brother¬ 
hood  of  all  True  Believers,  and  the  Islamic  political  ideal 
of  the  “Imamat,”  or  universal  theocratic  democracy, 
naturally  tended  to  inhibit  the  formation  of  sovereign, 
mutually  exclusive  national  units;  just  as  the  nascent 
nationalities  of  Renaissance  Europe  conflicted  with  the 
mediaeval  ideals  of  universal  papacy  and  “Holy  Roman 
Empire.” 

Given  such  an  unfavorable  environment,  it  is  not 


164  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


strange  to  see  Moslem  nationalist  tendencies  germinat¬ 
ing  obscurely  and  confusedly  throughout  the  first  half 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  Not  until  the  second  half 
of  the  century  is  there  any  clear  conception  of  “  Na¬ 
tionalism”  in  the  Western  sense.  There  are  distinct 
nationalist  tendencies  in  the  teachings  of  Djemal-ed-Din 
el-Afghani  (who  is  philosophically  the  connecting  link 
between  Pan-Islamism  and  Moslem  nationalism),  while 
the  Turkish  reformers  of  the  mid-nineteenth  century 
were  patently  influenced  by  nationalism  as  they  were 
by  other  Western  ideas.  It  was,  in  fact,  in  Turkey 
that  a  true  nationalist  consciousness  first  appeared. 
Working  upon  the  Turks’  traditional  devotion  to  their 
dynasty  and  pride  in  themselves  as  a  ruling  race  lord¬ 
ing  it  over  many  subject  peoples  both  Christian  and 
Moslem,  the  Turkish  nationalist  movement  made  rapid 
progress. 

Precisely  as  in  Europe,  the  nationalist  movement  in 
Turkey  began  with  a  revival  of  historic  memories  and  a 
purification  of  the  language.  Half  a  century  ago  the 
Ottoman  Turks  knew  almost  nothing  about  their  origins 
or  their  history.  The  martial  deeds  of  their  ancestors 
and  the  stirring  annals  of  their  empire  were  remem¬ 
bered  only  in  a  vague,  legendary  fashion,  the  study  of 
the  national  history  being  completely  neglected.  Re¬ 
ligious  discussions  and  details  of  the  life  of  Mohammed 
or  the  early  days  of  Islam  interested  men  more  than  the 
spread  of  Ottoman  power  in  three  continents.  The 
nationalist  pioneers  taught  their  fellow  countrymen  their 
historic  glories  and  awakened  both  pride  of  past  and 
confidence  in  the  future. 

Similarly  with  the  Turkish  language;  the  early  na- 


NATIONALISM 


165 


tionalists  found  it  virtually  cleft  in  twain.  On  the  one 
hand  was  “official”  Turkish — a  clumsy  hotchpotch, 
overloaded  with  flowers  of  rhetoric  and  cryptic  expres¬ 
sions  borrowed  from  Arabic  and  Persian.  This  extraor¬ 
dinary  jargon,  couched  in  a  bombastic  style,  was  vir¬ 
tually  unintelligible  to  the  masses.  The  masses,  on  the 
other  hand,  spoke  “popular”  Turkish — a  primitive, 
limited  idiom,  divided  into  many  dialects  and  despised 
as  uncouth  and  boorish  by  “educated”  persons.  The 
nationalists  changed  all  this.  Appreciating  the  simple, 
direct  strength  of  the  Turkish  tongue,  nationalist  en¬ 
thusiasts  trained  in  European  principles  of  grammar  and 
philology  proceeded  to  build  up  a  real  Turkish  language 
in  the  Western  sense.  So  well  did  they  succeed  that  in 
less  than  a  generation  they  produced  a  simplified,  flexi¬ 
ble  Turkish  which  was  used  effectively  by  both  journal¬ 
ists  and  men  of  letters,  was  intelligible  to  all  classes, 
and  became  the  unquestioned  vehicle  for  thought  and 
the  canon  of  style.1 

Of  course  the  chief  stimulus  to  Turkish  nationalism 
was  Western  political  pressure.  The  more  men  came  to 
love  their  country  and  aspire  to  its  future,  the  more 
European  assaults  on  Turkish  territorial  integrity  spurred 
them  to  defend  their  threatened  independence.  The 
nationalist  ideal  was  “Ottomanism” — the  welding  of  a 
real  “nation”  in  which  all  citizens,  whatever  their  origin 
or  creed,  should  be  “Ottomans,”  speaking  the  Turkish 
language  and  inspired  by  Ottoman  patriotism.  This, 

1  For  these  early  stages  of  the  Turkish  nationalist  movement,  see  Vam- 
b6ry,  La  Turquie  d’aujourd’hui  et  d’avant  Quarante  Ans;  and  his  Western 
Culture  in  Eastern  Lands.  Also  the  articles  by  Leon  Cahun  in  Lavisse 
et  Rambaud ,  previously  cited;  and  L.  Rousseau,  L’ Effort  Ottoman  (Paris, 
1907). 


166  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


however,  conflicted  sharply  with  the  rival  (and  prior) 
nationalisms  of  the  Christian  peoples  of  the  empire, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  new  Arab  nationalism  which  was 
taking  shape  at  just  this  same  time.  Turkish  national¬ 
ism  was  also  frowned  on  by  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid.  Ab¬ 
dul  Hamid  had  an  instinctive  aversion  to  all  nationalist 
movements,  both  as  limitations  to  his  personal  absolut¬ 
ism  and  as  conflicting  with  that  universal  Pan-Islamic 
ideal  on  which  he  based  his  policy.  Accordingly,  even 
those  Turkish  nationalists  who  proclaimed  complete 
loyalty  were  suspect,  while  those  with  liberal  tendencies 
were  persecuted  and  driven  into  exile. 

The  revolution  of  1908,  however,  brought  nationalism 
to  power.  Whatever  their  differences  on  other  matters, 
the  Young-Turks  were  all  ardent  nationalists.  In  fact, 
the  very  ardor  of  their  nationalism  was  a  prime  cause 
of  their  subsequent  misfortunes.  With  the  rashness  of 
fanatics  the  Young-Turks  tried  to  “Ottomanize”  the 
whole  empire  at  once.  This  enraged  all  the  other  na¬ 
tionalities,  alienated  them  from  the  revolution,  and  gave 
the  Christian  Balkan  states  their  opportunity  to  attack 
disorganized  Turkey  in  1912. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  was  that  Turkish  nationalism 
was  evolving  in  a  direction  which  could  only  mean 
heightened  antagonism  between  the  Turkish  element  on 
the  one  side  and  the  non-Turkish  elements,  Christian 
or  Moslem,  on  the  other.  Turkish  nationalism  had,  in 
fact,  now  reached  the  second  or  “racial”  stage.  Pass¬ 
ing  the  bounds  of  the  limited,  mainly  territorial  idea 
connoted  by  the  term  “Ottomanism,”  it  had  embraced 
the  far-flung  and  essentially  racial  concepts  known  as 
“Pan-Turkism”  and  “Pan-Turanism.”  These  wider  de- 


NATIONALISM 


167 


velopments  we  shall  consider  later  on  in  this  chapter. 
Before  so  doing  let  us  examine  the  beginnings  of  na¬ 
tionalism's  “ first  stage"  in  other  portions  of  the  Moslem 
world. 

Shortly  after  the  Ottoman  Turks  showed  signs  of  a 
nationalistic  awakening,  kindred  symptoms  began  to 
appear  among  the  Arabs.  As  in  all  self-conscious  na¬ 
tionalist  movements,  it  was  largely  a  protest  against 
some  other  group.  In  the  case  of  the  Arabs  this  protest 
was  naturally  directed  against  their  Turkish  rulers.  We 
have  already  seen  how  Desert  Arabia  (the  Nejd)  had 
always  maintained  its  freedom,  and  we  have  also  seen 
how  those  Arab  lands  like  Syria,  Mesopotamia,  and  the 
Hedjaz  which  fell  under  Turkish  control  nevertheless 
continued  to  feel  an  ineradicable  repugnance  at  seeing 
themselves,  Islam's  “  Chosen  People,"  beneath  the  yoke 
of  a  folk  which,  in  Arab  eyes,  were  mere  upstart  barba¬ 
rians.  Despite  a  thousand  years  of  Turkish  domination 
the  two  races  never  got  on  well  together,  their  racial 
temperaments  being  too  incompatible  for  really  cordial 
relations.  The  profound  temperamental  incompatibility 
of  Turk  and  Arab  has  been  well  summarized  by  a  French 
writer.  Says  Victor  Berard:  “Such  are  the  two  lan¬ 
guages  and  such  the  two  peoples:  in  the  latitude  of  Pome 
and  in  the  latitude  of  Algiers,  the  Turk  of  Adrianople, 
like  the  Turk  of  Adalia,  remains  a  man  of  the  north 
and  of  the  extreme  north;  in  all  climates  the  Arab  re¬ 
mains  a  man  of  the  south  and  of  the  extreme  south. 
To  the  Arab's  suppleness,  mobility,  imagination,  artistic 
feeling,  democratic  tendencies,  and  anarchic  individu¬ 
alism,  the  Turk  opposes  his  slowness,  gravity,  sense  of 
discipline  and  regularity,  innate  militarism.  The  Turk- 


168  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ish  master  has  always  felt  disdain  for  the  ‘artistic 
canaille/  whose  pose,  gesticulations,  and  indiscipline, 
shock  him  profoundly.  On  their  side,  the  Arabs  see  in 
the  Turk  only  a  blockhead;  in  his  placidity  and  taci¬ 
turnity  only  stupidity  and  ignorance;  in  his  respect  for 
law  only  slavishness;  and  in  his  love  of  material  well¬ 
being  only  gross  bestiality.  Especially  do  the  Arabs 
jeer  at  the  Turk’s  artistic  incapacity:  after  having  gone 
to  school  to  the  Chinese,  Persians,  Arabs,  and  Greeks, 
the  Turk  remains,  in  Arab  eyes,  just  a  big  booby  of  bar¬ 
rack  and  barnyard.”1 

Add  to  this  the  fact  that  the  Arabs  regard  the  Turks 
as  perverters  of  the  Islamic  faith,  and  we  need  not  be 
surprised  to  find  that  Turkey’s  Arab  subjects  have  ever 
displayed  symptoms  of  rebellious  unrest.  We  have  seen 
how  the  Wahabi  movement  was  specifically  directed 
against  Turkish  control  of  the  holy  cities,  and  despite 
the  Wahabi  defeat,  Arab  discontent  lived  on.  About 
1820  the  German  explorer  Burckhardt  wrote  of  Arabia: 
“When  Turkish  power  in  the  Hedjaz  declines,  the  Arabs 
will  avenge  themselves  for  their  subjection.” 2  And 
some  twenty  years  later  the  Shereef  of  Mecca  remarked 
to  a  French  traveller:  “We,  the  direct  descendants  of 
the  Prophet,  have  to  bow  our  heads  before  miserable 
Pashas,  most  of  them  former  Christian  slaves  come  to 
power  by  the  most  shameful  courses.” 3  Throughout 
the  nineteenth  century  every  Turkish  defeat  in  Europe 
was  followed  by  a  seditious  outburst  in  its  Arab  prov¬ 
inces. 

Down  to  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  these 

1  Berard,  Le  Sultan,  VI slam  et  les  Puissances,  p.  16  (Paris,  1907). 

2  Cited  by  B6rard,  p.  19.  3  Ibid.,  p.  20. 


NATIONALISM 


169 


seditious  stirrings  remained  sporadic,  uncoordinated  out¬ 
bursts  of  religious,  regional,  or  tribal  feeling,  with  no 
genuinely  “Nationalistic”  programme  of  action  or  ideal. 
But  in  the  later  sixties  a  real  nationalist  agitation  ap¬ 
peared.  Its  birthplace  was  Syria.  That  was  what 
might  have  been  expected,  since  Syria  was  the  part  of 
Turkey’s  Arab  dominions  most  open  to  Western  influ¬ 
ences.  This  first  Arab  nationalist  movement,  however, 
did  not  amount  to  much.  Directed  by  a  small  group  of 
noisy  agitators  devoid  of  real  ability,  the  Turkish  Gov¬ 
ernment  suppressed  it  without  much  difficulty. 

The  disastrous  Russian  war  of  1877,  however,  blew 
the  scattered  embers  into  a  fresh  flame.  For  several 
years  Turkey’s  Arab  provinces  were  in  full  ferment. 
The  nationalists  spoke  openly  of  throwing  off  the  Turk¬ 
ish  yoke  and  welding  the  Arab  lands  into  a  loose-knit 
confederation  headed  by  a  religious  potentate,  probably 
the  Shereef  of  Mecca.  This  was  obviously  an  adaptation 
of  Western  nationalism  to  the  traditional  Arab  ideal  of 
a  theocratic  democracy  already  realized  in  the  Meccan 
caliphate  and  the  Wahabi  government  of  the  Nejd. 

This  second  stirring  of  Arab  nationalism  was  likewise 
of  short  duration.  Turkey  was  now  ruled  by  Sultan 
Abdul  Hamid,  and  Abdul  Hamid’s  Pan-Islamic  policy 
looked  toward  good  relations  with  his  Arab  subjects. 
Accordingly,  Arabs  were  welcomed  at  Constantinople, 
favors  were  heaped  upon  Arab  chiefs  and  notables,  while 
efforts  were  made  to  promote  the  contentment  of  the 
empire’s  Arab  populations.  At  the  same  time  the  con¬ 
struction  of  strategic  railways  in  Syria  and  the  Hedjaz 
gave  the  Turkish  Government  a  stronger  grip  over  its 
Arab  provinces  than  ever  before,  and  conversely  ren- 


170  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


dered  successful  Arab  revolts  a  far  more  remote  possi¬ 
bility.  Furthermore,  Abdul  Hamid’s  Pan-Islamic  propa¬ 
ganda  was  specially  directed  toward  awakening  a  sense 
of  Moslem  solidarity  between  Arabs  and  Turks  as  against 
the  Christian  West.  These  efforts  achieved  a  measure 
of  success.  Certainly,  every  European  aggression  in  the 
Near  East  was  an  object-lesson  to  Turks  and  Arabs  to 
forget,  or  at  least  adjourn,  their  domestic  quarrels  in 
face  of  the  common  foe. 

Despite  the  partial  successes  of  Abdul  Hamid’s  efforts, 
a  considerable  section  of  his  Arab  subjects  remained 
unreconciled,  and  toward  the  close  of  the  nineteenth 
centuiy  a  fresh  stirring  of  Arab  nationalist  discontent 
made  its  appearance.  Relentlessly  persecuted  by  the 
Turkish  authorities,  the  Arab  nationalist  agitators, 
mostly  Syrians,  went  into  exile.  Gathering  in  near-by 
Egypt  (now  of  course  under  British  governance)  and  in 
western  Europe,  these  exiles  organized  a  revolutionary 
propaganda.  Their  formal  organization  dates  from  the 
year  1895,  when  the  “ Arabian  National  Committee” 
was  created  at  Paris.  For  a  decade  their  propaganda 
went  on  obscurely,  but  evidently  with  effect,  for  in  1905 
the  Arab  provinces  of  Hedjaz  and  Yemen  burst  into 
armed  insurrection.  This  insurrection,  despite  the  best 
efforts  of  the  Turkish  Government,  was  never  wholly 
suppressed,  but  dragged  on  year  after  year,  draining 
Turkey  of  troops  and  treasure,  and  contributing  mate¬ 
rially  to  her  Tripolitan  and  Balkan  disasters  in  1911-12. 

The  Arab  revolt  of  1905  focussed  the  world’s  atten¬ 
tion  upon  “The  Arab  Question,”  and  the  nationalist 
exiles  made  the  most  of  their  opportunity  by  redoubling 
their  propaganda,  not  only  at  home  but  in  the  West  as 


NATIONALISM 


171 


i 


well.  Europe  was  fully  informed  of  “Young  Arabia's” 
wrongs  and  aspirations,  notably  by  an  extremely  clever 
book  by  one  of  the  nationalist  leaders,  entitled  The 
Awakening  of  the  Arab  Nation,1  which  made  a  distinct 
sensation.  The  aims  of  the  Arab  nationalists  are  clearly 
set  forth  in  the  manifesto  of  the  Arabian  National 
Committee,  addressed  to  the  Great  Powers  and  pub¬ 
lished  early  in  1906.  Says  this  manifesto:  “A  great 
pacific  change  is  on  the  eve  of  occurring  in  Turkey. 
The  Arabs,  whom  the  Turks  tyrannized  over  only  by 
keeping  them  divided  on  insignificant  questions  of  ritual 
and  religion,  have  become  conscious  of  their  national, 
historic,  and  racial  homogeneity,  and  wish  to  detach 
themselves  from  the  worm-eaten  Ottoman  trunk  in  order 
to  form  themselves  into  an  independent  State.  This 
new  Arab  Empire  will  extend  to  its  natural  frontiers, 
from  the  valleys  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  to  the 
Isthmus  of  Suez,  and  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Sea 
of  Oman.  It  will  be  governed  by  the  constitutional 
and  liberal  monarchy  of  an  Arabian  Sultan.  The  present 
Vilayet  of  the  Hedjaz,  together  with  the  territory  of 
Medina,  will  form  an  independent  empire  whose  sover¬ 
eign  will  be  at  the  same  time  the  religious  Khalif  of  all 
the  Mohammedans.  Thus,  one  great  difficulty,  the 
separation  of  the  civil  and  the  religious  powers  in  Islam, 
will  have  been  solved  for  the  greater  good  of  all.” 

To  their  fellow  Arabs  the  committee  issued  the  fol¬ 
lowing  proclamation:  “Dear  Compatriots!  All  of  us 
know  how  vile  and  despicable  the  glorious  and  illustrious 
title  of  Arabian  Citizen  has  become  in  the  mouths  of 
all  foreigners,  especially  Turks.  All  of  us  see  to  what 

1  Le  Reveil  de  la  Nation  arabe ,  by  Negib  Azoury  (Paris,  1905). 


172  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


depths  of  misery  and  ignorance  we  have  fallen  under  the 
tyranny  of  these  barbarians  sprung  from  Central  Asia. 
Our  land,  the  richest  and  finest  on  earth,  is  to-day  an 
arid  waste.  When  we  were  free,  we  conquered  the 
world  in  a  hundred  years;  we  spread  everywhere  sci¬ 
ences,  arts,  and  letters;  for  centuries  we  led  world-civ¬ 
ilization.  But,  since  the  spawn  of  Ertogrul1  usurped 
the  caliphate  of  Islam,  they  have  brutalized  us  so  as  to 
exploit  us  to  such  a  degree  that  we  have  become  the 
poorest  people  on  earth.”  The  proclamation  then  goes 
on  to  declare  Arabia’s  independence.2 

Of  course  “ Young  Arabia”  did  not  then  attain  its 
independence.  The  revolt  was  kept  localized  and  Tur¬ 
key  maintained  its  hold  over  most  of  its  Arab  dominions. 
Nevertheless,  there  was  constant  unrest.  During  the 
remainder  of  Abdul  Hamid’s  reign  his  Arab  provinces 
were  in  a  sort  of  unstable  equilibrium,  torn  between  the 
forces  of  nationalist  sedition  on  the  one  hand  and  Pan- 
Islamic,  anti-European  feeling  on  the  other. 

The  Young-Turk  revolution  of  1908  caused  a  new 
shift  in  the  situation.  The  Arab  provinces,  like  the 
other  parts  of  the  empire,  rejoiced  in  the  downfall  of 
despotism  and  hoped  great  things  for  the  future.  In 
the  Turkish  Parliament  the  Arab  provinces  were  well 
represented,  and  their  deputies  asked  for  a  measure  of 
federal  autonomy.  This  the  Young-Turks,  bent  upon 
“Ottomanization,”  curtly  refused.  The  result  was  pro¬ 
found  disillusionment  in  the  Arab  provinces  and  a  re¬ 
vival  of  separatist  agitation.  It  is  interesting  to  note 

1  The  semi-legendary  founder  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

2  The  texts  of  both  the  above  documents  can  be  most  conveniently 
found  in  E.  Jung,  Les  Puissances  devant  la  Revolte  arabe :  La  Crise  mondiale 
de  Demain,  pp.  23-25  (Paris,  1906). 


NATIONALISM 


173 


that  the  new  independence  agitation  had  a  much  more 
ambitious  programme  than  that  of  a  few  years  before. 
The  Arab  nationalists  of  Turkey  were  by  this  time  defi¬ 
nitely  linking  up  with  the  nationalists  of  Egypt  and 
French  North  Africa — Arabic-speaking  lands  where  the 
populations  were  at  least  partly  Arab  in  blood.  Arab 
nationalism  was  beginning  to  speak  aloud  what  it  had 
previously  whispered — the  programme  of  a  great  “Pan- 
Arab77  empire  stretching  right  across  North  Africa  and 
southern  Asia  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Indian  Oceans. 
Thus,  Arab  nationalism,  like  Turkish  nationalism,  was 
evolving  into  the  “second,77  or  racial,  stage. 

Deferring  discussion  of  this  broader  development,  let 
us  follow  a  trifle  further  the  course  of  the  more  restricted 
Arab  nationalism  within  the  Turkish  Empire.  Despite 
the  Pan-Islamic  sentiment  evoked  by  the  European 
aggressions  of  1911-12,  nationalist  feeling  was  contin¬ 
ually  aroused  by  the  Ottomanizing  measures  of  the 
Young-Turk  government,  and  the  independence  agita¬ 
tion  was  presently  in  full  swing  once  more.  In  1913 
an  Arabian  nationalist  congress  convened  in  Paris  and 
revolutionary  propaganda  was  inaugurated  on  an  in¬ 
creased  scale.  When  the  Great  War  broke  out  next 
year,  Turkey’s  Arab  provinces  were  seething  with  sedi¬ 
tious  unrest.1  The  Turkish  authorities  took  stem  mea¬ 
sures  against  possible  trouble,  imprisoning  and  executing 
all  prominent  nationalists  upon  whom  they  could  lay 
their  hands,  while  the  proclamation  of  the  “Holy  War77 
rallied  a  certain  portion  of  Arab  public  opinion  to  the 

1  A  good  analysis  of  Arab  affairs  on  the  eve  of  the  Great  War  is  that  of 
the  Moslem  publicist  “X,”  “Les  Courants  politiques  dans  le  Monde 
arabe,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman,  December,  1913.  Also  see  G.  W. 
Bury,  Arabia  Infelix ,  or  the  Turks  in  Yemen  (London,  1915). 


174  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Turkish  side,  especially  since  the  conquest  of  Egypt 
was  a  possibility.  But  as  the  war  dragged  on  the  forces 
of  discontent  once  more  raised  their  heads.  In  1916 
the  revolt  of  the  Shereef  of  Mecca  gave  the  signal  for 
the  downfall  of  Turkish  rule.  This  revolt,  liberally 
backed  by  England,  gained  the  active  or  passive  sup¬ 
port  of  the  Arab  elements  throughout  the  Turkish  Em¬ 
pire.  Inspired  by  Allied  promises  of  national  indepen¬ 
dence  of  a  most  alluring  character,  the  Arabs  fought 
strenuously  against  the  Turks  and  were  a  prime  factor 
in  the  debacle  of  Ottoman  military  power  in  the  autumn 
of  1918.1 

Before  discussing  the  momentous  events  which  have 
occurred  in  the  Arab  provinces  of  the  former  Ottoman 
Empire  since  1918,  let  us  consider  nationalist  develop¬ 
ments  in  the  Arabized  regions  of  North  Africa  lying  to 
the  westward.  Of  these  developments  the  most  im¬ 
portant  is  that  of  Egypt.  The  mass  of  the  Egyptian 
people  is  to-day,  as  in  Pharaoh’s  time,  of  the  old  “Ni¬ 
lotic”  stock.  A  slow,  self-contained  peasant  folk,  the 
Egyptian  “fellaheen”  have  submitted  passively  to  a 
long  series  of  conquerors,  albeit  this  passivity  has  been 
occasionally  broken  by  outbursts  of  volcanic  fury  pres¬ 
ently  dying  away  into  passivity  once  more.  Above  the 
Nilotic  masses  stands  a  relatively  small  upper  class 
descended  chiefly  from  Egypt’s  more  recent  Asiatic  con¬ 
querors — Arabs,  Kurds,  Circassians,  Albanians,  and 

1  For  Arab  affairs  during  the  Great  War,  see  E.  Jung,  “L’Independance 
arabe  et  la  R6volte  actuelle,”  La  Revue ,  1  August,  1916;  I.  D.  Levine, 
“Arabs  versus  Turks,”  American  Review  of  Reviews ,  November,  1916; 
A.  Musil,  Zur  Zeitgeschichte  von  Arabien  (Leipzig,  1918);  G.  W.  Bury, 
Pan-Islam  (London,  1919);  S.  Mylrea,  “The  Politico-Religious  Situation 
in  Arabia,”  The  Moslem  World ,  July,  1919;  L.  Thomas,  “Lawrence:  The 
Soul  of  the  Arabian  Revolution,”  Asia ,  April,  May,  June,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


175 


Turks.  In  addition  to  this  upper  class,  which  until 
the  English  occupation  monopolized  all  political  power, 
there  are  large  European  “colonies”  with  “ extraterri¬ 
torial”  rights,  while  a  further  complication  is  added  by 
the  persistence  of  a  considerable  native  Christian  ele¬ 
ment,  the  “  Copts,”  who  refused  to  turn  Mohammedan 
at  the  Arab  conquest  and  who  to-day  number  fully  one- 
tenth  of  the  total  population. 

With  such  a  medley  of  races,  creeds,  and  cultures, 
and  with  so  prolonged  a  tradition  of  foreign  domination, 
Egypt  might  seem  a  most  unlikely  milieu  for  the  growth 
of  nationalism.  On  the  other  hand,  Egypt  has  been 
more  exposed  to  Western  influences  than  any  other  part 
of  the  Near  East.  Bonaparte’s  invasion  at  the  close 
of  the  eighteenth  century  profoundly  affected  Egyptian 
life,  and  though  the  French  were  soon  expelled,  European 
influences  continued  to  permeate  the  valley  of  the  Nile. 
Mehemet  Ali,  the  able  Albanian  adventurer  who  made 
himself  master  of  Egypt  after  the  downfall  of  French 
rule,  realized  the  superiority  of  European  methods  and 
fostered  a  process  of  Europeanization  which,  however 
superficial,  resulted  in  a  wide  dissemination  of  Western 
ideas.  Mehemet  Ali’s  policy  was  continued  by  his  suc¬ 
cessors.  That  magnificent  spendthrift  Khedive  Ismail, 
whose  reckless  contraction  of  European  loans  was  the 
primary  cause  of  European  intervention,  prided  himself 
on  his  “Europeanism”  and  surrounded  himself  with 
Europeans. 

Indeed,  the  first  stirrings  of  Egyptian  nationalism 
took  the  form  of  a  protest  against  the  noxious,  parasiti¬ 
cal  “Europeanism”  of  Khedive  Ismail  and  his  courtiers. 
Sober-minded  Egyptians  became  increasingly  alarmed 


176  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


at  the  way  Ismail  was  mortgaging  Egypt’s  independence 
by  huge  European  loans  and  sucking  its  life-blood  by 
merciless  taxation.  Inspired  consciously  or  uncon¬ 
sciously  by  the  Western  concepts  of  “ nation”  and  “ pa¬ 
triotism/’  these  men  desired  to  stay  Ismail’s  destructive 
course  and  to  safeguard  Egypt’s  future.  In  fact,  their 
efforts  were  directed  not  merely  against  the  motley 
crew  of  European  adventurers  and  concessionaires  who 
were  luring  the  Khedive  into  fresh  extravagances,  but 
also  against  the  complaisant  Turkish  and  Circassian 
pashas,  and  the  Armenian  and  Syrian  usurers,  who  were 
the  instruments  of  Ismail’s  will.  The  nascent  move¬ 
ment  was  thus  basically  a  “ patriotic”  protest  against 
all  those,  both  foreigners  and  native-born,  who  were 
endangering  the  country.  This  showed  clearly  in  the 
motto  adopted  by  the  agitators — the  hitherto  unheard- 
of  slogan:  “ Egypt  for  the  Egyptians!” 

Into  this  incipient  ferment  there  was  presently  in¬ 
jected  the  dynamic  personality  of  Djemal-ed-Din.  No¬ 
where  else  did  this  extraordinary  man  exert  so  profound 
and  lasting  an  influence  as  in  Egypt.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  he  is  the  father  of  every  shade  of  Egyptian 
nationalism.  He  influenced  not  merely  violent  agitators 
like  Arabi  Pasha  but  also  conservative  reformers  like 
Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdou,  who  realized  Egypt’s  weak¬ 
ness  and  were  content  to  labor  patiently  by  evolutionary 
methods  for  distant  goals. 

For  the  moment  the  apostles  of  violent  action  had 
the  stage.  In  1882  a  revolutionary  agitation  broke  out 
headed  by  Arabi  Pasha,  an  army  officer,  who,  signifi¬ 
cantly  enough,  was  of  fellah  origin,  the  first  man  of 
Nilotic  stock  to  sway  Egypt’s  destinies  in  modern  times. 


NATIONALISM 


177 


Raising  their  slogan,  “Egypt  for  the  Egyptians/’  the 
revolutionists  sought  to  drive  all  “foreigners,”  both 
Europeans  and  Asiatics,  from  the  country.  Their  at¬ 
tempt;  was  of  course  foredoomed  to  failure.  A  massa¬ 
cre  of  Europeans  in  the  port-city  of  Alexandria  at  once 
precipitated  European  intervention.  An  English  army 
crushed  the  revolutionists  at  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir, 
and  after  this  one  battle,  disorganized,  bankrupt  Egypt 
submitted  to  British  rule,  personified  by  Evelyn  Baring, 
Lord  Cromer.  The  khedivial  dynasty  was,  to  be  sure, 
retained,  and  the  native  forms  of  government  respected, 
but  all  real  power  centred  in  the  hands  of  the  British 
“Financial  Adviser,”  the  representative  of  Britain’s 
imperial  will. 

For  twenty-five  years  Lord  Cromer  ruled  Egypt,  and 
the  record  of  this  able  proconsul  will  place  him  forever 
in  the  front  rank  of  the  world’s  great  administrators. 
His  strong  hand  drew  Egypt  from  hopeless  bankruptcy 
into  abounding  prosperity.  Material  well-being,  how¬ 
ever,  did  not  kill  Egyptian  nationalism.  Scattered  to 
the  winds  before  the  British  bayonet  charges,  the  seeds 
of  unrest  slowly  germinated  beneath  the  fertile  Nilotic 
soil.  Almost  imperceptible  at  first  under  the  numbing 
shock  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  nationalist  sentiment  grew  steadily 
as  the  years  wore  on,  and  by  the  closing  decade  of  the 
nineteenth  century  it  had  become  distinctly  perceptible 
to  keen-sighted  European  observers.  Passing  through 
Egypt  in  1895,  the  well-known  African  explorer  Schwein- 
furth  was  struck  with  the  psychological  change  which 
had  occurred  since  his  earlier  visits  to  the  valley  of  the 
Nile.  “A  true  national  self-consciousness  is  slowly  be¬ 
ginning  to  awaken,”  he  wrote.  “The  Egyptians  are 


178  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


still  very  far  from  being  a  true  Nationality,  but  the  be¬ 
ginning  has  been  made.”1 

With  the  opening  years  of  the  twentieth  century  what 
had  previously  been  visible  only  to  discerning  eyes  burst 
into  sudden  and  startling  bloom.  This  resurgent  Egyp¬ 
tian  nationalism  had,  to  be  sure,  its  moderate  wing, 
represented  by  conservative-minded  men  like  Moham¬ 
med  Abdou,  Rector  of  El  Azhar  University  and  respected 
friend  of  Lord  Cromer,  who  sought  to  teach  his  fellow 
countrymen  that  the  surest  road  to  freedom  was  along 
the  path  of  enlightenment  and  progress.  In  the  main, 
however,  the  movement  was  an  impatient  and  violent 
protest  against  British  rule  and  an  intransigeant  demand 
for  immediate  independence.  Perhaps  the  most  signifi¬ 
cant  point  was  that  virtually  all  Egyptians  were  na¬ 
tionalists  at  heart,  conservatives  as  well  as  radicals  de¬ 
clining  to  consider  Egypt  as  a  permanent  part  of  the 
British  Empire.  The  nationalists  had  a  sound  legal 
basis  for  this  attitude,  owing  to  the  fact  that  British 
rule  rested  upon  insecure  diplomatic  foundations.  Eng¬ 
land  had  intervened  in  Egypt  as  a  self-constituted  “Man¬ 
datory”  of  European  financial  interests.  Its  action  had 
roused  much  opposition  in  Europe,  particularly  in 
France,  and  to  allay  this  opposition  the  British  Gov¬ 
ernment  had  repeatedly  announced  that  its  occupation 
of  Egypt  was  of  a  temporary  nature.  In  fact,  Egyptian 
discontent  was  deliberately  fanned  by  France  right  down 
to  the  conclusion  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  in  1904.  This 
French  sympathy  for  Egyptian  aspirations  was  of  capital 
importance  in  the  development  of  the  nationalist  move- 

1  Georg  Schweinfurth,  Die  Wiedergeburt  Agyptens  im  Lichte  eines  aufge- 
klarten  Islam  (Berlin,  1895). 


NATIONALISM 


179 


ment.  In  Egypt,  France’s  cultural  prestige  was  pre¬ 
dominant.  In  Egyptian  eyes  a  European  education 
was  synonymous  with  a  French  education,  so  the  rising 
generation  inevitably  sat  under  French  teachers,  either 
in  Egypt  or  in  France,  and  these  French  preceptors, 
being  usually  Anglophobes,  rarely  lost  an  opportunity 
for  instilling  dislike  of  England  and  aversion  to  British 
rule. 

The  radical  nationalists  were  headed  by  a  young  man 
named  Mustapha  Kamel.  He  was  a  very  prince  of 
agitators;  ardent,  magnetic,  enthusiastic,  and  possessed 
of  a  fiery  eloquence  which  fairly  swept  away  both  his 
hearers  and  his  readers.  An  indefatigable  propagandist, 
he  edited  a  whole  chain  of  newspapers  and  periodicals, 
and  as  fast  as  one  organ  was  suppressed  by  the  British 
authorities  he  started  another.  His  uncompromising 
nationalism  may  be  gauged  from  the  following  examples 
from  his  writings.  Taking  for  his  motto  the  phrase 
“The  Egyptians  for  Egypt;  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians,” 
he  wrote  as  early  as  1896:  “Egyptian  civilization  cannot 
endure  in  the  future  unless  it  is  founded  by  the  people 
itself;  unless  the  fellah,  the  merchant,  the  teacher,  the 
pupil,  in  fine,  every  single  Egyptian,  knows  that  man 
has  sacred,  intangible  rights;  that  he  is  not  created  to  be 
a  tool,  but  to  lead  an  intelligent  and  worthy  life;  that 
love  of  country  is  the  most  beautiful  sentiment  which 
can  ennoble  a  soul;  and  that  a  nation  without  indepen¬ 
dence  is  a  nation  without  existence !  It  is  by  patriotism 
that  backward  peoples  come  quickly  to  civilization,  to 
greatness,  and  to  power.  It  is  patriotism  that  forms 
the  blood  which  courses  in  the  veins  of  virile  nations, 
and  it  is  patriotism  that  gives  life  to  every  living  being.” 


180  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


The  English,  of  course,  were  bitterly  denounced. 
Here  is  a  typical  editorial  from  his  organ  El  Lewa: 
“We  are  the  despoiled.  The  English  are  the  despoilers. 
We  demand  a  sacred  right.  The  English  are  the  usurp¬ 
ers  of  that  right.  This  is  why  we  are  sure  of  success 
sooner  or  later.  When  one  is  in  the  right,  it  is  only  a 
question  of  time.” 

Despite  his  ardent  aspirations,  Mustapha  Kamel  had 
a  sense  of  realities,  and  recognized  that,  for  the  moment 
at  least,  British  power  could  not  be  forcibly  overthrown. 
He  did  not,  therefore,  attempt  any  open  violence  which 
he  knew  would  merely  ruin  himself  and  his  followers. 
Early  in  1908  he  died,  only  thirty-four  years  of  age. 
His  mantle  fell  upon  his  leading  disciple,  Mohammed 
Farid  Bey.  This  man,  who  was  not  of  equal  caliber, 
tried  to  make  up  for  his  deficiency  in  true  eloquence 
by  the  violence  of  his  invective.  The  difference  between 
the  two  leaders  can  be  gauged  by  the  editorial  columns 
of  El  Lewa.  Here  is  an  editorial  of  September,  1909: 
“This  land  was  polluted  by  the  English,  putrefied  with 
their  atrocities  as  they  suppressed  our  beloved  dustour 
[constitution],  tied  our  tongues,  burned  our  people  alive 
and  hanged  our  innocent  relatives,  and  perpetrated 
other  horrors  at  which  the  heavens  are  about  to  tremble, 
the  earth  to  split,  and  the  mountains  to  fall  down.  Let 
us  take  a,  new  step.  Let  our  lives  be  cheap  while  we 
seek  our  independence.  Death  is  far  better  than  life 
for  you  if  you  remain  in  your  present  condition.” 

Mohammed  Farid’s  fanatical  impatience  of  all  opposi¬ 
tion  led  him  into  tactical  blunders  like  alienating  the 
native  Christian  Copts,  whom  Mustapha  Kamel  had  been 
careful  to  conciliate.  The  following  diatribe  (which, 


NATIONALISM 


181 


by  the  way,  reveals  a  grotesque  jumble  of  Western  and 
Eastern  ideas)  is  an  answer  to  Coptic  protests  at  the 
increasing  violence  of  his  propaganda:  “The  Copts 
should  be  kicked  to  death.  They  still  have  faces  and 
bodies  similar  to  those  of  demons  and  monkeys,  which 
is  a  proof  that  they  hide  poisonous  spirits  within  their 
souls.  The  fact  that  they  exist  in  the  world  confirms 
Darwin’s  theoiy  that  human  beings  are  generated  from 
monkeys.  You  sons  of  adulterous  women !  You  de¬ 
scendants  of  the  bearers  of  trays!  You  tails  of  camels 
with  your  monkey  faces!  You  bones  of  bodies!” 

In  this  more  violent  attitude  the  nationalists  were 
encouraged  by  several  reasons.  For  one  thing,  Lord 
Cromer  had  laid  down  his  proconsulate  in  1907  and  had 
been  succeeded  by  Sir  Eldon  Gorst.  The  new  ruler 
represented  the  ideas  of  British  Liberalism,  now  in 
power,  which  wished  to  appease  Egyptian  unrest  by  con¬ 
ciliation  instead  of  by  Lord  Cromer’s  autocratic  indiffer¬ 
ence.  In  the  second  place,  the  Young-Turk  revolution 
of  1908  gave  an  enormous  impetus  to  the  Egyptian  cry 
for  constitutional  self-government.  Lastly,  France’s 
growing  intimacy  with  England  dashed  the  nationalists’ 
cherished  hope  that  Britain  would  be  forced  by  outside 
pressure  to  redeem  her  diplomatic  pledges  and  evacuate 
the  Nile  valley,  thus  driving  the  nationalists  to  rely 
more  on  their  own  exertions. 

Given  this  nationalist  temper,  conciliatory  attempt 
was  foredoomed  to  failure.  For,  however  conciliatory 
Sir  Eldon  Gorst  might  be  in  details,  he  could  not  prom¬ 
ise  the  one  thing  which  the  nationalists  supremely  de¬ 
sired — independence.  This  demand  England  refused 
even  to  consider.  Practically  all  Englishmen  had  be- 


182  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


come  convinced  that  Egypt  with  the  Suez  Canal  was  a 
vital  link  between  the  eastern  and  western  halves  of  the 
British  Empire,  and  that  permanent  control  of  Egypt 
was  thus  an  absolute  necessity.  There  was  thus  a  fun¬ 
damental  deadlock  between  British  imperial  and  Egyp¬ 
tian  national  convictions.  Accordingly,  the  British 
Liberal  policy  of  conciliation  proved  a  fiasco.  Even 
Sir  Eldon  Gorst  admitted  in  his  official  reports  that  con¬ 
cessions  were  simply  regarded  as  signs  of  weakness. 

Before  long  seditious  agitation  and  attendant  violence 
grew  to  such  proportions  that  the  British  Government 
became  convinced  that  only  strong  measures  would 
save  the  situation.  Therefore,  in  1911,  Sir  Eldon  Gorst 
was  replaced  by  Lord  Kitchener — a  patent  warning  to 
the  nationalists  that  sedition  would  be  given  short  shrift 
by  the  iron  hand  which  had  crushed  the  Khalifa  and 
his  Dervish  hordes  at  Omdurman.  Kitchener  arrived 
in  Egypt  with  the  express  mandate  to  restore  order,  and 
this  he  did  with  thoroughness  and  exactitude.  The 
Egyptians  were  told  plainly  that  England  neither  in¬ 
tended  to  evacuate  the  Nile  valley  nor  considered  its  in¬ 
habitants  fit  for  self-government  within  any  discernible 
future.  They  were  admonished  to  turn  their  thoughts 
from  politics,  at  which  they  were  so  bad,  to  agriculture, 
at  which  they  were  so  good.  As  for  seditious  propaganda, 
new  legislation  enabled  Lord  Kitchener  to  deal  with  it 
in  summary  fashion.  Practically  all  the  nationalist 
papers  were  suppressed,  while  the  nationalist  leaders 
were  imprisoned,  interned,  or  exiled.  In  fact,  the  Brit¬ 
ish  Government  did  its  best  to  distract  attention  every¬ 
where  from  Egypt,  the  British  press  co-operating  loyally 
by  labelling  the  subject  taboo.  The  upshot  was  that 


NATIONALISM  183 

Egypt  became  quieter  than  it  had  been  for  a  gener¬ 
ation. 

I 

However,  it  was  only  a  surface  calm.  Driven  under¬ 
ground,  Egyptian  unrest  even  attained  new  virulence 
which  alarmed  close  observers.  In  1913  the  well-known 
English  publicist  Sidney  Low,  after  a  careful  investiga¬ 
tion  of  the  Egyptian  situation,  wrote:  “We  are  not 
popular  in  Egypt.  Feared  we  may  be  by  some;  re¬ 
spected  I  doubt  not  by  many  others;  but  really  liked, 

I  am  sure,  by  very  few. 5,1  Still  more  outspoken  was 
an  article  significantly  entitled  “The  Darkness  over 
Egypt/'  which  appeared  on  the  eve  of  the  Great  War.2 
Its  publication  in  a  semiscientific  periodical  for  special-  ' 
ists  in  Oriental  problems  rendered  it  worthy  of  serious 
attention.  “The  long-continued  absence  of  practically 
all  discussion  or  even  mention  of  Egyptian  internal 
affairs  from  the  British  press,"  asserted  this  article, 
“is  not  indicative  of  a  healthy  condition.  In  Egypt 
the  superficial  quiet  is  that  of  suppressed  discontent — 
of  a  sullen,  hopeless  mistrust  toward  the  Government 
of  the  Occupation.  Certain  recent  happenings  have 
strengthened  in  Egyptian  minds  the  conviction  that  the 
Government  is  making  preparations  for  the  complete 
annexation  of  the  country.  .  .  .  We  are  not  concerned 
to  question  how  far  the  motives  attributed  to  the  Gov¬ 
ernment  are  true.  The  essential  fact  is  that  the  Govern¬ 
ment  of  the  Occupation  has  not  yet  succeeded  in  endear¬ 
ing,  or  even  recommending,  itself  to  the  Egyptian  peo¬ 
ple,  but  is,  on  the  contrary,  an  object  of  suspicion,  an 
occasion  of  enmity."  The  article  expresses  grave  doubt 

1  Low,  Egypt  in  Transition ,  p.  260  (London,  1914). 

2  The  Asiatic  Review ,  April,  1914. 


184  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


whether  Lord  Kitchener’s  repressive  measures  have 
done  more  than  drive  discontent  underground,  and 
shows  “how  strong  is  the  Nationalist  feeling  in  Egypt 
to-day  in  spite  of  the  determined  attempts  to  stamp  out 
all  freedom  of  political  opinion.  As  might  be  expected, 
this  wholesale  muzzling  of  the  press  has  not  only  re¬ 
duced  the  Mohammedan  majority  to  a  condition  of  in¬ 
ternal  ferment,  but  has  seriously  alienated  the  hitherto 
loyal  Copts.  It  may  be  that  the  Government  can  dis¬ 
cover  no  better  means  of  recommending  itself  to  the 
confidence  and  good-will  of  the  Egyptian  people;  it  may 
be  that  only  by  the  instant  repression  of  every  outward 
sign  of  discontent  can  it  feel  secure  in  its  occupation; 
but  if  such  be  the  case,  it  is  an  admission  of  extreme 
weakness,  or  recognized  insecurity  of  tenure.”  The 
article  concludes  with  the  following  warning  as  to  the 
problem’s  wider  implications:  “Egypt,  though  a  sub¬ 
ject  of  profound  indifference  to  the  English  voter,  is 
being  feverishly  watched  by  the  Indian  Mohammedans, 
and  by  the  whole  of  our  West  and  Central  African  sub¬ 
jects — themselves  strongly  Moslem  in  sympathy,  and 
at  the  present  time  jealously  suspicious  of  the  political 
activities  of  Christian  Imperialism.” 

Such  being  the  state  of  Egyptian  feeling  in  1914,  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War  was  bound  to  produce  inten¬ 
sified  unrest.  England’s  position  in  Egypt  was,  in  truth, 
very  difficult.  Although  in  fact  England  exercised  com¬ 
plete  control,  in  law  Egypt  was  still  a  dependency  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  Britain  merely  exercising  a  tem¬ 
porary  occupation.  Now  it  soon  became  evident  that 
Turkey  was  going  to  join  England’s  enemies,  the  Teu¬ 
tonic  empires,  while  it  was  equally  evident  that  the 


NATIONALISM 


185 


Egyptians  sympathized  with  the  Turks,  even  the  Khe¬ 
dive  Abbas  Hilmi  making  no  secret  of  his  pro-Turkish 
views.  During  the  first  months  of  the  European  War, 
while  Turkey  was  still  nominally  neutral,  the  Egyptian 
native  press,  despite  the  British  censorship,  was  full  of 
veiled  seditious  statements,  while  the  unruly  attitude  of 
the  Egyptian  populace  and  the  stirrings  among  the 
Egyptian  native  regiments  left  no  doubt  as  to  how  the 
wind  was  blowing.  England  was  seriously  alarmed. 
Accordingly,  when  Turkey  entered  the  war  in  November, 
1914,  England  took  the  decisive  plunge,  deposed  Abbas 
Hilmi,  nominated  his  cousin  Hussein  Kamel  “Sultan,” 
and  declared  Egypt  a  protectorate  of  the  British  Empire. 

This  stung  the  nationalists  to  fury.  Anything  like 
formal  rebellion  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  heavy 
masses  of  British  and  Colonial  troops  which  had  been 
poured  into  the  country.  Nevertheless,  there  was  a 
good  deal  of  sporadic  violence,  suppressed  only  by  a 
stern  application  of  the  “State  of  Siege.”  A  French 
observer  thus  vividly  describes  these  critical  days:  “The 
Jehadd  is  rousing  the  anti-Christian  fanaticism  which 
always  stirs  in  the  soul  of  every  good  Moslem.  Since 
the  end  of  October  one  could  read  in  the  eyes  of  the  low- 
class  Mohammedan  natives  their  hope — the  massacre  of 
the  Christians.  In  the  streets  of  Cairo  they  stared 
insolently  at  the  European  passers-by.  Some  even 
danced  for  joy  on  learning  that  the  Sultan  had  declared 
the  Holy  War.  Denounced  to  the  police  for  this,  they 
were  incontinently  bastinadoed  at  the  nearest  police- 
station.  The  same  state  of  mind  reigned  at  El-Azhar, 
and  I  am  told  that  Europeans  who  visit  the  celebrated 
Mohammedan  Universit}^  have  their  ears  filled  with  the 


186  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


strongest  epithets  of  the  Arab  repertory — that  best 
furnished  language  in  the  world/’ 1 

The  nationalist  exiles  vehemently  expressed  abroad 
what  their  fellows  could  not  say  at  home.  Their  leader, 
Mohammed  Farid  Bey,  issued  from  Geneva  an  official 
protest  against  “the  new  illegal  regime  proclaimed  by 
England  the  18th  of  last  December.  England,  which 
pretends  to  make  war  on  Germany  to  defend  Belgium, 
ought  not  to  trample  under  foot  the  rights  of  Egypt, 
nor  consider  the  treaties  relative  thereto  as  ‘  scraps  of 
paper/  ”2  These  exiles  threw  themselves  vehemently 
into  the  arms  of  Germany,  as  may  be  gauged  from  the 
following  remarks  of  Abd-el-Malek  Hamsa,  secretary  of 
the  Nationalist  party,  in  a  German  periodical:  “There 
is  hardly  an  Egyptian  who  does  not  pray  that  England 
may  be  beaten  and  her  Empire  fall  in  ruins.  During 
the  early  days  of  the  war,  while  I  was  still  in  Egypt, 
I  was  a  witness  of  this  popular  feeling.  In  cities  and 
villages,  from  sage  to  simple  peasant,  all  are  convinced 
in  the  Kaiser’s  love  for  Islam  and  friendship  for  its 
caliph,  and  they  are  hoping  and  praying  for  Germany’s 
victory.”3 

Of  course,  in  face  of  the  overwhelming  British  garrison 
in  Egypt,  such  pronouncements  were  as  idle  as  the  wind. 
The  hoped-for  Turkish  attacks  were  beaten  back  from 
the  Suez  Canal,  the  “State  of  Siege”  functioned  with 
stem  efficiency  and  Egypt,  flooded  with  British  troops, 

1  “L’Egypte  et  les  Debuts  du  Protectorate  Revue  des  Sciences  Poll - 
tiques,  15  June,  1915. 

2  Mohammed  Farid  Bey,  “L’figypte  et  la  Guerre,”  Revue  Politique 
Internationale ,  May,  1915. 

3  Abd-el-Malek  Hamsa,  “Die  agyptische  Frage,”  Asien,  November, 
1916. 


NATIONALISM  187 

lapsed  into  sullen  silence,  not  to  be  broken  until  the  end 
of  the  war. 

Turning  back  at  this  point  to  consider  nationalist 
developments  in  the  rest  of  North  Africa,  we  do  not,  as 
in  Egypt,  find  a  well-marked  territorial  patriotism. 
Anti-European  hatred  there  is  in  plenty,  but  such  “  pa¬ 
triotic”  sentiments  as  exist  belong  rather  to  those  more 
diffused  types  of  nationalist  feeling  known  as  “Pan- 
Arabism”  and  aPan-Islamic  Nationalism/’  which  we 
shall  presently  discuss. 

The  basic  reason  for  this  North  African  lack  of  na¬ 
tional  feeling,  in  its  restricted  sense,  is  that  nowhere 
outside  of  Egypt  is  there  a  land  which  ever  has  been, 
or  which  shows  distinct  signs  of  becoming,  a  true  “  na¬ 
tion.”  The  mass  of  the  populations  inhabiting  the  vast 
band  of  territory  between  the  Mediterranean  Sea  and 
the  Sahara  desert  are  “ Berbers” — an  ancient  stock, 
racially  European  rather  than  Asiatic  or  negroid,  and 
closely  akin  to  the  “ Latin”  peoples  across  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean.  The  Berbers  remind  one  of  the  Balkan  Albani¬ 
ans:  they  are  extremely  tenacious  of  their  language  and 
customs,  and  they  have  an  instinctive  racial  feeling; 
but  they  are  inveterate  particularists,  having  always 
been  split  up  into  many  tribes,  sometimes  combining 
into  partial  confederations  but  never  developing  true 
national  patriotism.1 

Alongside  the  Berbers  we  find  everywhere  a  varying 
proportion  of  Arabs.  The  Arabs  have  colonized  North 
Africa  ever  since  the  Moslem  conquest  twelve  centuries 
ago.  They  converted  the  Berbers  to  Islam  and  Arab 

1 A  good  summary  of  Berber  history  is  H.  Weisgerber,  Les  Blancs 
d'Afrique  (Paris,  1910). 


188  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


culture,  but  they  never  made  North  Africa  part  of  the 
Arab  world  as  they  did  Syria  and  Mesopotamia,  and  in 
somewhat  lesser  degree  Egypt.  The  two  races  have 
never  really  fused.  Despite  more  than  a  thousand  years 
of  Arab  tutelage,  the  Berbers’  manner  of  life  remains 
distinct.  They  have  largely  kept  their  language,  and 
there  has  been  comparatively  little  intermarriage.  Pure- 
blooded  Arabs  abound,  often  in  large  tribal  groups,  but 
they  are  still,  in  a  way,  foreigners.1 

With  such  elements  of  discord,  North  Africa’s  political 
life  has  always  been  troubled.  The  most  stable  re¬ 
gion  has  been  Morocco,  though  even  there  the  Sultan’s 
authority  has  never  really  extended  to  the  mountain 
tribes.  As  for  the  so-called  “Barbary  States”  (Algiers, 
Tunis,  and  Tripoli),  they  were  little  more  than  port- 
cities  along  the  coast,  the  hinterland  enjoying  practi¬ 
cally  complete  tribal  independence.  Over  this  confused 
turmoil  spread  the  tide  of  French  conquest,  beginning 
with  Algiers  in  1830  and  ending  with  Morocco  to-day.2 
France  brought  peace,  order,  and  material  prosperity, 
but  here,  as  in  other  Eastern  lands,  these  very  benefits 
of  European  tutelage  created  a  new  sort  of  unity  among 
the  natives  in  their  common  dislike  of  the  European 
conqueror  and  their  common  aspiration  toward  inde¬ 
pendence.  Accordingly,  the  past  generation  has  wit¬ 
nessed  the  appearance  of  “Young  Algerian”  and  “Young 
Tunisian”  political  groups,  led  by  French-educated  men 
who  have  imbibed  Western  ideas  of  “self-government” 

1  For  analyses  of  differences  between  Arabs  and  Berbers,  see  Caix  de 
Saint- Aymour,  Arabes  et  Kabyles  (Paris,  1891);  A.  Bel,  Coup  d'CEil  sur 
VI slam  en  Berberie  (Paris,  1917). 

2  For  short  historical  summary,  see  A.  C.  Coolidge,  ‘‘The  European 
Reconquest  of  North  Africa,”  American  Historical  Review,  July,  1912. 


NATIONALISM 


189 


and  “ liberty.”1  However,  as  we  have  already  re¬ 
marked,  their  goal  is  not  so  much  the  erection  of  distinct 
Algerian  and  Tunisian  “Nations”  as  it  is  creation  of  a 
larger  North  African,  perhaps  Pan-Islamic,  unity.  It 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  they  are  in  close  touch  with 
the  Sennussi  and  kindred  influences  which  we  have 
already  examined  in  the  chapter  on  Pan-Islamism. 

So  much  for  “first-stage”  nationalist  developments 
in  the  Arab  or  Arabized  lands.  There  is,  however,  one 
more  important  centre  of  nationalist  sentiment  in  the 
Moslem  world  to  be  considered — Persia.  Persia  is,  in 
fact,  the  land  where  a  genuine  nationalist  movement 
would  have  been  most  logically  expected,  because  the 
Persians  have  for  ages  possessed  a  stronger  feeling  of 
“country”  than  any  other  Near  Eastern  people. 

In  the  nineteenth  century  Persia  had  sunk  into  such 
deep  decrepitude  that  its  patent  weakness  excited  the 
imperialistic  appetites  of  Czarist  Russia  and,  in  some¬ 
what  lesser  degree,  of  England.  Persia’s  decadence  and 
external  perils  were,  however,  appreciated  by  thinking 
Persians,  and  a  series  of  reformist  agitations  took  place, 
beginning  with  the  religious  movement  of  the  Bab  early 
in  the  nineteenth  century  and  culminating  with  the 
revolution  of  1908.2  That  revolution  was  largely  pre¬ 
cipitated  by  the  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  of  1907  by 


1  For  these  nationalist  movements  in  French  North  Africa,  see  A.  Ser- 
vier,  Le  Nationalisme  musulman  (Constantine,  Algeria,  1913);  P.  Lapie, 
Les  Civilisations  tunisiennes  (Paris,  1898);  P.  Millet,  “Les  Jeunes-Alge- 
riens,”  Revue  de  Paris,  1  November,  1913. 

2  A  good  analysis  of  the  prerevolutionary  reformist  movements  is 
found  in  “X,”  “La  Situation  politique  de  la  Perse,”  Revue  du  Monde 
musulman,  June,  1914.  See  also  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern 
Lands;  General  Sir  T.  E.  Gordon,  “The  Reform  Movement  in  Persia,” 
Proceedings  of  the  Central  Asian  Society,  13  March,  1907. 


190  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


which  England  and  Russia  virtually  partitioned  Persia; 
the  country  being  divided  into  a  Russian  “sphere  of 
influence”  in  the  north  and  a  British  “sphere  of  influ¬ 
ence  ”  in  the  south,  with  a  “neutral  zone ”  between.  The 
revolution  was  thus  in  great  part  a  desperate  attempt  of 
the  Persian  patriots  to  set  their  house  in  order  and  avert, 
at  the  eleventh  hour,  the  shadow  of  European  domina¬ 
tion  which  was  creeping  over  the  land.  But  the  revolu¬ 
tion  was  not  merely  a  protest  against  European  aggres¬ 
sion.  It  was  also  aimed  at  the  alien  Khadjar  dynasty 
which  had  so  long  misruled  Persia.  These  Khadjar 
sovereigns  were  of  Turkoman  origin.  They  had  never 
become  really  Persianized,  as  shown  by  the  fact  that 
the  intimate  court  language  was  Turki,  not  Persian. 
They  occupied  a  position  somewhat  analogous  to  that  of 
the  Manchus  before  the  Chinese  revolution.  The  Per¬ 
sian  revolution  was  thus  basically  an  Iranian  patriotic 
outburst  against  all  alien  influences,  whether  from  East 
or  West. 

We  have  already  seen  how  this  patriotic  movement 
was  crushed  by  the  forcible  intervention  of  European 
imperialism.1  By  1912  Russia  and  England  were  in 
full  control  of  the  situation,  the  patriots  were  proscribed 
and  persecuted,  and  Persia  sank  into  despairing  silence. 
As  a  British  writer  then  remarked:  “For  such  broken 
spirit  and  shattered  hopes,  as  for  the  1  anarchy  ’  now 
existing  in  Persia,  Russia  and  Great  Britain  are  directly 
responsible,  and  if  there  be  a  Reckoning,  will  one  day  be 
held  to  account.  It  is  idle  to  talk  of  any  improvement 

1  See  W.  Morgan  Shuster,  The  Strangling  of  Persia  (New  York,  1912). 
Also,  for  earlier  phase  of  the  revolution,  see  E.  G.  Browne,  The  Revolu¬ 
tion  in  Persia  (London,  1910). 


NATIONALISM 


191 


in  the  situation,  when  the  only  Government  in  Persia 
consists  of  a  Cabinet  which  does  not  command  the  con¬ 
fidence  of  the  people,  terrorized  by  Russia,  financially 
starved  by  both  Russia  and  England,  allowed  only  mis¬ 
erable  doles  of  money  on  usurious  terms,  and  forbidden 
to  employ  honest  and  efficient  foreign  experts  like  Mr. 
Shuster;  when  the  King  is  a  boy,  the  Regent  an  absentee, 
the  Parliament  permanently  suspended,  and  the  best, 
bravest,  and  most  honest  patriots  either  killed  or  driven 
into  exile,  while  the  wolf-pack  of  financiers,  concession- 
hunters  and  land-grabbers  presses  ever  harder  on  the 
exhausted  victim,  whose  struggles  grow  fainter  and 
fainter.  Little  less  than  a  miracle  can  now  save  Persia.” 1 

So  ends  our  survey  of  the  main  “ first-stage”  nation¬ 
alist  movements  in  the  Moslem  world.  We  should  of 
course  remember  that  a  nationalist  movement  was 
developing  concurrently  in  India,  albeit  following  an 
eccentric  orbit  of  its  own.  We  should  also  remember 
that,  in  addition  to  the  main  movements  just  discussed, 
there  were  minor  nationalist  stirrings  among  other 
Moslem  peoples  such  as  the  Russian  Tartars,  the  Chinese 
Mohammedans,  and  even  the  Javanese  of  the  Dutch 
Indies.  Lastly,  we  should  remember  that  these  nation¬ 
alist  movements  were  more  or  less  interwoven  with  the 
non-national  movement  of  Pan-Islamism,  and  with  those 
“ second-stage,”  “ racial”  nationalist  movements  which 
we  shall  now  consider. 

1 E.  G.  Browne,  “The  Present  Situation  in  Persia,”  Contemporary 
Review ,  November,  1912. 


192  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


II 

Earlier  in  this  chapter  we  have  already  remarked  that 
the  opening  years  of  the  twentieth  century  witnessed 
the  appearance  in  Asia  of  nationalism’s  second  or  racial 
stage,  especially  among  the  Turkish  and  Arab  peoples. 
This  wider  stage  of  nationalism  has  attained  its  highest 
development  among  the  Turks;  where,  indeed,  it  has 
gone  through  two  distinct  phases,  describable  respec¬ 
tively  by  the  terms  “  Pan-Turkism  ”  and  aPan-Turan- 
ism.”  We  have  described  the  primary  phase  of  Turkish 
nationalism  in  its  restricted  “ Ottoman”  sense  down  to 
the  close  of  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13.  It  is  at  that 
time  that  the  secondary  or  “ racial”  aspects  of  Turkish 
nationalism  first  come  prominently  to  the  fore. 

By  this  time  the  Ottoman  Turks  had  begun  to  realize 
that  they  did  not  stand  alone  in  the  world;  that  they 
were,  in  fact,  the  westernmost  branch  of  a  vast  band 
of  peoples  extending  right  across  eastern  Europe  and 
Asia,  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Pacific  and  from  the  Medi¬ 
terranean  to  the  Arctic  Ocean,  to  whom  ethnologists 
have  assigned  the  name  of  “  Uralo-Altaic  race,”  but  who 
are  more  generally  termed  “ Turanians.”  This  group 
embraces  the  most  widely  scattered  folk — the  Ottoman 
Turks  of  Constantinople  and  Anatolia,  the  Turkomans 
of  Persia  and  Central  Asia,  the  Tartars  of  South  Russia 
and  Transcaucasia,  the  Magyars  of  Hungary,  the  Finns 
of  Finland  and  the  Baltic  provinces,  the  aboriginal  tribes 
of  Siberia,  and  even  the  distant  Mongols  and  Manchus. 
Diverse  though  they  are  in  culture,  tradition,  and  even 
personal  appearance,  these  people  nevertheless  possess 
certain  well-marked  traits  in  common.  Their  languages 


NATIONALISM 


193 


are  all  similar,  while  their  physical  and  mental  make-up 
displays  undoubted  affinities.  They  are  all  noted  for 
great  physical  vitality  combined  with  unusual  toughness 
of  nerve-fibre.  Though  somewhat  deficient  in  imagina¬ 
tion  and  creative  artistic  sense,  they  are  richly  endowed 
with  patience,  tenacity,  and  dogged  energy.  Above  all, 
they  have  usually  displayed  extraordinary  military  ca¬ 
pacity,  together  with  a  no  less  remarkable  aptitude  for 
the  masterful  handling  of  subject  peoples.  The  Tura¬ 
nians  have  certainly  been  the  greatest  conquerors  that 
the  world  has  ever  seen.  Attila  and  his  Huns,  Arpad 
and  his  Magyars,  Isperich  and  his  Bulgars,  Alp  Arslan 
and  his  Seljuks,  Ertogrul  and  his  Ottomans,  Jenghiz 
Khan  and  Tamerlane  with  their  “inflexible77  Mongol 
hordes,  Baber  in  India,  even  Kubilai  Khan  and  Nur- 
hachu  in  far-off  Cathay :  the  type  is  ever  the  same.  The 
hoof-print  of  the  Turanian  “man  on  horseback77  is 
stamped  deep  all  over  the  palimpsest  of  history. 

Glorious  or  sinister  according  to  the  point  of  view, 
Turan7s  is  certainly  a  stirring  past.  Of  course  one  may 
query  whether  these  diverse  peoples  actually  do  form 
one  genuine  race.  But,  as  we  have  already  seen,  so  far 
as  practical  politics  go,  that  makes  no  difference.  Pos¬ 
sessed  of  kindred  tongues  and  temperaments,  and  dow¬ 
ered  with  such  a  wealth  of  soul-stirring  tradition,  it 
would  suffice  for  them  to  think  themselves  racially  one 
to  form  a  nationalist  dynamic  of  truly  appalling  potency. 

Until  about  a  generation  ago,  to  be  sure,  no  signs  of 
such  a  movement  were  visible.  Not  only  were  distant 
stocks  like  Finns  and  Manchus  quite  unaware  of  any 
common  Turanian  bond,  but  even  obvious  kindred  like 
Ottoman  Turks  and  Central  Asian  Turkomans  regarded 


194  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


one  another  with  indifference  or  contempt.  Certainly 
the  Ottoman  Turks  were  almost  as  devoid  of  racial  as 
they  were  of  national  feeling.  Arminius  Vambery  tells 
how,  when  he  first  visited  Constantinople  in  1856,  “the 
word  Turkluk  (i.  e .,  ‘Turk’)  was  considered  an  oppro¬ 
brious  synonym  of  grossness  and  savagery,  and  when 
I  used  to  call  people’s  attention  to  the  racial  importance 
of  the  Turkish  stock  (stretching  from  Adrianople  to  the 
Pacific)  they  answered:  ‘But  you  are  surely  not  classing 
us  with  Kirghiz  and  with  the  gross  nomads  of  Tartary.’ 
.  .  .  With  a  few  exceptions,  I  found  no  one  in  Con¬ 
stantinople  who  was  seriously  interested  in  the  ques¬ 
tions  of  Turkish  nationality  or  language.” 1 

It  was,  in  fact,  the  labors  of  Western  ethnologists  like 
the  Hungarian  Vambery  and  the  Frenchman  Leon  Ca- 
hun  that  first  cleared  away  the  mists  which  enshrouded 
Turan.  These  labors  disclosed  the  unexpected  vastness 
of  the  Turanian  world.  And  this  presently  acquired  a 
most  unacademic  significance.  The  writings  of  Vambery 
and  his  colleagues  spread  far  and  wide  through  Turan 
and  were  there  devoured  by  receptive  minds  already 
stirring  to  the  obscure  promptings  of  a  new  time.  The 
normality  of  the  Turanian  movement  is  shown  by  its 
simultaneous  appearance  at  such  widely  sundered  points 
as  Turkish  Constantinople  and  the  Tartar  centres  along 
the  Russian  Volga.  Indeed,  if  anything,  the  leaven 
began  its  working  on  the  Volga  sooner  than  on  the  Bos¬ 
phorus.  This  Tartar  revival,  though  little  known,  is 
one  of  the  most  extraordinary  phenomena  in  all  nation¬ 
alist  history.  The  Tartars,  once  masters  of  Russia, 
though  long  since  fallen  from  their  high  estate,  have 

1  Vambery,  La  Turquie  d'aujourd'hui  et  d'avant  Quaranie  Ans ,  pp.  11-12. 


NATIONALISM 


195 


never  vanished  in  the  Slav  ocean.  Although  many  of 
them  have  been  for  four  centuries  under  Russian  rule, 
they  have  stubbornly  maintained  their  religious,  racial, 
and  cultural  identity.  Clustered  thickly  along  the 
Volga,  especially  at  Kazan  and  Astrakhan,  retaining 
much  of  the  Crimea,  and  forming  a  considerable  mi¬ 
nority  in  Transcaucasia,  the  Tartars  remained  distinct 
“ enclaves”  in  the  Slav  empire,  widely  scattered  but 
indomitable. 

The  first  stirrings  of  nationalist  self-consciousness 
among  the  Russian  Tartars  appeared  as  far  back  as 
1895,  and  from  then  on  the  movement  grew  with  aston¬ 
ishing  rapidity.  The  removal  of  governmental  restric¬ 
tions  at  the  time  of  the  Russian  revolution  of  1904  was 
followed  by  a  regular  literary  florescence.  Streams  of 
books  and  pamphlets,  numerous  newspapers,  and  a 
solid  periodical  press,  all  attested  the  vigor  and  fecun¬ 
dity  of  the  Tartar  revival.  The  high  economic  level  of 
the  Russian  Tartars  assured  the  material  sinews  of  war. 
The  Tartar  oil  millionaires  of  Baku  here  played  a  con¬ 
spicuous  role,  freely  opening  their  capacious  purses  for 
the  good  of  the  cause.  The  Russian  Tartars  also  showed 
distinct  political  ability  and  soon  gained  the  confidence 
of  their  Turkoman  cousins  of  Russian  Central  Asia, 
who  were  also  stirring  to  the  breath  of  nationalism. 
The  first  Russian  Duma  contained  a  large  Mohammedan 
group  so  enterprising  in  spirit  and  so  skilfully  led  that 
Russian  public  opinion  became  genuinely  uneasy  and 
encouraged  the  government  to  diminish  Tartar  influence 
in  Russian  parliamentary  life  by  summary  curtailments  * 
of  Mohammedan  representation.1 

1  For  the  Tartar  revival,  see  S.  Brobovnikov,  “Moslems  in  Russia,” 
The  Moslem  World,  January,  1911;  Fevret,  “Les  Tatars  de  Crimee,” 


196  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Of  course  the  Russian  Mohammedans  were  careful  to 
proclaim  their  political  loyalty  to  the  Russian  Empire. 
Nevertheless;  many  earnest  spirits  revealed  their  secret 
aspirations  by  seeking  a  freer  and  more  fruitful  field  of 
labor  in  Turkish  Stambul;  where  the  Russian  Tartars 
played  a  prominent  part  in  the  Pan-Turk  and  Pan- 
Turanian  movements  within  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In 
fact;  it  was  a  Volga  Tartar,  Yusuf  Bey  Akchura  Oglu, 
who  was  the  real  founder  of  the  first  Pan-Turanian  so¬ 
ciety  at  Constantinople;  and  his  well-known  book. 
Three  Political  Systems,  became  the  text  on  which  most 
subsequent  Pan-Turanian  writings  have  been  based.1 

Down  to  the  Young-Turk  revolution  of  1908,  Pan- 
Turanism  was  somewhat  under  a  cloud  at  Stambul. 
Sultan  Abdul  Hamid,  as  already  remarked,  was  a  Pan- 
Islamist  and  had  a  rooted  aversion  to  all  nationalist 
movements.  Accordingly,  the  Pan-Turanians,  while  not 
actually  persecuted,  were  never  in  the  Sultan’s  favor. 
With  the  advent  of  Young-Turk  nationalism  to  power, 
however,  all  was  changed.  The  “  Ottomanizing  ”  leaders 
of  the  new  government  listened  eagerly  to  Pan-Turanian 
preaching  and  most  of  them  became  affiliated  with  the 
movement.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Russian  Tar¬ 
tars  continued  to  play  a  prominent  part.  The  chief  Pan- 
Turanian  propagandist  was  the  able  publicist  Ahmed 

Revue  du  Monde  musulman,  August,  1907;  A.  Le  Chatelier,  “Les  Musul- 
mans  russes,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman ,  December,  1906;  Fr.  von 
Mackay,  “Die  Erweckung Russlands  asiatischen  Volkerschaften,”  Deutsche 
Rundschau ,  March,  1918;  Arminius  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern 
Lands;  H.  Williams,  “The  Russian  Mohammedans,”  Russian  Review, 
February,  1914;  “X,”  “Le  Pan-Islamisme  et  le  Pan-Turquisme,”  Revue 
du  Monde  musulman ,  March,  1913. 

1  For  these  activities,  see  article  by  “X,”  quoted  above;  also  Ahmed 
Emin,  The  Development  of  Modern  Turkey  as  Measured  by  its  Press  (New 
York,  1914). 


NATIONALISM 


197 


Bey  Agayeff,  a  Volga  Tartar.  His  well-edited  organ, 
Turk  Yurdu  ( Turkish  Home),  penetrated  to  every  corner 
of  the  Turko-Tartar  world  and  exercised  great  influence 
on  the  development  of  its  public  opinion. 

Although  leaders  like  Ahmed  Bey  Agayeff  clearly 
visualized  the  entire  Turanian  world  from  Finland  to 
Manchuria  as  a  potential  whole,  and  were  thus  full- 
fledged  “  Pan-Turanians/ ’  their  practical  efforts  were  at 
first  confined  to  the  closely  related  Turko-Tartar  seg¬ 
ment;  that  is,  to  the  Ottomans  of  Turkey,  the  Tartars 
of  Russia,  and  the  Turkomans  of  Central  Asia  and  Per¬ 
sia.  Since  all  these  peoples  were  also  Mohammedans, 
it  follows  that  this  propaganda  had  a  religious  as  well  as 
a  racial  complexion,  trending  in  many  respects  toward 
Pan-Islamism.  Indeed,  even  disregarding  the  religious 
factor,  we  may  say  that,  though  Pan-Turanian  in  theory, 
the  movement  was  at  that  time  in  practice  little  more 
than  “Pan-Turkism.” 

It  was  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13  which  really  pre¬ 
cipitated  full-fledged  Pan-Turanism.  Those  wars  not 
merely  expelled  the  Turks  from  the  Balkans  and  turned 
their  eyes  increasingly  toward  Asia,  but  also  roused 
such  hatred  of  the  victorious  Serbs  in  the  breasts  of 
Hungarians  and  Bulgarians  that  both  these  peoples 
proclaimed  their  “ Turanian”  origins  and  toyed  with 
ideas  of  “ Pan-Turanian”  solidarity  against  the  menace 
of  Serbo-Russian  “Pan-Slavism.” 1  The  Pan-Turanian 
thinkers  were  assuredly  evolving  a  body  of  doctrine 
grandiose  enough  to  satisfy  the  most  ambitious  hopes. 


1  For  these  Pan-Turanian  tendencies  in  Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  see  my 
article  “Pan-Turanism,”  American  Political  Science  Review,  February, 
1917. 


198  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Emphasizing  the  great  virility  and  nerve-force  every¬ 
where  patent  in  the  Turanian  stocks,  these  thinkers 
saw  in  Turan  the  dominant  race  of  the  morrow.  Zeal¬ 
ous  students  of  Western  evolutionism  and  ethnology, 
they  were  evolving  their  own  special  theory  of  race 
grandeur  and  decadence.  According  to  Pan-Turanian 
teaching,  the  historic  peoples  of  southern  Asia — Arabs, 
Persians,  and  Hindus — are  hopelessly  degenerate.  As 
for  the  Europeans,  they  have  recently  passed  their 
apogee,  and,  exhausted  by  the  consuming  fires  of  modern 
industrialism,  are  already  entering  upon  their  decline. 
It  is  the  Turanians,  with  their  inherent  virility  and 
steady  nerves  unspoiled  by  the  wear  and  tear  of  Western 
civilization,  who  must  be  the  great  dynamic  of  the  fu¬ 
ture.  Indeed,  some  Pan-Turanian  thinkers  go  so  far 
as  to  proclaim  that  it  is  the  sacred  mission  of  their  race 
to  revitalize  a  whole  senescent,  worn-out  world  by  the 
saving  infusion  of  regenerative  Turanian  blood.1 

Of  course  the  Pan-Turanians  recognized  that  any¬ 
thing  like  a  realization  of  their  ambitious  dreams  was 
dependent  upon  the  virtual  destruction  of  the  Russian 
Empire.  In  fact,  Russia,  with  its  Tartars,  Turkomans, 
Kirghiz,  Finns,  and  numerous  kindred  tribes,  was  in 
Pan-Turanian  eyes  merely  a  Slav  alluvium  laid  with 
varying  thickness  over  a  Turanian  subsoil.  This  turn¬ 
ing  of  Russia  into  a  vast  “Turania  irredenta”  was  cer¬ 
tainly  an  ambitious  order.  Nevertheless,  the  Pan- 
Turanians  counted  on  powerful  Western  backing.  They 
realized  that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  fast 

1  See  article  by  “X,”  quoted  above;  also  his  article  “Les  Courants 
politiques  dans  la  Turquie  contemporaine,”  Revue  du  Monde  musulman , 
December,  1912. 


NATIONALISM 


199 


drifting  toward  war  with  Russia,,  and  they  felt  that  such 
a  cataclysm,  however  perilous,  would  also  offer  most 
glorious  possibilities. 

These  Pan-Turanian  aspirations  undoubtedly  had  a 
great  deal  to  do  with  driving  Turkey  into  the  Great 
War  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Empires.  Certainly, 
Enver  Pasha  and  most  of  the  other  leaders  of  the  gov¬ 
erning  group  had  long  been  more  or  less  affiliated  with 
the  Pan-Turanian  movement.  Of  course  the  Turkish 
Government  had  more  than  one  string  to  its  bow.  It 
tried  to  drive  Pan-Turanism  and  Pan-Islamism  in  double 
harness,  using  the  “Holy  War”  agitation  for  pious 
Moslems  everywhere,  while  it  redoubled  Pan-Turanian 
propaganda  among  the  Turko-Tartar  peoples.  A  good 
statement  of  Pan-Turanian  ambitions  in  the  early  years 
of  the  war  is  that  of  the  publicist  Tekin  Alp  in  his 
book,  The  Turkish  and  Pan-Turkish  Ideal ,  published 
in  1915.  Says  Tekin  Alp:  “With  the  crushing  of  Rus¬ 
sian  despotism  by  the  brave  German,  Austrian,  and 
Turkish  armies,  30,000,000  to  40,000,000  Turanians  will 
receive  their  independence.  With  the  10,000,000  Otto¬ 
man  Turks,  this  will  form  a  nation  of  50,000,000,  ad¬ 
vancing  toward  a  great  civilization  which  may  perhaps 
be  compared  with  that  of  Germany,  in  that  it  will  have 
the  strength  and  energy  to  rise  even  higher.  In  some 
ways  it  will  be  superior  to  the  degenerate  French  and 
English  civilizations.” 

With  the  collapse  of  Russia  after  the  Bolshevik  revo¬ 
lution  at  the  end  of  1917,  Pan-Turanian  hopes  knew  no 
bounds.  So  certain  were  they  of  triumph  that  they 
began  to  flout  even  their  German  allies,  thus  revealing 
that  hatred  of  all  Europeans  which  had  always  lurked 


200  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


at  the  back  of  their  minds.  A  German  staff-officer  thus 
describes  the  table-talk  of  Halil  Pasha,  the  Turkish  com¬ 
mander  of  the  Mesopotamian  front  and  uncle  of  En¬ 
ver:  “  First  of  all,  every  tribe  with  a  Turkish  mother- 
tongue  must  be  forged  into  a  single  nation.  The  na¬ 
tional  principle  was  supreme;  so  it  was  the  design  to 
conquer  Turkestan,  the  cradle  of  Turkish  power  and 
glory.  That  was  the  first  task.  From  that  base  con¬ 
nections  must  be  established  with  the  Yakutes  of  Si¬ 
beria,  who  were  considered,  on  account  of  their  lin¬ 
guistic  kinship,  the  remotest  outposts  of  the  Turkish 
blood  to  the  eastward.  The  closely  related  Tartar 
tribes  of  the  Caucasus  must  naturally  join  this  union. 
Armenians  and  Georgians,  who  form  minority  nation¬ 
alities  in  that  territory,  must  either  submit  voluntarily 
or  be  subjugated.  .  .  .  Such  a  great  compact  Turkish 
Empire,  exercising  hegemony  over  all  the  Islamic  world, 
would  exert  a  powerful  attraction  upon  Afghanistan  and 
Persia.  ...  In  December,  1917,  when  the  Turkish 
front  in  Mesopotamia  threatened  to  yield,  Halil  Pasha 
said  to  me,  half  vexed,  half  jokingly:  ‘Supposing  we  let 
the  English  have  this  cursed  desert  hole  and  go  to 
Turkestan,  where  I  will  erect  a  new  empire  for  my  little 
boy.’  He  had  named  his  youngest  son  after  the  great 
conqueror  and  destroyer,  Jenghiz  Khan.”  1 

1  Ex-Chief  of  General  Staff  (Ottoman)  Ernst  Paraquin,  in  the  Berliner 
Tageblatt,  January  24,  1920.  For  Turkish  nationalist  activities  and  atti¬ 
tudes  during  the  war,  see  further  I.  D.  1199 — A  Manual  on  the  Tura¬ 
nians  and  Pan-Turanianism.  Compiled  by  the  Geographical  Section  of  the 
Naval  Intelligence  Division ,  Naval  Staff ,  Admiralty  (London,  1919);  E.  F. 
Benson,  Crescent  and  Iron  Cross  (London,  1918);  M.  A.  Czaplicka,  The 
Turks  of  Central  Asia :  An  Inquiry  into  the  Pan-Turanian  Problem  (Oxford, 
1918);  H.  Morgenthau,  Ambassador  Morgenthau’s  Story  (New  York,  1918); 
Dr.  Harry  Sturmer,  Two  War-Years  in  Constantinople  (New  York,  1917); 
A.  Mandelstam,  “The  Turkish  Spirit,”  New  Europe ,  April  22,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


201 


As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  summer  of  1918  saw  Transcau¬ 
casia  and  northern  Persia  overrun  by  Turkish  armies 
headed  for  Central  Asia.  Then  came  the  German  col¬ 
lapse  in  the  West  and  the  end  of  the  war,  apparently 
dooming  Turkey  to  destruction.  For  the  moment  the 
Pan-Turanians  were  stunned.  Nevertheless,  their  hopes 
were  soon  destined  to  revive,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 

Before  describing  the  course  of  events  in  the  Near 
East  since  1918,  which  need  to  be  treated  as  a  unit,  let 
us  go  back  to  consider  the  earlier  developments  of  the 
other  “ second-stage”  nationalist  movements  in  the 
Moslem  world.  We  have  already  seen  how,  concur¬ 
rently  with  Turkish  nationalism,  Arab  nationalism  was 
likewise  evolving  into  the  “racial”  stage,  the  ideal  being 
a  great  “Pan- Arab”  empire,  embracing  not  merely  the 
ethnically  Arab  peninsula-homeland,  Syria,  and  Meso¬ 
potamia,  but  also  the  Arabized  regions  of  Egypt,  Tripoli, 
French  North  Africa,  and  the  Sudan. 

Pan-Arabism  has  not  been  as  intellectually  developed 
as  Pan-Turanism,  though  its  general  trend  is  so  similar 
that  its  doctrines  need  not  be  discussed  in  detail.  One 
important  difference  between  the  two  movements  is 
that  Pan-Arabism  is  much  more  religious  and  Pan- 
Islamic  in  character,  the  Arabs  regarding  themselves 
as  “The  Chosen  People”  divinely  predestined  to  domi¬ 
nate  the  whole  Islamic  world.  Pan-Arabism  also  lacks 
Pan-Turanism ’s  unity  of  direction.  There  have  been 
two  distinct  intellectual  centres — Syria  and  Egypt.  In 
fact,  it  is  in  Egypt  that  Pan-Arab  schemes  have  been 
most  concretely  elaborated,  the  Egyptian  programme 
looking  toward  a  reunion  of  the  Arab-speaking  lands  un¬ 
der  the  Khedive — perhaps  at  first  subject  to  British  tute- 


202  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


lage,  though  ultimately  throwing  off  British  control  by 
concerted  Pan-Arab  action.  The  late  Khedive  Abbas 
Hilmi,  deposed  by  the  British  in  1914,  is  supposed  to 
have  encouraged  this  movement.1 

The  Great  War  undoubtedly  stimulated  Pan-Arabism, 
especially  by  its  creation  of  an  independent  Arab  king¬ 
dom  in  the  Hedjaz  with  claims  on  Syria  and  Mesopo¬ 
tamia.  However,  the  various  Arab  peoples  are  so  en¬ 
grossed  with  local  independence  agitations  looking 
toward  the  elimination  of  British,  French,  and  Italian 
control  from  specific  regions  like  Egypt,  Syria,  Meso¬ 
potamia,  and  Tripoli,  that  the  larger  concept  of  Pan- 
Arabism,  while  undoubtedly  an  underlying  factor,  is 
not  to-day  in  the  foreground  of  Arab  nationalist  pro¬ 
grammes. 

Furthermore,  as  I  have  already  said,  Pan-Arabism 
is  interwoven  with  the  non-racial  concepts  of  Pan- 
Islamism  and  “Pan-Islamic  Nationalism/’  This  latter 
concept  may  seem  a  rather  grotesque  contradiction  of 
terms.  So  it  may  be  to  us  Westerners.  But  it  is  not 
necessarily  so  to  Eastern  minds.  However  eagerly  the 
East  may  have  seized  upon  our  ideas  of  nationality  and 
patriotism,  those  ideas  have  entered  minds  already  full 
of  concepts  like  Islamic  solidarity  and  the  brotherhood 
of  all  True  Believers.  The  result  has  been  a  subtle  col¬ 
oration  of  the  new  by  the  old,  so  that  even  when  Mos¬ 
lems  use  our  exact  words,  “ nationality,”  “race,”  etc., 
their  conception  of  what  those  words  mean  is  distinctly 
different  from  ours.  These  differences  in  fact  extend 

1  For  Pan- Arab  developments,  see  A.  Musil,  Zur  Zeitgeschichte  von 
Arabien  (Leipzig,  1918);  M.  Pickthall,  “Turkey,  England,  and  the  Present 
Crisis,”  Asiatic  Review ,  October  1,  1914;  A.  Servier,  Le  Nationalisms 
musulman;  Sheick  Abd-el-Aziz  Schauisch,  “Das  Machtgebiet  der  arabi- 
schen  Sprache,”  Preussische  Jahrbucher,  September,  1916. 


NATIONALISM 


203 


to  all  political  concepts.  Take  the  word  “State,”  for 
example.  The  typical  Mohammedan  state  is  not,  like 
the  typical  Western  state,  a  sharply  defined  unit,  with 
fixed  boundaries  and  full  sovereignty  exercised  every¬ 
where  within  its  frontiers.  It  is  more  or  less  an  amor¬ 
phous  mass,  with  a  central  nucleus,  the  seat  of  an  au¬ 
thority  which  shades  off  into  ill-defined,  anarchic  inde¬ 
pendence.  Of  course,  in  the  past  half-century,  most 
Mohammedan  states  have  tried  to  remodel  themselves 
on  Western  lines,  but  the  traditional  tendency  is  typi¬ 
fied  by  Afghanistan,  where  the  tribes  of  the  Indian 
northwest  frontier,  though  nominally  Afghan,  enjoy 
practical  independence  and  have  frequently  conducted 
private  wars  of  their  own  against  the  British  which  the 
Ameer  has  disavowed  and  for  which  the  British  have  not 
held  him  responsible. 

Similarly  with  the  term  “Nationality.”  In  Moslem 
eyes,  a  man  need  not  be  born  or  formally  naturalized 
to  be  a  member  of  a  certain  Moslem  “Nationality.” 
Every  Moslem  is  more  or  less  at  home  in  every  part  of 
Islam,  so  a  man  may  just  happen  into  a  particular  coun¬ 
try  and  thereby  become  at  once,  if  he  wishes,  a  national 
in  good  standing.  For  example:  “Egypt  for  the  Egyp¬ 
tians”  does  not  mean  precisely  what  we  think.  Let  a 
Mohammedan  of  Algiers  or  Damascus  settle  in  Cairo. 
Nothing  prevents  him  from  acting,  and  being  considered 
as,  an  “Egyptian  Nationalist”  in  the  full  sense  of  the 
term.  This  is  because  Islam  has  always  had  a  distinct 
idea  of  territorial  as  well  as  spiritual  unity.  All  pre¬ 
dominantly  Mohammedan  lands  are  believed  by  Mos¬ 
lems  to  constitute  “Dar-ul-Islam,”1  which  is  in  a  sense 

1  Literally  “House  of  Islam.”  All  non-Moslem  lands  are  collectively 
known  as  “  Dar-ul-Harb  ”  or  “House  of  War.” 


204  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


the  joint  possession  of  all  Moslems  and  which  all  Mos¬ 
lems  are  jointly  obligated  to  defend.  That  is  the  reason 
why  alien  encroachments  on  any  Moslem  land  are  in¬ 
stantly  resented  by  Moslems  at  the  opposite  end  of  the 
Moslem  world,  who  could  have  no  possible  material 
interest  in  the  matter. 

We  are  now  better  able  to  understand  how  many 
Moslem  thinkers,  combining  the  Western  concept  of 
nationality  with  the  traditional  idea  of  Dar-ul-Islam, 
have  evolved  a  new  synthesis  of  the  two,  expressed  by 
the  term  “Pan-Islamic  Nationalism/7  This  trend  of 
thought  is  well  set  forth  by  an  Indian  Moslem,  who 
writes:  “In  the  West,  the  whole  science  of  government 
rests  on  the  axiom  that  the  essential  divisions  of  hu¬ 
manity  are  determined  by  considerations  of  race  and 
geography;  but  for  Orientals  these  ideas  are  very  far 
from  being  axioms.  For  them,  humanity  divides  ac¬ 
cording  to  religious  beliefs.  The  unity  is  no  longer  the 
nation  or  the  State,  but  the  ‘Millah/1  Europeans  see 
in  this  a  counterpart  to  their  Middle  Ages — a  stage 
which  Islam  should  pass  through  on  its  way  to  mo¬ 
dernity  in  the  Western  sense.  How  badly  they  under¬ 
stand  how  religion  looks  to  a  Mohammedan!  They 
forget  that  Islam  is  not  only  a  religion,  but  also  a  social 
organization,  a  form  of  culture,  and  a  nationality.  .  .  . 
The  principle  of  Islamic  fraternity — of  Pan-Islamism, 
if  you  prefer  the  word — is  analogous  to  patriotism,  but 
with  this  difference:  this  Islamic  fraternity,  though  re¬ 
sulting  in  identity  of  laws  and  customs,  has  not  (like 
Western  Nationality)  been  brought  about  by  community 


1  I.  e.,  the  organized  group  of  followers  of  a  particular  religion. 


NATIONALISM 


205 


of  race,  country,  or  history,  but  has  been  received,  as 
we  believe,  directly  from  God.”  1 

Pan-Islamic  nationalism  is  a  relatively  recent  phe¬ 
nomenon  and  has  not  been  doctrinally  worked  out. 
Nevertheless  it  is  visible  throughout  the  Moslem  world 
and  is  gaining  in  strength,  particularly  in  regions  like 
North  Africa  and  India,  where  strong  territorial  patri¬ 
otism  has,  for  one  reason  or  another,  not  developed. 
As  a  French  writer  remarks:  “Mohammedan  Nation¬ 
alism  is  not  an  isolated  or  sporadic  agitation.  It  is  a 
broad  tide,  which  is  flowing  over  the  whole  Islamic 
world  of  Asia,  India,  and  Africa.  Nationalism  is  a  new 
form  of  the  Mohammedan  faith,  which,  far  from  being 
undermined  by  contact  with  European  civilization, 
seems  to  have  discovered  a  surplus  of  religious  fervor, 
and  which,  in  its  desire  for  expansion  and  proselytism, 
tends  to  realize  its  unity  by  rousing  the  fanaticism  of 
the  masses,  by  directing  the  political  tendencies  of  the 
elites,  and  by  sowing  everywhere  the  seeds  of  a  danger¬ 
ous  agitation.” 2  Pan-Islamic  nationalism  may  thus, 
in  the  future,  become  a  major  factor  which  will  have 
to  be  seriously  reckoned  with.3 


1  Mohammed  Ali,  “Le  Mouvement  musulman  dans  l’lnde,”  Revue 
Politique  Internationale ,  January,  1914.  He  headed  the  so-called  “Khila- 
fat  Delegation”  sent  by  the  Indian  Moslems  to  England  in  1919  to  pro¬ 
test  against  the  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  by  the  peace  treaties. 

2  A.  Servier,  Le  Nationalisme  musulman,  p.  181. 

3  For  Pan-Islamic  nationalism,  besides  Servier  and  Mohammed  Ali, 
quoted  above,  see  A.  Le  Chatelier,  L’Islam  au  dix-neuvibme  Siecle  (Paris, 
1888);  same  author,  “Politique  musulmane,”  Revue  du  Monde  Musulman , 
September,  1910;  Sir  T.  Morison,  “England  and  Islam,”  Nineteenth  Cen¬ 
tury  and  After ,  July,  1919;  G.  Demorgny,  La  Question  Persane,  pp.  23-31 
(Paris,  1916);  W.  E.  D.  Allen,  “Transcaucasia,  Past  and  Present,”  Quar¬ 
terly  Review ,  October,  1920. 


206  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


III 

So  ends  our  survey  of  nationalist  movements  in  the 
Moslem  world.  Given  such  a  tangled  complex  of  as¬ 
pirations,  enormously  stimulated  by  Armageddon,  it  was 
only  natural  that  the  close  of  the  Great  War  should 
have  left  the  Orient  a  veritable  welter  of  unrest.  Ob¬ 
viously,  anything  like  a  constructive  settlement  could 
have  been  effected  only  by  the  exercise  of  true  states¬ 
manship  of  the  highest  order.  Unfortunately,  the  Ver¬ 
sailles  peace  conference  was  devoid  of  true  statesman¬ 
ship,  and  the  resulting  “ settlement”  not  only  failed  to 
give  peace  to  Europe  but  disclosed  an  attitude  toward 
the  East  inspired  by  the  pre-war  spirit  of  predatoiy 
imperialism  and  cynical  Realjpolitik.  Apparently  ob¬ 
livious  of  the  mighty  psychological  changes  which  the 
war  had  wrought,  and  of  the  consequent  changes  of 
attitude  and  policy  required,  the  victorious  Allies  pro¬ 
ceeded  to  treat  the  Orient  as  though  Armageddon  were 
a  skirmish  and  Asia  the  sleeping  giant  of  a  century  ago. 

In  fact,  disregarding  both  the  general  pronounce¬ 
ments  of  liberal  principles  and  the  specific  promises  of 
self-determination  for  Near  Eastern  peoples  which  they 
had  made  during  the  war,  the  Allies  now  paraded  a  se¬ 
ries  of  secret  treaties  (negotiated  between  themselves 
during  those  same  war-years  when  they  had  been  so 
unctuously  orating),  and  these  secret  treaties  clearly 
divided  up  the  Ottoman  Empire  among  the  victors,  in 
absolute  disregard  of  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants. 
The  purposes  of  the  Allies  were  further  revealed  by  the 
way  in  which  the  Versailles  conference  refused  to  receive 
the  representatives  of  Persia  (theoretically  still  inde- 


NATIONALISM 


207 


pendent),  but  kept  them  cooling  their  heels  in  Paris 
while  British  pressure  at  Teheran  forced  the  Shah’s 
government  to  enter  into  an  “ agreement”  that  made 
Persia  a  virtual  protectorate  of  the  British  Empire.  As 
for  the  Egyptians,  who  had  always  protested  against 
the  protectorate  proclaimed  by  England  solely  on  its 
own  initiative  in  1914,  the  conference  refused  to  pay 
any  attention  to  their  delegates,  and  they  were  given  to 
understand  that  the  conference  regarded  the  British 
protectorate  over  Egypt  as  a  fait  accompli.  The  upshot 
was  that,  as  a  result  of  the  war,  European  domination 
over  the  Near  and  Middle  East  was  riveted  rather  than 
relaxed. 

But  the  strangest  feature  of  this  strange  business 
remains  to  be  told.  One  might  imagine  that  the  Allied 
leaders  would  have  realized  that  they  were  playing  a 
dangerous  game,  which  could  succeed  only  by  close 
team-work  and  quick  action.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
very  reverse  was  the  case.  After  showing  their  hand, 
and  thereby  filling  the  East  with  disillusionment,  de¬ 
spair,  and  fury,  the  Allies  proceeded  to  quarrel  over  the 
spoils.  Nearly  two  years  passed  before  England,  France, 
and  Italy  were  able  to  come  to  an  even  superficial  agree¬ 
ment  as  to  the  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and 
meanwhile  they  had  been  bickering  and  intriguing 
against  each  other  all  over  the  Near  East.  This  was 
sheer  madness.  The  destined  victims  were  thereby  in¬ 
formed  that  European  domination  rested  not  only  on 
disregard  of  the  moral  “ imponderables”  but  on  diplo¬ 
matic  bankruptcy  as  well.  The  obvious  reflection  was 
that  a  domination  resting  on  such  rotten  foundations 
might  well  be  overthrown. 


208  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


That,  at  any  rate,  is  the  way  multitudes  of  Orientals 
read  the  situation,  and  their  rebellious  feelings  were 
stimulated  not  merely  by  consciousness  of  their  own 
strength  and  Western  disunion,  but  also  by  the  active 
encouragement  of  a  new  ally — Bolshevik  Russia.  Rus¬ 
sian  Bolshevism  had  thrown  down  the  gauntlet  to  West¬ 
ern  civilization,  and  in  the  desperate  struggle  which  was 
now  on,  the  Bolshevik  leaders  saw  with  terrible  glee  the 
golden  opportunities  vouchsafed  them  in  the  East.  The 
details  of  Bolshevik  activity  in  the  Orient  will  be  con¬ 
sidered  in  the  chapter  on  Social  Unrest.  Suffice  it  to 
remember  here  that  Bolshevik  propaganda  is  an  im¬ 
portant  element  in  that  profound  ferment  which  ex¬ 
tends  over  the  whole  Near  and  Middle  East;  a  ferment 
which  has  reduced  some  regions  to  the  verge  of  chaos 
and  which  threatens  to  increase  rather  than  diminish 
in  the  immediate  future. 

To  relate  all  the  details  of  contemporary  Eastern  un¬ 
rest  would  fill  a  book  in  itself.  Let  us  here  content 
ourselves  with  considering  the  chief  centres  of  this  un¬ 
rest,  remembering  always  that  it  exists  throughout 
the  Moslem  world  from  French  North  Africa  to  Central 
Asia  and  the  Dutch  Indies.  The  centres  to  be  here  sur¬ 
veyed  will  be  Egypt,  Persia,  and  the  Turkish  and  Arab 
regions  of  the  former  Ottoman  Empire.  A  fifth  main 
centre  of  unrest — India — will  be  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter. 

The  gathering  storm  first  broke  in  Egypt.  During 
the  war  Egypt,  flooded  with  British  troops  and  sub¬ 
jected  to  the  most  stringent  martial  law,  had  remained 
quiet,  but  it  was  the  quiet  of  repression,  not  of  pas¬ 
sivity.  We  have  seen  how,  with  the  opening  years  of 


NATIONALISM 


209 


the  twentieth  century,  virtually  all  educated  Egyptians 
had  become  more  or  less  impregnated  with  nationalist 
ideas,  albeit  a  large  proportion  of  them  believed  in  evo¬ 
lutionary  rather  than  revolutionary  methods.  The  chief 
hope  of  the  moderates  had  been  the  provisional  char¬ 
acter  of  English  rule.  So  long  as  England  declared 
herself  merely  in  “temporary  occupation ”  of  Egypt, 
anything  was  possible.  But  the  proclamation  of  the 
protectorate  in  1914,  which  declared  Egypt  part  of  the 
British  Empire,  entirely  changed  the  situation.  Even 
the  most  moderate  nationalists  felt  that  the  future  was 
definitely  prejudged  against  them  and  that  the  door  had 
been  irrevocably  closed  upon  their  ultimate  aspirations. 
The  result  was  that  the  moderates  were  driven  over  to 
the  extremists  and  were  ready  to  join  the  latter  in  vio¬ 
lent  action  as  soon  as  opportunity  might  offer. 

The  extreme  nationalists  had  of  course  protested 
bitterly  against  the  protectorate  from  the  first,  and  the 
close  of  the  war  saw  a  delegation  composed  of  both  na¬ 
tionalist  wings  proceed  to  Paris  to  lay  their  claims  be¬ 
fore  the  Versailles  conference.  Rebuffed  by  the  confer¬ 
ence,  which  recognized  the  British  protectorate  over 
Egypt  as  part  of  the  peace  settlement,  the  Egyptian 
delegation  issued  a  formal  protest  warning  of  trouble. 
This  protest  read: 

“We  have  knocked  at  door  after  door,  but  have  re¬ 
ceived  no  answer.  In  spite  of  the  definite  pledges  given 
by  the  statesmen  at  the  head  of  the  nations  which  won 
the  war,  to  the  effect  that  their  victory  would  mean  the 
triumph  of  Right  over  Might  and  the  establishment  of 
the  principle  of  self-determination  for  small  nations,  the 
British  protectorate  over  Egypt  was  written  into  the 


210  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


treaties  of  Versailles  and  Saint  Germain  without  the  peo¬ 
ple  of  Egypt  being  consulted  as  to  their  political  status. 

“This  crime  against  our  nation,  a  breach  of  good 
faith  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  who  have  declared  that 
they  are  forming  in  the  same  Treaty  a  Society  of  Na¬ 
tions,  will  not  be  consummated  without  a  solemn  warn¬ 
ing  that  the  people  of  Egypt  consider  the  decision  taken 
at  Paris  null  and  void.  ...  If  our  voice  is  not  heard, 
it  will  be  only  because  the  blood  already  shed  has  not 
been  enough  to  overthrow  the  old  world-order  and  give 
birth  to  a  new  world-order.  ”x 

Before  these  lines  had  appeared  in  type,  trouble  in 
Egypt  had  begun.  Simultaneously  with  the  arrival  of  the 
Egyptian  delegation  at  Paris,  the  nationalists  in  Egypt 
laid  their  demands  before  the  British  authorities.  The 
nationalist  programme  detnanded  complete  self-govern¬ 
ment  for  Egypt,  leaving  England  only  a  right  of  super¬ 
vision  over  the  public  debt  and  the  Suez  Canal.  The 
nationalists’  strength  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  these 
proposals  were  indorsed  by  the  Egyptian  cabinet  re¬ 
cently  appointed  by  the  Khedive  at  British  suggestion. 
In  fact,  the  Egyptian  Premier,  Roushdi  Pasha,  asked 
to  be  allowed  to  go  to  London  with  some  of  his  col¬ 
leagues  for  a  hearing.  This  placed  the  British  authori¬ 
ties  in  Egypt  in  a  distinctly  trying  position.  However, 
they  determined  to  stand  firm,  and  accordingly  an¬ 
swered  that  England  could  not  abandon  its  responsi¬ 
bility  for  the  continuance  of  order  and  good  govern¬ 
ment  in  Egypt,  now  a  British  protectorate  and  an  inte¬ 
gral  part  of  the  empire,  and  that  no  useful  purpose 

1  Egyptian  White  Book :  Collection  of  Official  Correspondence  of  the 
Egyptian  Delegation  to  the  Peace  Conference  (Paris,  1919). 


NATIONALISM 


211 


would  be  served  by  allowing  the  Egyptian  leaders  to 
go  to  London  and  there  advance  immoderate  demands 
which  could  not  possibly  be  entertained. 

The  English  attitude  was  firm.  The  Egyptian  atti¬ 
tude  was  no  less  firm.  The  cabinet  at  once  resigned, 
no  new  cabinet  could  be  formed,  and  the  British  High 
Commissioner,  General  Allenby,  was  forced  to  assume 
unveiled  control.  Meanwhile  the  nationalists  announced 
that  they  were  going  to  hold  a  plebiscite  to  determine 
the  attitude  of  the  Egyptian  people.  Forbidden  by 
the  British  authorities,  the  plebiscite  was  nevertheless 
illegally  held,  and  resulted,  according  to  the  nationalists, 
in  an  overwhelming  popular  indorsement  of  their  de¬ 
mands.  This  defiant  attitude  determined  the  British 
on  strong  action.  Accordingly,  in  the  spring  of  1919, 
most  of  the  nationalist  leaders  were  seized  and  deported 
to  Malta. 

Egypt’s  answer  was  an  explosion.  From  one  end  of 
the  country  to  the  other,  Egypt  flamed  into  rebellion. 
Everywhere  it  was  the  same  stoiy.  Railways  and  tele¬ 
graph  lines  were  systematically  cut.  Trains  were  stalled 
and  looted.  Isolated  British  officers  and  soldiers  were 
murdered.  In  Cairo  alone,  thousands  of  houses  were 
sacked  by  the  mob.  Soon  the  danger  was  rendered 
more  acute  by  the  irruption  out  of  the  desert  of  swarms 
of  Bedouin  Arabs  bent  on  plunder.  For  a  few  days 
Egypt  trembled  on  the  verge  of  anarchy,  and  the  British 
Government  admitted  in  Parliament  that  all  Egypt 
was  in  a  state  of  insurrection. 

The  British  authorities  met  the  crisis  with  vigor  and 
determination.  The  number  of  British  troops  in  Egypt 
was  large,  trusty  black  regiments  were  hurried  up  from 


212  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


the  Sudan,  and  the  well-disciplined  Egyptian  native 
police  generally  obeyed  orders.  After  several  weeks  of 
sharp  fighting  and  heavy  loss  of  life,  Egypt  was  again 
gotten  under  control. 

Order  was  restored,  but  the  outlook  was  ominous  in 
the  extreme.  Only  the  presence  of  massed  British  and 
Sudanese  troops  enabled  order  to  be  maintained.  Even 
the  application  of  stern  martial  law  could  not  prevent 
continuous  nationalist  demonstrations,  sometimes  end¬ 
ing  in  riots,  fighting,  and  heavy  loss  of  fife.  The  most 
serious  aspect  of  the  situation  was  that  not  only  were 
the  upper  classes  solidly  nationalist,  but  they  had  be¬ 
hind  them  the  hitherto  passive  fellah  millions.  The 
war-years  had  borne  hard  on  the  fellaheen.  Military 
exigencies  had  compelled  Britain  to  conscript  fully  a 
million  of  them  for  forced  labor  in  the  Near  East  and 
even  in  Europe,  while  there  had  also  been  wholesale 
requisitions  of  grain,  fodder,  and  other  supplies.  These 
things  had  caused  profound  discontent  and  had  roused 
among  the  fellaheen  not  merely  passive  dislike  but 
active  hatred  of  British  rule.  Authoritative  English 
experts  on  Egypt  were  seriously  alarmed.  Shortly  after 
the  riots  Sir  William  Willcocks,  the  noted  engineer, 
said  in  a  public  statement:  “The  keystone  of  the  British 
occupation  of  Egypt  was  the  fact  that  the  fellaheen 
were  for  it.  The  Sheikhs,  Omdehs,  governing  classes, 
and  high  religious  heads  might  or  might  not  be  hostile, 
but  nothing  counted  for  much  while  the  millions  of 
fellaheen  were  solid  for  the  occupation.  The  British 
have  undoubtedly  to-day  lost  the  friendship  and  confi¬ 
dence  of  the  fellaheen.”  And  Sir  Valentine  Chirol 
stated  in  the  London  Times :  “We  are  now  admittedly 


NATIONALISM 


213 


fa,ce  to  face  with  the  ominous  fact  that  for  the  first  time 
since  the  British  occupation  large  numbers  of  the  Egyp¬ 
tian  fellaheen,  who  owe  far  more  to  us  than  does  any 
other  class  of  Egyptians,  have  been  worked  up  into  a 
fever  of  bitter  discontent  and  hatred.  Very  few  people 
at  home,  even  in  responsible  quarters,  have,  I  think, 
the  slightest  conception  of  the  very  dangerous  degree 
of  tension  which  has  now  been  reached  out  here.” 

All  foreign  observers  were  impressed  by  the  national¬ 
ist  feeling  which  united  all  creeds  and  classes.  Re¬ 
garding  the  monster  demonstrations  held  during  the 
summer  of  1919,  an  Italian  publicist  wrote:  “For  the 
first  time  in  history,  the  banners  flown  showed  the  Cres¬ 
cent  interwoven  with  the  Cross.  Until  a  short  time  ago 
the  two  elements  were  as  distinct  from  each  other  as 
each  of  them  was  from  the  Jews.  To-day,  precisely  as 
has  happened  in  India  among  the  Mussulmans  and 
the  Hindus,  every  trace  of  religious  division  has  de¬ 
parted.  All  Egyptians  are  enrolled  under  a  single  ban¬ 
ner.  Every  one  behind  his  mask  of  silence  is  burning 
with  the  same  faith,  and  confident  that  his  cause  will 
ultimately  triumph.” 1  And  a  Frenchwoman,  a  lifelong 
resident  of  Egypt,  wrote:  “We  have  seen  surprising 
things  in  this  country,  so  often  divided  by  party  and 
religious  struggles:  Coptic  priests  preaching  in  mosques; 
ulemas  preaching  in  Christian  churches;  Syrian,  Mar- 
onite,  or  Mohammedan  students;  women,  whether  of 
Turkish  or  Egyptian  blood,  united  in  the  same  fervor, 
the  same  ardent  desire  to  see  break  over  their  ancient 
land  the  radiant  dawn  of  independence.  For  those  who, 
like  myself,  have  known  the  Egypt  of  Tewfik,  the  atti- 

1  G.  Civimini,  in  the  Corriere  della  Sera,  December  30,  1919. 


214  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tude  of  the  women  these  last  few  years  is  the  most  sur¬ 
prising  transformation  that  has  happened  in  the  val¬ 
ley  of  the  Nile.  One  should  have  seen  the  nonchalant 
life,  the  almost  complete  indifference  to  anything  savor¬ 
ing  of  politics,  to  appreciate  the  enormous  steps  taken 
in  the  last  few  months.  For  example;  last  summer  a 
procession  of  women  demonstrators  was  surrounded 
by  British  soldiers  with  fixed  bayonets.  One  of  the 
women,  threatened  by  a  soldier,  turned  on  him,  baring 
her  breast,  and  cried:  ‘Kill  me,  then,  so  that  there  may 
be  another  Miss  Cavell.’”1 

Faced  by  this  unprecedented  nationalist  fervor, 
Englishmen  on  the  spot  were  of  two  opinions.  Some, 
like  Sir  William  Willcocks  and  Sir  Valentine  Chirol, 
stated  that  extensive  concessions  must  be  made.2  Other 
qualified  observers  asserted  that  concessions  would  be 
weakness  and  would  spell  disaster.  Said  Sir  M.  Mc- 
Ilwraith:  “Five  years  of  a  Nationalist  regime  would 
lead  to  hopeless  chaos  and  disorder.  ...  If  Egypt 
is  not  to  fall  back  into  the  morass  of  bankruptcy  and 
anarchy  from  which  we  rescued  her  in  1882,  with  the 
still  greater  horrors  of  Bolshevism,  of  which  there  are 
already  sinister  indications,  superadded,  Britain  must 
not  loosen  her  control.”  3  In  England  the  Egyptian 
situation  caused  grave  disquietude,  and  in  the  summer 

1  Madame  Jehan  d’lvray,  "En  figypte,”  Revue  de  Paris ,  September  15, 
1920.  Madame  d’lvray  cites  other  picturesque  incidents  of  a  like  charac¬ 
ter.  See  also  Annexes  to  Egyptian  White  Book,  previously  quoted. 
These  Annexes  contain  numerous  depositions,  often  accompanied  by  pho¬ 
tographs,  alleging  severities  and  atrocities  by  the  British  troops. 

2  Contained  in  the  press  statements  previously  mentioned. 

3  Sir  M.  Mcllwraith,  “Egyptian  Nationalism,”  Edinburgh  Review, 
July,  1919.  See  also  Hon.  W.  Ormsby-Gore,  “The  Future  in  Egypt,” 
New  Europe,  November  6,  1919. 


NATIONALISM 


215 


of  1919  the  British  Government  announced  the  ap¬ 
pointment  of  a  commission  of  inquiry  headed  by  Lord 
Milner  to  investigate  fully  into  Egyptian  affairs. 

The  appointment  was  a  wise  one.  Lord  Milner  was 
one  of  the  ablest  figures  in  British  political  life,  a  man 
of  long  experience  with  imperial  problems,  including 
that  of  Egypt,  and  possessed  of  a  temperament  equally 
remote  from  the  doctrinaire  liberal  or  the  hidebound 
conservative.  In  short,  Lord  Milner  was  a  realist ,  in 
the  true  sense  of  the  word,  as  his  action  soon  proved. 
Arriving  in  Egypt  at  the  beginning  of  1920,  Lord  Mil¬ 
ner  and  his  colleagues  found  themselves  confronted 
with  a  most  difficult  situation.  In  Egypt  the  word  had 
gone  forth  to  boycott  the  commission,  and  not  merely 
nationalist  politicians  but  also  religious  leaders  like  the 
Grand  Mufti  refused  even  to  discuss  matters  unless  the 
commissioners  would  first  agree  to  Egyptian  indepen¬ 
dence.  This  looked  like  a  deadlock.  Nevertheless,  by 
infinite  tact  and  patience,  Lord  Milner  finally  got  into 
free  and  frank  discussion  with  Zagloul  Pasha  and  the 
other  responsible  nationalist  leaders. 

His  efforts  were  undoubtedly  helped  by  certain  de¬ 
velopments  within  Egypt  itself.  In  Egypt,  as  else¬ 
where  in  the  East,  there  were  appearing  symptoms  not 
merely  of  political  but  also  of  social  unrest.  New  types 
of  agitators  were  springing  up,  preaching  to  the  popu¬ 
lace  the  most  extreme  revolutionary  doctrines.  These 
youthful  agitators  disquieted  the  regular  nationalist 
leaders,  who  felt  themselves  threatened  both  as  party 
chiefs  and  as  men  of  social  standing  and  property.  The 
upshot  was  that,  by  the  autumn  of  1920,  Lord  Milner 
and  Zagloul  Pasha  had  agreed  upon  the  basis  of  what 


216  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

looked  like  a  genuine  compromise.  According  to  the 
intimations  then  given  out  to  the  press,  and  later  con¬ 
firmed  by  the  nature  of  Lord  Milner’s  official  report, 
the  fines  of  the  tentative  agreement  ran  as  follows: 
England  was  to  withdraw  her  protectorate  and  was  to 
declare  Egypt  independent.  This  independence  was 
qualified  to  about  the  same  extent  that  Cuba’s  is  to¬ 
ward  the  United  States.  Egypt  was  to  have  complete 
self-government,  both  the  British  garrison  and  British 
civilian  officials  being  withdrawn.  Egypt  was,  how¬ 
ever,  to  make  a  perpetual  treaty  of  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  was  to  agree  not  to  make  treaties  with  other 
powers  save  with  Britain’s  consent,  and  was  to  grant 
Britain  a  military  and  naval  station  for  the  protection 
of  the  Suez  Canal  and  of  Egypt  itself  in  case  of  sudden 
attack  by  foreign  enemies.  The  vexed  question  of  the 
Sudan  was  left  temporarily  open. 

These  proposals  bore  the  earmarks  of  genuinely  con¬ 
structive  compromise.  Unfortunately,  they  were  not 
at  once  acted  upon.1  Both  in  England  and  in  Egypt 
they  roused  strong  opposition.  In  England  adverse 
official  influences  held  up  the  commission’s  report  till 
February,  1921.  In  Egypt  the  extreme  nationalists  de¬ 
nounced  Zagloul  Pasha  as  a  traitor,  though  moderate 
opinion  seemed  substantially  satisfied.  The  commis¬ 
sion’s  report,  as  finally  published,  declared  that  the 
grant  of  self-government  to  Egypt  could  not  be  safely 
postponed;  that  the  nationalist  spirit  could  not  be  ex¬ 
tinguished;  that  an  attempt  to  govern  Egypt  in  the 
teeth  of  a  hostile  people  would  be  “a  difficult  and  dis- 

1  For  unfortunate  aspects  of  this  delay,  see  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  “  Con¬ 
flicting  Policies  in  the  East,”  New  Eurojpe,  July  1,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


217 


graceful  task”;  and  that  it  would  be  a  great  misfortune 
if  the  present  opportunity  for  a  settlement  were  lost. 
However,  the  report  was  not  indorsed  by  the  British 
Government  in  its  entirety,  and  Lord  Milner  forthwith 
resigned.  As  for  Zagloul  Pasha,  he  still  maintains  his 
position  as  -nationalist  leader,  but  his  authority  has 
been  gravely  shaken.  Such  is  the  situation  of  Egypt 
at  this  present  writing:  a  situation  frankly  not  so  en¬ 
couraging  as  it  was  last  year. 

Meanwhile  the  storm  which  had  begun  in  Egypt  had 
long  since  spread  to  other  parts  of  the  Near  East.  In 
fact,  by  the  opening  months  of  1920,  the  storm-centre 
had  shifted  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  For  this  the  Al¬ 
lies  themselves  were  largely  to  blame.  Of  course  a 
constructive  settlement  of  these  troubled  regions  would 
have  been  very  difficult.  Still,  it  might  not  have  proved 
impossible  if  Allied  policy  had  been  fair  and  above¬ 
board.  The  close  of  the  war  found  the  various  peoples 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire  hopeful  that  the  liberal  war- 
aims  professed  by  the  Allied  spokesmen  would  be  re¬ 
deemed.  The  Arab  elements  were  notably  hopeful,  be¬ 
cause  they  had  been  given  a  whole  series  of  Allied  prom¬ 
ises  (shortly  to  be  repudiated,  as  we  shall  presently  see), 
while  even  the  beaten  Turks  were  not  entirely  bereft 
of  hope  in  the  future.  Besides  the  general  pronounce¬ 
ments  of  liberal  treatment  as  formulated  in  the  “  Four¬ 
teen  Points”  programme  of  President  Wilson  and  indorsed 
by  the  Allies,  the  Turks  had  pledges  of  a  more  specific 
character,  notably  by  Premier  Lloyd  George,  who,  on 
January  5,  1918,  had  said:  “Nor  are  we  fighting  to  de¬ 
prive  Turkey  of  its  capital  or  of  the  rich  and  renowned 
lands  of  Asia  Minor  and  Thrace,  which  are  predomi- 


218  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


nantly  Turkish  in  race.”  In  other  words,  the  Turks 
were  given  unequivocally  to  understand  that,  while 
their  rule  over  non-Turkish  regions  like  the  Arab  prov¬ 
inces  must  cease,  the  Turkish  regions  of  the  empire 
were  not  to  pass  under  alien  rule,  but  were  to  form  a 
Turkish  national  state.  The  Turks  did  not  know 
about  a  series  of  secret  treaties  between  the  Allies,  be¬ 
gun  in  1915,  which  partitioned  practically  the  whole 
of  Asia  Minor  between  the  Allied  Powers.  These  were 
to  come  out  a  little  later.  For  the  moment  the  Turks 
might  hope. 

In  the  case  of  the  Arabs  there  were  far  brighter 
grounds  for  nationalist  hopes — and  far  darker  depths 
of  Allied  duplicity.  We  have  already  mentioned  the 
Arab  revolt  of  1916,  which,  beginning  in  the  Hedjaz 
under  the  leadership  of  the  Shereef  of  Mecca,  presently 
spread  through  all  the  Arab  provinces  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  and  contributed  so  largely  to  the  collapse  of 
Turkish  resistance.  This  revolt  was,  however,  not  a 
sudden,  unpremeditated  thing.  It  had  been  carefully 
planned,  and  was  due  largely  to  Allied  backing — and 
Allied  promises.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war 
Arab  nationalist  malcontents  had  been  in  touch  with 
the  British  authorities  in  Egypt.  They  were  warmly 
welcomed  and  encouraged  in  their  separatist  schemes, 
because  an  Arab  rebellion  would  obviously  be  of  inval¬ 
uable  assistance  to  the  British  in  safeguarding  Egypt 
and  the  Suez  Canal,  to  say  nothing  of  an  advance  into 
Turkish  territory. 

The  Arabs,  however,  asked  not  merely  material  aid 
but  also  definite  promises  that  their  rebellion  should 
be  rewarded  by  the  formation  of  an  Arab  state  embrac- 


NATIONALISM 


219 


ing  the  Arab  provinces  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Un¬ 
fortunately  for  Arab  nationalist  aspirations,  the  British 
and  French  Governments  had  their  own  ideas  as  to  the 
future  of  Turkey’s  Arab  provinces.  Both  England 
and  France  had  long  possessed  “ spheres  of  influence” 
in  those  regions.  The  English  sphere  was  in  southern 
Mesopotamia  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  The 
French  sphere  was  the  Lebanon,  a  mountainous  district 
in  northern  Syria  just  inland  from  the  Mediterranean 
coast,  where  the  population,  known  as  Maronites,  were 
Roman  Catholics,  over  whom  France  had  long  extended 
her  diplomatic  protection.  Of  course  both  these  dis¬ 
tricts  were  legally  Turkish  territory.  Also,  both  were 
small  in  area.  But  “ spheres  of  influence”  are  elastic 
things.  Under  favorable  circumstances  they  are  capa¬ 
ble  of  sudden  expansion  to  an  extraordinary  degree. 
Such  a  circumstance  was  the  Great  War.  Accordingly, 
the  British  and  French  foreign  offices  put  their  heads 
together  and  on  March  5,  1915,  the  two  governments 
signed  a  secret  treaty  by  the  terms  of  which  France 
was  given  a  “ predominant  position”  in  Syria  and  Brit¬ 
ain  a  predominant  position  in  Mesopotamia.  No  defi¬ 
nite  boundaries  were  then  assigned,  but  the  intent  was 
to  stake  out  claims  which  would  partition  Turkey’s 
Arab  provinces  between  England  and  France. 

Naturally  the  existence  of  this  secret  treaty  was  an 
embarrassment  to  the  British  officials  in  Egypt  in  their 
negotiations  with  the  Arabs.  However,  an  Arab  re¬ 
bellion  was  too  valuable  an  asset  to  be  lost,  and  the  Brit¬ 
ish  negotiators  finally  evolved  a  formula  which  satisfied 
the  Arab  leaders.  On  October  25,  1915,  the  Shereef  of 
Mecca’s  representative  at  Cairo  was  given  a  document 


220  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


by  the  Governor-General  of  Egypt,  Sir  Henry  Mc¬ 
Mahon,  in  which  Great  Britain  undertook,  conditional 
upon  an  Arab  revolt,  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
the  Arabs  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  except  in  southern 
Mesopotamia,  where  British  interests  required  special 
measures  of  administrative  control,  and  also  except 
areas  where  Great  Britain  was  “not  free  to  act  without 
detriment  to  the  interests  of  France.”  This  last  clause 
was  of  course  a  “joker.”  However,  it  achieved  its 
purpose.  The  Arabs,  knowing  nothing  about  the  secret 
treaty,  supposed  it  referred  merely  to  the  restricted 
district  of  the  Lebanon.  They  went  home  jubilant, 
to  prepare  the  revolt  which  broke  out  next  year. 

The  revolt  began  in  November,  1916.  It  might  not 
have  begun  at  all  had  the  Arabs  known  what  had  hap¬ 
pened  the  preceding  May.  In  that  month  England  and 
France  signed  another  secret  treaty,  the  celebrated 
Sykes-Picot  Agreement.  This  agreement  definitely  par¬ 
titioned  Turkey’s  Arab  provinces  along  the  lines  sug¬ 
gested  in  the  initial  secret  treaty  of  the  year  before. 
By  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  most  of  Mesopotamia 
was  to  be  definitely  British,  while  the  Syrian  coast  from 
Tyre  to  Alexandretta  was  to  be  definitely  French,  to¬ 
gether  with  extensive  Armenian  and  Asia  Minor  regions 
to  the  northward.  Palestine  was  to  be  “international,” 
albeit  its  chief  seaport,  Haifa,  was  to  be  British,  and 
the  implication  was  that  Palestine  fell  within  the  English 
sphere.  As  to  the  great  hinterland  lying  between  Meso¬ 
potamia  and  the  Syrian  coast,  it  was  to  be  “indepen¬ 
dent  Arab  under  two  spheres  of  influence,”  British  and 
French;  the  French  sphere  embracing  all  the  rest  of 
Syria  from  Aleppo  to  Damascus,  the  English  sphere 


NATIONALISM 


221 


embracing  all  the  rest  of  Mesopotamia — the  region  about 
Mosul.  In  other  words,  the  independence  promised 
the  Arabs  by  Sir  Henry  McMahon  had  vanished  into 
thin  air. 

This  little  shift  behind  the  scenes  was  of  course  not 
communicated  to  the  Arabs.  On  the  contrary,  the 
British  did  everything  possible  to  stimulate  Arab  na¬ 
tionalist  hopes — this  being  the  best  way  to  extract  their 
fighting  zeal  against  the  Turks.  The  British  Govern¬ 
ment  sent  the  Arabs  a  number  of  picked  intelligence 
officers,  notably  a  certain  Colonel  Lawrence,  an  extraor¬ 
dinary  young  man  who  soon  gained  unbounded  in¬ 
fluence  over  the  Arab  chiefs  and  became  known  as  aThe 
Soul  of  the  Arabian  Revolution.”  1  These  men,  chosen 
for  their  knowledge  of,  and  sympathy  for,  the  Arabs, 
were  not  informed  about  the  secret  treaties,  so  that 
their  encouragement  of  Arab  zeal  might  not  be  marred 
by  any  lack  of  sincerity.  Similarly,  the  British  generals 
were  prodigal  of  promises  in  their  proclamations.2  The 
climax  of  this  blessed  comedy  occurred  at  the  very  close 
of  the  war,  when  the  British  and  French  Governments 
issued  the  following  joint  declaration  which  was  posted 
throughout  the  Arab  provinces:  “The  aim  which  France 
and  Great  Britain  have  in  view  in  waging  in  the  East 
the  war  let  loose  upon  the  world  by  German  ambition, 
is  to  insure  the  complete  and  final  emancipation  of  all 
those  peoples,  so  long  oppressed  by  Turks,  and  to  es¬ 
tablish  national  governments  and  administrations  which 

1  For  a  good  account  of  Lawrence  and  his  work,  see  series  of  articles 
by  L.  Thomas,  “Lawrence:  The  Soul  of  the  Arabian  Revolution,”  Asia, 
April,  May,  June,  July,  1920. 

2  A  notable  example  is  General  Maude’s  proclamation  to  the  Meso¬ 
potamian  Arabs  in  March,  1917. 


222  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

shall  derive  their  authority  from  the  initiative  and  free 
will  of  the  people  themselves.” 

This  climax  was,  however,  followed  by  a  swift  de¬ 
nouement.  The  war  was  over,  the  enemy  was  beaten, 
the  comedy  was  ended,  the  curtain  was  rung  down, 
and  on  that  curtain  the  Arabs  read — the  inner  truth  of 
things.  French  troops  appeared  to  occupy  the  Syrian 
coast,  the  secret  treaties  came  out,  and  the  Arabs  learned 
how  they  had  been  tricked.  Black  and  bitter  was  their 
wrath.  Probably  they  would  have  exploded  at  once 
had  it  not  been  for  their  cool-headed  chiefs,  especially 
Prince  Feisal,  the  son  of  the  Shereef  of  Mecca,  who 
had  proved  himself  a  real  leader  of  men  during  the  war 
and  who  had  now  attained  a  position  of  unquestioned 
authority.  Feisal  knew  the  Allies’  military  strength 
and  realized  how  hazardous  war  would  be,  especially 
at  that  time.  Feeling  the  moral  strength  of  the  Arab 
position,  he  besought  his  countrymen  to  let  him  plead 
Arabia’s  cause  before  the  impending  peace  conference, 
and  he  had  his  way.  During  the  year  1919  the  Arab 
lands  were  quiet,  though  it  was  the  quiet  of  suspense. 

Prince  Feisal  pleaded  his  case  before  the  peace  con¬ 
ference  with  eloquence  and  dignity.  But  Feisal  failed. 
The  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  might  contain 
the  benevolent  statement  that  “certain  communities 
formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire  have  reached 
a  stage  of  development  where  their  existence  as  inde¬ 
pendent  nations  can  be  provisionally  recognized  subject 
to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and  assistance 
by  a  mandatory  until  such  time  as  they  are  able  to 
stand  alone.”1  The  Arabs  knew  what  “mandatories” 


1  Article  xxii. 


NATIONALISM 


223 


meant.  Lloyd  George  might  utter  felicitous  phrases 
such  as  “Arab  forces  have  redeemed  the  pledges  given 
to  Great  Britain,  and  we  should  redeem  our  pledges.” 1 
The  Arabs  had  read  the  secret  treaties.  “In  vain  is 
the  net  spread  in  the  sight  of  any  bird.”  The  game  no 
longer  worked.  The  Arabs  knew  that  they  must  rely 
on  their  own  efforts,  either  in  diplomacy  or  war. 

Feisal  still  counselled  peace.  He  was  probably  in¬ 
fluenced  to  this  not  merely  by  the  risks  of  armed  resis¬ 
tance  but  also  by  the  fact  that  the  Allies  were  now  quar¬ 
relling  among  themselves.  These  quarrels  of  course 
extended  all  over  the  Near  East,  but  there  was  none 
more  bitter  than  the  quarrel  which  had  broken  out 
between  England  and  France  over  the  division  of  the 
Arab  spoils.  This  dispute  originated  in  French  dissat¬ 
isfaction  with  the  secret  treaties.  No  sooner  had  the 
Sykes-Picot  Agreement  been  published  than  large  and 
influential  sections  of  French  opinion  began  shouting 
that  they  had  been  duped.  For  generations  French 
imperialists  had  had  their  eye  on  Syria,2  and  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  the  imperialist  press  had  been  con¬ 
ducting  an  ardent  propaganda  for  wholesale  annexa¬ 
tions  in  the  Near  East.  “La  Syrie  integrate!”  “All 
Syria!”  was  the  cry.  And  this  “all”  included  not 
merely  the  coast-strip  assigned  France  by  the  Sykes- 

1  From  a  speech  delivered  September  19,  1919. 

2  For  examples  of  this  pre-war  imperialist  propaganda,  see  G.  Poignant, 
“Les  Inter6ts  frangais  en  Syrie,”  Questions  diplomatiques  et  coloniales, 
March  1-16,  1913.  Among  other  interesting  facts,  the  author  cites 
Premier  Poincare’s  declaration  before  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  December 
21,  1912:  “I  need  not  remark  that  in  the  Lebanon  and  Syria  particu¬ 
larly  we  have  traditional  interests  and  that  we  intend  to  make  them  re¬ 
spected.”  See  also  J.  Atalla,  “Les  Trois  Solutions  de  la  Question  sy- 
rienne,”  Questions  diplomatiques  et  coloniales ,  October  16,  1913;  L.  Le  Fur, 
Le  Protectorat  de  la  France  sur  les  Catholiques  d’ Orient  (Paris,  1914). 


224  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Picot  Agreement,  but  also  Palestine  and  the  vast  Aleppo- 
Damascus  hinterland  right  across  to  the  rich  oil-fields 
of  Mosul.  To  this  entire  region,  often  termed  in  French 
expansionist  circles  “La  France  du  Levant,”  the  impe¬ 
rialists  asserted  that  France  had  “imprescriptible  his¬ 
toric  rights  running  back  to  the  Crusades  and  even  to 
Charlemagne.”  Syria  was  a  “second  Alsace,”  which 
held  out  its  arms  to  France  and  would  not  be  denied. 
It  was  also  the  indispensable  fulcrum  of  French  world- 
policy.  These  imperialist  aspirations  had  powerful 
backing  in  French  Government  circles.  For  example, 
early  in  1915,  M.  Leygues  had  said  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies:  “The  axis  of  French  policy  is  in  the  Medi¬ 
terranean.  One  of  its  poles  is  in  the  West,  at  Algiers, 
Tunis,  and  Morocco.  The  other  must  lie  in  the  East, 
with  Syria,  Lebanon,  Palestine.”  1 

After  such  high  hopes,  the  effect  of  the  Sykes-Picot 
Agreement  on  French  imperialists  can  be  imagined. 
Their  anger  turned  naturally  upon  the  English,  who 
were  roundly  denounced  and  blamed  for  everything 
that  was  happening  in  the  East,  Arab  nationalist  aspi¬ 
rations  being  stigmatized  as  nothing  but  British  propa¬ 
ganda.  Cried  one  French  writer:  “Some  psychiatrist 
ought  to  write  a  study  of  these  British  colonial  officials, 
implacable  imperialists,  megalomaniacs,  who,  night  and 
day,  work  for  their  country  without  even  asking  counsel 
from  London,  and  whose  constant  care  is  to  annihilate 

1  Quoted  by  Senator  E.  Flandrin  in  his  article  “Nos  Droits  en  Syrie 
et  en  Palestine,”  Revue  Hebdomadaire,  June  5,  1915.  For  other  examples 
of  French  imperialist  propaganda,  see,  besides  above  article,  C.  G.  Bassim, 
La  Question  du  Liban  (Paris,  1915);  H.  Baudouin,  “La  Syrie:  Champ  de 
Bataille  politique,”  La  Revue  Mondiale ,  February  1-15,  1920;  Comte 
Cressaty,  La  Syrie  frangaise  (Paris,  1916);  F.  Laudet,  “La  France  du 
Levant,”  Revue  Hebdomadaire,  March  1,  1919. 


NATIONALISM 


225 


in  Syria,  as  they  once  annihilated  in  Egypt,  the  su¬ 
premacy  of  France.”  1  In  answer  to  such  fulminations, 
English  writers  scored  French  “greed”  and  “folly” 
which  was  compromising  England’s  prestige  and  threat¬ 
ening  to  set  the  whole  East  on  fire.2  In  fine,  there  was 
a  very  pretty  row  on  between  people  who,  less  than  a 
year  before,  had  been  pledging  their  “sacred  union” 
for  all  eternity.  The  Arabs  were  certainly  much  edi¬ 
fied,  and  the  other  Eastern  peoples  as  well. 

Largely  owing  to  these  bickerings,  Allied  action  in 
the  Near  East  was  delayed  through  1919.  But  by  the 
spring  of  1920  the  Allies  came  to  a  measure  of  agree¬ 
ment.  The  meeting  of  the  Allied  Premiers  at  San 
Remo  elaborated  the  terms  of  the  treaty  to  be  imposed 
on  Turkey,  dividing  Asia  Minor  into  spheres  of  influ¬ 
ence  and  exploitation,  while  the  Arab  provinces  were 
assigned  England  and  France  according  to  the  terms  of 
the  Sykes-Picot  Agreement — properly  camouflaged,  of 
course,  as  “mandates”  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Eng¬ 
land,  France,  and  their  satellite,  Greece,  prepared  for 
action.  British  reinforcements  were  sent  to  Mesopo¬ 
tamia  and  Palestine;  French  reinforcements  were  sent 
to  Syria;  an  Anglo-Franco-Greek  force  prepared  to  oc¬ 
cupy  Constantinople,  and  Premier  Venizelos  promised 
a  Greek  army  for  Asia  Minor  contingencies.  The  one 
rift  in  the  lute  was  Italy.  Italy  saw  big  trouble  brew- 

1  Baudouin,  supra.  For  other  violent  anti-British  comment,  see  Lau- 
det,  supra. 

2  For  sharp  British  criticisms  of  the  French  attitude  in  Syria,  see  Beckles 
Wilson,  “Our  Amazing  Syrian  Adventure,”  National  Review ,  September, 
1920;  W.  Urinowski,  “The  Arab  Cause,”  Balkan  Review ,  September,  1920. 
Both  of  these  writers  were  officers  in  the  British  forces  in  the  Arab  area. 
See  also  strong  articles  by  “Taira”  in  the  Balkan  Review ,  August  and 
October,  1920. 


226  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


mg  and  determined  not  to  be  directly  involved.  Said 
Premier  Nitti  to  an  English  journalist  after  the  San 
Remo  conference:  “You  will  have  war  in  Asia  Minor, 
and  Italy  will  not  send  a  single  soldier  nor  pay  a  single 
lira.  You  have  taken  from  the  Turks  their  sacred  city 
of  Adrianople;  you  have  placed  their  capital  city  under 
foreign  control;  you  have  taken  from  them  every  port 
and  the  larger  part  of  their  territory;  and  the  five  Turk¬ 
ish  delegates  whom  you  will  select  will  sign  a  treaty 
which  will  not  have  the  sanction  of  the  Turkish  people 
or  the  Turkish  Parliament.” 

Premier  Nitti  was  a  true  prophet.  For  months  past 
the  Turkish  nationalists,  knowing  what  was  in  store 
for  them,  had  been  building  up  a  centre  of  resistance 
in  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor.  Of  course  the  former 
nationalist  leaders  such  as  Enver  Pasha  had  long  since 
fled  to  distant  havens  like  Transcaucasia  or  Bolshevik 
Russia,  but  new  leaders  appeared,  notably  a  young 
officer  of  marked  military  talent,  Mustapha  Kemal 
Pasha.  With  great  energy  Mustapha  Kemal  built  up 
a  really  creditable  army,  and  from  his  “capital,”  the 
city  of  Angora  in  the  heart  of  Asia  Minor,  he  now  defied 
the  Allies,  emphasizing  his  defiance  by  attacking  the 
French  garrisons  in  Cilicia  (a  coast  district  in  Asia 
Minor  just  north  of  Syria),  inflicting  heavy  losses. 

The  Arabs  also  were  preparing  for  action.  In  March 
a  “Pan-Syrian  Congress”  met  at  Damascus,  unani¬ 
mously  declared  the  independence  of  Syria,  and  elected 
Feisal  king.  This  announcement  electrified  all  the 
Arab  provinces.  In  the  French-occupied  coastal  zone 
riots  broke  out  against  the  French;  in  Palestine  there 
were  “pogroms”  against  the  Jews,  whom  the  Arabs, 


NATIONALISM 


227 


both  Moslem  and  Christian,  hated  for  their  “Zionist” 
plans;  while  in  Mesopotamia  there  were  sporadic  up¬ 
risings  of  tribesmen. 

Faced  by  this  ominous  situation,  the  “mandatories” 
took  military  counter-measures.  The  French  took  espe¬ 
cially  vigorous  action.  France  now  had  nearly  100,000 
men  in  Syria  and  Cilicia,  headed  by  General  Gouraud,  a 
veteran  of  many  colonial  wars  and  a  believer  in  “strong- 
arm”  methods.  On  July  15  Gouraud  sent  Feisal  an 
ultimatum  requiring  complete  submission.  Feisal,  dip¬ 
lomatic  to  the  last,  actually  accepted  the  ultimatum, 
but  Gouraud  ignored  this  acceptance  on  a  technicality 
and  struck  for  Damascus  with  60,000  men.  Feisal  at¬ 
tempted  no  real  resistance,  fighting  only  a  rear-guard 
action  and  withdrawing  into  the  desert.  On  July  25 
the  French  entered  Damascus,  the  Arab  capital,  deposed 
Feisal,  and  set  up  thoroughgoing  French  rule.  Oppo¬ 
sition  was  punished  with  the  greatest  severity.  Da¬ 
mascus  was  mulcted  of  a  war-contribution  of  10,000,000 
francs,  after  the  German  fashion  in  Belgium,  many 
nationalist  leaders  were  imprisoned  or  shot,  while  Gou¬ 
raud  announced  that  the  death  of  “one  French  subject 
or  one  Christian”  would  be  followed  by  wholesale  “most 
terrible  reprisals”  by  bombing  aeroplanes.1 

Before  this  Napoleonic  “thunder-stroke”  Syria  bent 
for  the  moment,  apparently  terrorized.  In  Mesopo¬ 
tamia,  however,  the  British  were  not  so  fortunate.  For 
some  months  trouble  had  patently  been  brewing,  and 
in  March  the  British  commander  had  expressed  him¬ 
self  as  “much  struck  with  the  volcanic  possibilities  of 
the  country.”  In  July  all  Mesopotamia  flamed  into 

1  For  accounts  of  French  severities,  see  articles  just  quoted. 


228  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


insurrection,  and  though  Britain  had  fully  100,000 
troops  in  the  province,  they  were  hard  put  to  it  to  stem 
the  rebellion. 

Meanwhile,  the  Allies  had  occupied  Constantinople, 
to  force  acceptance  of  the  draft  treaty  of  peace.  Nat¬ 
urally,  there  was  no  resistance,  Constantinople  being 
entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  Allied  fleet.  But  the  si¬ 
lence  of  the  vast  throngs  gathered  to  watch  the  incom¬ 
ing  troops  filled  some  Allied  observers  with  disquietude. 
A  French  journalist  wrote:  “The  silence  of  the  multi¬ 
tude  was  more  impressive  than  boisterous  protests. 
Their  eyes  glowed  with  sullen  hatred.  Scattered  through 
this  throng  of  mute,  prostrated,  hopeless  people  circu¬ 
lated  watchful  and  sinuous  emissaries,  who  were  to 
carry  word  of  this  misfortune  to  the  remotest  confines 
of  Islam.  In  a  few  hours  they  would  be  in  Anatolia. 
A  couple  of  days  later  the  news  would  have  spread  to 
Konia,  Angora,  and  Sivas.  In  a  brief  space  of  time  it 
would  be  heralded  throughout  the  regions  of  Bolshevist 
influence,  extending  to  the  Caucasus  and  beyond.  In 
a  few  weeks  all  these  centres  of  agitation  will  be  prepar¬ 
ing  their  counter-attack.  Asia  and  Africa  will  again 
cement  their  union  of  faith.  Intelligent  agents  will 
record  in  the  retentive  minds  of  people  wTho  do  not 
read,  the  history  of  our  blunders.  These  missionaries 
of  insurrection  and  fanaticism  come  from  every  race 
and  class  of  society.  Educated  and  refined  men  dis¬ 
guise  themselves  as  beggars  and  outcasts,  in  order  to 
spread  the  news  apace  and  to  prepare  for  bitter  ven¬ 
geance.”  1 

Events  in  Turkey  now  proceeded  precisely  as  the 

1  B.  G.  Gaulis  in  L’Opinion,  April  24,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


229 


Italian  Premier  Nitti  had  foretold.  The  Allied  masters 
of  Constantinople  compelled  the  Sultan  to  appoint  a 
“ friendly”  cabinet  which  solemnly  denounced  Mustapha 
Kemal  and  his  “rebels,”  and  sent  a  hand-picked  delega¬ 
tion  to  Sevres,  France,  where  they  dutifully  “signed  on 
the  dotted  line”  the  treaty  that  the  Allies  had  pre¬ 
pared.  The  Allies  had  thus  “imposed  their  will” — on 
paper.  For  every  sensible  man  knew  that  the  whole 
business  was  a  roaring  farce;  knew  that  the  “friendly” 
government,  from  Sultan  to  meanest  clerk,  was  as  na¬ 
tionalist  as  Mustapha  Kemal  himself;  knew  that  the 
real  Turkish  capital  was  not  Constantinople  but  Angora, 
and  that  the  Allies’  power  was  measured  by  the  range 
of  their  guns.  As  for  Mustapha  Kemal,  his  comment 
on  the  Sevres  Treaty  was:  “I  will  fight  to  the  end  of 
the  world.” 

The  Allies  were  thus  in  a  decidedly  embarrassing 
situation,  especially  since  “The  Allies”  now  meant  only 
England’  and  France.  Italy  was  out  of  the  game.  As 
Nitti  had  warned  at  San  Remo,  she  would  “not  send  a 
single  soldier  nor  pay  a  single  lira.”  With  200,000 
soldiers  holding  down  the  Arabs,  and  plenty  of  trouble 
elsewhere,  neither  France  nor  Britain  had  the  troops  to 
crush  Mustapha  Kemal — a  job  which  the  French  staff 
estimated  would  take  300,000  men.  One  weapon,  how¬ 
ever,  they  still  possessed — Greece.  In  return  for  large 
territorial  concessions,  Premier  Venizelos  offered  to  bring 
the  Turks  to  reason.  His  offer  was  accepted,  and  100,- 
000  Greek  troops  landed  at  Smyrna.  But  the  Greek 
campaign  was  not  a  success.  Even  100,000  men  soon 
wore  thin  when  spread  out  over  the  vast  Asia  Minor 
plateau.  Mustapha  Kemal  avoided  decisive  battle, 


230  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

I 

harassing  the  Greeks  by  guerilla  warfare  just  as  he  was 
harassing  the  French  in  Cilicia  at  the  other  end  of  the 
line.  The  Greeks  “dug  in/7  and  a  deadlock  ensued 
which  threatened  to  continue  indefinitely.  This  soon 
caused  a  new  complication.  Venizelos  might  be  willing 
to  “carry  on77  as  the  Allies7  submandatory,  but  the 
Greek  people  were  not.  Kept  virtually  on  a  war-footing 
since  1912,  the  Greeks  kicked  over  the  traces.  In  the 
November  elections  they  repudiated  Venizelos  by  a  vote 
of  990,000  to  10,000,  and  recalled  King  Constantine,  who 
had  been  deposed  by  the  Allies  three  years  before.  This 
meant  that  Greece,  like  Italy,  was  out  of  the  game.  To 
be  sure,  King  Constantine  presently  started  hostilities 
with  the  Turks  on  his  own  account.  This  was,  however, 
something  very  different  from  Greece’s  attitude  under 
the  Venizelist  regime.  The  Allies7  weapon  had  thus 
broken  in  their  hands. 

Meanwhile  Mustapha  Kemal  was  not  merely  consoli¬ 
dating  his  authority  in  Asia  Minor  but  was  gaining 
allies  of  his  own.  In  the  first  place,  he  was  establish¬ 
ing  close  relations  with  the  Arabs.  It  may  appear 
strange  to  find  such  bitter  foes  become  friends;  never¬ 
theless,  Franco-British  policy  had  achieved  even  this 
seeming  miracle.  The  reason  was  clearly  explained  by  no 
less  a  person  than  Lawrence  (“The  Soul  of  the  Arab 
Revolution77)  who  had  returned  to  civil  life  and  was 
thus  free  to  speak  his  mind  on  the  Eastern  situation, 
which  he  did  in  no  imcertain  fashion.  In  one  of  sev¬ 
eral  statements  given  to  the  British  press,  Lawrence 
said:  “The  Arabs  rebelled  against  the  Turks  during  the 
war,  not  because  the  Turkish  Govermnent  was  notably 
bad,  but  because  they  wanted  independence.  They 


NATIONALISM 


231 


did  not  risk  their  lives  in  battle  to  change  masters,  to 
become  British  subjects  or  French  citizens,  but  to  win  a 
State  of  their  own.”  The  matter  was  put  even  more 
pointedly  by  an  Arab  nationalist  leader  in  the  columns 
of  a  French  radical  paper  opposed  to  the  Syrian  adven¬ 
ture.  Said  this  leader:  “Both  the  French  and  the  Eng¬ 
lish  should  know  once  for  all  that  the  Arabs  are  joined 
by  a  common  religion  with  the  Turks,  and  have  been 
politically  identified  with  them  for  centuries,  and  there¬ 
fore  do  not  wish  to  separate  themselves  from  their  fel¬ 
low  believers  and  brothers-in-arms  merely  to  submit  to 
the  domination  of  a  European  nation,  no  matter  what 
form  the  latter’s  suzerainty  may  assume.  ...  It  is  no 
use  for  M.  Millerand  to  say:  ‘We  have  never  thought 
of  trespassing  in  any  respect  upon  the  independence 
of  these  people.’  No  one  is  deceived  by  such  state¬ 
ments  as  that.  The  armistice  was  signed  in  accordance 
with  the  conditions  proclaimed  by  Mr.  Wilson,  but  as 
soon  as  Germany  and  its  allies  were  helpless,  the  prom¬ 
ises  of  the  armistice  were  trodden  under  foot,  as  well 
as  the  Fourteen  Points.  Such  a  violation  of  the  prom¬ 
ises  of  complete  independence,  so  prodigally  made  to 
the  Arabs  on  so  many  occasions,  has  resulted  in  reunit¬ 
ing  closer  than  ever  the  Arabs  and  the  Turks.  It  has 
taken  but  a  few  months  to  restore  that  intimacy.  .  .  . 
It  is  probable  that  France,  by  maintaining  an  army  of 
150,000  men  in  Syria,  and  by  spending  billions  of  francs, 
will  be  able  to  subdue  the  Syrian  Arabs.  But  that  will 
not  finish  the  task.  The  interior  of  that  country  borders 
upon  other  lands  inhabited  by  Arabs,  Kurds,  and  Turks, 
and  by  the  immense  desert.  In  starting  a  conflict  with 
4,000,000  Syrians,  France  will  be  making  enemies  of 


232  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


15,000,000  Arabs  in  the  Levant,  most  of  whom  are 
armed  tribes,  without  including  the  other  Mohammedan 
peoples,  who  are  speedily  acquiring  solidarity  and  or¬ 
ganization  under  the  blows  that  are  being  dealt  them 
by  the  Entente.  If  you  believe  I  am  exaggerating,  all 
you  have  to  do  is  to  investigate  the  facts  yourself.  But 
what  good  will  it  do  to  confirm  the  truth  too  late,  and 
after  floods  of  blood  have  flowed?”  1 

In  fact,  signs  of  Turco-Arab  co-operation  became 
eveiy where  apparent.  To  be  sure,  this  co-operation 
was  not  openly  avowed  either  by  Mustapha  Kemal  or 
by  the  deposed  King  Feisal  who,  fleeing  to  Italy,  con¬ 
tinued  his  diplomatic  manoeuvres.  But  Arabs  fought 
beside  Turks  against  the  French  in  Cilicia;  Turks  and 
Kurds  joined  the  Syrian  Arabs  in  their  continual  local 
risings;  while  KemaFs  hand  was  clearly  apparent  in 
the  rebellion  against  the  British  in  Mesopotamia. 

This  Arab  entente  was  not  the  whole  of  Mustapha 
KemaFs  foreign  policy.  He  was  also  reaching  out 
northeastward  to  the  Tartars  of  Transcaucasia  and  the 
Turkomans  of  Persian  Azerbaidjan.  The  Caucasus  was 
by  this  time  the  scene  of  a  highly  complicated  struggle 
between  Moslem  Tartars  and  Turkomans,  Christian 
Armenians  and  Georgians,  and  various  Russian  fac¬ 
tions,  which  was  fast  reducing  that  unhappy  region  to 
chaos.  Among  the  Tartar-Turkomans,  long  leavened 
by  Pan-Turanian  propaganda,  Mustapha  Kemal  found 
enthusiastic  adherents;  and  his  efforts  were  supported 
by  a  third  ally — Bolshevik  Russia.  Bolshevik  policy, 
which,  as  we  have  already  stated,  was  seeking  to  stir 
up  trouble  against  the  Western  Powers  throughout  the 

1  Le  Populaire,  February  16,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


233 


East,  had  watched  Kemal’s  rise  with  great  satisfaction. 
At  first  the  Bolsheviki  could  do  very  little  for  the  Turk¬ 
ish  nationalists  because  they  were  not  in  direct  touch, 
but  the  collapse  of  Wrangel’s  “White”  army  in  Novem¬ 
ber,  1920,  and  the  consequent  overrunning  of  all  south 
Russia  by  the  Red  armies,  opened  a  direct  line  from 
Moscow  to  Angora  via  the  Caucasus,  and  henceforth 
Mustapha  Kemal  was  supplied  with  money,  arms,  and  a 
few  men. 

Furthermore,  Kemal  and  the  Bolsheviki  were  start¬ 
ing  trouble  in  Persia.  That  country  was  in  a  most  de¬ 
plorable  condition.  During  the  war  Persia,  despite  her 
technical  neutrality,  had  been  a  battle-ground  between 
the  Anglo-Russians  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Turco- 
Germans  on  the  other.  Russia’s  collapse  in  1917  had 
led  to  her  military  withdrawal  from  Persia,  and  Eng¬ 
land,  profiting  by  the  situation,  had  made  herself  su¬ 
preme,  legalizing  her  position  by  the  famous  “  Agree¬ 
ment”  “ negotiated”  with  the  Shah’s  government  in 
August,  1919. 1  This  treaty,  though  signed  and  sealed 
in  due  form,  was  bitterly  resented  by  the  Persian  peo¬ 
ple.  Here  was  obviously  another  ripe  field  for  Bolshe¬ 
vik  propaganda.  Accordingly,  the  Bolshevik  govern¬ 
ment  renounced  all  rights  in  Persia  acquired  by  the 
Czarist  regime  and  proclaimed  themselves  the  friends 
of  the  Persian  people  against  Western  imperialism. 
Naturally,  the  game  worked,  and  Persia  soon  became 
honeycombed  with  militant  unrest.  In  the  early  sum¬ 
mer  of  1920  a  Bolshevist  force  actually  crossed  the 
Caspian  Sea  and  landed  on  the  Persian  shore.  They 

1  For  the  details  of  these  events,  see  my  article  on  Persia  in  The  Cen¬ 
tury,  January,  1920. 


234  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


did  not  penetrate  far  into  the  country.  They  did  not 
need  to,  for  the  country  simply  effervesced  in  a  way 
which  made  the  British  position  increasingly  untenable. 
For  many  months  a  confused  situation  ensued.  In 
fact,  at  this  writing  the  situation  is  still  obscure.  But 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Britain’s  hold  on  Persia  is 
gravely  shaken,  and  she  may  soon  be  compelled  to 
evacuate  the  country,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
the  extreme  south. 

Turning  back  to  the  autumn  of  1920:  the  position  of 
England  and  France  in  the  Near  East  had  become  far 
from  bright.  Deserted  by  Italy  and  Greece,  defied  by 
the  Turks,  harried  by  the  Arabs,  worried  by  the  Egyp¬ 
tians  and  Persians,  and  everywhere  menaced  by  the 
subtle  workings  of  Bolshevism,  the  situation  was  not  a 
happy  one.  The  burden  of  empire  was  proving  heavy. 
In  Mesopotamia  alone  the  bill  was  already  100,000,000 
sterling,  with  no  relief  in  sight. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
in  both  England  and  France  Near  Eastern  policies 
were  subjected  to  a  growing  flood  of  criticism.  In  Eng¬ 
land  especially  the  tide  ran  very  strong.  The  Meso¬ 
potamian  imbroglio  was  denounced  as  both  a  crime  and 
a  blunder.  For  example,  Colonel  Lawrence  stated: 
“We  are  to-day  not  far  from  disaster.  Our  govern¬ 
ment  is  worse  than  the  old  Turkish  system.  They 
kept  14,000  local  conscripts  in  the  ranks  and  killed 
yearly  an  average  of  200  Arabs  in  maintaining  peace. 
We  keep  90,000  men,  with  aeroplanes,  armored  cars, 
gunboats,  and  armored  trains.  We  have  killed  about 
10,000  Arabs  in  the  rising  this  summer.”  1  Influenced 

1  Statement  given  to  the  press  in  August,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


235 


by  such  criticisms  and  by  the  general  trend  of  events, 
the  British  Government  modified  its  attitude,  sending 
out  Sir  Percy  Cox  to  negotiate  with  the  Arabs.  Sir 
Percy  Cox  was  a  man  of  the  Milner  type,  with  a  firm 
grip  on  realities  and  an  intimate  experience  with  Eastern 
affairs.  Authorized  to  discuss  large  concessions,  he  met 
the  nationalist  leaders  frankly  and  made  a  good  impres¬ 
sion  upon  them.  At  this  writing  matters  have  not 
been  definitely  settled,  but  it  looks  as  though  England 
was  planning  to  limit  her  direct  control  to  the  extreme 
south  of  Mesopotamia  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf — 
practically  her  old  sphere  of  influence  before  1914. 

Meanwhile,  in  Syria,  France  has  thus  far  succeeded 
in  maintaining  relative  order  by  strong-arm  methods. 
But  the  situation  is  highly  unstable.  All  classes  of  the 
population  have  been  alienated.  Even  the  Catholic 
Maronites,  traditionally  pro-French,  have  begun  agitat¬ 
ing.  General  Gouraud  promptly  squelched  the  agita¬ 
tion  by  deporting  the  leaders  to  Corsica;  nevertheless, 
the  fact  remains  that  France’s  only  real  friends  in  Syria 
are  dissatisfied.  Up  to  the  present  these  things  have 
not  changed  France’s  attitude.  A  short  time  ago  ex- 
Premier  Leygues  remarked  of  Syria,  “France  will  oc¬ 
cupy  all  of  it,  and  always”;  while  still  more  recently 
General  Gouraud  stated:  “France  must  remain  in  Syria, 
both  for  political  and  economic  reasons.  The  political 
consequences  of  our  abandonment  of  the  country  would 
be  disastrous.  Our  prestige  and  influence  in  the  Levant 
and  the  Mediterranean  would  be  doomed.  The  eco¬ 
nomic  interests  of  France  also  compel  us  to  remain 
there.  When  fully  developed,  Syria  and  Cilicia  will 
have  an  economic  value  fully  equal  to  that  of  Egypt.” 


236  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


However,  despite  the  French  Government’s  firmness, 
there  is  an  increasing  public  criticism  of  the  “  Syrian 
adventure,”  not  merely  from  radical  anti-imperialist 
quarters,  but  from  unimpeachably  conservative  circles 
as  well.  The  editor  of  one  of  the  most  conservative 
French  political  periodicals  has  stated:  “Jealous  of  its 
autonomy,  the  Arab  people,  liberated  from  the  Otto¬ 
man  yoke,  do  not  desire  a  new  foreign  domination. 
To  say  that  Syria  demands  our  protection  is  a  lie.  Syria 
wishes  to  be  entirely  independent.”  1  And  recently 
Senator  Victor  Berard,  one  of  France’s  recognized  au¬ 
thorities  on  Eastern  affairs,  made  a  speech  in  the  French 
Senate  strongly  criticising  the  Government’s  Syrian 
policy  from  the  very  start  and  declaring  that  a  “free 
Syria”  was  “a  question  of  both  interest  and  honor.” 

Certainly,  the  French  Government,  still  so  unyield¬ 
ing  toward  the  Arabs,  has  reversed  its  attitude  toward 
the  Turks.  Sidestepping  the  Sevres  Treaty,  it  has 
lately  agreed  on  provisional  peace  terms  with  the  Turkish 
nationalists,  actually  agreeing  to  evacuate  Cilicia.  In 
fact,  both  France  and  England  know  that  the  Sevres 
Treaty  is  unworkable  and  that  Turkish  possession  of 
virtually  the  whole  of  Asia  Minor  will  have  to  be  rec¬ 
ognized. 

In  negotiating  with  Mustapha  Kemal,  France  un¬ 
doubtedly  hopes  to  get  him  to  throw  over  the  Arabs. 
But  this  is  scarcely  thinkable.  The  whole  trend  of 
events  betokens  an  increasing  solidarity  of  the  Near 
Eastern  peoples  against  Western  political  control.  A 


1  Henri  de  Chambon,  editor  of  La  Revue  Parlementaire.  Quoted  by 
Beckles  Wilson,  “Our  Amazing  Syrian  Adventure,”  National  Review , 
September,  1920. 


NATIONALISM 


237 


most  remarkable  portent  in  this  direction  is  the  Pan- 
Islamic  conference  held  at  Sivas  early  in  1921.  This 
conference,  called  to  draw  up  a  definite  scheme  for  effec¬ 
tive  Moslem  co-operation  the  world  over,  was  attended 
not  merely  by  the  high  orthodox  Moslem  dignitaries 
and  political  leaders,  but  also  by  heterodox  chiefs  like 
the  Shiah  Emir  of  Kerbela,  the  Imam  Yahya,  and  the 
Zaidite  Emir  of  Yemen — leaders  of  heretical  sects  be¬ 
tween  whom  and  the  orthodox  Sunnis  co-operation  had 
previously  been  impossible.  Most  notable  of  all,  the 
press  reports  state  that  the  conference  was  presided 
over  by  no  less  a  personage  than  El  Sennussi.  This 
may  well  be  so,  for  we  have  already  seen  how  the  Sen¬ 
nussi  have  always  worked  for  a  close  union  of  all  Islam 
against  Western  domination. 

Such  is  the  situation  in  the  Near  East — a  situation 
very  grave  and  full  of  trouble.  The  most  hopeful  por¬ 
tent  is  the  apparent  awakening  of  the  British  Govern¬ 
ment  to  the  growing  perils  of  the  hour,  and  its  conse¬ 
quent  modifications  of  attitude.  The  labors  of  men 
like  Lord  Milner  and  Sir  Percy  Cox,  however  hampered 
by  purblind  influences,  can  scarcely  be  wholly  barren 
of  results.  Such  men  are  the  diplomatic  descendants 
of  Chatham  and  of  Durham;  the  upholders  of  that  great 
political  tradition  which  has  steered  the  British  Empire 
safely  through  crises  that  appeared  hopeless. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  darkest  portent  in  the  Near 
East  is  the  continued  intransigeance  of  France.  Steeped 
in  its  old  traditions,  French  policy  apparently  refuses 
to  face  realities.  If  an  explosion  comes,  as  come  it 
must  unless  France  modifies  her  attitude;  if,  some  dark 
day,  thirty  or  forty  French  battalions  are  caught  in  a 


238  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


simoom  of  Arab  fury  blowing  out  of  the  desert  and  are 
annihilated  in  a  new  Adowa;  the  regretful  verdict  of 
many  versed  in  Eastern  affairs  can  only  be:  “French 
policy  has  deserved  it.” 

Leaving  the  Near  Eastern  problem  at  this  critical 
juncture  to  the  inscrutable  solution  of  the  future,  let  us 
now  turn  to  the  great  political  problem  of  the  Middle 
East — the  nationalist  movement  in  India. 


CHAPTER  VI 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 

India  is  a  land  of  paradox.  Possessing  a  fundamental 
geographical  unity,  India  has  never  known  real  political 
union  save  that  recently  imposed  externally  by  the 
British  “Raj.”  Full  of  warlike  stocks,  India  has  never 
been  able  to  repel  invaders.  Occupied  by  many  races, 
these  races  have  never  really  fused,  but  have  remained 
distinct  and  mutually  hostile,  sundered  by  barriers  of 
blood,  speech,  culture,  and  creed.  Thus  India,  large 
and  populous  as  Europe  or  China,  has  neither,  like 
China,  evolved  a  generalized  national  unity;  nor,  like 
Europe,  has  developed  a  specialized  national  diversity; 
but  has  remained  an  amorphous,  unstable  indetermi¬ 
nate,  with  tendencies  in  both  directions  which  were 
never  carried  to  their  logical  conclusion. 

India’s  history  has  been  influenced  mainly  by  three 
great  invasions:  the  Aryan  invasion,  commencing  about 
1500  B.  C.;  the  Mohammedan  invasion,  extending 
roughly  from  1000  to  1700  A.  D.,  and  the  English  inva¬ 
sion,  beginning  about  1750  A.  D.  and  culminating  a 
century  later  in  a  complete  conquest  which  has  lasted 
to  the  present  day. 

The  Aryans  were  a  fair-skinned  people,  unquestion¬ 
ably  of  the  same  general  stock  as  ourselves.  Press¬ 
ing  down  from  Central  Asia  through  those  northwestern 

passes  where  alone  land-access  is  possible  to  India,  else- 

239 


240  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


where  impregnably  guarded  by  the  mountain  wall  of 
the  Himalayas;  the  Aiyans  subdued  the  dark-skinned 
Dravidian  aborigines  and  settled  down  as  masters. 
This  conquest  was,  however,  superficial  and  partial. 
The  bulk  of  the  Aryans  remained  in  the  northwest, 
the  more  adventurous  spirits  scattering  thinly  over  the 
rest  of  the  vast  peninsula.  Even  in  the  north  large 
areas  of  hill-country  and  jungle  remained  in  the  exclu¬ 
sive  possession  of  the  aborigines,  while  very  few  Aryans 
ever  penetrated  the  south.  Over  most  of  India,  there¬ 
fore,  the  Aryans  were  merely  a  small  ruling  class  super¬ 
imposed  upon  a  much  more  numerous  subject  popula¬ 
tion.  Fearing  to  be  swallowed  up  in  the  Dravidian 
ocean,  the  Aryans  attempted  to  preserve  their  politi¬ 
cal  ascendancy  and  racial  purity  by  the  institution  of 
“caste,”  which  has  ever  since  remained  the  basis  of 
Indian  social  fife.  Caste  was  originally  a  “color  line.” 
But  it  was  enforced  not  so  much  by  civil  law  as  by  re¬ 
ligion.  Society  was  divided  into  three  castes:  Brah¬ 
mins,  or  priests;  Kshatriyas,  or  warriors;  and  Sudras, 
or  workers.  The  Aryans  monopolized  the  two  upper 
castes,  the  Sudras  being  the  Dravidian  subject  popula¬ 
tion.  These  castes  were  kept  apart  by  a  rigorous  series 
of  religious  taboos.  Intermarriage,  partaking  of  food 
and  drink,  even  physical  propinquity,  entailed  cere¬ 
monial  defilement  sometimes  inexpiable.  Disobedience 
to  these  taboos  was  punished  with  the  terrible  penalty 
of  “out casting,”  whereby  the  offender  did  not  merely 
fall  to  a  lower  rank  in  the  caste  hierarchy  but  sank  even 
below  the  Sudra  and  became  a  “Pariah,”  or  man  of  no¬ 
caste,  condemned  to  the  most  menial  and  revolting  oc¬ 
cupations,  and  with  no  rights  which  even  the  Sudra  was 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


241 


bound  to  respect.  Thus  Indian  society  was  governed, 
not  by  civil,  but  by  ceremonially  religious  law;  while, 
conversely,  the  nascent  Indian  religion  (“  Brahminism  ”) 
became  not  ethical  but  social  in  character. 

These  things  produced  the  most  momentous  conse¬ 
quences.  As  a  “color  line/7  caste  worked  very  imper¬ 
fectly.  Despite  its  prohibitions,  even  the  Brahmins 
became  more  or  less  impregnated  with  Dravidian  blood.1 
But  as  a  social  system  caste  continued  to  function  in 
ways  peculiar  to  itself.  The  three  original  castes  gradu¬ 
ally  subdivided  into  hundreds  and  even  thousands  of 
sub-castes.  These  sub-castes  had  little  or  nothing  of 
the  original  racial  significance.  But  they  were  all  just 
as  exclusive  as  the  primal  trio,  and  the  outcome  was  a 
shattering  of  Indian  society  into  a  chaos  of  rigid  social 
atoms,  between  which  co-operation  or  even  understand¬ 
ing  was  impossible.  The  results  upon  Indian  history  are 
obvious.  Says  a  British  authority:  “The  effect  of  this 
permanent  maintenance  of  human  types  is  that  the  popu¬ 
lation  is  heterogeneous  to  the  last  degree.  It  is  no  ques¬ 
tion  of  rich  and  poor,  of  town  and  country,  of  employer 
and  employed :  the  differences  lie  far  deeper.  The  popu¬ 
lation  of  a  district  or  a  town  is  a  collection  of  different 
nationalities — almost  different  species — of  mankind  that 
will  not  eat  or  drink  or  intermarry  with  one  another,  and 
that  are  governed  in  the  more  important  affairs  of  life  by 
committees  of  their  own.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say 

1  According  to  some  historians,  this  race-mixture  occurred  almost  at 
once.  The  theory  is  that  the  Aryan  conquerors,  who  outside  the  north¬ 
western  region  had  very  few  of  their  own  women  with  them,  took  Dra¬ 
vidian  women  as  wives  or  concubines,  and  legitimatized  their  half-breed 
children,  the  offspring  of  the  conquerors,  both  pure-bloods  and  mixed- 
bloods,  coalescing  into  a  closed  caste.  Further  infiltration  of  Dravidian 
blood  was  thus  prevented,  but  Aryan  race-purity  had  been  destroyed. 


242  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


that  by  the  caste  system  the  inhabitants  of  India  are 
differentiated  into  over  two  thousand  species,  which,  in 
the  intimate  physical  relations  of  life,  have  as  little  in 
common  as  the  inmates  of  a  zoological  garden/’  1 
Obviously,  a  land  socially  atomized  and  politically 
split  into  many  principalities  was  destined  to  fall  before 
the  first  strong  invader.  This  invader  was  Islam.  The 
Mohammedans  attacked  India  soon  after  their  con¬ 
quest  of  Persia,  but  these  early  attacks  were  mere  bor¬ 
der  raids  without  lasting  significance.  The  first  real 
Mohammedan  invasion  was  that  of  Mahmud  of  Ghazni, 
an  Afghan  prince,  in  the  year  1001  A.  D.  Following 
the  road  taken  by  the  Aryans  ages  before,  Mahmud 
conquered  northwestern  India,  the  region  known  as 
the  Punjab.  Islam  had  thus  obtained  a  firm  foothold 
in  India,  and  subsequent  Moslem  leaders  spread  grad¬ 
ually  eastward  until  most  of  northern  India  was  under 
Moslem  rule.  The  invaders  had  two  notable  advan¬ 
tages:  they  were  fanatically  united  against  the  despised 
“Idolaters,”  and  they  drew  many  converts  from  the 
native  population.  The  very  antithesis  of  Brahmanism, 
Islam,  with  its  doctrine  that  all  Believers  are  brothers, 
could  not  fail  to  attract  multitudes  of  low-castes  and 
out-castes,  who  by  conversion  might  rise  to  the  status 
of  the  conquerors.  This  is  the  main  reason  why  the 
Mohammedans  in  India  to-day  number  more  than 


1  Sir  Bampfylde  Fuller,  Studies  of  Indian  Life  and  Sentiment ,  p.  40 
(London,  1910).  For  other  discussions  of  caste  and  its  effects,  see  W. 
Archer,  India  and  the  Future  (London,  1918);  Sir  V.  Chirol,  Indian  Un¬ 
rest  (London,  1910);  Rev.  J.  Morrison,  New  Ideas  in  India:  A  Study  of 
Social,  Political,  and  Religious  Developments  (Edinburgh,  1906);  Sir  H. 
Risley,  The  People  of  India  (London,  1908);  also  writings  of  the  “Namasu- 
dra”  leader,  Dr.  Nair,  previously  quoted,  and  S.  Nihal  Singh,  “India’s 
Untouchables,”  Contemporary  Review ,  March,  1913. 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


243 


70,000,000  —  over  one-fifth  of  the  total  population. 
These  Indian  Moslems  are  descended,  not  merely  from 
Afghan,  Turkish,  Arab,  and  Persian  invaders,  but  even 
more  from  the  millions  of  Hindu  converts  who  embraced 
Islam. 

For  many  generations  the  Moslem  hold  on  India  was 
confined  to  the  north.  Then,  early  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  the  great  Turko-Mongol  leader  Baber  entered 
India  and  founded  the  “ Mogul’ ’  Empire.  Baber  and 
his  successors  overran  even  the  south  and  united  India 
politically  as  it  had  never  been  united  before.  But 
even  this  conquest  was  superficial.  The  Brahmins, 
threatened  with  destruction,  preached  a  Hindu  revival; 
the  Mogul  dynasty  petered  out;  and  at  the  beginning 
of  the  eighteenth  century  the  Mogul  Empire  collapsed, 
leaving  India  a  welter  of  warring  principalities,  Mo¬ 
hammedan  and  Hindu,  fighting  each  other  for  religion, 
for  politics,  or  for  sheer  lust  of  plunder. 

Out  of  this  anarchy  the  British  rose  to  power.  The 
British  were  at  first  merely  one  of  several  other  Euro¬ 
pean  elements — Portuguese,  Dutch,  and  French — who 
established  small  settlements  along  the  Indian  coasts. 
The  Europeans  never  dreamed  of  conquering  India 
while  the  Mogul  power  endured.  In  fact,  the  British 
connection  with  India  began  as  a  purely  trading  ven¬ 
ture — the  East  India  Company.  But  when  India  col¬ 
lapsed  into  anarchy  the  Europeans  were  first  obliged  to 
acquire  local  authority  to  protect  their  “factories,” 
and  later  were  lured  into  more  ambitious  schemes  by 
the  impotence  of  petty  rulers.  Gradually  the  British 
ousted  their  European  rivals  and  established  a  solid 
political  foothold  in  India.  The  one  stable  element 


244  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


in  a  seething  chaos,  the  British  inevitably  extended 
their  authority.  At  first  they  did  so  reluctantly.  The 
East  India  Company  long  remained  primarily  a  trad¬ 
ing  venture,  aiming  at  dividends  rather  than  dominion. 
However,  it  later  evolved  into  a  real  government  with 
an  ambitious  policy  of  annexation.  This  in  turn  awak¬ 
ened  the  fears  of  many  Indians  and  brought  on  the 
“  Mutiny  ”  of  1857.  The  mutiny  was  quelled,  the  East 
India  Company  abolished,  and  India  came  directly 
under  the  British  Crown,  Queen  Victoria  being  later 
proclaimed  Empress  of  India.  These  events  in  turn 
resulted  not  only  in  a  strengthening  of  British  political 
authority  but  also  in  an  increased  penetration  of  West¬ 
ern  influences  of  every  description.  Roads,  railways, 
and  canals  opened  up  and  unified  India  as  never  before; 
the  piercing  of  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  facilitated  communi¬ 
cation  with  Europe;  while  education  on  European  lines 
spread  Western  ideas. 

Over  this  rapidly  changing  India  stood  the  British 
“Raj” — a  system  of  government  unique  in  the  world’s 
history.  It  was  the  government  of  a  few  hundred 
highly  skilled  administrative  experts  backed  by  a  small 
professional  army,  ruling  a  vast  agglomeration  of  sub¬ 
ject  peoples.  It  was  frankly  an  absolute  paternalism, 
governing  as  it  saw  fit,  with  no  more  responsibility  to 
the  governed  than  the  native  despots  whom  it  had  dis¬ 
placed.  But  it  governed  well.  In  efficiency,  honesty, 
and  sense  of  duty,  the  government  of  India  is  probably 
the  best  example  of  benevolent  absolutism  that  the 
world  has  ever  seen.  It  gave  India  profound  peace. 
It  played  no  favorites,  holding  the  scales  even  between 
rival  races,  creeds,  and  castes.  Lastly,  it  made  India 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


245 


a  real  political  entity — something  which  India  had  never 
been  before.  For  the  first  time  in  its  history,  India 
was  firmly  united  under  one  rule — the  rule  of  the  Pax 
Britannica. 

Yet  the  very  virtues  of  British  rule  sowed  the  seeds  of 
future  trouble.  Generations  grew  up,  peacefully  united 
in  unprecedented  acquaintanceship,  forgetful  of  past 
ills,  seeing  only  European  shortcomings,  and,  above  all, 
familiar  with  Western  ideas  of  self-government,  liberty, 
and  nationality.  In  India,  as  elsewhere  in  the  East, 
there  was  bound  to  arise  a  growing  movement  of  dis¬ 
content  against  Western  rule — a  discontent  varying 
from  moderate  demands  for  increasing  autonomy  to 
radical  demands  for  immediate  independence. 

Down  to  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
organized  political  agitation  against  the  British  “  Raj  ” 
was  virtually  unknown.  Here  and  there  isolated  in¬ 
dividuals  uttered  half-audible  protests,  but  these  voices 
found  no  popular  echo.  The  Indian  masses,  preoccu¬ 
pied  with  the  ever-present  problem  of  getting  a  living, 
accepted  passively  a  government  no  more  absolute, 
and  infinitely  more  efficient,  than  its  predecessors.  Of 
anything  like  self-conscious  Indian  “Nationalism”  there 
was  virtually  no  trace. 

The  first  symptom  of  organized  discontent  was  the 
formation  of  the  “Indian  National  Congress”  in  the 
year  1885.  The  very  name  showed  that  the  British 
Raj,  covering  all  India,  was  itself  evoking  among  India’s 
diverse  elements  a  certain  common  point  of  view  and 
aspiration.  However,  the  early  congresses  were  very 
far  from  representing  Indian  public  opinion,  in  the 
general  sense  of  the  term.  On  the  contraiy,  these  con- 


246  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


gresses  represented  merely  a  small  class  of  professional 
men,  journalists;  and  politicians;  all  of  them  trained 
in  Western  ideas.  The  European  methods  of  educa¬ 
tion  which  the  British  had  introduced  had  turned  out 
an  Indian  intelligentsia ,  conversant  with  the  English 
language  and  saturated  with  Westernism. 

This  new  intelligentsia ,  convinced  as  it  was  of  the 
value  of  Western  ideals  and  achievements;  could  not 
fail  to  be  dissatisfied  with  many  aspects  of  Indian  life. 
In  fact;  its  first  efforts  were  directed;  not  so  much  to 
politics;  as  to  social  and  economic  reforms  like  the  sup¬ 
pression  of  child-marriage;  the  remarriage  of  widows, 
and  wider  education.  But,  as  time  passed,  matters  of 
political  reform  came  steadily  to  the  fore.  Saturated 
with  English  history  and  political  philosophy  as  they 
were,  the  Indian  intellectuals  felt  more  and  more  keenly 
their  total  lack  of  self-government,  and  aspired  to  en¬ 
dow  India  with  those  blessings  of  liberty  so  highly  prized 
by  their  English  rulers.  Soon  a  vigorous  native  press 
developed,  preaching  the  new  gospel,  welding  the  in¬ 
tellectuals  into  a  self-conscious  unity,  and  moulding  a 
genuine  public  opinion.  By  the  close  of  the  nineteenth 
century  the  Indian  intelligentsia  was  frankly  agitating 
for  sweeping  political  innovations  like  representative 
councils,  increasing  control  over  taxation  and  the  execu¬ 
tive,  and  the  opening  of  the  public  services  to  Indians 
all  the  way  up  the  scale. 

Down  to  the  closing  years  of  the  nineteenth  century 
Indian  discontent  was,  as  already  said,  confined  to  a 
small  class  of  more  or  less  Europeanized  intellectuals 
who,  despite  their  assumption  of  the  title,  could  hardly 
be  termed  “Nationalists”  in  the  ordinaiy  sense  of  the 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


247 


word.  With  a  few  exceptions,  their  goal  was  neither 
independence  nor  the  elimination  of  effective  British 
oversight,  but  rather  the  reforming  of  Indian  life  along 
Western  lines,  including  a  growing  degree  of  self-gov¬ 
ernment  under  British  paramount  authority. 

But  by  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  there 
came  a  change  in  the  situation.  India,  like  the  rest  of 
the  Orient,  was  stirring  to  a  new  spirit  of  political  and 
racial  self-consciousness.  True  nationalist  symptoms  be¬ 
gan  to  appear.  Indian  scholars  delved  into  their  musty 
chronicles  and  sacred  texts,  and  proclaimed  the  glories 
of  India's  historic  past.  Reformed  Hindu  sects  like 
the  Arya  Somaj  lent  religious  sanctions.  The  little 
band  of  Europeanized  intellectuals  was  joined  by  other 
elements,  thinking,  not  in  terms  of  piecemeal  reforms 
on  Western  models,  but  of  a  new  India,  rejuvenated 
from  its  own  vital  forces,  and  free  to  work  out  its  own 
destiny  in  its  own  way.  From  the  nationalist  ranks 
now  arose  the  challenging  slogan:  “Bandemataram !” 

(“Hail,  Motherland!")1 

The  outstanding  feature  about  this  early  Indian  na¬ 
tionalism  was  that  it  was  a  distinctively  Hindu  move¬ 
ment.  The  Mohammedans  regarded  it  with  suspicion 
or  hostility.  And  for  this  they  had  good  reasons.  The 


1  For  the  nationalist  movement,  see  Archer,  Chirol,  and  Morrison, 
supra.  Also  Sir  H.  J.  S.  Cotton,  India  in  Transition  (London,  1904); 
J.  N.  Farquhar,  Modern  Religious  Movements  in  India  (New  York,  1915); 
Sir  W.  W.  Hunter,  The  India  of  the  Queen  and  Other  Essays  (London, 
1903);  W.  S.  Lilly,  India  and  Its  Problems  (London,  1902);  Sir  V.  Lovett, 
A  History  of  the  Indian  Nationalist  Movement  (London,  1920);  J.  Ramsay 
Macdonald,  The  Government  of  India  (London,  1920);  Sir  T.  Morison, 
Imperial  Rule  in  India  (London,  1899) ;  J.  D.  Rees,  The  Real  India  (Lon¬ 
don,  1908) ;  Sir  J.  Strachey,  India :  Its  Administration  and  Progress  (Fourth 
Edition — London,  1911);  K.  Vyasa  Rao,  The  Future  Government  of  India 
(London,  1918). 


248  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ideal  of  the  new  nationalists  was  Aryan  India,  the  India 
of  the  “ Golden  Age.’ 7  “Back  to  the  Vedas!”  was  a 
nationalist  watchword,  and  this  implied  a  veneration 
for  the  past,  including  a  revival  of  aggressive  Brahmin- 
ism.  An  extraordinary  change  came  over  the  intelli¬ 
gentsia.  Men  who,  a  few  years  before,  had  proclaimed 
the  superiority  of  Western  ideas  and  had  openly  flouted 
“superstitions”  like  idol-worship,  now  denounced  every¬ 
thing  Western  and  reverently  sacrificed  to  the  Hindu 
gods.  The  “sacred  soil”  of  India  must  be  purged  of  the 
foreigner.1  But  the  “foreigner,”  as  these  nationalists 
conceived  him,  was  not  merely  the  Englishman;  he  was 
the  Mohammedan  as  well.  This  was  stirring  up  the 
past  with  a  vengeance.  For  centuries  the  great  Hindu- 
Mohammedan  division  had  run  like  a  chasm  athwart 
India.  It  had  never  been  closed,  but  it  had  been  some¬ 
what  veiled  by  the  neutral  overlordship  of  the  British 
Raj.  Now  the  veil  was  torn  aside,  and  the  Moham¬ 
medans  saw  themselves  menaced  by  a  recrudescence  of 
militant  Hinduism  like  that  which  had  shattered  the 
Mogul  Empire  after  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Aurangzeb 
two  hundred  years  before.  The  Mohammedans  were  not 
merely  alarmed;  they  were  infuriated  as  well.  Remem¬ 
bering  the  glories  of  the  Mogul  Empire  just  as  the  Hin¬ 
dus  did  the  glories  of  Aryan  India,  they  considered  them¬ 
selves  the  rightful  lords  of  the  land,  and  had  no  mind 
to  fall  under  the  sway  of  despised  “Idolaters.”  The 

*1  have  already  discussed  this  “Golden  Age”  tendency  in  Chapter  III. 
For  more  or  less  Extremist  Indian  view-points,  see  A.  Coomaraswamy, 
The  Dance  of  Siva  (New  York,  1918);  H.  Maitra,  Hinduism:  The  World- 
Ideal  (London,  1916);  Bipin  Chandra  Pal,  “The  Forces  Behind  the  Un¬ 
rest  in  India,”  Contemporary  Review ,  February,  1910;  also  various  writ¬ 
ings  of  Lajpat  Rai,  especially  The  Arya  Samaj  (London,  1915)  and  Young 
India  (New  York,  1916). 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


249 


Mohammedans  had  no  love  for  the  British,  but  they 
hated  the  Hindus,  and  they  saw  in  the  British  Raj  a 
bulwark  against  the  potential  menace  of  hereditary 
enemies  who  outnumbered  them  nearly  five  to  one. 
Thus  the  Mohammedans  denounced  Hindu  nationalism 
and  proclaimed  their  loyalty  to  the  Raj.  To  be  sure,  the 
Indian  Moslems  were  also  affected  by  the  general  spirit 
of  unrest  which  was  sweeping  over  the  East.  They  too 
felt  a  quickened  sense  of  self-consciousness.  But,  being 
a  minority  in  India,  their  feelings  took  the  form,  not  of 
territorial  “ patriotism,”  but  of  those  more  diffused  senti¬ 
ments,  Pan-Islamism  and  Pan-Islamic  nationalism,  which 
we  have  already  discussed.1 

Early  Indian  nationalism  was  not  merely  Hindu  in 
character;  it  was  distinctly  “Brahminical”  as  well. 
More  and  more  the  Brahmins  became  the  driving  power 
of  the  movement,  seeking  to  perpetuate  their  supremacy 
in  the  India  of  the  morrow  as  they  had  enjoyed  it  in 
the  India  of  the  past.  But  this  aroused  apprehension 
in  certain  sections  of  Hindu  society.  Many  low-castes 
and  Pariahs  began  to  fear  that  an  independent  or  even 
autonomous  India  might  be  ruled  by  a  tyrannical  Brah¬ 
min  oligarchy  which  would  deny  them  the  benefits  they 
now  enjoyed  under  British  rule.2  Also,  many  of  the 
Hindu  princes  disliked  the  thought  of  a  theocratic  re- 


1  For  Indian  Mohammedan  points  of  view,  mostly  anti-Hindu,  see 
H.  H.  The  Aga  Khan,  India  in  Transition  (London,  1918);  S.  Khuda 
Bukhsh,  Essays:  Indian  and  Islamic  (London,  1912);  Sir  Syed  Ahmed, 
The  Present  State  of  Indian  Politics  (Allahabad,  1888);  Syed  Sirdar  Ali 
Khan,  The  Unrest  in  India  (Bombay,  1907);  also  his  India  of  Today 
(Bombay,  1908). 

2  This  attitude  of  the  “Depressed  Classes,”  especially  as  revealed  in 
the  “Namasudra  Association,”  has  already  been  discussed  in  Chapter 
III,  and  will  be  further  touched  upon  later  in  this  present  chapter. 


250  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


gime  which  might  reduce  them  to  shadows.1  Thus  the 
nationalist  movement  stood  out  as  an  alliance  between 
the  Brahmins  and  the  Western-educated  intelligentsia, 
who  had  pooled  their  ambitions  in  a  programme  for 
jointly  ruling  India. 

Quickened  by  this  ambition  and  fired  by  religious 
zeal,  the  nationalist  movement  rapidly  acquired  a  fanat¬ 
ical  temper  characterized  by  a  mystical  abhorrence  of 
everything  Western  and  a  ferocious  hatred  of  all  Euro¬ 
peans.  The  Russo-Japanese  War  greatly  inflamed  this 
spirit,  and  the  very  next  year  (1905)  an  act  of  the  In¬ 
dian  Government  precipitated  the  gathering  storm. 
This  act  was  the  famous  Partition  of  Bengal.  The  par¬ 
tition  was  a  mere  administrative  measure,  with  no  po¬ 
litical  intent.  But  the  nationalists  made  it  a  “  vital 
issue,”  and  about  this  grievance  they  started  an  intense 
propaganda  that  soon  filled  India  with  seditious  unrest. 
The  leading  spirit  in  this  agitation  was  Bal  Gangadhar 
Tilak,  who  has  been  called  “the  father  of  Indian  un¬ 
rest.”  Tilak  typified  the  nationalist  movement.  A 
Brahmin  with  an  excellent  Western  education,  he  was 
the  sworn  foe  of  English  rule  and  Western  civilization. 
An  able  propagandist,  his  speeches  roused  his  hearers 
to  frenzy,  while  his  newspaper,  the  Yugantar,  of  Cal¬ 
cutta,  preached  a  campaign  of  hate,  assassination,  and 
rebellion.  Tilak’s  incitements  soon  produced  tangible 
results,  numerous  riots,  “dacoities,”  and  murders  of 
Englishmen  taking  place.  And  of  course  the  Yugantar 

1  Regarding  the  Indian  native  princes,  see  Archer  and  Chirol,  supra. 
Also  J.  Pollen,  “Native  States  and  Indian  Home  Rule,”  Asiatic  Review , 
January  1,  1917;  The  Maharajah  of  Bobbili,  Advice  to  the  Indian  Aris¬ 
tocracy  (Madras,  1905) ;  articles  by  Sir  D.  Barr  and  Sir  F.  Younghusband 
in  The  Empire  and  the  Century  (London,  1905). 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


251 


was  merely  one  of  a  large  number  of  nationalist  organs, 
some  printed  in  the  vernacular  and  others  in  English, 
which  vied  with  one  another  in  seditious  invective. 

The  violence  of  the  nationalist  press  may  be  judged 
by  a  few  quotations.  “Revolution,”  asserted  the  Yu- 
gantar,  “is  the  only  way  in  which  a  slavish  society  can 
save  itself.  If  you  cannot  prove  yourself  a  man  in  life, 
play  the  man  in  death.  Foreigners  have  come  and  de¬ 
cided  how  you  are  to  live.  But  how  you  are  to  die  de¬ 
pends  entirely  upon  yourself.’ 7  “Let  preparations  be 
made  for  a  general  revolution  in  every  household !  The 
handful  of  police  and  soldiers  will  never  be  able  to  with¬ 
stand  this  ocean  of  revolutionists.  Revolutionists  may 
be  made  prisoners  and  may  die,  but  thousands  of  others 
will  spring  into  their  places.  Do  not  be  afraid!  With 
the  blood  of  heroes  the  soil  of  Hindustan  is  ever  fertile. 
Do  not  be  downhearted.  There  is  no  dearth  of  heroes. 
There  is  no  dearth  of  money;  glory  awaits  you!  A  sin¬ 
gle  frown  (a  few  bombs)  from  your  eyes  has  struck 
terror  into  the  heart  of  the  foe!  The  uproar  of  panic 
has  filled  the  sky.  Swim  with  renewed  energy  in  the 
ocean  of  bloodshed!”  The  assassination  note  was  ve¬ 
hemently  stressed.  Said  S.  Krishnavarma  in  The  In¬ 
dian  Sociologist:  “Political  assassination  is  not  murder, 
and  the  rightful  employment  of  physical  force  connotes 
‘force  used  defensively  against  force  used  aggressively.’” 
“The  only  subscription  required,”  stated  the  Yugantary 
“is  that  every  reader  shall  bring  the  head  of  a  Euro¬ 
pean.”  Not  even  women  and  children  were  spared. 
Commenting  on  the  murder  of  an  English  lady  and  her 
daughter,  the  Yugantar  exclaimed  exultantly:  “Many 
a  female  demon  must  be  killed  in  course  of  time,  in 


252  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


order  to  extirpate  the  race  of  Asuras  from  the  breast 
of  the  earth.”  The  fanaticism  of  the  men  (usually 
very  young  men)  who  committed  these  assassinations 
may  be  judged  by  the  statement  of  the  murderer  of  a 
high  English  official,  Sir  Curzon-Wyllie,  made  shortly 
before  his  execution:  “I  believe  that  a  nation  held  down 
by  foreign  bayonets  is  in  a  perpetual  state  of  war.  Since 
open  battle  is  rendered  impossible  to  a  disarmed  race, 
I  attacked  by  surprise;  since  guns  were  denied  to  me,  I 
drew  my  pistol  and  fired.  As  a  Hindu  I  feel  that  wrong 
to  my  country  is  an  insult  to  the  gods.  Her  cause  is 
the  cause  of  Shri  Ram;  her  service  is  the  service  of  Shri 
Krishna.  Poor  in  wealth  and  intellect,  a  son  like  my¬ 
self  has  nothing  else  to  offer  the  Mother  but  his  own 
blood,  and  so  I  have  sacrificed  the  same  on  Her  altar. 
The  only  lesson  required  in  India  at  present  is  to  learn 
how  to  die,  and  the  only  way  to  teach  it  is  to  die  our¬ 
selves;  therefore  I  die  and  glory  in  my  martyrdom. 
This  war  will  continue  between  England  and  India  so 
long  as  the  Hindee  and  English  races  last,  if  the  present 
unnatural  relation  does  not  cease.”  1 

The  government’s  answer  to  this  campaign  of  sedi¬ 
tion  and  assassination  was  of  course  stern  repression. 
The  native  press  was  muzzled,  the  agitators  imprisoned  or 
executed,  and  the  hands  of  the  authorities  were  strength¬ 
ened  by  punitive  legislation.  In  fact,  so  infuriated  was 
the  European  community  by  the  murders  and  outrages 
committed  by  the  nationalists  that  many  Englishmen 

1 A  good  symposium  of  extremist  comment  is  contained  in  Chirol, 
supra.  Also  see  J.  D.  Rees,  The  Real  India  (London,  1908);  series  of 
extremist  articles  in  The  Open  Court ,  March,  1917.  A  good  sample  of 
extremist  literature  is  the  fairly  well-known  pamphlet  India's  “ Loyalty ” 
to  England  (1915). 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


253 


urged  the  withdrawal  of  such  political  privileges  as  did 
exist,  the  limiting  of  Western  education,  and  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  extreme  autocratic  rule.  These  angry 
counsels  were  at  once  caught  up  by  the  nationalists, 
resulted  in  fresh  outrages,  and  were  answered  by  more 
punishment  and  fresh  menaces.  Thus  the  extremists  on 
both  sides  lashed  each  other  to  hotter  fury  and  worsened 
the  situation.  For  several  years  India  seethed  with  an 
unrest  which  jailings,  hangings,  and  deportations  did 
little  to  allay. 

Presently,  however,  things  took  at  least  a  temporary 
turn  for  the  better.  The  extremists  were,  after  all,  a 
small  minority,  and  cool  heads,  both  British  and  Indian, 
were  seeking  a  way  out  of  the  impasse.  Conservative 
Indian  leaders  like  Mr.  Gokhale  condemned  terrorism 
and  besought  their  countrymen  to  seek  the  realization 
of  their  aspirations  by  peaceful  means.  On  the  other 
hand,  liberal-minded  Englishmen,  while  refusing  to  be 
stampeded,  sought  a  programme  of  conciliation.  Indian 
affairs  were  then  in  the  hands  of  the  eminent  Liberal 
statesman  John  Morley,  and  the  fruit  of  his  labors  was 
the  Indian  Councils  Act  of  1909.  The  act  was  a  dis¬ 
tinct  departure  from  the  hitherto  almost  unlimited 
absolutism  of  British  rule  in  India.  It  gave  the  Indian 
opposition  greatly  increased  opportunities  for  advice, 
criticism,  and  debate,  and  it  initiated  a  restricted  scheme 
of  elections  to  the  legislative  bodies  which  it  established. 
The  salutary  effect  of  these  concessions  was  soon  ap¬ 
parent.  The  moderate  nationalist  elements,  while  not 
wholly  satisfied,  accepted  the  act  as  an  earnest  of  sub¬ 
sequent  concessions  and  as  a  proof  of  British  good-will. 
The  terrorism  and  seditious  plottings  of  the  extremists, 


254  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


while  not  stamped  out,  were  held  in  check  and  driven 
underground.  King  George’s  visit  to  India  in  1911 
evoked, a  wave  of  loyal  enthusiasm  which  swept  the 
peninsula  and  augured  well  for  the  future. 

The  year  1911  was  the  high-water  mark  of  this  era 
of  appeasement  following  the  storms  of  1905-9.  The 
years  after  1911  witnessed  a  gradual  recrudescence  of 
discontent  as  the  first  effect  of  the  Councils  Act  wore 
off  and  the  sense  of  unfulfilled  aspiration  sharpened  the 
appetite  for  more.  In  fact,  during  these  years,  Indian 
nationalism  was  steadily  broadening  its  base.  In  one 
sense  this  made  for  stability,  for  the  nationalist  move¬ 
ment  ceased  to  be  a  small  minority  of  extremists  and 
came  more  under  the  influence  of  moderate  leaders  like 
Mr.  Gokhale,  who  were  content  to  work  for  distant 
goals  by  evolutionary  methods.  It  did,  however,  mean 
an  increasing  pressure  on  the  government  for  fresh  devo¬ 
lutions  of  authority.  The  most  noteworthy  symptom 
of  nationalist  growth  was  the  rallying  of  a  certain  sec¬ 
tion  of  Mohammedan  opinion  to  the  nationalist  cause. 
The  Mohammedans  had  by  this  time  formed  their  own 
organization,  the  “  All-India  Moslem  League.”  The 
league  was  the  reverse  of  nationalist  in  complexion, 
having  been  formed  primarily  to  protect  Moslem  inter¬ 
ests  against  possible  Hindu  ascendancy.  Nevertheless, 
as  time  passed,  some  Mohammedans,  reassured  by  the 
friendly  attitude  and  promises  of  the  Hindu  moderates, 
abandoned  the  league’s  anti-Hindu  attitude  and  joined 
the  moderate  nationalists,  though  refraining  from  sedi¬ 
tious  agitation.  Indeed,  the  nationalists  presently  split 
into  two  distinct  groups,  moderates  and  extremists.  The 
extremists,  condemned  by  their  fellows,  kept  up  a  desul- 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


255 


tory  campaign  of  violence,  largely  directed  by  exiled 
leaders  who  from  the  shelter  of  foreign  countries  incited 
their  followers  at  home  to  seditious  agitation  and  violent 
action. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  India  on  the  outbreak  of 
the  Great  War;  a  situation  by  no  means  free  from  diffi¬ 
culty,  yet  far  less  troubled  than  it  had  been  a  few  years 
before.  Of  course,  the  war  produced  an  increase  of  un¬ 
rest  and  a  certain  amount  of  terrorism.  Yet  India,  as 
a  whole,  remained  quiet.  Throughout  the  war  India 
contributed  men  and  money  unstintedly  to  the  imperial 
cause,  and  Indian  troops  figured  notably  on  European, 
Asiatic,  and  African  battle-fields. 

However,  though  the  war-years  passed  without  any 
serious  outbreak  of  revolutionary  violence,  it  must  not 
be  thought  that  the  far  more  wide-spread  movement  for 
increasing  self-government  had  been  either  quenched  or 
stilled.  On  the  contrary,  the  war  gave  this  movement 
fresh  impetus.  Louder  and  louder  swelled  the  cry  for 
not  merely  good  government  but  government  accepta¬ 
ble  to  Indian  patriots  because  responsible  to  them. 
The  very  fact  that  India  had  proved  her  loyalty  to  the 
Empire  and  had  given  generously  of  her  blood  and  trea¬ 
sure  were  so  many  fresh  arguments  adduced  for  the 
grant  of  a  larger  measure  of  self-direction.  Numerous 
were  the  memoranda  presented  to  the  British  authori¬ 
ties  by  various  sections  of  Indian  public  opinion.  These 
memoranda  were  an  accurate  reflection  of  the  different 
shades  of  Indian  nationalism.  The  ultimate  goal  of  all 
was  emancipation  from  British  tutelage,  but  they  dif¬ 
fered  widely  among  themselves  as  to  how  and  when  this 
emancipation  was  to  be  attained.  The  most  conserva- 


256  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tive  contented  themselves  with  asking  for  modified  self- 
government  under  British  guidance,  while  the  more 
ambitious  asked  for  the  full  status  of  a  dominion  of 
the  British  Empire  like  Australia  and  Canada.  The 
revolutionary  element  naturally  held  aloof,  recognizing 
that  only  violence  could  serve  their  aim — immediate 
and  unqualified  independence. 

Of  course  even  the  more  moderate  nationalist  de¬ 
mands  implied  great  changes  in  the  existing  govern¬ 
mental  system  and  a  diminution  of  British  control  such 
as  the  Government  of  India  was  not  prepared  at  present 
to  concede.  Nevertheless,  the  Government  met  these 
demands  by  a  conciliatory  attitude  foreshadowing  fresh 
concessions  in  the  near  future.  In  1916  the  Viceroy, 
Lord  Harding,  said:  “I  do  not  for  a  moment  wish  to 
discountenance  self-government  for  India  as  a  national 
ideal.  It  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  aspiration  and  has  the 
sympathy  of  all  moderate  men,  but  in  the  present  posi¬ 
tion  of  India  it  is  not  idealism  that  is  needed  but  practi¬ 
cal  politics.  We  should  do  our  utmost  to  grapple  with 
realities,  and  lightly  to  raise  extravagant  hopes  and  en¬ 
courage  unrealizable  demands  can  only  tend  to  delay 
and  will  not  accelerate  political  progress.  I  know  this 
is  the  sentiment  of  wise  and  thoughtful  Indians.  No¬ 
body  is  more  anxious  than  I  am  to  see  the  early  realiza¬ 
tion  of  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  India,  but  I  am 
equally  desirous  of  avoiding  all  danger  of  reaction  from 
the  birth  of  institutions  which  experience  might  prove 
to  be  premature.” 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  toward  the  close  of  1917,  Mr. 
Montagu,  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  came  out  from 
England  with  the  object  of  thoroughly  canvassing  In- 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


257 


dian  public  opinion  on  the  question  of  constitutional 
reform.  For  months  the  problem  was  carefully  weighed, 
conferences  being  held  with  the  representatives  of  all 
races,  classes,  and  creeds.  The  result  of  these  researches 
was  a  monumental  report  signed  by  Mr.  Montagu  and 
by  the  Viceroy,  Lord  Chelmsford,  and  published  in 
July,  1918. 

The  report  recommended  concessions  far  beyond  any 
which  Great  Britain  had  hitherto  made.  It  frankly 
envisaged  the  gift  of  home  rule  for  India  “as  soon  as 
possible,”  and  went  on  to  state  that  the  gift  was  to  be 
conferred  not  because  of  Indian  agitation,  but  because 
of  “the  faith  that  is  in  us.”  There  followed  these  mem¬ 
orable  words:  “We  believe  profoundly  that  the  time 
has  come  when  the  sheltered  existence  which  we  have 
given  India  cannot  be  prolonged  without  damage  to  her 
national  life;  that  we  have  a  richer  gift  for  her  people 
than  any  that  we  have  yet  bestowed  on  them;  that  na¬ 
tionhood  within  the  Empire  represents  something  bet¬ 
ter  than  anything  India  has  hitherto  attained;  that  the 
placid,  pathetic  contentment  of  the  masses  is  not  the 
soil  on  which  such  Indian  nationhood  will  grow,  and 
that  in  deliberately  disturbing  it  we  are  working  for  her 
highest  good.” 

The  essence  of  the  report  was  its  recommendation  of 
the  principle  of  “diarchy,”  or  division  of  governmental 
responsibility  between  councillors  nominated  by  the 
British  executive  and  ministers  chosen  from  elective 
legislative  bodies.  This  diarchy  was  to  hold  for  both 
the  central  and  provincial  governments.  The  legisla¬ 
tures  were  to  be  elected  by  a  much  more  extensive  fran¬ 
chise  than  had  previously  prevailed  and  were  to  have 


258  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


greatly  enlarged  powers.  Previously  they  had  been 
little  more  than  advisory  bodies;  now  they  were  to  be¬ 
come  “ legislatures”  in  the  Western  sense,  though  their 
powers  were  still  limited,  many  powers,  particularly 
that  of  the  purse,  being  still  “ reserved”  to  the  execu¬ 
tive.  The  British  executive  thus  retained  ultimate  con¬ 
trol  and  had  the  last  word;  thus  no  true  “ balance  of 
power  ”  was  to  exist,  the  scales  being  frankly  weighted 
in  favor  of  the  British  Raj.  But  the  report  went  on  to 
state  that  this  scheme  of  government  was  not  intended 
to  be  permanent;  that  it  was  frankly  a  transitional 
measure,  a  school  in  which  the  Indian  people  was  to 
serve  its  apprenticeship,  and  that  when  these  first  les¬ 
sons  in  self-government  had  been  learned,  India  would 
be  given  a  thoroughly  representative  government  which 
would  not  only  initiate  and  legislate,  but  which  would 
also  control  the  executive  officials. 

The  Montagu-Chelmsford  Report  was  exhaustively 
discussed  both  in  India  and  in  England,  and  from  these 
frank  discussions  an  excellent  idea  of  the  Indian  prob¬ 
lem  in  all  its  challenging  complexity  can  be  obtained. 
The  nationalists  split  sharply  on  the  issue,  the  moder¬ 
ates  welcoming  the  report  and  agreeing  to  give  the  pro¬ 
posed  scheme  of  government  their  loyal  co-operation, 
the  extremists  condemning  the  proposals  as  a  snare  and 
a  sham.  The  moderate  attitude  was  stated  in  a  mani¬ 
festo  signed  by  their  leaders,  headed  by  the  eminent 
Indian  economist  Sir  Dinshaw  Wacha,  which  stated: 
“The  proposed  scheme  forms  a  complicated  structure 
capable  of  improvement  in  some  particulars,  especially 
at  the  top,  but  is  nevertheless  a  progressive  measure. 
The  reforms  are  calculated  to  make  the  provinces  of 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


259 


India  reach  the  goal  of  complete  responsible  govern¬ 
ment.  On  the  whole,  the  proposals  are  evolved  with 
great  foresight  and  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  genuine  sym¬ 
pathy  with  Indian  political  aspirations,  for  which  the 
distinguished  authors  are  entitled  to  the  country’s 
gratitude.”  The  condemnation  of  the  radicals  was 
voiced  by  leaders  like  Mr.  Tilak,  who  urged  “  standing 
fast  by  the  Indian  National  Congress  ideal,”  and  Mr. 
Bepin  Chander  Pal,  who  asserted:  “It  is  my  deliberate 
opinion  that  if  the  scheme  is  accepted,  the  Government 
will  be  more  powerful  and  more  autocratic  than  it  is  to¬ 
day.” 

Extremely  interesting  was  the  protest  of  the  anti¬ 
nationalist  groups,  particularly  the  Mohammedans  and 
the  low-caste  Hindus.  For  it  is  a  fact  significant  of 
the  complexity  of  the  Indian  problem  that  many  mil¬ 
lions  of  Indians  fear  the  nationalist  movement  and 
look  upon  the  autocracy  of  the  British  Raj  as  a  shield 
against  nationalist  oppression  and  discrimination.  The 
Mohammedans  of  India  are,  on  the  question  of  self- 
government  for  India,  sharply  divided  among  them¬ 
selves.  The  majority  still  dislike  and  fear  the  nation¬ 
alist  movement,  owing  to  its  “Hindu”  character.  A 
minority,  however,  as  already  stated,  have  rallied  to 
the  nationalist  cause.  This  minority  grew  greatly  in 
numbers  during  the  war-years,  their  increased  friendli¬ 
ness  being  due  not  merely  to  desire  for  self-government 
but  also  to  anger  at  the  Allies’  policy  of  dismemberment 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  kindred  policies  in  the 
Near  and  Middle  East.1  The  Hindu  nationalists  were 
quick  to  sympathize  with  the  Mohammedans  on  these 

1  Discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter. 


260  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


external  matters,  and  the  result  was  a  cordiality  be¬ 
tween  the  two  elements  never  known  before. 

The  predominance  of  high-caste  Brahmins  in  the  na¬ 
tionalist  movement  explains  the  opposition  of  many  low- 
caste  Hindus  to  Indian  home  rule.  So  great  is  the  low- 
caste  fear  of  losing  their  present  protection  under  the 
British  Raj  and  of  being  subjected  to  the  domination 
of  a  high-caste  Brahmin  oligarchy  that  in  recent  years 
they  have  formed  an  association  known  as  the  “Namasu- 
dra,”  led  by  well-known  persons  like  Doctor  Nair.1 
The  Namasudra  points  out  what  might  happen  by 
citing  the  Brahminic  pressure  which  occurs  even  in  such 
political  activity  as  already  exists.  For  example:  in 
many  elections  the  Brahmins  have  terrorized  low-caste 
voters  by  threatening  to  “  out-caste  ”  all  who  should  not 
vote  the  Brahmin  ticket,  thus  making  them  “Pariahs” 
— untouchables,  with  no  rights  in  Hindu  society. 

Such  protests  against  home  rule  from  large  sections 
of  the  Indian  population  gave  pause  even  to  many  Eng¬ 
lish  students  of  the  problem  who  had  become  convinced 
of  home  rule’s  theoretical  desirability.  And  of  course 
they  greatly  strengthened  the  arguments  of  those  nu¬ 
merous  Englishmen,  particularly  Anglo-Indians,  who  as¬ 
serted  that  India  was  as  yet  unfit  for  self-government. 
Said  one  of  these  objectors  in  The  Round  Table:  “The 
masses  care  not  one  whit  for  politics;  Home  Rule  they 
do  not  understand.  They  prefer  the  English  District 
Magistrate.  They  only  ask  to  remain  in  eternal  and 
bovine  quiescence.  They  feel  confidence  in  the  Eng¬ 
lishman  because  he  has  always  shown  himself  the  ‘Pro¬ 
tector  of  the  Poor/  and  because  he  is  neither  Hindu 

1  Quoted  in  Chapter  IV. 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


261 


nor  Mussulman,  and  has  a  reputation  for  honesty.” 
And  Lord  Sydenham,  in  a  detailed  criticism  of  the  Mon- 
tagu-Chelmsford  proposals,  stated:  “ There  ,are  many 
defects  in  our  system  of  government  in  India.  Re¬ 
forms  are  needed;  but  they  must  be  based  solely  upon 
considerations  of  the  welfare  of  the  masses  of  India  as 
a  whole.  If  the  policy  of  ‘  deliberately  ’  disturbing  their 
‘  contentment  ’  which  the  Viceroy  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  have  announced  is  carried  out;  if,  through  the 
‘  whispering  galleries  of  the  East/  the  word  is  passed 
that  the  only  authority  that  can  maintain  law  and  order 
and  secure  the  gradual  building-up  of  an  Indian  na¬ 
tion  is  weakening;  if,  as  is  proposed,  the  great  public 
services  are  emasculated;  then  the  fierce  old  animosi¬ 
ties  will  break  out  afresh,  and,  assisted  by  a  recrudes¬ 
cence  of  the  reactionary  forces  of  Brahminism,  they  will 
within  a  few  years  bring  to  nought  the  noblest  work 
which  the  British  race  has  ever  accomplished.”  1 
Yet,  other  English  authorities  on  Indian  affairs  as¬ 
serted  that  the  Montagu-Chelmsford  proposals  were 
sound  and  must  be  enacted  into  law  if  the  gravest  perils 
were  to  be  averted.  Such  were  the  opinions  of  men 
like  Lionel  Curtis2  and  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  who  stated: 
“It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  there  should  be 
no  unnecessary  delay.  We  have  had  object-lessons 
enough  as  to  the  danger  of  procrastination,  and  in  In¬ 
dia  as  elsewhere  time  is  on  the  side  of  the  trouble-mak- 


1  Lord  Sydenham,  “India,”  Contemporary  Review,  November,  1918. 
For  similar  criticisms  of  the  Montagu-Chelmsford  proposals,  see  G.  M. 
Chesney,  India  under  Experiment  (London,  1918);  “The  First  Stage 
towards  Indian  Anarchy,”  Spectator,  December  20,  1919. 

2  Lionel  Curtis,  Letters  to  the  People  of  India  on  Responsible  Government , 
already  quoted  at  the  end  of  Chapter  IV. 


262  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ers.  .  .  .  We  cannot  hope  to  reconcile  Indian  Extrem¬ 
ism.  What  we  can  hope  to  do  is  to  free  from  its  insidi¬ 
ous  influence  all  that  is  best  in  Indian  public  life  by 
opening  up  a  larger  field  of  useful  activity.”  1 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Montagu-Chelmsford  Report 
was  accepted  as  the  basis  of  discussion  by  the  British 
Parliament,  and  at  the  close  of  the  year  1919  its  recom¬ 
mendations  were  formally  embodied  in  law.  Unfortu¬ 
nately,  during  the  eighteen  months  which  elapsed  be¬ 
tween  the  publication  of  the  report  and  its  legal  enact¬ 
ment,  the  situation  in  India  had  darkened.  Militant 
unrest  had  again  raised  its  head,  and  India  was  more 
disturbed  than  it  had  been  since  1909. 

For  this  there  were  several  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  all  those  nationalist  elements  who  were  dissatis¬ 
fied  with  the  report  began  coquetting  with  the  revolu¬ 
tionary  irreconcilables  and  encouraging  them  to  fresh 
terrorism,  perhaps  in  the  hope  of  stampeding  the  British 
Parliament  into  wider  concessions  than  the  report  had 
contemplated.  But  there  were  other  causes  of  a  more 
general  nature.  The  year  1918  was  a  black  one  for  In¬ 
dia.  The  world-wide  influenza  epidemic  hit  India  par¬ 
ticularly  hard,  nearly  7,000,000  persons  being  carried 
off  by  the  grim  plague.  Furthermore,  India  was  cursed 
with  drought,  the  crops  failed,  and  the  spectre  of  famine 
stalked  through  the  land.  The  year  1919  saw  an  even 
worse  drought,  involving  an  almost  record  famine.  By 
the  late  summer  it  was  estimated  that  32,000,000  per¬ 
sons  had  died  of  hunger,  with  150,000,000  more  on  the 
verge  of  starvation.  And  on  top  of  all  came  an  Afghan 
war,  throwing  the  northwest  border  into  tumult  and 

1  Sir  V.  Chirol,  “India  in  Travail,”  Edinburgh  Review ,  July,  1918. 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA  263 

further  unsettling  the  already  restless  Mohammedan 
element. 

The  upshot  was  a  wave  of  unrest  revealing  itself  in 
an  epidemic  of  riots,  terrorism,  and  seditious  activity 
which  gave  the  British  authorities  serious  concern.  So 
critical  appeared  the  situation  that  a  special  commission 
was  appointed  to  investigate  conditions,  and  the  report 
handed  in  by  its  chairman,  Justice  Rowlatt,  painted  a 
depressing  picture  of  the  strength  of  revolutionary  un¬ 
rest.  The  report  stated  that  not  only  had  a  considera¬ 
ble  number  of  young  men  of  the  educated  upper  classes 
become  involved  in  the  promotion  of  anarchical  move¬ 
ments,  but  that  the  ranks  were  filled  with  men  belonging 
to  other  social  orders,  including  the  military,  and  that 
there  was  clear  evidence  of  successful  tampering  with 
the  loyalty  of  the  native  troops.  To  combat  this  grow¬ 
ing  disaffection,  the  Rowlatt  committee  recommended 
fresh  repressive  legislation. 

Impressed  with  the  gravity  of  the  committee’s  report, 
the  Government  of  India  formulated  a  project  of  law 
officially  known  as  the  Anarchical  and  Revolutionary 
Crimes  Act,  though  generally  known  as  the  Rowlatt 
Bill.  By  its  provisions  the  authorities  were  endowed 
with  greatly  increased  powers,  such  as  the  right  to 
search  premises  and  arrest  persons  on  mere  suspicion 
of  seditious  activity,  without  definite  evidence  of  the 
same. 

The  Rowlatt  Bill  at  once  aroused  bitter  nationalist 
opposition.  Not  merely  extremists,  but  many  moder¬ 
ates,  condemned  it  as  a  backward  step  and  as  a  provoker 
of  fresh  trouble.  When  the  bill  came  up  for  debate  in 
the  Indian  legislative  body,  the  Imperial  Legislative 


264  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Council,  all  the  native  members  save  one  opposed  it, 
and  the  bill  was  finally  passed  on  strictly  racial  lines  by 
the  votes  of  the  appointed  English  majority.  However, 
the  government  considered  the  bill  an  absolute  pre¬ 
requisite  to  the  successful  maintenance  of  order,  and  it 
was  passed  into  law  in  the  spring  of  1919. 

This  brought  matters  to  a  head.  The  nationalists, 
stigmatizing  the  Rowlatt  law  as  the  “  Black  Cobra  Act,” 
were  unmeasured  in  their  condemnation.  The  extrem¬ 
ists  engineered  a  campaign  of  militant  protest  and  de¬ 
creed  the  date  of  the  bill’s  enactment,  April  6,  1919,  as 
a  national  “Humiliation  Day.”  On  that  day  monster 
mass-meetings  were  held,  at  which  nationalist  orators 
made  seditious  speeches  and  inflamed  the  passions  of 
the  multitude.  “Humiliation  Day”  was  in  fact  the 
beginning  of  the  worst  wave  of  unrest  since  the  mutiny. 
For  the  next  three  months  a  veritable  epidemic  of  riot¬ 
ing  and  terrorism  swept  India,  particularly  the  northern 
provinces.  Officials  were  assassinated,  English  civilians 
were  murdered,  and  there  was  wholesale  destruction  of 
property.  At  some  moments  it  looked  as  though  India 
were  on  the  verge  of  revolution  and  anarchy. 

However,  the  government  stood  firm.  Violence  was 
countered  with  stern  repression.  Riotous  mobs  were 
mowed  down  wholesale  by  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire 
or  were  scattered  by  bombs  dropped  from  low-flying 
aeroplanes.  The  most  noted  of  these  occurrences  was 
the  so-called  “Amritsar  Massacre,”  where  British  troops 
fired  into  a  seditious  mass-meeting,  killing  500  and 
wounding  1,500  persons.  In  the  end  the  government 
mastered  the  situation.  Order  was  restored,  the  sedi¬ 
tious  leaders  were  swept  into  custody,  and  the  revolu- 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


265 


tionary  agitation  was  once  more  driven  underground. 
The  enactment  of  the  Montagu-Chelmsford  reform  bill 
by  the  British  Parliament  toward  the  close  of  the  year 
did  much  to  relax  the  tension  and  assuage  discontent, 
though  the  situation  of  India  was  still  far  from  normal. 
The  deplorable  events  of  the  earlier  part  of  1919  had 
roused  animosities  which  were  by  no  means  allayed. 
The  revolutionary  elements,  though  driven  underground, 
were  more  bitter  and  uncompromising  than  ever,  while 
opponents  of  home  rule  were  confirmed  in  their  convic¬ 
tion  that  India  could  not  be  trusted  and  that  any  re¬ 
laxation  of  autocracy  must  spell  anarchy. 

This  was  obviously  not  the  best  mental  atmosphere 
in  which  to  apply  the  compromises  of  the  Montagu- 
Chelmsford  reforms.  In  fact,  the  extremists  were  de¬ 
termined  that  they  should  not  be  given  a  fair  trial,  re¬ 
garding  the  reforms  as  a  snare  which  must  be  avoided 
at  all  costs.  Recognizing  that  armed  rebellion  was  still 
impossible,  at  least  for  the  present,  the  extremists  evolved 
the  idea  known  as  “ non-co-operation/7  This  was,  in 
fact,  a  gigantic  boycott  of  everything  British.  Not 
merely  were  the  new  voters  urged  to  stay  away  from  the 
polls  and  thus  elect  no  members  to  the  proposed  legis¬ 
lative  bodies,  but  lawyers  and  litigants  were  to  avoid 
the  courts,  taxpayers  refuse  to  pay  imposts,  workmen 
to  go  on  strike,  shopkeepers  to  refuse  to  buy  or  sell 
British-made  goods,  and  even  pupils  to  leave  the  schools 
and  colleges.  This  wholesale  “ out-casting”  of  every¬ 
thing  British  would  make  the  English  in  India  a  new 
sort  of  Pariah — “  untouchables  the  British  Govern¬ 
ment  and  the  British  community  in  India  would  be 
left  in.  absolute  isolation,  and  the  Raj,  rendered  unworka- 


266  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ble,  would  have  to  capitulate  to  the  extremist  demands 
for  complete  self-government. 

Such  was  the  non-co-operation  idea.  And  the  idea 
soon  found  an  able  exponent:  a  certain  M.  K.  Gandhi, 
who  had  long  possessed  a  reputation  for  personal  sanc¬ 
tity  and  thus  inspired  the  Hindu  masses  with  that  pe¬ 
culiar  religious  fervor  which  certain  types  of  Indian 
ascetics  have  always  known  how  to  arouse.  Gandhi’s 
propaganda  can  be  judged  by  the  following  extract  from 
one  of  his  speeches:  “It  is  as  amazing  as  it  is  humiliat¬ 
ing  that  less  than  100,000  white  men  should  be  able  to 
rule  315,000,000  Indians.  They  do  so  somewhat,  un¬ 
doubtedly,  by  force,  but  more  by  securing  our  co-opera¬ 
tion  in  a  thousand  ways  and  making  us  more  and  more 
helpless  and  dependent  on  them,  as  time  goes  forward. 
Let  us  not  mistake  reformed  councils  (legislatures), 
more  law-courts,  and  even  governorships  for  real  freedom 
or  power.  They  are  but  subtler  methods  of  emascu¬ 
lation.  The  British  cannot  rule  us  by  mere  force.  And 
so  they  resort  to  all  means,  honorable  and  dishonorable, 
in  order  to  retain  their  hold  on  India.  They  want  In¬ 
dia’s  billions  and  they  want  India’s  man-power  for  their 
imperialistic  greed.  If  we  refuse  to  supply  them  with 
men  and  money,  we  achieve  our  goal:  namely,  Swaraj,1 
equality,  manliness.” 

The  extreme  hopes  of  the  non-co-operation  movement 
have  not  been  realized.  The  Montagu-Chelmsford  re¬ 
forms  have  been  put  in  operation,  and  the  first  elections 
under  them  were  held  at  the  beginning  of  1921.  But 
the  outlook  is  far  from  bright.  The  very  light  vote 
cast  at  the  elections  revealed  the  effect  of  the  non-co- 


1  /.  e.,  self -government,  in  the  extremist  sense — practically  independence. 


NATIONALISM  IN  INDIA 


267 


operation  movement,  which  showed  itself  in  countless 
other  ways,  from  strikes  in  factories  to  strikes  of  school- 
children.  India  to-day  is  in  a  turmoil  of  unrest.  And 
this  unrest  is  not  merely  political;  it  is  social  as  well. 
The  vast  economic  changes  which  have  been  going  on  in 
India  for  the  past  half-century  have  profoundly  dis¬ 
organized  Indian  society.  These  changes  will  be  dis¬ 
cussed  in  later  chapters.  The  point  to  be  here  noted 
is  that  the  extremist  leaders  are  capitalizing  social  dis¬ 
content  and  are  unquestionably  in  touch  with  Bolshevik 
Russia.  Meanwhile  the  older  factors  of  disturbance 
are  by  no  means  eliminated.  The  recent  atrocious 
massacre  of  dissident  Sikh  pilgrims  by  orthodox  Sikh 
fanatics,  and  the  three-cornered  riots  between  Hindus, 
Mohammedans,  and  native  Christians  which  broke  out 
about  the  same  time  in  southern  India,  reveal  the  hid¬ 
den  fires  of  religious  and  racial  fanaticism  that  smoulder 
beneath  the  surface  of  Indian  life. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  India  is  to-day  a  bat¬ 
tle-ground  between  the  forces  of  evolutionary  and  revolu¬ 
tionary  change.  It  is  an  anxious  and  a  troubled  time. 
The  old  order  is  obviously  passing,  and  the  new  order 
is  not  yet  fairly  in  sight.  The  hour  is  big  with  possi¬ 
bilities  of  both  good  and  evil,  and  no  one  can  confidently 
predict  the  outcome. 


CHAPTER  VII 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 

One  of  the  most  interesting  phenomena  of  modern 
world-history  is  the  twofold  conquest  of  the  East  by 
the  West.  The  word  “ conquest”  is  usually  employed 
in  a  political  sense,  and  calls  up  visions  of  embattled 
armies  subduing  foreign  lands  and  lording  it  over  distant 
peoples.  Such  political  conquests  in  the  Orient  did  of 
course  occur,  and  we  have  already  seen  how,  during  the 
past  century,  the  decrepit  states  of  the  Near  and  Middle 
East  fell  an  easy  prey  to  the  armed  might  of  the  Euro¬ 
pean  Powers. 

But  what  is  not  so  generally  realized  is  the  fact  that 
this  political  conquest  was  paralleled  by  an  economic 
conquest  perhaps  even  more  complete  and  probably 
destined  to  produce  changes  of  an  even  more  profound 
and  enduring  character. 

The  root-cause  of  this  economic  conquest  was  the 
Industrial  Revolution.  Just  as  the  voyages  of  Colum¬ 
bus  and  Da  Gama  gave  Europe  the  strategic  mastery 
of  the  ocean  and  thereby  the  political  mastery  of  the 
world,  so  the  technical  inventions  of  the  later  eighteenth 
century  which  inaugurated  the  Industrial  Revolution 
gave  Europe  the  economic  mastery  of  the  world.  These 
inventions  in  fact  heralded  a  new  Age  of  Discovery,  this 
time  into  the  realms  of  science.  The  results  were,  if 
possible,  more  momentous  even  than  those  of  the  age 

of  geographical  discovery  three  centuries  before.  They 

268 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


269 


gave  our  race  such  increased  mastery  over  the  resources 
of  nature  that  the  ensuing  transformation  of  economic 
life  swiftly  and  utterly  transformed  the  face  of  things. 

This  transformation  was,  indeed;  unprecedented  in 
the  world’s  history.  Hitherto  man’s  material  progress 
had  been  a  gradual  evolution.  With  the  exception  of 
gunpowder,  he  had  tapped  no  new  sources  of  material 
energy  since  very  ancient  times.  The  horse-drawn  mail- 
coach  of  our  great-grandfathers  was  merely  a  logical 
elaboration  of  the  horse-drawn  Egyptian  chariot;  the 
wind-driven  clipper-ship  traced  its  line  unbroken  to 
Ulysses’s  lateen  bark  before  Troy;  while  industry  still 
relied  on  the  brawn  of  man  and  beast  or  upon  the  sim¬ 
ple  action  of  wind  and  waterfall.  Suddenly  all  was 
changed.  Steam,  electricity,  petrol,  the  Hertzian  wave, 
harnessed  nature’s  hidden  powers,  conquered  distance, 
and  shrunk  the  terrestrial  globe  to  the  measure  of  hu¬ 
man  hands.  Man  entered  a  new  material  world,  differ¬ 
ing  not  merely  in  degree  but  in  kind  from  that  of  pre¬ 
vious  generations. 

When  I  say  “Man,”  I  mean,  so  far  as  the  nineteenth 
century  was  concerned,  the  white  man  of  Europe  and 
its  racial  settlements  overseas.  It  was  the  white  man’s 
brain  which  had  conceived  all  this,  and  it  was  the  white 
man  alone  who  at  first  reaped  the  benefits.  The  two 
outstanding  features  of  the  new  order  were  the  rise  of 
machine-industry  with  its  incalculable  acceleration  of 
mass-production,  and  the  correlative  development  of 
cheap  and  rapid  transportation.  Both  these  factors 
favored  a  prodigious  increase  in  economic  power  and 
wealth  in  Europe,  since  Europe  became  the  workshop 
of  the  world.  In  fact,  during  the  nineteenth  century, 


270  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Europe  was  transformed  from  a  semirural  continent  into 
a  swarming  hive  of  industry,  gorged  with  goods,  capital, 
and  men,  pouring  forth  its  wares  to  the  remotest  corners 
of  the  earth,  and  drawing  thence  fresh  stores  of  raw 
material  for  new  fabrication  and  exchange. 

Such  was  the  industrially  revolutionized  West  which 
confronted  an  East  as  backward  and  stagnant  in  eco¬ 
nomics  as  it  was  in  politics  and  the  art  of  war.  In  fact, 
the  East  was  virtually  devoid  of  either  industry  or  busi¬ 
ness,  as  we  understand  these  terms  to-day.  Economi¬ 
cally,  the  East  was  on  an  agricultural  basis,  the  eco¬ 
nomic  unit  being  the  self-supporting,  semi-isolated 
village.  Oriental  “industries”  were  handicrafts,  car¬ 
ried  on  by  relatively  small  numbers  of  artisans,  usually 
working  by  and  for  themselves.  Their  products,  while 
often  exquisite  in  quality,  were  largely  luxuries,  and  were 
always  produced  by  such  slow,  antiquated  methods 
that  their  quantity  was  limited  and  their  market  price 
relatively  high.  Despite  very  low  wages,  therefore, 
Asiatic  products  not  only  could  not  compete  in  the 
world-market  with  European  and  American  machine- 
made,  mass-produced  articles,  but  were  hard  hit  in  their 
home-markets  as  well. 

This  Oriental  inability  to  compete  with  Western  in¬ 
dustry  arose  not  merely  from  methods  of  production 
but  also  from  other  factors  such  as  the  mentality  of  the 
workers  and  the  scarcity  of  capital.  Throughout  the 
Near  and  Middle  East  economic  life  rested  on  the  princi¬ 
ple  of  status.  The  Western  economic  principles  of  con¬ 
tract  and  competition  were  virtually  unknown.  Agri¬ 
culturists  and  artisans  followed  blindly  in  the  footsteps 
of  their  fathers.  There  was  no  competition,  no  stimu- 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


271 


lus  for  improvement,  no  change  in  customary  wages, 
no  desire  for  a  better  and  more  comfortable  living.  The 
industries  were  stereotyped;  the  apprentice  merely  imi¬ 
tated  his  master,  and  rarely  thought  of  introducing  new 
implements  or  new  methods  of  manufacture.  Instead 
of  working  for  profit  and  advancement,  men  followed 
an  hereditary  “calling,”  usually  hallowed  by  religious 
sanctions,  handed  down  from  father  to  son  through 
many  generations,  each  calling  possessing  its  own  un¬ 
changing  ideals,  its  zealously  guarded  craft-secrets. 

The  few  bolder,  more  enterprising  spirits  who  might 
have  ventured  to  break  the  iron  bands  of  custom  and 
tradition  were  estopped  by  lack  of  capital.  Fluid  “in¬ 
vestment”  capital,  easily  mobilized  and  ready  to  pour 
into  an  enterprise  of  demonstrable  utility  and  profit, 
simply  did  not  exist.  To  the  Oriental,  whether  prince 
or  peasant,  money  was  regarded,  not  as  a  source  of  profit 
or  a  medium  of  exchange,  but  as  a  store  of  value,  to  be 
hoarded  intact  against  a  “rainy  day.”  The  East  has 
been  known  for  ages  as  a  “sink  of  the  precious  metals.” 
In  India  alone  the  value  of  the  gold,  silver,  and  jewels 
hidden  in  strong-boxes,  buried  in  the  earth,  or  hanging 
about  the  necks  of  women  must  run  into  billions.  Says 
a  recent  writer  on  India:  “I  had  the  privilege  of  being 
taken  through  the  treasure-vaults  of  one  of  the  wealth¬ 
iest  Maharajahs.  I  could  have  plunged  my  arm  to  the 
shoulder  in  great  silver  caskets  filled  with  diamonds, 
pearls,  emeralds,  rubies.  The  walls  were  studded  with 
hooks  and  on  each  pair  of  hooks  rested  gold  bars  three 
to  four  feet  long  and  two  inches  across.  I  stood  by  a 
great  cask  of  diamonds,  and  picking  up  a  handful  let  them 
drop  slowly  from  between  my  fingers,  sparkling  and  glis- 


272  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tening  like  drops  of  water  in  sunlight.  There  are  some 
seven  hundred  native  states,  and  the  rulers  of  every  one 
has  his  treasure-vaults  on  a  more  or  less  elaborate  scale. 
Besides  these,  every  zamindar  and  every  Indian  of  high 
or  low  degree  who  can  save  anything,  wants  to  have  it 
by  him  in  actual  metal;  he  distrusts  this  new-fangled 
paper  currency  that  they  try  to  pass  off  on  him.  Some¬ 
times  he  beats  his  coins  into  bangles  for  his  wives,  and 
sometimes  he  hides  money  behind  a  loose  brick  or  under 
a  flat  stone  in  the  bottom  of  the  oven,  or  he  goes  out 
and  digs  a  little- hole  and  buries  it.”  1 
Remember  that  this  description  is  of  present-day 
India,  after  more  than  a  century  of  British  rule  and  not¬ 
withstanding  a  permeation  of  Western  ideas  which,  as 
we  shall  presently  see,  has  produced  momentous  modi¬ 
fications  in  the  native  point  of  view.  Remember  also 
that  this  hoarding  propensity  is  not  peculiar  to  India 
but  is  shared  by  the  entire  Orient.  We  can  then  realize 
the  utter  lack  of  capital  for  investment  purposes  in  the 
East  of  a  hundred  years  ago,  especially  when  we  remem¬ 
ber  that  political  insecurity  and  religious  prohibitions 
of  the  lending  of  money  at  interest  stood  in  the  way  of 
such  far-sighted  individuals  as  might  have  been  inclined 
to  employ  their  hoarded  wealth  for  productive  pur¬ 
poses.  There  was,  indeed,  one  outlet  for  financial  ac¬ 
tivity — usury,  and  therein  virtually  all  the  scant  fluid 
capital  of  the  old  Orient  was  employed.  But  such  cap¬ 
ital,  lent  not  for  productive  enterprise  but  for  luxury, 
profligacy,  or  incompetence,  was  a  destructive  rather 
than  a  creative  force  and  merely  intensified  the  preju¬ 
dice  against  capital  of  any  kind. 

1 F.  B.  Fisher,  India's  Silent  Revolution,  p.  53  (New  York,  1920). 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


273 


Such  was  the  economic  life  of  the  Orient  a  hundred 
years  ago.  It  is  obvious  that  this  archaic  order  was 
utterly  unable  to  face  the  tremendous  competition  of 
the  industrialized  West.  Everywhere  the  flood  of  cheap 
Western  machine-made,  mass-produced  goods  began 
invading  Eastern  lands,  driving  the  native  wares  be¬ 
fore  them.  The  way  in  which  an  ancient  Oriental 
handicraft  like  the  Indian  textiles  was  literally  annihi¬ 
lated  by  the  destructive  competition  of  Lancashire  cot¬ 
tons  is  only  one  of  many  similar  instances.  To  be  sure, 
some  Oriental  writers  contend  that  this  triumph  of 
Western  manufactures  was  due  to  political  rather  than 
economic  reasons,  and  Indian  nationalists  cite  British 
governmental  activity  in  favor  of  the  Lancashire  cot¬ 
tons  above  mentioned  as  the  sole  cause  for  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  Indian  textile  handicrafts.  But  such  argu¬ 
ments  appear  to  be  fallacious.  British  official  action 
may  have  hastened  the  triumph  of  British  industry  in 
India,  but  that  triumph  was  inevitable  in  the  long  run. 
The  best  proof  is  the  way  in  which  the  textile  crafts  of 
independent  Oriental  countries  like  Turkey  and  Persia 
were  similarly  ruined  by  Western  competition. 

A  further  proof  is  the  undoubted  fact  that  Oriental 
peoples,  taken  as  a  whole,  have  bought  Western-manu¬ 
factured  products  in  preference  to  their  own  hand-made 
wares.  To  many  Westerners  this  has  been  a  mystery. 
Such  persons  cannot  understand  how  the  Orientals 
could  buy  the  cheap,  shoddy  products  of  the  West, 
manufactured  especially  for  the  Eastern  market,  in 
preference  to  their  native  wares  of  better  quality  and 
vastly  greater  beauty.  The  answer,  however,  is  that 
the  average  Oriental  is  not  an  art  connoisseur  but  a 


274  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


poor  man  living  perilously  close  to  the  margin  of  star¬ 
vation.  He  not  only  wants  but  must  buy  things  cheap ; 
and  the  wide  price-margin  is  the  deciding  factor.  Of 
course  there  is  also  the  element  of  novelty.  Besides 
goods  which  merely  replace  articles  he  has  always  used, 
the  West  has  introduced  many  new  articles  whose  utility 
or  charm  are  irresistible.  I  have  already  mentioned 
the  way  in  which  the  sewing-machine  and  the  kerosene- 
lamp  have  swept  the  Orient  from  end  to  end,  and  there 
are  many  other  instances  of  a  similar  nature.  The 
permeation  of  Western  industry  has,  in  fact,  profoundly 
modified  every  phase  of  Oriental  economic  life.  New 
economic  wants  have  been  created;  standards  of  living 
have  been  raised;  canons  of  taste  have  been  altered. 
Says  a  lifelong  American  student  of  the  Orient:  “The 
knowledge  of  modern  inventions  and  of  other  foods  and 
articles  has  created  new  wants.  The  Chinese  peasant 
is  no  longer  content  to  burn  bean-oil;  he  wants  kerosene. 
The  desire  of  the  Asiatic  to  possess  foreign  lamps  is 
equalled  only  by  his  passion  for  foreign  clocks.  The 
ambitious  Syrian  scorns  the  mud  roof  of  his  ancestors, 
and  will  be  satisfied  only  with  the  bright  red  tiles  im¬ 
ported  from  France.  Everywhere  articles  of  foreign 
manufacture  are  in  demand.  .  .  .  Knowledge  increases 
wants,  and  the  Oriental  is  acquiring  knowledge.  He 
demands  a  hundred  things  to-day  that  his  grandfather 
never  heard  of.”  1 

Everywhere  it  is  the  same  story.  An  Indian  eco¬ 
nomic  writer,  though  a  bitter  enemy  of  Western  indus¬ 
trialism,  bemoans  the  fact  that  “the  artisans  are  losing 

1  Rev.  A.  J.  Brown,  “Economic  Changes  in  Asia/'  The  Century,  March, 
1904. 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


275 


their  occupations  and  are  turning  to  agriculture.  The 
cheap  kerosene-oil  from  Baku  or  New  York  threatens 
the  oilman’s1  existence.  Brass  and  copper  which  have 
been  used  for  vessels  from  time  immemorial  are  threat¬ 
ened  by  cheap  enamelled  ironware  imported  from  Eu¬ 
rope.  .  .  .  There  is  also,  pari  passu ,  a  transformation 
of  the  tastes  of  the  consumers.  They  abandon  gur  for 
crystal  sugar.  Home-woven  cloths  are  now  replaced 
by  manufactured  cloths  for  being  too  coarse.  All  local 
industries  are  attacked  and  many  have  been  destroyed. 
Villages  that  for  centuries  followed  customary  practices 
are  brought  into  contact  with  the  world’s  markets  all 
on  a  sudden.  For  steamships  and  railways  which  have 
established  the  connection  have  been  built  in  so  short 
an  interval  as  hardly  to  allow  breathing-time  to  the 
village  which  slumbered  so  long  under  the  dominion  of 
custom.  Thus  the  sudden  introduction  of  competition 
into  an  economic  unit  which  had  from  time  immemorial 
followed  custom  has  wrought  a  mighty  change.”  2 

This  “ mighty  change”  was  due  not  merely  to  the  in¬ 
flux  of  Western  goods  but  also  to  an  equally  momentous 
influx  of  Western  capital.  The  opportunities  for  profita¬ 
ble  investment  were  so  numerous  that  Western  capital 
soon  poured  in  streams  into  Eastern  lands.  Virtually 
devoid  of  fluid  capital  of  its  own,  the  Orient  was  bound 
to  have  recourse  to  Western  capital  for  the  initiation 
of  all  economic  activity  in  the  modern  sense.  Rail¬ 
ways,  mines,  large-scale  agriculture  of  the  “ plantation” 
type,  and  many  other  undertakings  thus  came  into  be¬ 
ing.  Most  notable  of  all  was  the  founding  of  numerous 

1  7.  e.,  the  purveyor  of  the  native  vegetable-oils. 

2  R.  Mukerjee,  The  Foundations  of  Indian  Economics ,  p.  5  (London,  1916). 


276  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


manufacturing  establishments  from  North  Africa  to 
China  and  the  consequent  growth  of  genuine  “factory 
towns  ”  where  the  whir  of  machinery  and  the  smoke  of 
tall  chimneys  proclaimed  that  the  East  was  adopting 
the  industrial  life  of  the  West. 

The  momentous  social  consequences  of  this  industriali¬ 
zation  of  the  Orient  will  be  treated  in  subsequent  chap¬ 
ters.  In  the  present  chapter  we  will  confine  ourselves 
to  a  consideration  of  its  economic  side.  Furthermore, 
this  book,  limited  as  it  is  to  the  Near  and  Middle  East, 
cannot  deal  with  industrial  developments  in  China  and 
Japan.  The  reader  should,  however,  always  bear  in 
mind  Far  Eastern  developments,  which,  in  the  main, 
run  parallel  to  those  which  we  shall  here  discuss. 

These  industrial  innovations  were  at  first  pure  West¬ 
ern  transplantings  set  in  Eastern  soil.  Initiated  by 
Western  capital,  they  were  wholly  controlled  and  man¬ 
aged  by  Western  brains.  Western  capital  could  not 
venture  to  intrust  itself  to  Orientals,  with  their  lack  of 
the  modern  industrial  spirit,  their  habits  of  “  squeeze  ” 
and  nepotism,  their  lust  for  quick  returns,  and  their 
incapacity  for  sustained  business  team-play.  As  time 
passed,  however,  the  success  of  Western  undertakings 
so  impressed  Orientals  that  the  more  forward-looking 
among  them  were  ready  to  risk  their  money  and  to  ac¬ 
quire  the  technic  necessary  for  success.  At  the  close 
of  Chapter  II,  I  described  the  development  of  modern 
business  types  in  the  Moslem  world,  and  the  same  is 
true  of  the  non-Moslem  populations  of  India.  In  India 
there  were  several  elements  such  as  the  Parsis  and  the 
Hindu  “banyas,”  or  money-lenders,  whose  previous 
activities  in  commerce  or  usury  predisposed  them  to 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


277 


financial  and  industrial  activity  in  the  modern  sense. 
From  their  ranks  have  chiefly  sprung  the  present-day 
native  business  communities  of  India,  exemplified  by 
the  jute  and  textile  factories  of  Calcutta  and  Bombay, 
and  the  great  Tata  iron-works  of  Bengal — undertakings 
financed  by  native  capital  and  wholly  under  native  con¬ 
trol.  Of  course,  beside  these  successes  there  have  been 
many  lamentable  failures.  Nevertheless,  there  seems 
to  be  no  doubt  that  Western  industrialism  is  ceasing  to 
be  an  exotic  and  is  rooting  itself  firmly  in  Eastern  soil.1 

The  combined  result  of  Western  and  Eastern  enter¬ 
prise  has  been,  as  already  stated,  the  rise  of  important 
industrial  centres  at  various  points  in  the  Orient.  In 
Egypt  a  French  writer  remarks:  “Both  banks  of  the 
Nile  are  lined  with  factories,  sugar-refineries  and  cotton- 
mills,  whose  belching  chimneys  tower  above  the  mud 
huts  of  the  fellahs.”  2  And  Sir  Theodore  Morison  says 
of  India:  “In  the  city  of  Bombay  the  industrial  revolu¬ 
tion  has  already  been  accomplished.  Bombay  is  a 
modem  manufacturing  city,  where  both  the  dark  and 
the  bright  side  of  modern  industrialism  strike  the  eye. 
Bombay  has  insanitary  slums  where  overcrowding  is  as 
great  an  evil  as  in  any  European  city;  she  has  a  prole¬ 
tariat  which  works  long  hours  amid  the  din  and  whir  of 
machinery;  she  also  has  her  millionaires,  whose  princely 
charities  have  adorned  her  streets  with  beautiful  build¬ 
ings.  Signs  of  lavish  wealth  and,  let  me  add,  culture  and 


1  On  these  points,  see  Fisher,  op.  cit. ;  Sir  T.  Morison,  The  Economic 
Transition  in  India  (London,  1911);  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  Indian  Unrest 
(London,  1910);  D.  H.  Dodwell,  “Economic  Transition  in  India,”  Eco¬ 
nomic  Journal ,  December,  1910;  J.  P.  Jones,  “The  Present  Situation  in 
India,”  Journal  of  Race  Development,  July,  1910. 

2  L.  Bertrand,  Le  Mirage  oriental ,  pp.  20-21  (Paris,  1910). 


278  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


taste  in  Bombay  astonish  the  visitor  from  the  inland 
districts.  The  brown  villages  and  never-ending  fields 
with  which  he  has  hitherto  been  familiar  are  the  India 
which  is  passing  away;  Bombay  is  the  presage  of  the 
future.”  1 

The  juxtaposition  of  vast  natural  resources  and  a 
limitless  supply  of  cheap  labor  has  encouraged  the  most 
ambitious  hopes  in  Oriental  minds.  Some  Orientals 
look  to  a  combination  of  Western  money  and  Eastern 
man-power,  expressed  by  an  Indian  economic  writer  in 
the  formula:  “ English  money  and  Indian  labor  are  the 
two  cheapest  things  in  the  world.”  2  Others  more  am¬ 
bitiously  dream  of  industrializing  the  East  entirely  by 
native  effort,  to  the  exclusion  and  even  to  the  detriment 
of  the  West.  This  view  was  well  set  forth  some  years 
ago  by  a  Hindu,  who  wrote  in  a  leading  Indian  periodi¬ 
cal:3  “In  one  sense  the  Orient  is  really  menacing  the 
West,  and  so  earnest  and  open-minded  is  Asia  that  no 
pretense  or  apology  whatever  is  made  about  it.  The 
Easterner  has  thrown  down  the  industrial  gauntlet,  and 
from  now  on  Asia  is  destined  to  witness  a  progressively 
intense  trade  warfare,  the  Occidental  scrambling  to  re¬ 
tain  his  hold  on  the  markets  of  the  East,  and  the  Ori¬ 
ental  endeavoring  to  beat  him  in  a  battle  in  which  here¬ 
tofore  he  has  been  an  easy  victor.  ...  In  competing 
with  the  Occidental  commercialists,  the  Oriental  has 
awakened  to  a  dynamic  realization  of  the  futility  of 
pitting  unimproved  machinery  and  methods  against 
modern  methods  and  appliances.  Casting  aside  his 


1  Sir  T.  Morison,  The  Economic  Transition  in  India ,  p.  181. 

2  Quoted  by  Jones,  supra. 

3  The  Indian  Review  (Madras),  1910. 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


279 


former  sense  of  self-complacency,  he  is  studying  the  sci¬ 
ences  and  arts  that  have  given  the  West  its  material 
prosperity.  He  is  putting  the  results  of  his  investiga¬ 
tions  to  practical  use,  as  a  rule,  recasting  the  Occidental 
methods  to  suit  his  peculiar  needs,  and  in  some  instances 
improving  upon  them.” 

This  statement  of  the  spirit  of  the  Orient’s  industrial 
awakening  is  confirmed  by  many  white  observers.  At 
the  very  moment  when  the  above  article  was  penned, 
an  American  economic  writer  was  making  a  study  tour 
of  the  Orient,  of  which  he  reported:  “The  real  cause  of  . 
Asia’s  poverty  lies  in  just  two  things:  the  failure  of  Asi¬ 
atic  governments  to  educate  their  people,  and  the  failure 
of  the  people  to  increase  their  productive  capacity  by 
the  use  of  machinery.  Ignorance  and  lack  of  machinery 
are  responsible  for  Asia’s  poverty;  knowledge  and  mod¬ 
ern  tools  are  responsible  for  America’s  prosperity.” 
But,  continues  this  writer,  we  must  watch  out.  Asia 
now  realizes  these  facts  and  is  doing  much  to  remedy 
the  situation.  Hence,  “we  must  face  in  ever-increas¬ 
ing  degree  the  rivalry  of  awakening  peoples  who  are 
strong  with  the  strength  that  comes  from  struggle  with 
poverty  and  hardship,  and  who  have  set  themselves  to 
master  and  apply  all  our  secrets  in  the  coming  world- 
struggle  for  industrial  supremacy  and  for  racial  read¬ 
justment.”  1  Another  American  observer  of  Asiatic 
economic  conditions  reports:  “All  Asia  is  being  per¬ 
meated  with  modern  industry  and  present-day  mechani¬ 
cal  progress.”  2  And  Sir  Theodore  Morison  concludes 


Clarence  Poe,  “What  the  Orient  can  Teach  Us,”  World's  Work,  July, 
1911. 

2  C.  S.  Cooper,  The  Modernizing  of  the  Orient,  p.  5  (New  York,  1914). 


280  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


regarding  India’s  economic  future:  “India’s  industrial 
transformation  is  near  at  hand;  the  obstacles  which  have 
hitherto  prevented  the  adoption  of  modern  methods  of 
manufacture  have  been  removed;  means  of  transport 
have  been  spread  over  the  face  of  the  whole  country, 
capital  for  the  purchase  of  machinery  and  erection  of 
factories  may  now  be  borrowed  on  easy  terms;  me¬ 
chanics,  engineers,  and  business  managers  may  be  hired 
from  Europe  to  train  the  future  captains  of  Indian  in¬ 
dustry;  in  English  a  common  language  has  been  found 
in  which  to  transact  business  with  all  the  provinces  of 
India  and  with  a  great  part  of  the  Western  world;  se¬ 
curity  from  foreign  invasion  and  internal  commotion 
justifies  the  inception  of  large  enterprises.  All  the 
conditions  are  favorable  for  a  great  reorganization  of 
industry  which,  when  successfully  accomplished,  will 
bring  about  an  increase  hitherto  undreamed  of  in  In¬ 
dia’s  annual  output  of  wealth.”  1 
The  factor  usually  relied  upon  to  overcome  the  Ori¬ 
ent’s  handicaps  of  inexperience  and  inexpertness  in  in¬ 
dustrialism  is  its  cheap  labor.  To  Western  observers 
the  low  wages  and  long  hours  of  Eastern  industry  are 
literally  astounding.  Take  Egypt  and  India  as  exam¬ 
ples  of  industrial  conditions  in  the  Near  and  Middle 
East.  Writing  of  Egypt  in  1908,  the  English  economist 
H.  N.  Brailsford  says:  “There  was  then  no  Factory  Act 
in  Egypt.  There  are  all  over  the  country  ginning-mills, 
which  employ  casual  labor  to  prepare  raw  cotton  for 
export,  during  four  or  five  months  of  the  year.  The 
wages  were  low,  from  7J^d.  to  lOd.  (15  to  20  cents)  a 
day  for  an  adult,  and  6d.  (12  cents)  for  a  child.  Chil- 

1  Moriaon,  op.  dt.}  p.  242. 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


281 


dren  and  adults  alike  worked  sometimes  for  twelve, 
usually  for  fifteen,  and  on  occasion  even  for  sixteen  or 
eighteen  hours  a  day.  In  the  height  of  the  season  even 
the  children  were  put  on  night  shifts  of  twelve  hours.”  1 

In  India  conditions  are  about  the  same.  The  first 
thorough  investigation  of  Indian  industry  was  made  in 
1907  by  a  factoiy  labor  commission,  and  the  follow¬ 
ing  are  some  of  the  data  published  in  its  report:  In  the 
cotton-mills  of  Bombay  the  hours  regularly  worked  ran 
from  13  to  14  hours.  In  the  jute-mills  of  Calcutta  the 
operatives  usually  worked  15  hours.  Cotton-ginning 
factories  required  their  employees  to  work  17  and  18 
hours  a  day,  rice  and  flour  mills  20  to  22  hours,  and  an 
extreme  case  was  found  in  a  printing  works  where  the 
men  had  to  work  22  hours  a  day  for  seven  consecutive 
days.  As  to  wages,  an  adult  male  operative,  working 
from  13  to  15  hours  a  day,  received  from  15  to  20  rupees 
a  month  ($5  to  $6.35).  Child  labor  was  very  prevalent, 
children  six  and  seven  years  old  working  “ half-time” — 
in  many  cases  8  hours  a  day.  As  a  result  of  this  report 
legislation  was  passed  by  the  Indian  Government  better¬ 
ing  working  conditions  somewhat,  especially  for  women 
and  children.  But  in  1914  the  French  economist  Albert 
Metin,  after  a  careful  study,  reported  factory  conditions 
not  greatly  changed,  the  Factory  Acts  systematically 
evaded,  hours  very  long,  and  wages  extremely  low.  In 
Bombay  men  were  earning  from  10  cents  to  20  cents  per 
day,  the  highest  wages  being  30  cents.  For  women  and 
children  the  maximum  was  10  cents  per  day.2 

With  such  extraordinarily  low  wages  and  long  hours 

1  H.  N.  Brailsford,  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold ,  p.  114  (London,  1915). 

2  A.  Metin,  UInde  d'aujourd'hu il>:  Etude  sociale,  p.  336  (Paris,  1918). 


282  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


of  labor  it  might  at  first  sight  seem  as  though,  given 
adequate  capital  and  up-to-date  machinery,  the  Orient 
could  not  only  drive  Occidental  products  from  Eastern 
markets  but  might  invade  Western  markets  as  well. 
This,  indeed,  has  been  the  fear  of  many  Western  writ¬ 
ers.  Nearly  three-quarters  of  a  century  ago  Gobineau 
prophesied  an  industrial  invasion  of  Europe  from  Asia,1 
and  of  late  years  economists  like  H.  N.  Brailsford  have 
warned  against  an  emigration  of  Western  capital  to  the 
tempting  lure  of  factory  conditions  in  Eastern  lands.2 
Nevertheless,  so  far  as  the  Near  and  Middle  East  is 
concerned,  nothing  like  this  has  as  yet  materialized. 
China,  to  be  sure,  may  yet  have  unpleasant  surprises 
in  store  for  the  West,3  but  neither  the  Moslem  world  nor 
India  have  developed  factory  labor  with  the  skill,  stam¬ 
ina,  and  assiduity  sufficient  to  undercut  the  industrial 
workers  of  Europe  and  America.  In  India,  for  exam¬ 
ple,  despite  a  swarming  and  poverty-stricken  popula¬ 
tion,  the  factories  are  unable  to  recruit  an  adequate  or 
dependable  labor-supply.  Says  M.  Metin:  “With  such 
long  hours  and  low  wages  it  might  be  thought  that  In¬ 
dian  industry  would  be  a  formidable  competitor  of  the 
West.  This  is  not  so.  The  reason  is  the  bad  quality 
of  the  work.  The  poorly  paid  coolies  are  so  badly  fed 
and  so  weak  that  it  takes  at  least  three  of  them  to  do  the 
work  of  one  European.  Also,  the  Indian  workers  lack 
not  only  strength  but  also  skill,  attention,  and  liking 
for  their  work.  .  .  .  An  Indian  of  the  people  will  do 

1  In  his  book,  Trois  Am  en  Perse  (Paris,  1858). 

2  Brailsford,  op.  cit.,  pp.  83,  114-115. 

3  Regarding  conditions  in  China,  especially  the  extraordinary  disci¬ 
pline  and  working  ability  of  the  Chinaman,  see  my  Rising  Tide  of  Color 
against  White  World-Supremacy ,  pp.  28-30,  243-251. 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


283 


anything  else  in  preference  to  becoming  a  factory  opera¬ 
tive.  The  factories  thus  get  only  the  dregs  of  the  work¬ 
ing  class.  The  workers  come  to  the  factories  and  mines 
as  a  last  resort;  they  leave  as  soon  as  they  can  return 
to  their  prior  occupations  or  find  a  more  remunerative 
employment.  Thus  the  factories  can  never  count  on 
a  regular  labor-supply.  Would  higher  wages  remedy 
this?  Many  employers  say  no — as  soon  as  the  workers 
got  a  little  ahead  they  would  quit,  either  temporarily 
till  their  money  was  spent,  or  permanently  for  some 
more  congenial  calling.  ”  1  These  statements  are  fully 
confirmed  by  an  Indian  economic  writer,  who  says: 
“One  of  the  greatest  drawbacks  to  the  establishment  of 
large  industries  in  India  is  the  scarcity  and  inefficiency 
of  labor.  Cheap  labor,  where  there  is  no  physical  stam¬ 
ina,  mental  discipline,  and  skill  behind  it,  tends  to  be 
costly  in  the  end.  The  Indian  laborer  is  mostly  unedu¬ 
cated.  He  is  not  in  touch  with  his  employers  or  with 
his  work.  The  laboring  population  of  the  towns  is  a 
flitting,  dilettante  population.”  2 

Thus  Indian  industry,  despite  its  very  considerable 
growth,  has  not  come  up  to  early  expectations.  As  the 
official  Year-Book  very  frankly  states:  “India,  in  short, 
is  a  country  rich  in  raw  materials  and  in  industrial  pos¬ 
sibilities,  but  poor  in  manufacturing  accomplishments.”  3 
In  fact,  to  some  observers,  India’s  industrial  future 
seems  far  from  bright.  As  a  competent  English  student 
of  Indian  conditions  recently  wrote:  “Some  years  ago 
it  seemed  possible  that  India  might,  by  a  rapid  assimila- 


1  Metin,  op.  cit.,  p.  337. 

2  A.  Yusuf  Ali,  Life  and  Labor  in  India ,  p.  183  (London,  1907). 

*  “India  in  the  Years  1917-1918”  (official  publication — Calcutta). 


284  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tion  of  Western  knowledge  and  technical  skill,  adapt 
for  her  own  conditions  the  methods  of  modern  industry, 
and  so  reach  an  approximate  economic  level.  Some 
even  now  threaten  the  Western  world  with  a  vision  of 
the  vast  populations  of  China  and  India  rising  up  with 
skilled  organization,  vast  resources,  and  comparatively 
cheap  labor  to  impoverish  the  West.  To  the  present 
writer  this  is  a  mere  bogey.  The  peril  is  of  a  very  dif¬ 
ferent  kind.  Instead  of  a  growing  approximation,  he 
sees  a  growing  disparity.  For  every  step  India  takes 
toward  mechanical  efficiency,  the  West  takes  two. 
When  India  is  beginning  to  use  bicycles  and  motor-cars 
(not  to  make  them),  the  West  is  perfecting  the  aero¬ 
plane.  That  is  merely  symbolic.  The  war,  as  we  know, 
has  speeded  up  mechanical  invention  and  produced  a 
population  of  mechanics;  but  India  has  stood  compara¬ 
tively  still.  It  is,  up  to  now,  overwhelmingly  mediaeval, 
a  country  of  domestic  industry  and  handicrafts.  Me¬ 
chanical  power,  even  of  the  simplest,  has  not  yet  been 
applied  to  its  chief  industry — agriculture.  Yet  the 
period  of  age-long  isolation  is  over,  and  India  can  never 
go  back  to  it;  nevertheless,  the  gap  between  East  and 
West  is  widening.  What  is  to  be  the  outcome  for  her 
300  millions?  We  are  in  danger  in  the  East  of  seeing 
the  worst  evils  of  commercialism  developed  on  an  enor¬ 
mous  scale,  with  the  vast  population  of  India  the  vic¬ 
tims — of  seeing  the  East  become  a  world  slum.”  1 
Whether  or  not  this  pessimistic  outlook  is  justified, 
certain  it  is  that  not  merely  India  but  the  entire  Orient 
is  in  a  stage  of  profound  transition;  and  transition  pe¬ 
riods  are  always  painful  times.  We  have  been  consider- 

1  Young  &  Ferrers,  India  in  Conflict,  pp.  15-17  (London,  1920). 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


285 


mg  the  new  industrial  proletariat  of  the  towns.  But 
the  older  social  classes  are  affected  in  very  similar  fash¬ 
ion.  The  old-type  handicraftsman  and  small  merchant 
are  obviously  menaced  by  modern  industrial  and  busi¬ 
ness  methods,  and  the  peasant  masses  are  in  little  better 
shape.  It  is  not  merely  a  change  in  technic  but  a 
fundamental  difference  in  outlook  on  life  that  is  in¬ 
volved.  The  life  of  the  old  Orient,  while  there  was 
much  want  and  hardship,  was  an  easy-going  life,  with 
virtually  no  thought  of  such  matters  as  time,  efficiency, 
output,  and  “turnover.”  The  merchant  sat  cross- 
legged  in  his  little  booth  amid  his  small  stock  of  wares, 
passively  waiting  for  trade,  chaffering  interminably  with 
his  customers,  annoyed  rather  than  pleased  if  brisk 
business  came  his  way.  The  artisan  usually  worked 
by  and  for  himself,  keeping  his  own  hours  and  knock¬ 
ing  off  whenever  he  chose.  The  peasant  arose  with  the 
dawn,  but  around  noon  he  and  his  animals  lay  down  for 
a  long  nap  and  slept  until,  in  the  cool  of  afternoon,  they 
awoke,  stretched  themselves,  and,  comfortably  and  cas¬ 
ually,  went  to  work  again. 

To  such  people  the  speed,  system,  and  discipline  of 
our  economic  life  are  painfully  repugnant,  and  adapta¬ 
tion  can  at  best  be  effected  only  very  slowly  and  under 
the  compulsion  of  the  direst  necessity.  Meanwhile 
they  suffer  from  the  competition  of  those  better  equipped 
in  the  economic  battle.  Sir  William  Ramsay  paints  a 
striking  picture  of  the  way  in  which  the  Turkish  popu¬ 
lation  of  Asia  Minor,  from  landlords  and  merchants  to 
simple  peasants,  have  been  going  down-hill  for  the  last 
half-century  under  the  economic  pressure  not  merely 
of  Westerners  but  of  the  native  Christian  elements, 


286  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


Armenians  and  Greeks,  who  had  partially  assimilated 
Western  business  ideas  and  methods.  Under  the  old 
state  of  things,  he  says,  there  was  in  Asia  Minor  “no 
economic  progress  and  no  mercantile  development; 
things  went  on  in  the  old  fashion,  year  after  year.  Such 
simple  business  as  was  carried  on  was  inconsistent  with 
the  highly  developed  Western  business  system  and  West¬ 
ern  civilization;  but  it  was  not  oppressive  to  the  people. 
There  were  no  large  fortunes;  there  was  no  opportunity 
for  making  a  great  fortune;  it  was  impossible  for  one 
man  to  force  into  his  service  the  minds  and  the  work 
of  a  large  number  of  people,  and  so  to  create  a  great 
organization  out  of  which  he  might  make  big  profits. 
There  was  a  very  large  number  of  small  men  doing  busi¬ 
ness  on  a  small  scale.”  1  Sir  William  Ramsay  then  goes 
on  to  describe  the  shattering  of  this  archaic  economic 
life  by  modern  business  methods,  to  the  consequent 
impoverishment  of  all  classes  of  the  unadaptable  Turkish 
population. 

How  the  agricultural  classes,  peasants  and  landlords 
alike,  are  suffering  from  changing  economic  conditions 
is  well  exemplified  by  the  recent  history  of  India.  Says 
the  French  writer  Chailley,  an  authoritative  student 
of  Indian  problems:  “For  the  last  half-century  large 
fractions  of  the  agricultural  classes  are  being  entirely 
despoiled  of  their  lands  or  reduced  to  onerous  tenancies. 
On  the  other  hand,  new  classes  are  rising  and  taking 
their  place.  .  .  .  Both  ryots  and  zamindars2  are  in¬ 
volved.  The  old-type  nobility  has  not  advanced  with 


1  Sir  W.  M.  Ramsay,  “The  Turkish  Peasantry  of  Anatolia,”  Quarterly 
Review ,  January,  1918. 

2 1.  e.,  peasants  and  landlords. 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


287 


the  times.  It  remains  idle  and  prodigal,  while  the 
peasant  proprietors,  burdened  by  the  traditions  of  many 
centuries,  are  likewise  improvident  and  ignorant.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  economic  conditions  of  British  In¬ 
dia  are  producing  capitalists  who  seek  employment  for 
their  wealth.  A  conflict  between  them  and  the  old 
landholders  was  predestined,  and  the  result  was  inevita¬ 
ble.  Wealth  goes  to  the  cleverest,  and  the  land  must 
pass  into  the  hands  of  new  masters,  to  the  great  indig¬ 
nation  of  the  agricultural  classes,  a  portion  of  whom  will 
be  reduced  to  the  position  of  farm-laborers.’7 1 

The  Hindu  economist  Mukerjee  thus  depicts  the  dis¬ 
integration  and  decay  of  the  Indian  village:  “New  eco¬ 
nomic  ideas  have  now  begun  to  influence  the  minds  of 
the  villagers.  Some  are  compelled  to  leave  their  occu¬ 
pations  on  account  of  foreign  competition,  but  more 
are  leaving  their  hereditary  occupations  of  their  own 
accord.  The  Brahmins  go  to  the  cities  to  seek  govern¬ 
ment  posts  or  professional  careers.  The  middle  classes 
also  leave  their  villages  and  get  scattered  all  over  the 
country  to  earn  a  living.  The  peasants  also  leave  their 
ancestral  acres  and  form  a  class  of  landless  agricultural 
laborers.  The  villages,  drained  of  their  best  blood, 
stagnate  and  decay.  The  movement  from  the  village 
to  the  city  is  in  fact  not  only  working  a  complete  revolu¬ 
tion  in  the  habits  and  ideals  of  our  people,  but  its  eco¬ 
nomic  consequences  are  far  more  serious  than  are  ordi¬ 
narily  supposed.  It  has  made  our  middle  classes  help¬ 
lessly  subservient  to  employment  and  service,  and  has 
also  killed  the  independence  of  our  peasant  proprietors. 

1 J.  Chailley,  Administrative  Problems  of  British  India ,  p.  339  (London, 
1910 — English  translation). 


288  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


It  has  jeopardized  our  food-supply,  and  is  fraught  with 
the  gravest  peril  not  only  to  our  handicrafts  but  also  to 
our  national  industry — agriculture.”  1 

Happily  there  are  signs  that,  in  Indian  agriculture 
at  least,  the  transition  period  is  working  itself  out  and 
that  conditions  may  soon  be  on  the  mend.  Both  the 
British  Government  and  the  native  princes  have  vied 
with  one  another  in  spreading  Western  agricultural  ideas 
and  methods,  and  since  the  Indian  peasant  has  proved 
much  more  receptive  than  has  the  Indian  artisan,  a  more 
intelligent  type  of  farmer  is  developing,  better  able  to 
keep  step  with  the  times.  A  good  instance  is  the  growth 
of  rural  co-operative  credit  societies.  First  introduced 
by  the  British  Government  in  1904,  there  were  in  1915 
more  than  17,000  such  associations,  with  a  total  of  825,- 
000  members  and  a  working  capital  of  nearly  $30,000,- 
000.  These  agricultural  societies  make  loans  for  the 
purchase  of  stock,  fodder,  seed,  manure,  sinking  of  wells, 
purchase  of  Western  agricultural  machinery,  and,  in 
emergencies,  personal  maintenance.  In  the  districts 
where  they  have  established  themselves  they  have 
greatly  diminished  the  plague  of  usury  practised  by  the 
“banyas,”  or  village  money-lenders,  lowering  the  rate  of 
interest  from  its  former  crushing  range  of  20  to  75  per 
cent  to  a  range  averaging  from  9  to  18  per  cent.  Of 
course  such  phenomena  are  as  yet  merely  exceptions  to 
a  very  dreary  rule.  Nevertheless,  they  all  point  toward 
a  brighter  morrow.2 

1  Mukerjee,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 

2  On  the  co-operative  movement  in  India,  see  Fisher,  India's  Silent 
Revolution,  pp.  54-58;  R.  B.  Ewebank,  “The  Co-operative  Movement  in 
India,”  Quarterly  Review,  April,  1916.  India’s  economic  problems,  both 
agricultural  and  industrial,  have  been  carefully  studied  by  a  large  number 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


289 


But  this  brighter  agricultural  morrow  is  obviously 
far  off,  and  in  industry  it  seems  to  be  farther  still.  Mean¬ 
while  the  changing  Orient  is  full  of  suffering  and  dis¬ 
content.  What  wonder  that  many  Orientals  ascribe 
their  troubles,  not  to  the  process  of  economic  transition, 
but  to  the  political  control  of  European  governments 
and  the  economic  exploitation  of  Western  capital. 
The  result  is  agitation  for  emancipation  from  Western 
economic  as  well  as  Western  political  control.  At  the 
end  of  Chapter  II  we  examined  the  movement  among 
the  Mohammedan  peoples  known  as  “  Economic  Pan- 
Islamism.”  A  similar  movement  has  arisen  among  the 
Hindus  of  India — the  so-called  “ Swadeshi”  movement. 
The  Swadeshists  declare  that  India’s  economic  ills  are 
almost  entirely  due  to  the  “ drain”  of  India’s  wealth  to 
England  and  other  Western  lands.  They  therefore 
advocate  a  boycott  of  English  goods  until  Britain  grants 
India  self-government,  whereupon  they  propose  to  erect 
protective  tariffs  for  Indian  products,  curb  the  activi¬ 
ties  of  British  capital,  replace  high-salaried  English 
officials  by  natives,  and  thereby  keep  India’s  wealth 
at  home.1 

of  Indian  economists,  some  of  whose  writings  are  extremely  interesting. 
Some  of  the  most  noteworthy  books,  besides  those  of  Mukerjee  and  Yusuf 
Ali,  already  quoted,  are:  Dadabhai  Naoroji,  Poverty  and  Un-British  Rule 
in  India  (London,  1901);  Romesh  Dutt,  The  Economic  History  of  India 
in  the  Victorian  Age  (London,  1906);  H.  H.  Gosh,  The  Advancement  of 
Industry  (Calcutta,  1910);  P.  C.  Ray,  The  Poverty  Problem  in  India  (Cal¬ 
cutta,  1895);  M.  G.  Ranade,  Essays  on  Indian  Economics  (Madras,  1920); 
Jadunath  Sarkar,  Economics  of  British  India  (Calcutta,  1911). 

1  The  best  compendium  of  Swadeshist  opinion  is  the  volume  contain¬ 
ing  pronouncements  from  all  the  Swadeshi  leaders,  entitled.  The  Swa¬ 
deshi  Movement :  A  Symposium  (Madras,  1910).  See  also  writings  of  the 
economists  Gosh,  Mukerjee,  Ray,  and  Sarkar,  above  quoted,  as  well  as  the 
various  writings  of  the  nationalist  agitator  La j  pat  Rai.  A  good  summary 
interpretation  is  found  in  M.  Glotz,  “Le  Mouvement  ‘Swadeshi’  dans 
l’lnde,”  Revue  du  Mois ,  July,  1913. 


290  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


An  analysis  of  these  Swadeshist  arguments,  however, 
reveals  them  as  inadequate  to  account  for  India’s  ills, 
which  are  due  far  more  to  the  general  economic  trend  of 
the  times  than  to  any  specific  defects  of  the  British  con¬ 
nection.  British  governance  and  British  capital  do  cost 
money,  but  their  undoubted  efficiency  in  producing 
peace,  order,  security,  and  development  must  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  offsets  to  the  higher  costs  which  native  rule 
and  native  capital  would  impose.  As  Sir  Theodore 
Morison  well  says:  “The  advantages  which  the  British 
Navy  and  British  credit  confer  on  India  are  a  liberal 
offset  to  her  expenditure  on  pensions  and  gratuities  to 
her  English  servants.  .  .  .  India  derives  a  pecuniary 
advantage  from  her  connection  with  the  British  Empire. 
The  answer,  then,  which  I  give  to  the  question  ‘What 
economic  equivalent  does  India  get  for  foreign  pay¬ 
ments?’  is  this:  India  gets  the  equipment  of  modern 
industry,  and  she  gets  an  administration  favorable  to 
economic  evolution  cheaper  than  she  could  provide  it 
herself.” 1  A  comparison  with  Japan’s  much  more 
costly  defense  budgets,  inferior  credit,  and  higher  in¬ 
terest  charges  on  both  public  and  private  loans  is  en¬ 
lightening  on  this  point. 

In  fact,  some  Indians  themselves  admit  the  fallacy  of 
Swadeshist  arguments.  As  one  of  them  remarks:  “The 
so-called  economic  ‘drain’  is  nonsense.  Most  of  the 
misery  of  late  years  is  due  to  the  rising  cost  of  living — a 
world- wide  phenomenon.”  And  in  proof  of  this  he  cites 
conditions  in  other  Oriental  countries,  especially  Japan.2 

1  Sir  T.  Morison,  The  Economic  Transition  in  India,  pp.  240-241.  Also 
see  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  Indian  Unrest,  pp.  255-279;  William  Archer, 
India  and  the  Future ,  pp.  131-157. 

2  Syed  Sirdar  Ali  Khan,  India  of  Today ,  p.  19  (Bombay,  1908). 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


291 


As  warm  a  friend  of  the  Indian  people  as  the  British 
labor  leader,  Ramsay  Macdonald,  states:  “One  thing 
is  quite  evident:  a  tariff  will  not  re-establish  the  old 
hand-industry  of  India  nor  help  to  revive  village  handi¬ 
crafts.  Factory  and  machine  production,  native  to 
India  itself,  will  throttle  them  as  effectively  as  that  of 
Lancashire  and  Birmingham  has  done  in  the  past.”  1 

Even  more  trenchant  are  the  criticisms  formulated  by 
the  Hindu  writer  Pramatha  Nath  Bose.2  The  “drain,” 
says  Mr.  Bose,  is  ruining  India.  But  would  the  Home 
Rule  programme,  as  envisaged  by  most  Swadeshists, 
cure  India’s  economic  ills?  Under  Home  Rule  these 
people  would  do  the  following  things:  (1)  Substitute 
Englishmen  for  Indians  in  the  Administration;  (2)  levy 
protective  duties  on  Indian  products;  (3)  grant  state 
encouragement  to  Indian  industries;  (4)  disseminate 
technical  education.  Now,  how  would  these  matters 
work  out?  The  substitution  of  Indian  for  British  offi¬ 
cials  would  not  lessen  the  “drain  ”  as  much  as  most 
Home  Rulers  think.  The  high-placed  Indian  officials 
who  already  exist  have  acquired  European  standards 
of  living,  so  the  new  official  corps  would  cost  almost 
as  much  as  the  old.  Also,  “the  influence  of  the  ex¬ 
ample  set  by  the  well-to-do  Indian  officials  would  per¬ 
meate  Indian  society  more  largely  than  at  present,  and 
the  demand  for  Western  articles  would  rise  in  propor¬ 
tion.  So  commercial  exploitation  by  foreigners  would 
not  only  continue  almost  as  if  they  were  Europeans,  but 
might  even  increase.”  As  to  a  protective  tariff,  it  would 
attract  European  capital  to  India  which  would  exploit 

1 J.  Ramsay  Macdonald,  The  Government  of  India,  p.  133  (London,  1920). 

2  In  The  Hindustan  Review  (Calcutta),  1917. 


292  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


labor  and  skim  the  profits.  India  has  shown  relatively 
little  capacity  for  indigenous  industrial  development.  Of 
course,  even  at  low  wages,  many  Indians  might  benefit, 
yet  such  persons  would  form  only  a  tithe  of  the  millions 
now  starving — besides  the  fact  that  this  industrialization 
would  bring  in  many  new  social  evils.  As  to  state  en¬ 
couragement  of  industries,  this  would  bring  in  Western 
capital  even  more  than  a  protective  tariff,  with  the  re¬ 
sults  already  stated.  As  for  technical  education,  it  is  a 
worthy  project,  but,  says  Mr.  Bose,  “I  am  afraid  the 
movement  is  too  late,  now.  Within  the  last  thirty  years 
the  Westerners  and  the  Japanese  have  gone  so  far  ahead 
of  us  industrially  that  it  has  been  yearly  becoming 
more  and  more  difficult  to  compete  with  them.” 

In  fact,  Mr.  Bose  goes  on  to  criticise  the  whole  system 
of  Western  education,  as  applied  to  India.  Neither 
higher  nor  lower  education  have  proven  panaceas. 
“  Higher  education  has  led  to  the  material  prosperity  of 
a  small  section  of  our  community,  comprising  a  few 
thousands  of  well-to-do  lawyers,  doctors,  and  State 
servants.  But  their  occupations  being  of  a  more  or 
less  unproductive  or  parasitic  character,  their  well¬ 
being  does  not  solve  the  problem  of  the  improvement 
of  India  as  a  whole.  On  the  contrary,  as  their  taste 
for  imported  articles  develops  in  proportion  to  their 
prosperity,  they  help  to  swell  rather  than  diminish  the 
economic  drain  from  the  country  which  is  one  of  the 
chief  causes  of  our  impoverishment.”  Neither  has  ele¬ 
mentary  education  “on  the  whole  furthered  the  well¬ 
being  of  the  multitude.  It  has  not  enabled  the  culti¬ 
vators  to  ‘grow  two  blades  where  one  grew  before/ 
On  the  contrary,  it  has  distinctly  diminished  their  effi- 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


293 


ciency  by  inculcating  in  the  literate  proletariat,  who 
constitute  the  cream  of  their  class,  a  strong  distaste  for 
their  hereditary  mode  of  living  and  their  hereditary  call¬ 
ings,  and  an  equally  strong  taste  for  shoddy  superflui¬ 
ties  and  brummagem  fineries,  and  for  occupations  of  a 
more  or  less  parasitic  character.  They  have,  directly 
or  indirectly,  accelerated  rather  than  retarded  the  de¬ 
cadence  of  indigenous  industries,  and  have  thus  helped 
to  aggravate  their  own  economic  difficulties  and  those 
of  the  entire  community.  What  they  want  is  more 
food — and  New  India  vies  with  the  Government  in  giv¬ 
ing  them  what  is  called  ‘  education  ’  that  does  not  in¬ 
crease  their  food-earning  capacity,  but  on  the  contrary 
fosters  in  them  tastes  and  habits  which  make  them  de¬ 
spise  indigenous  products  and  render  them  fit  subjects 
for  the  exploitation  of  scheming  capitalists,  mostly 
foreign.  Political  and  economic  causes  could  not  have 
led  to  the  extinction  of  indigenous  industry  if  they  had 
not  been  aided  by  change  of  taste  fostered  by  the  West¬ 
ern  environment  of  which  the  so-called  ‘ education7  is 
a  powerful  factor.  ” 

From  all  this  Mr.  Bose  concludes  that  none  of  the 
reforms  advocated  by  the  Home  Rulers  would  cure 
India’s  ills.  “In  fact,  the  chances  are,  she  would  be 
more  inextricably  entangled  in  the  toils  of  Western  civi¬ 
lization,  without  any  adequate  compensating  advantage, 
and  the  grip  of  the  West  would  close  on  her  to  crush 
her  more  effectively.”  Therefore,  according  to  Mr. 
Bose,  the  only  thing  for  India  to  do  is  to  turn  her  back 
on  everything  Western  and  plunge  resolutely  into  the 
traditional  past.  As  he  expresses  it:  “India’s  salvation 
lies,  not  in  the  region  of  politics,  but  outside  it;  not  in 


294  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


aspiring  to  be  one  of  the  1  great  ’  nations  of  the  present 
day,  but  in  retiring  to  her  humble  position — a  position, 
to  my  mind,  of  solitary  grandeur  and  glory;  not  in  going 
forward  on  the  path  of  Western  civilization,  but  in  going 
back  from  it  so  far  as  practicable;  not  in  getting  more 
and  more  entangled  in  the  silken  meshes  of  its  finely 
knit,  wide-spread  net,  but  in  escaping  from  it  as  far  as 
possible.” 

Such  are  the  drastic  conclusions  of  Mr.  Bose;  conclu¬ 
sions  shared  to  a  certain  extent  by  other  Indian  idealists 
like  Rabindranath  Tagore.  But  surely  such  projects, 
however  idealistic,  are  the  vainest  fantasies.  Whole 
peoples  cannot  arbitrarily  cut  themselves  off  from  the 
rest  of  the  world,  like  isolated  individuals  forswearing 
society  and  setting  up  as  anchorites  in  the  jungle.  The 
time  for  “ hermit  nations”  has  passed,  especially  for  a 
vast  country  like  India,  set  at  the  crossroads  of  the 
East,  open  to  the  sea,  and  already  profoundly  penetrated 
by  Western  ideas. 

Nevertheless,  such  criticisms,  appealing  as  they  do  to 
the  strong  strain  of  asceticism  latent  in  the  Indian  na¬ 
ture,  have  affected  many  Indians  who,  while  unable  to 
concur  in  the  conclusions,  still  try  to  evolve  a  “  middle 
term,”  retaining  everything  congenial  in  the  old  system 
and  grafting  on  a  select  set  of  Western  innovations. 
Accordingly,  these  persons  have  elaborated  programmes 
for  a  “new  order”  built  on  a  blend  of  Hindu  mysticism, 
caste,  Western  industry,  and  socialism.1 

Now  these  schemes  are  highly  ingenious.  But  they 
are  not  convincing.  Their  authors  should  remember 

1  Good  examples  are  found  in  the  writings  of  Mukerjee  and  Lajpat  Rai, 
already  quoted. 


ECONOMIC  CHANGE 


295 


the  old  adage  that  you  cannot  eat  your  cake  and  have  it 
too.  When  we  realize  the  abysmal  antithesis  between 
the  economic  systems  of  the  old  East  and  the  modern 
West,  any  attempt  to  combine  the  most  congenial  points 
of  both  while  eschewing  their  defects  seems  an  attempt 
to  reconcile  irreconcilables  and  about  as  profitable  as 
trying  to  square  the  circle.  As  Lowes  Dickinson  wisely 
observes:  “ Civilization  is  a  whole.  Its  art,  its  religion, 
its  way  of  life,  all  hang  together  with  its  economic  and 
technical  development.  I  doubt  whether  a  nation  can 
pick  and  choose;  whether,  for  instance,  the  East  can 
say,  ‘We  will  take  from  the  West  its  battle-ships,  its 
factories,  its  medical  science;  we  will  not  take  its  social 
confusion,  its  hurry  and  fatigue,  its  ugliness,  its  over¬ 
emphasis  on  activity/  ...  So  I  expect  the  East  to 
follow  us,  whether  it  like  it  or  no,  into  all  these  excesses, 
and  to  go  right  through,  not  round,  all  that  we  have 
been  through  on  its  way  to  a  higher  phase  of  civiliza¬ 
tion.7  ?  1 

This  seems  to  be  substantially  true.  Judged  by  the 
overwhelming  body  of  evidence,  the  East,  in  its  contem¬ 
porary  process  of  transformation,  will  follow  the  West — 
avoiding  some  of  our  more  patent  mistakes,  perhaps, 
but,  in  the  main,  proceeding  along  similar  lines.  And, 
as  already  stated,  this  transformation  is  modifying 
every  phase  of  Eastern  life.  We  have  already  examined 
the  process  at  work  in  the  religious,  political,  and  eco¬ 
nomic  phases.  To  the  social  phase  let  us  now  turn. 

1  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  An  Essay  on  the  Civilizations  of  India,  China, 
and  Japan,  pp.  84-85  (London,  1914). 


CHAPTER  VIII 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 

The  momentous  nature  of  the  contemporary  trans¬ 
formation  of  the  Orient  is  nowhere  better  attested  than 
by  the  changes  effected  in  the  lives  of  its  peoples.  That 
dynamic  influence  of  the  West  which  is  modifying  gov¬ 
ernmental  forms,  political  concepts,  religious  beliefs,  and 
economic  processes  is  proving  equally  potent  in  the  range 
of  social  phenomena.  In  the  third  chapter  of  this  vol¬ 
ume  we  attempted  a  general  survey  of  Western  influence 
along  all  the  above  lines.  In  the  present  chapter  we 
shall  attempt  a  detailed  consideration  of  the  social 
changes  which  are  to-day  taking  place. 

These  social  changes  are  very  great,  albeit  many  of 
them  may  not  be  so  apparent  as  the  changes  in  other 
fields.  So  firm  is  the  hold  of  custom  and  tradition  on 
individual,  family,  and  group  life  in  the  Orient  that 
superficial  observers  of  the  East  are  prone  to  assert 
that  these  matters  are  still  substantially  unaltered,  how¬ 
ever  pronounced  may  have  been  the  changes  on  the  ex¬ 
ternal,  material  side.  Yet  such  is  not  the  opinion  of 
the  closest  students  of  the  Orient,  and  it  is  most  em¬ 
phatically  not  the  opinion  of  Orientals  themselves. 
These  generally  stress  the  profound  social  changes  which 
are  going  on. 

And  it  is  their  judgments  which  seem  to  be  the  more 

correct.  To  say  that  the  East  is  advancing  “materi- 

296 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


297 


ally”  but  standing  still  “ socially”  is  to  ignore  the  ele¬ 
mental  truth  that  social  systems  are  altered  quite  as 
much  by  material  things  as  by  abstract  ideas.  Who 
that  looks  below  the  surface  can  deny  the  social,  moral, 
and  civilizing  power  of  railroads,  post-offices,  and  tele¬ 
graph  lines?  Does  it  mean  nothing  socially  as  well  as 
materially  that  the  East  is  adopting  from  the  West  a 
myriad  innovations,  weighty  and  trivial,  important 
and  frivolous,  useful  and  baneful?  Does  it  mean  noth¬ 
ing  socially  as  well  as  materially  that  the  Prophet’s 
tomb  at  Medina  is  lit  by  electricity  and  that  picture 
post-cards  are  sold  outside  the  Holy  Kaaba  at  Mecca? 
It  may  seem  mere  grotesque  piquancy  that  the  muezzin 
should  ride  to  the  mosque  in  a  tram-car,  or  that  the 
Moslem  business  man  should  emerge  from  his  harem, 
read  his  morning  paper,  motor  to  an  office  equipped  with 
a  prayer-rug,  and  turn  from  his  devotions  to  dictaphone 
and  telephone.  Yet  why  assume  that  his  life  is  moulded 
by  mosque,  harem,  and  prayer-rug,  and  yet  deny  the 
things  of  the  West  a  commensurate  share  in  the  shaping 
of  his  social  existence?  Now  add  to  these  tangible  inno¬ 
vations  intangible  novelties  like  scientific  education, 
Occidental  amusements,  and  the  partial  emancipation 
of  women,  and  we  begin  to  get  some  idea  of  the  depth 
and  scope  of  the  social  transformation  which  is  going 
on. 

In  those  parts  of  the  Orient  most  open  to  Western 
influences  this  social  transformation  has  attained  nota¬ 
ble  proportions  for  more  than  a  generation.  When  the 
Hungarian  Orientalist  Vambery  returned  to  Constanti¬ 
nople  in  1896  after  forty  years’  absence,  he  stood  amazed 
at  the  changes  which  had  taken  place,  albeit  Constan- 


298  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tinople  was  then  subjected  to  the  worst  repression  of 
the  Hamidian  regime.  “I  had,”  he  writes,  “ continually 
to  ask  myself  this  question:  Is  it  possible  that  these  are 
my  Turks  of  1856;  and  how  can  all  these  transformations 
have  taken  place?  I  was  astonished  at  the  aspect  of 
the  city;  at  the  stone  buildings  which  had  replaced  the 
old  wooden  ones;  at  the  animation  of  the  streets,  in 
which  carriages  and  tram-cars  abounded,  whereas  forty 
years  before  only  saddle-animals  were  used;  and  when 
the  strident  shriek  of  the  locomotive  mingled  with  the 
melancholy  calls  from  the  minarets,  all  that  I  saw  and 
heard  seemed  to  me  a  living  protest  against  the  old 
adage:  da  bidaat  fil  Islam ’ — 'there  is  nothing  to  reform 
in  Islam/  My  astonishment  became  still  greater  when 
I  entered  the  houses  and  was  able  to  appreciate  the 
people,  not  only  by  their  exteriors  but  still  more  by  their 
manner  of  thought.  The  effendi  class1  of  Constanti¬ 
nople  seemed  to  me  completely  transformed  in  its  con¬ 
duct,  outlook,  and  attitude  toward  foreigners.”  2 
Vambery  stresses  the  inward  as  well  as  outward  evolu¬ 
tion  of  the  Turkish  educated  classes,  for  he  says:  "Not 
only  in  his  outward  aspect,  but  also  in  his  home-life, 
the  present-day  Turk  shows  a  strong  inclination  to  the 
manners  and  habits  of  the  West,  in  such  varied  matters 
as  furniture,  table-manners,  sex-relations,  and  so  forth. 
This  is  of  the  very  greatest  significance.  For  a  people 
may,  to  be  sure,  assimilate  foreign  influences  in  the 
intellectual  field,  if  it  be  persuaded  of  their  utility  and 
advantage;  but  it  gives  up  with  more  difficulty  customs 
and  habits  which  are  in  the  blood.  One  cannot  over- 


1  /.  e.y  the  educated  upper  class 

9  Vambery,  La  Turquie  d’aujourd’hui  el  d’avant  Quarante  Ans ,  p.  13. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


299 


estimate  the  numerous  sacrifices  which,  despite  every¬ 
thing,  the  Turks  have  made  in  this  line.  I  find  all  Turk¬ 
ish  society,  even  the  Mollahs,1  penetrated  with  the 
necessity  of  a  union  with  Western  civilization.  Opin¬ 
ions  may  differ  as  to  the  method  of  assimilation:  some 
wish  to  impress  on  the  foreign  civilization  a  national 
character;  others,  on  the  contrary,  are  partisans  of  our 
intellectual  culture,  such  as  it  is,  and  reprobate  any  kind 
of  modification.”  2 

Most  significant  of  all,  Vambery  found  even  the  se¬ 
cluded  women  of  the  harems,  “  those  bulwarks  of  obscur¬ 
antism,”  notably  changed.  “Yes,  I  repeat,  the  life  of 
women  in  Turkey  seems  to  me  to  have  been  radically 
transformed  in  the  last  forty  years,  and  it  cannot  be  de¬ 
nied  that  this  transformation  has  been  produced  by  in¬ 
ternal  conviction  as  much  as  by  external  pressure.” 
Noting  the  spread  of  female  education,  and  the  in¬ 
creasing  share  of  women  in  reform  movements,  Vambery 
remarks:  “This  is  of  vital  importance,  for  when  women 
shall  begin  to  act  in  the  family  as  a  factor  of  modern 
progress,  real  reforms,  in  society  as  well  as  in  the  state, 
cannot  fail  to  appear.”  3 

In  India  a  similar  permeation  of  social  life  by  West¬ 
ernism  is  depicted  by  the  Moslem  liberal,  S.  Khuda 
Bukhsh,  albeit  Mr.  Bukhsh,  being  an  insider,  lays  greater 
emphasis  upon  the  painful  aspects  of  the  inevitable 
transition  process  from  old  to  new.  He  is  not  unduly 
pessimistic,  for  he  recognizes  that  “the  age  of  transition 
is  necessarily  to  a  certain  extent  an  age  of  laxity  of  mor¬ 
als,  indifference  to  religion,  superficial  culture,  and  gos¬ 
siping  levity.  These  are  passing  ills  which  time  itself 

1 1.  e.,  the  priestly  class.  2  Ibid.,  p.  15.  3  Ibid.,  p.  51. 


300  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


will  cure.”  Nevertheless,  he  does  not  minimize  the 
critical  aspects  of  the  present  situation,  which  implies 
nothing  less  than  the  breakdown  of  the  old  social  sys¬ 
tem.  “The  clearest  result  of  this  breakdown  of  our 
old  system  of  domestic  life  and  social  customs  under 
the  assault  of  European  ideas,”  he  says,  “is  to  be  found 
in  two  directions — in  our  religious  beliefs  and  in  our  so¬ 
cial  life.  The  old  system,  with  all  its  faults,  had  many 
redeeming  virtues.”  To-day  this  old  system,  narrow¬ 
minded  but  God-fearing,  has  been  replaced  by  a  “strange 
independence  of  thought  and  action.  Reverence  for 
age,  respect  for  our  elders,  deference  to  the  opinions  of 
others,  are  fast  disappearing.  .  .  .  Under  the  older 
system  the  head  of  the  family  was  the  sole  guide  and 
friend  of  its  members.  His  word  had  the  force  of  law. 
He  was,  so  to  speak,  the  custodian  of  the  honor  and 
prestige  of  the  family.  From  this  exalted  position  he 
is  now  dislodged,  and  the  most  junior  member  now 
claims  equality  with  him.”  1 
Mr.  Bukhsh  deplores  the  current  wave  of  extrava¬ 
gance,  due  to  the  wholesale  adoption  of  European  cus¬ 
toms  and  modes  of  living.  “What,”  he  asks,  “has 
happened  here  in  India?  We  have  adopted  European 
costume,  European  ways  of  living,  even  the  European 
vices  of  drinking  and  gambling,  but  none  of  their  vir¬ 
tues.  This  must  be  remedied.  We  must  learn  at  the 
feet  of  Europe,  but  not  at  the  sacrifice  of  our  Eastern 
individuality.  But  this  is  precisely  what  we  have  not 
done.  We  have  dabbled  a  little  in  English  and  Euro¬ 
pean  history,  and  we  have  commenced  to  despise  our 
religion,  our  literature,  our  history,  our  traditions.  We 

1  Bukhsh,  Essays :  Indian  and  Islamic,  pp.  221-226. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


301 


have  unlearned  the  lessons  of  our  history  and  our  civili¬ 
zation,  and  in  their  place  we  have  secured  nothing  solid 
and  substantial  to  hold  society  fast  in  the  midst  of  end¬ 
less  changes.”  In  fine:  “Destruction  has  done  its  work, 
but  the  work  of  construction  has  not  yet  begun.”  1 

Like  Vambery,  Bukhsh  lays  strong  emphasis  on  the 
increasing  emancipation  of  women.  No  longer  regarded 
as  mere  “child-bearing  machines,”  the  Mohammedan 
women  of  India  “are  getting  educated  day  by  day,  and 
now  assert  their  rights.  Though  the  purdah  system2 
still  prevails,  it  is  no  longer  that  severe,  stringent,  and 
unreasonable  seclusion  of  women  which  existed  fifty 
years  ago.  It  is  gradually  relaxing,  and  women  are 
getting,  step  by  step,  rights  and  liberties  which  must  in 
course  of  time  end  in  the  complete  emancipation  of 
Eastern  womanhood.  Forty  years  ago  women  meekly 
submitted  to  neglect,  indifference,  and  even  harsh  treat¬ 
ment  from  their  husbands,  but  such  is  the  case  no 
longer.”  3 

These  two  descriptions  of  social  conditions  in  the  Near 
and  Middle  East  respectively  enable  one  to  get  a  fair 
idea  of  the  process  of  change  which  is  going  on.  Of 
course  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  both  writers  deal 
primarily  with  the  educated  upper  classes  of  the  large 
towns.  Nevertheless,  the  leaven  is  working  steadily 
downward,  and  with  every  decade  is  affecting  wider 
strata  of  the  native  populations. 

The  spread  of  Western  education  in  the  East  during 
the  past  few  decades  has  been  truly  astonishing,  because 

1  Ibid.,  p.  240. 

2  The  purdah  is  the  curtain  separating  the  women’s  apartments  from 
the  rest  of  the  house. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  254-255. 


302  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

it  is  the  exact  antithesis  of  the  Oriental  educational  sys¬ 
tem.  The  traditional  “ education7’  of  the  entire  Orient, 
from  Morocco  to  China,  was  a  mere  memorizing  of  sa¬ 
cred  texts  combined  with  exercises  of  religious  devotion. 
The  Mohammedan  or  Hindu  student  spent  long  years 
reciting  to  his  master  (a  “holy  man”)  interminable 
passages  from  books  which,  being  written  in  classic 
Arabic  or  Sanskrit,  were  unintelligible  to  him,  so  that 
he  usually  did  not  understand  a  word  of  what  he  was 
saying.  No  more  deadening  system  for  the  intellect 
could  possibly  have  been  devised.  Every  part  of  the 
brain  except  the  memory  atrophied,  and  the  wonder  is 
that  any  intellectual  initiative  or  original  thinking  ever 
appeared. 

Even  to-day  the  old  system  persists,  and  millions  of 
young  Orientals  are  still  wasting  their  time  at  this  mind- 
petrifying  nonsense.  But  alongside  the  old  there  has 
arisen  a  new  system,  running  the  whole  educational 
gamut  from  kindergartens  to  universities,  where  Orien¬ 
tal  youth  is  being  educated  along  Western  lines.  These 
new-type  educational  establishments  are  of  every  kind. 
Besides  schools  and  universities  giving  a  liberal  educa¬ 
tion  and  fitting  students  for  government  service  or  the 
.  professions,  there  are  numerous  technical  schools  turn¬ 
ing  out  skilled  agriculturists  or  engineers,  while  good 
normal  schools  assure  a  supply  of  teachers  qualified  to 
instruct  coming  student-generations.  Both  public  and 
private  effort  furthers  Western  education  in  the  East. 
All  the  European  governments  have  favored  Western 
education  in  the  lands  under  their  control,  particularly 
the  British  in  India  and  Egypt,  while  various  Christian 
missionary  bodies  have  covered  the  East  with  a  net- 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


303 


work  of  schools  and  colleges.  Also  many  Oriental  gov¬ 
ernments  like  Turkey  and  the  native  states  of  India 
have  made  sincere  efforts  to  spread  Western  education 
among  their  peoples.1 

Of  course;  as  in  any  new  development,  the  results  so 
far  obtained  are  far  from  ideal.  The  vicious  traditions 
of  the  past  handicap  or  partially  pervert  the  efforts  of 
the  present.  Eastern  students  are  prone  to  use  their 
memories  rather  than  their  intellects,  and  seek  to  cram 
their  way  quickly  through  examinations  to  coveted  posts 
rather  than  acquire  knowledge  and  thus  really  fit  them¬ 
selves  for  their  careers.  The  result  is  that  many  fail, 
and  these  unfortunates,  half-educated  and  spoiled  for 
any  sort  of  useful  occupation,  vegetate  miserably,  come 
to  hate  that  Westernism  which  they  do  not  understand, 
and  give  themselves  up  to  anarchistic  revolutionary 
agitation.  Sir  Alfred  Lyall  well  describes  the  dark  side 
of  Western  education  in  the  East  when  he  says  of  India: 
“Ignorance  is  unquestionably  the  root  of  many  evils; 
and  it  was  natural  that  in  the  last  century  certain  phi¬ 
losophers  should  have  assumed  education  to  be  a  certain 
cure  for  human  delusions;  and  that  statesmen  like  Ma¬ 
caulay  should  have  declared  education  to  be  the  best  and 
surest  remedy  for  political  discontent  and  for  law-break¬ 
ing.  In  any  case,  it  was  the  clear  and  imperative  duty 
of  the  British  Government  to  attempt  the  intellectual 
emancipation  of  India  as  the  best  justification  of  British 
rule.  We  have  since  discovered  by  experience,  that, 
although  education  is  a  sovereign  remedy  for  many  ills — 


1  For  progress  in  Western  education  in  the  Orient,  under  both  European 
and  native  auspices,  see  L.  Bertrand,  Le  Mirage  oriental ,  pp.  291-  -392; 
C.  S.  Cooper,  The  Modernizing  of  the  Orient ,  pp.  3-13;  24-64. 


304  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


is  indeed  indispensable  to  healthy  progress — yet  an  in¬ 
discriminate  or  superficial  administration  of  this  potent 
medicine  may  engender  other  disorders.  It  acts  upon 
the  frame  of  an  antique  society  as  a  powerful  dissolvent, 
heating  weak  brains,  stimulating  rash  ambitions,  rais¬ 
ing  inordinate  expectations  of  which  the  disappointment 
is  bitterly  resented/’  1 

Indeed,  some  Western  observers  of  the  Orient,  particu¬ 
larly  colonial  officials,  have  been  so  much  impressed  by 
the  political  and  social  dangers  arising  from  the  existence 
of  this  “ literate  proletariat”  of  semieducated  failures 
that  they  are  tempted  to  condemn  the  whole  venture 
of  Western  education  in  the  East  as  a  mistake.  Lord 
Cromer,  for  example,  was  decidedly  sceptical  of  the 
worth  of  the  Western-educated  Egyptian,2  while  a 
prominent  Anglo-Indian  official  names  as  the  chief 
cause  of  Indian  unrest,  “the  system  of  education,  which 
we  ourselves  introduced — advisedly  so  far  as  the  limited 
vision  went  of  those  responsible;  blindly  in  view  of  the 
inevitable  consequences.”  3 

Yet  these  pessimistic  judgments  do  not  seem  to  make 
due  allowance  for  the  inescapable  evils  attendant  on 
any  transition  stage.  Other  observers  of  the  Orient 
have  made  due  allowance  for  this  factor.  Vambery, 
for  instance,  notes  the  high  percentage  of  honest  and 
capable  native  officials  in  the  British  Indian  and  French 
North  African  civil  service  (the  bulk  of  these  officials,  of 
course,  Western-educated  men),  and  concludes:  “Strictly 
conservative  Orientals,  and  also  fanatically  inclined 

1  In  his  Introduction  to  Sir  Valentine  Chirol’s  Indian  Unrest ,  p.  xii. 

2  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt ,  vol.  II,  pp.  228-243. 

3  J.  D.  Rees,  The  Real  India ,  p.  162  (London,  1908). 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


305 


Europeans,  think  that  with  the  entrance  of  our  culture 
the  primitive  virtues  of  the  Asiatics  have  been  destroyed, 
and  that  the  uncivilized  Oriental  was  more  faithful, 
more  honest,  and  more  reliable  than  the  Asiatic  edu¬ 
cated  on  European  principles.  This  is  a  gross  error.  It 
may  be  true  of  the  half-educated,  but  not  of  the  Asiatic 
in  whose  case  the  intellectual  evolution  is  founded  on 
the  solid  basis  of  a  thorough,  systematic  education.”  1 

And,  whatever  may  be  the  ills  attendant  upon  West¬ 
ern  education  in  the  East,  is  it  not  the  only  practicable 
course  to  pursue?  The  impact  of  Westernism  upon  the 
Orient  is  too  ubiquitous  to  be  confined  to  books.  Grant¬ 
ing,  therefore,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  colonial 
governments  could  have  prevented  Western  education 
in  the  formal  sense,  would  not  the  Oriental  have  learned 
in  other  ways?  Surely  it  is  better  that  he  should  learn 
through  good  texts  under  the  supervision  of  qualified 
teachers,  rather  than  tortuously  in  perverted — and  more 
dangerous — fashion. 

The  importance  of  Western  education  in  the  East  is 
nowhere  better  illustrated  than  in  the  effects  it  is  pro¬ 
ducing  in  ameliorating  the  status  of  women.  The  de¬ 
pressed  condition  of  women  throughout  the  Orient  is 
too  well  known  to  need  elaboration.  Bad  enough  in 
Mohammedan  countries,  it  is  perhaps  at  its  worst  among 
the  Hindus  of  India,  with  child-marriage,  the  virtual1 
enslavement  of  widows  (burned  alive  till  prohibited  by 
English  law),  and  a  seclusion  more  strict  even  than  that 
of  the  “ harem”  of  Moslem  lands.  As  an  English  writer 
well  puts  it:  Ladies  first/  we  say  in  the  West;  in  the 
East  it  is  Tadies  last/  That  sums  up  succinctly  the  dif- 

1  Vambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands ,  pp.  203-204. 


306  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ference  in  the  domestic  ideas  of  the  two  civilizations.”  1 

Under  these  circumstances  it  might  seem  as  though 
no  breath  of  the  West  could  yet  have  reached  these  jeal¬ 
ously  secluded  creatures.  Yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
Western  influences  have  already  profoundly  affected 
the  women  of  the  upper  classes,  and  female  education, 
while  far  behind  that  of  the  males,  has  attained  con¬ 
siderable  proportions.  In  the  more  advanced  parts  of 
the  Orient  like  Constantinople,  Cairo,  and  the  cities 
of  India,  distinctly  “  modern”  types  of  women  have 
appeared,  the  self-supporting,  self-respecting — and  re¬ 
spected — woman  school-teacher  being  especially  in  evi¬ 
dence. 

The  social  consequences  of  this  rising  status  of  women, 
not  only  to  women  themselves  but  also  to  the  com¬ 
munity  at  large,  are  very  important.  In  the  East  the 
harem  is,  as  Vambery  well  says,  the  “  bulwark  of  ob¬ 
scurantism.”  2  Ignorant  and  fanatical  herself,  the  ha¬ 
rem  woman  implants  her  ignorance  and  fanaticism  in 
her  sons  as  well  as  in  her  daughters.  What  could  be  a 
worse  handicap  for  the  Eastern  “  intellectual  ”  than  his 
boyhood  years  spent  “behind  the  veil”?  No  wonder 
that  enlightened  Oriental  fathers  have  been  in  the 
habit  of  sending  their  boys  to  school  at  the  earliest  pos¬ 
sible  age  in  order  to  get  them  as  soon  as  possible  out  of 
the  stultifying  atmosphere  of  harem  life.  Yet  even  this 
has  proved  merely  a  palliative.  Childhood  impressions 
are  ever  the  most  lasting,  and  so  long  as  one-half  of  the 
•  Orient  remained  untouched  by  progressive  influences. 


1  H.  E.  Compton,  Indian  Life  in  Town  and  Country ,  p.  98  (London, 
1904). 

2  Vambery,  La  Turquie  d' aujourd'hui  et  d’avant  Quarante  Ans,  p.  32. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


307 


Oriental  progress  had  to  be  begun  again  de  novo  with 
every  succeeding  generation. 

The  increasing  number  of  enlightened  Oriental  women 
is  remedying  this  fatal  defect.  As  a  Western  writer 
well  says:  “Give  the  mothers  education  and  the  whole 
situation  is  transformed.  Girls  who  are  learning  other 
things  than  the  unintelligible  phrases  of  the  Koran  are 
certain  to  impart  such  knowledge,  as  daughters,  sisters, 
and  mothers,  to  their  respective  households.  Women 
who  learn  housewifery,  methods  of  modern  cooking, 
sewing,  and  sanitation  in  the  domestic-economy  schools, 
are  bound  to  cast  about  the  home  upon  their  return  the 
atmosphere  of  a  civilized  community.  The  old-time 
picture  of  the  Oriental  woman  spending  her  hours  upon 
divans,  eating  sweetmeats,  and  indulging  in  petty  and 
degrading  gossip  with  the  servants  or  with  women  as 
ignorant  as  herself,  will  be  changed.  The  new  woman 
will  be  a  companion  rather  than  a  slave  or  a  toy  of  her 
husband.  Marriage  will  advance  from  the  stage  of  a 
paltry  trade  in  bodies  to  something  like  a  real  union, 
involving  respect  toward  the  woman  by  both  sons  and 
fathers,  while  in  a  new  pride  of  relationship  the  woman 
herself  will  be  discovered.”  1 

These  men  and  women  of  the  newer  Orient  reflect 
their  changing  ideas  in  their  changing  standards  of  liv¬ 
ing.  Although  this  is  most  evident  among  the  wealthier 
elements  of  the  towns,  it  is  perceptible  in  all  classes  of 
the  population.  Rich  and  poor,  urban  and  rural,  the 
Orientals  are  altering  their  living  standards  toward  those 
of  the  West.  And  this  involves  social  changes  of  the 
most  far-reaching  character,  because  few  antitheses 

1  Cooper,  op.  cit.,  pp.  48-49. 


308  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


could  be  sharper  than  the  living  conditions  prevailing 
respectively  in  the  traditional  East  and  in  the  modern 
Western  world.  This  basic  difference  lies,  not  in  wealth 
(the  East,  like  the  West,  knows  great  riches  as  well  as 
great  poverty),  but  rather  in  comfort — using  the  word  in 
its  broad  sense.  The  wealthy  Oriental  of  the  old  school 
spends  most  of  his  money  on  Oriental  luxuries,  like  fine 
raiment,  jewels,  women,  horses,  and  a  great  retinue  of 
attendants,  and  then  hoards  the  rest.  But  of  “comfort,” 
in  the  Western  sense,  he  knows  virtually  nothing,  and 
it  is  safe  to  say  that  he  lives  under  domestic  conditions 
which  a  Western  artisan  would  despise.1 

To-day,  however,  the  Oriental  is  discovering  “com¬ 
fort.”  And,  high  or  low,  he  likes  it  very  well.  All  the 
myriad  things  which  make  our  lives  easier  and  more 
agreeable — lamps,  electric  lights,  sewing-machines,  clocks, 
whiskey,  umbrellas,  sanitary  plumbing,  and  a  thousand 
others;  all  these  things,  which  to  us  are  more  or  less 
matters  of  course,  are  to  the  Oriental  so  many  delightful 
discoveries,  of  irresistible  appeal.  He  wants  them,  and 
he  gets  them  in  ever-increasing  quantities.  But  this 
produces  some  rather  serious  complications.  His  pri¬ 
vate  economy  is  more  or  less  thrown  out  of  gear.  This 
opening  of  a  whole  vista  of  new  wants  means  a  porten¬ 
tous  rise  in  his  standard  of  living.  And  where  is  he 
going  to  find  the  money  to  pay  for  it?  If  he  be  poor, 
he  has  to  skimp  on  his  bare  necessities.  If  he  be  rich, 
he  hates  to  forego  his  traditional  luxuries.  The  upshot 
is  a  universal  growth  of  extravagance.  And,  in  this 

this  point  of  comfort  vs.  luxury,  see  especially  Sir  Bampfylde 
Fuller,  “East  and  West:  A  Study  of  Differences,”  Nineteenth  Century  and 
After,  November,  1911. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


309 


connection;  it  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  peoples  of 
the  Near  and  Middle  East,  taken  as  a  whole,  have  never 
been  really  thrifty.  Poor  the  masses  may  have  been, 
and  thus  obliged  to  live  frugally,  but  they  have  always 
proved  themselves  “good  spenders”  when  opportunity 
offers.  The  way  in  which  a  Turkish  peasant  or  a  Hindu 
ryot  will  squander  his  savings  and  run  into  debt  over 
festivals,  marriages,  funerals,  and  other  social  events  is 
astounding  to  Western  observers.1  Now  add  to  all 
this  the  fact  that  in  the  Orient,  as  in  the  rest  of  the 
world,  the  cost  of  the  basic  necessaries  of  life — food, 
clothing,  fuel,  and  shelter,  has  risen  greatly  during  the 
past  two  decades,  and  we  can  realize  the  gravity  of  the 
problem  which  higher  Oriental  living-standards  involves.2 

Certain  it  is  that  the  struggle  for  existence  is  grow¬ 
ing  keener  and  that  the  pressure  of  poverty  is  getting 
more  severe.  With  the  basic  necessaries  rising  in  price, 
and  with  many  things  considered  necessities  which  were 
considered  luxuries  or  entirely  unheard  of  a  generation 
ago,  the  Oriental  peasant  or  town  working  man  is  finding 
it  harder  and  harder  to  make  both  ends  meet.  As  one 
writer  well  phrases  it:  “These  altered  economic  condi¬ 
tions  have  not  as  yet  brought  the  ability  to  meet  them. 
The  cost  of  living  has  increased  faster  than  the  resources 
of  the  people.”  3 

1  L.  Bertrand,  op.  cit.,  145-147 ;  J.  Chailley,  Administrative  Problems  of 
British  India ,  pp.  138-139.  For  increased  expenditure  on  Western  prod¬ 
ucts,  see  A.  J.  Brown,  “Economic  Changes  in  Asia,”  The  Century ,  March, 
1904;  J.  P.  Jones,  “The  Present  Situation  in  India,”  Journal  of  Race 
Development ,  July,  1910;  R.  Mukerjee,  The  Foundations  of  Indian  Eco¬ 
nomics ,  p.  5. 

2  For  higher  cost  of  living  in  the  East,  see  Chirol,  Indian  Unrest ,  pp.  2-3; 
Fisher,  India's  Silent  Revolution ,  pp.  46-60;  Jones,  op.  cit.;  T.  T.  Williams, 
“Inquiry  into  the  Rise  of  Prices  in  India,”  Economic  Journal ,  December, 
1915. 

3  Brown,  op.  cit . 


310  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


One  of  the  main  (though  not  sufficiently  recognized) 
causes  of  the  economico-social  crisis  through  which  the 
Orient  is  to-day  passing  is  overpopulation.  The  quick 
breeding  tendencies  of  Oriental  peoples  have  always 
been  proverbial;  and  have  been  due  not  merely  to  strong 
sexual  appetites  but  also  to  economic  reasons  like  the 
harsh  exploitation  of  women  and  children;  and  perhaps 
even  more  to  religious  doctrines  enjoining  early  marriage 
and  the  begetting  of  numerous  sons.  As  a  result.  Ori¬ 
ental  populations  have  always  pressed  close  upon  the 
limits  of  subsistence.  In  the  past;  however;  this  pres¬ 
sure  was  automatically  lightened  by  factors  like  war, 
misgovernment,  pestilence,  and  famine,  which  swept 
off  such  multitudes  of  people  that,  despite  high  birth¬ 
rates,  populations  remained  at  substantially  a  fixed  level. 
But  here,  as  in  every  other  phase  of  Eastern  life,  West¬ 
ern  influences  have  radically  altered  the  situation.  The 
extension  of  European  political  control  over  Eastern 
lands  has  meant  the  putting  down  of  internal  strife, 
the  diminution  of  governmental  abuses,  the  decrease  of 
disease,  and  the  lessening  of  the  blight  of  famine.  In 
other  words,  those  “ natural”  checks  which  previously 
kept  down  the  population  have  been  diminished  or  abol¬ 
ished,  and  in  response  to  the  life-saving  activities  of  the 
West,  the  enormous  death-rate  which  in  the  past  has 
kept  Oriental  populations  from  excessive  multiplication 
is  falling  to  proportions  comparable  with  the  low  death- 
rate  of  Western  nations.  But  to  lower  the  Orient’s 
prodigious  birth-rate  is  quite  another  matter.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  birth-rate  keeps  up  with  undimin¬ 
ished  vigor,  and  the  consequence  has  been  a  portentous 
increase  of  population  in  nearly  every  portion  of  the 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


311 


Orient  under  Western  political  control.  In  fact,  even 
those  Oriental  countries  which  have  maintained  their 
independence  have  more  or  less  adopted  Western  life- 
conserving  methods,  and  have  experienced  in  greater  or 
less  degree  an  accelerated  increase  of  population. 

The  phenomena  of  overpopulation  are  best  seen  in 
India.  Most  of  India  has  been  under  British  control 
for  the  greater  part  of  a  century.  Even  a  century  ago, 
India  was  densely  populated,  yet  in  the  intervening 
hundred  years  the  population  has  increased  between 
two  and  three  fold.1  Of  course,  factors  like  improved 
agriculture,  irrigation,  railways,  and  the  introduction 
of  modern  industry  enable  India  to  support  a  much 
larger  population  than  it  could  have  done  at  the  time  of 
the  British  conquest.  Nevertheless,  the  evidence  is 
clear  that  excessive  multiplication  has  taken  place. 
Nearly  all  qualified  students  of  the  problem  concur  on 
this  point.  Forty  years  ago  the  Duke  of  Argyll  stated: 
“ Where  there  is  no  store,  no  accumulation,  no  wealth; 
where  the  people  live  from  hand  to  mouth  from  season 
to  season  on  a  low  diet;  and  where,  nevertheless,  they 
breed  and  multiply  at  such  a  rate;  there  we  can  at  least 
see  that  this  power  and  force  of  multiplication  is  no 
evidence  even  of  safety,  far  less  of  comfort.”  Toward 
the  close  of  the  last  century,  Sir  William  Hunter  termed 
population  India’s  “  fundamental  problem,”  and  con¬ 
tinued:  “The  result  of  civilized  rule  in  India  has  been 
to  produce  a  strain  on  the  food-producing  powers  of  the 
country  such  as  it  had  never  before  to  bear.  It  has  be- 


1  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  population  of  India 
is  roughly  estimated  to  have  been  about  100,000,000.  According  to  the 
census  of  1911  the  population  was  315,000,000. 


312  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


come  a  truism  of  Indian  statistics  that  the  removal  of 
the  old  cruel  checks  on  population  in  an  Asiatic  country 
is  by  no  means  an  unmixed  blessing  to  an  Asiatic  peo¬ 
ple.”  1  Lord  Cromer  remarks  of  India’s  poverty:  “Not 
only  cannot  it  be  remedied  by  mere  philanthropy;  but 
it  is  absolutely  certain — cruel  and  paradoxical  though  it 
may  appear  to  say  so — that  philanthropy  enhances  the 
evil.  In  the  days  of  Akhbar  or  Shah  Jehan;  cholera, 
famine,  and  internal  strife  kept  down  the  population. 
Only  the  fittest  survived.  Now  internal  strife  is  forbid¬ 
den,  and  philanthropy  steps  in  and  says  that  no  single 
life  shall  be  sacrificed  if  science  and  Western  energy  or 
skill  can  save  it.  Hence  the  growth  of  a  highly  con¬ 
gested  population,  vast  numbers  of  whom  are  living  on  a 
bare  margin  of  subsistence.  The  fact  that  one  of  the 
greatest  difficulties  of  governing  the  teeming  masses  of 
the  East  is  caused  by  good  and  humane  government 
should  be  recognized.  It  is  too  often  ignored.”  2 

William  Archer  well  states  the  matter  when,  in  answer 
to  the  query  why  improved  external  conditions  have  not 
brought  India  prosperity,  he  says:  “The  reason,  in  my 
view,  is  simple:  namely,  that  the  benefit  of  good  govern¬ 
ment  is,  in  part  at  any  rate,  nullified,  when  the  people 
take  advantage  of  it,  not  to  save  and  raise  their  stand¬ 
ard  of  living,  but  to  breed  to  the  very  margin  of  sub¬ 
sistence.  Henry  George  used  to  point  out  that  every 
mouth  that  came  into  the  world  brought  two  hands 
along  with  it;  but  though  the  physiological  fact  is  unde¬ 
niable,  the  economic  deduction  suggested  will  not  hold 

1  Sir  W.  W.  Hunter,  The  India  of  the  Queen  and  Other  Essays,  p.  42  (Lon¬ 
don,  1903). 

2  Cromer,  “Some  Problems  of  Government  in  Europe  and  Asia,”  Nine-> 
teenth  Century  and  After,  May,  1913. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


313 


good  except  in  conditions  that  permit  of  the  profitable 
employment  of  the  two  hands.  ...  If  mouths  increase 
in  a  greater  ratio  than  food,  the  tendency  must  be  to¬ 
ward  greater  poverty.” 1 

It  is  one  of  the  most  unfortunate  aspects  of  the  situa¬ 
tion  that  very  few  Oriental  thinkers  yet  realize  that 
overpopulation  is  a  prime  cause  of  Oriental  poverty. 
Almost  without  exception  they  lay  the  blame  to  politi¬ 
cal  factors,  especially  to  Western  political  control.  In 
fact,  the  only  case  that  I  know  of  where  an  Eastern 
thinker  has  boldly  faced  the  problem  and  has  coura¬ 
geously  advocated  birth-control  is  in  the  book  published 
five  years  ago  by  P.  K.  Wattal,  a  native  official  of  the 
Indian  Finance  Department,  entitled,  The  Population 
Problem  of  India.2  This  pioneer  volume  is  written  with 
such  ability  and  is  of  such  apparent  significance  as  an 
indication  of  the  awakening  of  Orientals  to  a  more  ra¬ 
tional  attitude,  that  it  merits  special  attention. 

Mr.  Wattal  begins  his  book  by  a  plea  to  his  fellow 
countrymen  to  look  at  the  problem  rationally  and  with¬ 
out  prejudice.  “This  essay,”  he  says,  “should  not  be 
construed  into  an  attack  on  the  spiritual  civilization  of 
our  country,  or  even  indirectly  into  a  glorification  of 
the  materialism  of  the  West.  The  object  in  view  is 
that  we  should  take  a  somewhat  more  matter-of-fact 
view  of  the  main  problem  of  life,  viz.,  how  to  live  in  this 
world.  We  are  a  poor  people;  the  fact  is  indisputable. 
Our  poverty  is,  perhaps,  due  to  a  great  many  causes. 
But  I  put  it  to  every  one  of  us  whether  he  has  not  at 


1  Archer,  India  and  the  Future,  pp.  157,  162  (London,  1918). 

2  P.  K.  Wattal,  of  the  Indian  Finance  Department,  Assistant  Account¬ 
ant-General,  The  book  was  published  at  Bombay,  1916. 


314  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


some  of  the  most  momentous  periods  of  his  life  been 
handicapped  by  having  to  support  a  large  family,  and 
whether  this  encumbrance  has  not  seriously  affected 
the  chances  of  advancement  warranted  by  early  promise 
and  exceptional  endowment.  This  question  should  be 
viewed  by  itself.  It  is  a  physical  fact,  and  has  nothing 
to  do  with  political  environment  or  religious  obligation. 
If  we  have  suffered  from  the  consequences  of  that  mis¬ 
take,  is  it  not  a  duty  that  we  owe  to  ourselves  and  to 
our  progeny  that  its  evil  effects  shall  be  mitigated  as 
far  as  possible?  There  is  no  greater  curse  than  pov¬ 
erty — I  say  this  with  due  respect  to  our  spiritualism. 
It  is  not  in  a  spirit  of  reproach  that  restraint  in  married 
life  is  urged  in  these  pages.  It  is  solely  from  a  vivid 
realization  of  the  hardships  caused  by  large  families  and 
a  profound  sympathy  with  the  difficulties  under  which 
large  numbers  of  respectable  persons  struggle  through 
life  in  this  country  that  I  have  made  bold  to  speak  in 
plain  terms  what  comes  to  every  young  man,  but  which 
he  does  not  care  to  give  utterance  to  in  a  manner  that 
would  prevent  the  recurrence  of  the  evil.”  1 
After  this  appeal  to  reason  in  his  readers,  Mr.  Wattal 
develops  his  thesis.  The  first  prime  cause  of  over¬ 
population  in  India,  he  asserts,  is  early  marriage.  Con¬ 
trary  to  Western  lands,  where  population  is  kept  down 
by  prudential  marriages  and  by  birth-control,  “for  the 
Hindus  marriage  is  a  sacrament  which  must  be  per¬ 
formed,  regardless  of  the  fitness  of  the  parties  to  bear 
the  responsibilities  of  a  mated  existence.  A  Hindu  male 
must  marry  and  beget  children — sons,  if  you  please — to 
perform  his  funeral  rites  lest  his  spirit  wander  uneasily 

1  Wattal,  pp.  i-iii. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


315 


in  the  waste  places  of  the  earth.  The  very  name  of  son, 
‘putra/  means  one  who  saves  his  father’s  soul  from  the 
hell  called  Puta.  A  Hindu  maiden  unmarried  at  puberty 
is  a  source  of  social  obloquy  to  her  family  and  of  damna¬ 
tion  to  her  ancestors.  Among  the  Mohammedans,  who 
are  not  handicapped  by  such  penalties,  the  married 
state  is  equally  common,  partly  owing  to  Hindu  example 
and  partly  to  the  general  conditions  of  primitive  society, 
where  a  wife  is  almost  a  necessity  both  as  a  domestic 
drudge  and  as  a  helpmate  in  field  work.”  1  The  worst 
of  the  matter  is  that,  despite  the  efforts  of  social  re¬ 
formers,  child-marriage  seems  to  be  increasing.  The 
census  of  1911  showed  that  during  the  decade  1901-10 
the  numbers  of  married  females  per  1,000  of  ages 
0-5  years  rose  from  13  to  14;  of  ages  5-10  from  102  to 
105;  of '10-15  from  423  to  430,  and  of  15-20  from  770 
to  800.  In  other  words,  in  the  year  1911,  out  of  every 
1,000  Indian  girls,  over  one-tenth  were  married  before 
they  were  10  years  old,  nearly  one-half  before  they  were 
15,  and  four-fifths  before  they  were  20.2 

The  result  of  all  this  is  a  tremendous  birth-rate,  but 
this  is  “no  matter  for  congratulation.  We  have  heard 
so  often  of  our  high  death-rate  and  the  means  for  com¬ 
bating  it,  but  can  it  be  seriously  believed  that  with  a 
birth-rate  of  30  per  1,000  it  is  possible  to  go  on  as  we  are 
doing  with  the  death-rate  brought  down  to  the  level  of 
England  or  Scotland?  Is  there  room  enough  in  the 
country  for  the  population  to  increase  so  fast  as  20  per 
1,000  every  year  ?  We  are  paying  the  inevitable  penalty 
of  bringing  into  this  world  more  persons  than  can  be 
properly  cared  for,  and  therefore  if  we  wish  fewer  deaths 

1  Ibid.,  p.  3.  2  Ibid.,  p.  12. 


V 


316  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 

to  occur  in  this  country  the  births  must  be  reduced  to 
the  level  of  the  countries  where  the  death-rate  is  low. 
It  is,  therefore,  our  high  birth-rate  that  is  the  social 
danger;  the  high  death-rate,  however  regrettable,  is 
merely  an  incident  of  our  high  birth-rate.”  1 
Mr.  Wattal  then  describes  the  cruel  items  in  India’s 
death-rate:  the  tremendous  female  mortality,  due  largely 
to  too  early  childbirth,  and  the  equally  terrible  infant 
mortality,  nearly  50  per  cent  of  infant  deaths  being  due 
to  premature  birth  or  debility  at  birth.  These  are  the 
inevitable  penalties  of  early  and  universal  marriage. 
For,  in  India,  “  everybody  marries,  fit  or  unfit,  and  is  a 
parent  at  the  earliest  possible  age  permitted  by  nature.” 
This  process  is  highly  disgenic;  it  is  plainly  lowering 
the  quality  and  sapping  the  vigor  of  the  race.  It  is  the 
lower  elements  of  the  population,  the  negroid  aboriginal 
tribes  and  the  Pariahs  or  Outcastes,  who  are  gaining  the 
fastest.  Also  the  vitality  of  the  whole  population  seems 
to  be  lowering.  The  census  figures  show  that  the  num¬ 
ber  of  elderly  persons  is  decreasing,  and  that  the  average 
statistical  expectation  of  life  is  falling.  “The  coming 
generation  is  severely  handicapped  at  start  in  life.  And 
the  chances  of  living  to  a  good  old  age  are  considerably 
smaller  than  they  were,  say  thirty  or  forty  years  ago. 
Have  we  ever  paused  to  consider  what  it  means  to  us  in 
the  life  of  the  nation  as  a  whole?  It  means  that  the 
people  who  alone  by  weight  of  experience  and  wisdom 
are  fitted  for  the  posts  of  command  in  the  various  pub¬ 
lic  activities  of  the  country  are  snatched  away  by  death; 
and  that  the  guidance  and  leadership  which  belongs  to 
age  and  mature  judgment  in  the  countries  of  the  West 

1  Ibid.,  p.  14. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


317 


fall  in  India  to  younger  and  consequently  to  less  trust¬ 
worthy  persons.”  1 

After  warning  his  fellow  countiymen  that  neither 
improved  methods  of  agriculture,  the  growth  of  indus¬ 
try,  nor  emigration  can  afford  any  real  relief  to  the 
growing  pressure  of  population  on  means  of  subsistence, 
he  notes  a  few  hopeful  signs  that,  despite  the  hold  of 
religion  and  custom,  the  people  are  beginning  to  realize 
the  situation  and  that  in  certain  parts  of  India  there  are 
foreshadowings  of  birth-control.  For  example,  he  quotes 
from  the  census  report  for  1901  this  official  explanation 
of  a  slight  drop  in  the  birth-rate  of  Bengal:  “The  post¬ 
ponement  of  the  age  of  marriage  cannot  wholly  account 
for  the  diminished  rate  of  reproduction.  The  deliber¬ 
ate  avoidance  of  child-bearing  must  also  be  partly  re¬ 
sponsible^.  .  .  It  is  a  matter  of  common  belief  that 
among  the  tea-garden  coolies  of  Assam  means  are  fre¬ 
quently  taken  to  prevent  conception,  or  to  procure 
abortion.”  And  the  report  of  the  Sanitary  Commis¬ 
sioner  of  Assam  for  1913  states:  “An  important  factor 
in  producing  the  defective  birth-rate  appears  to  be  due 
to  voluntary  limitation  of  births.”  2 

However,  these  beginnings  of  birth-control  are  too 
local  and  partial  to  afford  any  immediate  relief  to  In¬ 
dia’s  growing  overpopulation.  Wider  appreciation  of 
the  situation  and  prompt  action  are  needed.  “The 
conclusion  is  irresistible.  We  can  no  longer  afford  to 
shut  our  eyes  to  the  social  canker  in  our  midst.  In  the 
land  of  the  bullock-cart,  the  motor  has  come  to  stay. 
The  competition  is  now  with  the  more  advanced  races  of 
the  West,  and  we  cannot  tell  them  what  Diogenes  said 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  19-21.  2  Ibid.,  p.  28. 


318  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


to  Alexander — ‘  Stand  out  of  my  sunshine/  After  the 
close  of  this  gigantic  World  War  theories  of  population 
will  perhaps  be  revised  and  a  reversion  in  favor  of  early 
marriage  and  larger  families  may  be  counted  upon. 
But,  (1)  that  will  be  no  solution  to  our  own  population 
problem,  and  (2)  this  reaction  will  be  only  for  a  time.  .  .  . 
The  law  of  population  may  be  arrested  in  its  operation, 
but  there  is  no  way  of  escaping  it.”  1 

So  concludes  this  striking  little  book.  Furthermore, 
we  must  remember  that,  although  India  may  be  the 
acutest  sufferer  from  overpopulation,  conditions  in  the 
entire  Orient  are  basically  the  same,  prudential  checks 
and  rational  birth-control  being  everywhere  virtually 
absent.2  Remembering  also  that,  besides  overpopula¬ 
tion,  there  are  other  economic  and  social  evils  previously 
discussed,  we  cannot  be  surprised  to  find  in  all  Eastern 
lands  much  acute  poverty  and  social  degradation. 

Both  the  rural  and  urban  masses  usually  live  on  the 
bare  margin  of  subsistence.  The  English  economist 
Brailsford  thus  describes  the  condition  of  the  Egyptian 
peasantry:  “The  villages  exhibited  a  poverty  such  as  I 
have  never  seen  even  in  the  mountains  of  anarchical 
Macedonia  or  among  the  bogs  of  Donegal.  .  .  .  The 
villages  are  crowded  slums  of  mud  hovels,  without  a 
tree,  a  flower,  or  a  garden.  The  huts,  often  without  a 
window  or  a  levelled  floor,  are  minute  dungeons  of  baked 
mud,  usually  of  two  small  rooms  neither  whitewashed 
nor  carpeted.  Those  which  I  entered  were  bare  of  any 
visible  property,  save  a  few  cooking  utensils,  a  mat  to 
serve  as  a  bed,  and  a  jar  which  held  the  staple  food  of 

1  Ibid.,  p.  82. 

2  For  conditions  in  the  Near  East,  see  Bertrand,  pp.  110;  124;  125-128. 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


319 


maize.” 1  As  for  the  poorer  Indian  peasants,  a  British 
sanitary  official  thus  depicts  their  mode  of  life:  “One 
has  actually  to  see  the  interior  of  the  houses,  in  which 
each  family  is  often  compelled  to  live  in  a  single  small 
cell,  made  of  mud  walls  and  with  a  mud  floor;  contain¬ 
ing  small  yards  littered  with  rubbish,  often  crowded 
with  cattle;  possessing  wells  permeated  by  rain  soaking 
through  this  filthy  surface;  and  frequently  jumbled  to¬ 
gether  in  inchoate  masses  called  towns  and  cities.”  2 

In  the  cities,  indeed,  conditions  are  even  worse  than 
in  the  country,  the  slums  of  the  Orient  surpassing  the 
slums  of  the  West.  The  French  publicist  Louis  Ber¬ 
trand  paints  positively  nauseating  pictures  of  the  poorer 
quarters  of  the  great  Levantine  towns  like  Cairo,  Con¬ 
stantinople,  and  Jerusalem.  Omitting  his  more  poign¬ 
ant  details,  here  is  his  description  of  a  Cairo  tenement: 
“In  Cairo,  as  elsewhere  in  Egypt,  the  wretchedness  and 
grossness  of  the  poorer-class  dwellings  are  perhaps  even 
more  shocking  than  in  the  other  Eastern  lands.  Two 
or  three  dark,  airless  rooms  usually  open  on  a  hallway 
not  less  obscure.  The  plaster,  peeling  off  from  the 
ceilings  and  the  worm-eaten  laths  of  the  walls,  falls  con¬ 
stantly  to  the  filthy  floors.  The  straw  mats  and  bed¬ 
ding  are  infested  by  innumerable  vermin.”  3 

In  India  it  is  the  same  story.  Says  Fisher:  “Even 
before  the  growth  of  her  industries  had  begun,  the  cities 
of  India  presented  a  baffling  housing  problem.  Into  the 

1  H.  N.  Brailsford,  The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,  pp.  112-113.  See  also 
T.  Rothstein,  Egypt's  Ruin,  pp.  298-300  (London,  1910),  Sir  W.  W. 
Ramsay,  “The  Turkish  Peasantry  of  Anatolia,”  Quarterly  Review,  January, 
1918. 

2  Dr.  D.  Ross,  “Wretchedness  a  Cause  of  Political  Unrest,”  The  Survey , 
February  18,  1911. 

3  Bertrand,  op.  cit.,  pp.  111-112. 


320  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


welter  of  crooked  streets  and  unsanitary  habits  of  an 
Oriental  city  these  great  industrial  plants  are  wedging 
their  thousands  of  employees.  Working  from  before 
dawn  until  after  dark,  men  and  women  are  too  exhausted 
to  go  far  from  the  plant  to  sleep,  if  they  can  help  it. 
When  near-by  houses  are  jammed  to  suffocation,  they 
live  and  sleep  in  the  streets.  In  Calcutta,  twenty  years 
ago,1  land  had  reached  $200,000  an  acre  in  the  over¬ 
crowded  tenement  districts.”  2  Of  Calcutta,  a  Western 
writer  remarks:  “ Calcutta  is  a  shame  even  in  the  East. 
In  its  slums,  mill  hands  and  dock  coolies  do  not  live; 
they  pig.  Houses  choke  with  unwholesome  breath; 
drains  and  compounds  fester  in  filth.  Wheels  com¬ 
press  decaying  refuse  in  the  roads;  cows  drink  from 
wells  soaked  with  sewage,  and  the  floors  of  bakeries 
are  washed  in  the  same  pollution.”  3  In  the  other  in¬ 
dustrial  centres  of  India,  conditions  are  practically  the 
same.  A  Bombay  native  sanitary  official  stated  in  a 
report  on  the  state  of  the  tenement  district,  drawn  up 
in  1904:  “In  such  houses — the  breeders  of  germs  and 
bacilli,  the  centres  of  disease  and  poverty,  vice,  and 
crime — have  people  of  all  kinds,  the  diseased,  the  disso¬ 
lute,  the  drunken,  the  improvident,  been  indiscrimi¬ 
nately  herded  and  tightly  packed  in  vast  hordes  to  dwell 
in  close  association  with  each  other.”  4 

Furthermore,  urban  conditions  seem  to  be  getting 
worse  rather  than  better.  The  problem  of  congestion, 
in  particular,  is  assuming  ever  graver  proportions.  Al¬ 
ready  in  the  opening  years  of  the  present  century  the 

1 1,  e.,  in  1900.  2  Fisher,  India's  Silent  Revolution,  p.  51. 

3  G.  W.  Stevens,  In  India.  Quoted  by  Fisher,  p.  51. 

4  Dr.  Bhalchandra  Krishna.  Quoted  by  A.  Yusuf  Ah,  Life  and  Labor 
in  India,  p.  35  (London,  1907). 


SOCIAL  CHANGE 


321 


congestion  in  the  great  industrial  centres  of  India  like 
Calcutta,  Bombay,  and  Lucknow  averaged  three  or  four 
times  the  congestion  of  London.  And  the  late  war  has 
rendered  the  housing  crisis  even  more  acute.  In  the 
East,  as  in  the  West,  the  war  caused  a  rapid  drift  of 
population  to  the  cities  and  at  the  same  time  stopped 
building  owing  to  the  prohibitive  cost  of  construction. 
Hence,  a  prodigious  rise  in  rents  and  a  plague  of  land¬ 
lord  profiteering.  Says  Fisher:  “ Rents  were  raised  as 
much  as  300  per  cent,  enforced  by  eviction.  Mass-meet¬ 
ings  of  protest  in  Bombay  resulted  in  government  ac¬ 
tion,  fixing  maximum  rents  for  some  of  the  tenements 
occupied  by  artisans  and  laborers.  Setting  maximum 
rental  does  not,  however,  make  more  room.”  1 

And,  of  course,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  higher 
rents  are_only  one  phase  in  a  general  rise  in  the  cost  of 
living  that  has  been  going  on  in  the  East  for  a  genera¬ 
tion  and  which  has  been  particularly  pronounced  since 
1914.  More  than  a  decade  ago  Bertrand  wrote  of  the 
Near  East:  “From  one  end  of  the  Levant  to  the  other, 
at  Constantinople  as  at  Smyrna,  Damascus,  Beyrout, 
and  Cairo,  I  heard  the  same  complaints  about  the  in¬ 
creasing  cost  of  living;  and  these  complaints  were  uttered 
by  Europeans  as  well  as  by  the  natives.”  2  To-day  the 
situation  is  even  more  difficult.  Says  Sir  Valentine 
Chirol  of  conditions  in  Egypt  since  the  war:  “The  rise 
in  wages,  considerable  as  it  has  been,  has  ceased  to  keep 
pace  with  the  inordinate  rise  in  prices  for  the  very  neces¬ 
sities  of  life.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  the  urban 
centres,  where  the  lower  classes — workmen,  carters,  cab- 
drivers,  shopkeepers,  and  a  host  of  minor  employees — 

1  Fisher,  pp.  51-52.  2  Bertrand,  p.  141. 


322  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


are  hard  put  to  it  nowadays  to  make  both  ends  meet.”  1 
As  a  result  of  all  these  hard  conditions  various  phe¬ 
nomena  of  social  degradation  such  as  alcoholism,  vice, 
and  crime,  are  becoming  increasingly  common.2  Last — 
but  not  least — there  are  growing  symptoms  of  social 
unrest  and  revolutionary  agitation,  which  we  will  ex¬ 
amine  in  the  next  chapter. 

1  Sir  V.  Cliirol,  “England’s  Peril  in  Egypt,”  from  the  London  Times , 
1919. 

2  See  Bertrand  and  Fisher,  supra. 


CHAPTER  IX 


SOCIAL  UNREST  AND  BOLSHEVISM 

Unrest  is  the  natural  concomitant  of  change — particu¬ 
larly  of  sudden  change.  Every  break  with  past,  how¬ 
ever  normal  and  inevitable,  implies  a  necessity  for  read¬ 
justment  to  altered  conditions  which  causes  a  temporary 
sense  of  restless  disharmony  until  the  required  adjust¬ 
ment  has  been  made.  Unrest  is  not  an  exceptional 
phenomenon;  it  is  always  latent  in  every  human  society 
which  has  not  fallen  into  complete  stagnation,  and  a 
slight  amount  of  unrest  should  be  considered  a  sign  of 
healthy  growth  rather  than  a  symptom  of  disease.  In 
fact,  the  minimum  degrees  of  unrest  are  usually  not 
called  by  that  name,  but  are  considered  mere  incidents 
of  normal  development.  Under  normal  circumstances, 
indeed,  the  social  organism  functions  like  the  human 
organism:  it  is  being  incessantly  destroyed  and  as  in¬ 
cessantly  renewed  in  conformity  with  the  changing  con¬ 
ditions  of  life.  These  changes  are  sometimes  very  con¬ 
siderable,  but  they  are  so  gradual  that  they  are  effected 
almost  without  being  perceived.  A  healthy  organism 
well  attuned  to  its  environment  is  always  plastic.  It 
instinctively  senses  environmental  changes  and  adapts 
itself  so  rapidly  that  it  escapes  the  injurious  conse¬ 
quences  of  disharmony. 

Far  different  is  the  character  of  unrest’s  acuter  mani¬ 
festations.  These  are  infallible  symptoms  of  sweeping 
changes,  sudden  breaks  with  the  past,  and  profound 

maladjustments  which  are  not  being  rapidly  rectified. 

323 


324  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


In  other  words,  acute  unrest  denotes  social  ill  health 
and  portends  the  possibility  of  one  of  those  violent 
crises  known  as  “revolutions.” 

The  history  of  the  Moslem  East  well  exemplifies  the 
above  generalizations.  The  formative  period  of  Sara¬ 
cenic  civilization  was  characterized  by  rapid  change  and 
an  intense  idealistic  ferment.  The  great  “Motazelite” 
movement  embraced  many  shades  of  thought,  its  radi¬ 
cal  wing  professing  religious,  political,  and  social  doc¬ 
trines  of  a  violent,  revolutionary  nature.  But  this 
changeful  period  was  superficial  and  brief.  Arab  vigor 
and  the  Islamic  spirit  proved  unable  permanently  to 
leaven  the  vast  inertia  of  the  ancient  East.  Soon  the 
old  traditions  reasserted  themselves — somewhat  modi¬ 
fied,  to  be  sure,  yet  basically  the  same.  Saracenic  civi¬ 
lization  became  stereotyped,  ossified,  and  with  this  ossi¬ 
fication  changeful  unrest  died  away.  Here  and  there 
the  radical  tradition  was  preserved  and  secretly  handed 
down  by  a  few  obscure  sects  like  the  Kharidjites  of  Inner 
Arabia  and  the  Bektashi  dervishes;  but  these  were  mere 
cryptic  episodes,  of  no  general  significance. 

With  the  Mohammedan  Revival  at  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  however,  symptoms  of  social 
unrest  appeared  once  more.  Wahabism  aimed  not 
merely  at  a  reform  of  religious  abuses  but  was  also  a 
general  protest  against  the  contemporary  decadence  of 
Moslem  society.  In  many  cases  it  took  the  form  of  a 
popular  revolt  against  established  governments.  The 
same  was  true  of  the  correlative  Babbist  movement  in 
Persia,  which  took  place  about  the  same  time.1 

1  For  these  early  forms  of  unrest,  see  A.  Le  Chatelier,  VI slam  au  dix- 
neuvi&me  Sibcle,  pp.  22-44  (Paris,  1888). 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


325 


And  of  course  these  nascent  stirrings  were  greatly 
stimulated  by  the  flood  of  Western  ideas  and  methods 
which;  as  the  nineteenth  century  wore  on,  increasingly 
permeated  the  East.  What,  indeed,  could  be  more  pro¬ 
vocative  of  unrest  of  every  description  than  the  result¬ 
ing  transformation  of  the  Orient — a  transformation  so 
sudden,  so  intense,  and  necessitating  so  concentrated  a 
process  of  adaptation  that  it  was  basically  revolutionary 
rather  than  evolutionary  in  its  nature?  The  details  of 
these  profound  changes — political,  religious,  economic, 
social — we  have  already  studied,  together  with  the 
equally  profound  disturbance,  bewilderment,  and  suffer¬ 
ing  afflicting  all  classes  in  this  eminently  transition 
period. 

The  essentially  revolutionary  nature  of  this  transition 
period,  as  exemplified  by  India,  is  well  described  by 
a  British-economist.1  What,  he  asks,  could  be  more 
anachronistic  than  the  contrast  between  rural  and  urban 
India?  “ Rural  India  is  primitive  or  mediaeval;  city 
India  is  modern.”  In  city  India  you  will  find  every 
symbol  of  Western  life,  from  banks  and  factories  down 
to  the  very  “sandwichmen  that  you  left  in  the  London 
gutters.”  Now  all  this  coexists  beside  rural  India. 
“And  it  is  surely  a  fact  unique  in  economic  history  that 
they  should  thus  exist  side  by  side.  The  present  condi¬ 
tion  of  India  does  not  correspond  with  any  period  of 
European  economic  history.”  Imagine  the  effect  in 
Europe  of  setting  down  modern  and  mediaeval  men  to¬ 
gether,  with  utterly  disparate  ideas.  That  has  not  hap¬ 
pened  in  Europe  because  “European  progress  in  the 

1 D.  H.  Dodwell,  ‘‘Economic  Transition  in  India,”  Economic  Journal , 
December,  1910. 


326  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


economic  world  has  been  evolutionary  a  process  spread 
over  centuries.  In  India,  on  the  other  hand,  this  eco¬ 
nomic  transformation  has  been  “  revolutionary  ”  in 
character. 

How  unevolutionary  is  India’s  economic  transforma¬ 
tion  is  seen  by  the  condition  of  rural  India. 

“Rural  India,  though  chiefly  characterized  by  primitive 
usage,  has  been  invaded  by  ideas  that  are  intensely  hos¬ 
tile  to  the  old  state  of  things.  It  is  primitive,  but  not  con¬ 
sistently  primitive .  Competitive  wages  are  paid  side  by 
side  with  customary  wages.  Prices  are  sometimes  fixed 
by  custom,  but  sometimes,  too,  by  free  economic  causes. 
From  the  midst  of  a  population  deeply  rooted  in  the 
soil,  men  are  being  carried  away  by  the  desire  of  better 
wages.  In  short,  economic  motives  have  suddenly  and 
partially  intruded  themselves  in  the  realm  of  primitive 
morality.  And,  if  we  turn  to  city  India,  we  see  a  simi¬ 
lar,  though  inverted,  state  of  things.  ...  In  neither 
case  has  the  mixture  been  harmonious  or  the  fusion 
complete.  Indeed,  the  two  orders  are  too  unrelated, 
too  far  apart,  to  coalesce  with  ease.  .  .  . 

“India,  then,  is  in  a  state  of  economic  revolution 
throughout  all  the  classes  of  an  enormous  and  complex  so¬ 
ciety.  The  only  period  in  which  Europe  offered  even  faint 
analogies  to  modern  India  was  the  Industrial  Revolution, 
from  which  even  now  we  have  not  settled  down  into 
comparative  stability.  We  may  reckon  it  as  a  fortunate 
circumstance  for  Europe  that  the  intellectual  movement 
which  culminated  in  the  French  Revolution  did  not  coin¬ 
cide  with  the  Industrial  Revolution.  If  it  had,  it  is 
possible  that  European  society  might  have  been  hope¬ 
lessly  wrecked.  But,  as  it  was,  even  when  the  French 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


327 


Revolution  had  spent  its  force  in  the  conquests  of  Na¬ 
poleon,  the  Industrial  Revolution  stirred  up  enough  so¬ 
cial  and  political  discontent.  When  whole  classes  of 
people  are  obliged  by  economic  revolution  to  change 
their  mode  of  life,  it  is  inevitable  that  many  should  suf¬ 
fer.  Discontent  is  roused.  Political  and  destructive 
movements  are  certain  to  ensue.  Not  only  the  revolu¬ 
tions  of  ’48,  but  also  the  birth  of  the  Socialist  Party 
sprang  from  the  Industrial  Revolution. 

“But  that  revolution  was  not  nearly  so  sweeping  as 
that  which  is  now  in  operation  in  India.  The  inven¬ 
tion  of  machinery  and  steam-power  was,  in  Europe,  but 
the  crowning  event  of  a  long  series  of  years  in  which 
commerce  and  industry  had  been  constantly  expanding, 
in  which  capital  had  been  largely  accumulated,  in  which 
economic  principles  had  been  gradually  spreading.  .  .  . 
No,  the  Indian  economic  revolution  is  vastly  greater 
and  more  fundamental  than  our  Industrial  Revolu¬ 
tion,  great  as  that  was.  Railways  have  been  built 
through  districts  where  travel  was  almost  impossible, 
and  even  roads  are  unknown.  Factories  have  been 
built,  and  filled  by  men  unused  to  industrial  labor. 
Capital  has  been  poured  into  the  country,  which  was 
unprepared  for  any  such  development.  And  what  are 
the  consequences?  India’s  social  organization  is  being 
dissolved.  The  Brahmins  are  no  longer  priests.  The 
ryot  is  no  longer  bound  to  the  soil.  The  banya  is  no 
longer  the  sole  purveyor  of  capital.  The  hand- weaver 
is  threatened  with  extinction,  and  the  brass-worker  can 
no  longer  ply  his  craft.  Think  of  the  dislocation  which 
this  sudden  change  has  brought  about,  of  the  many  who 
can  no  longer  follow  their  ancestral  vocations,  of  the 


328  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


commotion  which  a  less  profound  change  produced  in 
Europe,  and  you  will  understand  what  is  the  chief  mo¬ 
tive-power  of  the  political  unrest.  It  is  small  wonder. 
The  wonder  is  that  the  unrest  has  been  no  greater  than 
it  is.  Had  India  not  been  an  Asiatic  country,  she  would 
have  been  in  fierce  revolution  long  ago.” 

The  above  lines  were  of  course  written  in  the  opening 
years  of  the  twentieth  century,  before  the  world  had 
been  shattered  by  Armageddon  and  aggressive  social 
revolution  had  established  itself  in  semi-Asiatic  Russia. 
But  even  during  those  pre-war  years,  other  students  of 
the  Orient  were  predicting  social  disturbances  of  increas¬ 
ing  gravity.  Said  the  Hindu  nationalist  leader,  Bipin 
Chandra  Pal:  “This  so-called  unrest  is  not  really  politi¬ 
cal.  It  is  essentially  an  intellectual  and  spiritual  up¬ 
heaval,  the  forerunner  of  a  mighty  social  revolution,  with 
a  new  organon  and  a  new  philosophy  of  life  behind  it.”  1 
And  the  French  publicist  Chailley  wrote  of  India:  “There 
will  be  a  series  of  economic  revolutions,  which  must 
necessarily  produce  suffering  and  struggle.”2 

During  this  pre-war  period  the  increased  difficulty  of 
living  conditions,  together  with  the  adoption  of  West¬ 
ern  ideas  of  comfort  and  kindred  higher  standards, 
seem  to  have  been  engendering  friction  between  the  dif¬ 
ferent  strata  of  the  Oriental  population.  In  1911  a 
British  sanitary  expert  assigned  “wretchedness”  as  the 
root-cause  of  India’s  political  unrest.  After  describing 
the  deplorable  living  conditions  of  the  Indian  masses, 
he  wrote:  “It  will  of  course  be  said  at  once  that  these 

1  Bipin  Chandra  Pal,  “The  Forces  Behind  the  Unrest  in  India,”  Con¬ 
temporary  Review,  February,  1910. 

2  J.  Chailley,  Administrative  Problems  of  British  India,  p.  339  (London, 
1910 — English  translation). 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


329 


conditions  have  existed  in  India  from  time  immemorial, 
and  are  no  more  likely  to  cause  unrest  now  than  pre¬ 
viously;  but  in  my  opinion  unrest  has  always  existed 
there  in  a  subterranean  form.  Moreover,  in  the  old 
days,  the  populace  could  make  scarcely  any  comparison 
between  their  own  condition  and  that  of  more  fortunate 
people;  now  they  can  compare  their  own  slums  and 
terrible  ‘ native  quarters’  with  the  much  better  ordered 
cantonments,  stations,  and  houses  of  the  British  offi¬ 
cials  and  even  of  their  own  wealthier  brethren.  So  far 
as  I  can  see,  such  misery  is  always  the  fundamental 
cause  of  all  popular  unrest.  .  .  .  Seditious  meetings, 
political  chatter,  and  ‘aspirations’  of  babus  and  dema¬ 
gogues  are  only  the  superficial  manifestations  of  the 
deeper  disturbance.”  1 

This  growing  social  friction  was  indubitably  height¬ 
ened  by  the  lack  of  interest  of  Orientals  in  the  suffer¬ 
ings  of  all  persons  not  bound  to  them  by  family,  caste, 
or  customary  ties.  Throughout  the  East,  “social  ser¬ 
vice,”  in  the  Western  sense,  is  practically  unknown. 
This  fact  is  noted  by  a  few  Orientals  themselves.  Says 
an  Indian  writer,  speaking  of  Indian  town  life:  “There 
is  no  common  measure  of  social  conduct.  .  .  .  Hith¬ 
erto,  social  reform  in  India  has  taken  account  only  of 
individual  or  family  life.  As  applied  to  mankind  in  the 
mass,  and  especially  to  those  soulless  agglomerations  of 
seething  humanity  which  we  call  cities,  it  is  a  gospel 
yet  to  be  preached.”  2  As  an  American  sociologist  re¬ 
marked  of  the  growing  slum  evil  throughout  the  indus- 

1  Dr.  Ronald  Ross,  “Wretchedness  a  Cause  of  Political  Unrest,”  The 
Survey ,  18  February,  1911. 

2  A.  Yusuf  Ali,  Life  and  Labor  in  India ,  pp.  3,  32  (London,  1907). 


330  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


trialized  Orient:  “The  greatest  danger  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  Orientals  do  not  have  the  high  Western  sense  of 
the  value  of  the  life  of  the  individual,  and  are,  compara¬ 
tively  speaking,  without  any  restraining  influence  simi¬ 
lar  to  our  own  enlightened  public  opinion,  which  has 
been  roused  by  the  struggles  of  a  century  of  industrial 
strife.  Unless  these  elements  can  be  supplied,  there  is 
danger  of  suffering  and  of  abuses  worse  than  any  the 
West  has  known.”  1 

All  this  diffused  social  unrest  was  centring  about 
two  recently  emerged  elements:  the  Western-educated 
intelligentsia  and  the  industrial  proletariat  of  the  fac¬ 
tory  towns.  The  revolutionary  tendencies  of  the  in¬ 
telligentsia,  particularly  of  its  half-educated  failures, 
have  been  already  noted,  and  these  latter  have  undoubt¬ 
edly  played  a  leading  part  in  all  the  revolutionary  dis¬ 
turbances  of  the  modern  Orient,  from  North  Africa 
to  China.2  Regarding  the  industrial  proletariat,  some 
writers  think  that  there  is  little  immediate  likelihood 
of  their  becoming  a  major  revolutionary  factor,  be¬ 
cause  of  their  traditionalism,  ignorance,  and  apathy, 
and  also  because  there  is  no  real  connection  between 
them  and  the  intelligentsia,  the  other  centre  of  social 
discontent. 

The  French  economist  Metin  states  this  view-point 
very  well.  Speaking  primarily  of  India,  he  writes: 
“The  Nationalist  movement  rises  from  the  middle  classes 
and  manifests  no  systematic  hostility  toward  the  capi- 

1  E.  W.  Capen,  “A  Sociological  Appraisal  of  Western  Influence  in  the 
Orient,”  American  Journal  of  Sociology ,  May,  1911. 

2  P.  Khorat,  “Psychologie  de  la  Revolution  chinoise,”  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  15  March,  1912;  L.  Bertrand,  Le  Mirage  orientale,  pp.  164-166; 
J.  D.  Rees,  The  Real  India ,  pp.  162-163. 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


331 


talists  and  great  proprietors;  in  economic  matters  it  is 
on  their  side.”  1  As  for  the  proletariat:  “The  coolies 
do  not  imagine  that  their  lot  can  be  bettered.  Like  the 
ryots  and  the  agricultural  laborers,  they  do  not  show 
the  least  sign  of  revolt.  To  whom  should  they  turn? 
The  ranks  of  traditional  society  are  closed  to  them. 
People  without  caste,  the  coolies  are  despised  even  by 
the  old-style  artisan,  proud  of  his  caste-status,  humble 
though  that  be.  To  fall  to  the  job  of  a  coolie  is,  for  the 
Hindu,  the  worst  declassment.  The  factory  workers 
are  not  yet  numerous  enough  to  form  a  compact  and 
powerful  proletariat,  able  to  exert  pressure  on  the  old 
society.  Even  if  they  do  occasionally  strike,  they  are 
as  far  from  the  modern  trade-union  as  they  are  from  the 
traditional  working-caste.  Neither  can  they  look  for 
leadership  to  the  ‘intellectual  proletariat ’ ;  for  the  Na¬ 
tionalist  movement  has  not  emerged  from  the  ‘  bour¬ 
geois  ’  phase,  and  always  leans  on  the  capitalists.  .  .  . 

“Thus  Indian  industry  is  still  in  its  embryonic  stages. 
In  truth,  the  material  evolution  which  translates  itself 
by  the  construction  of  factories,  and  the  social  evolu¬ 
tion  which  creates  a  proletariat,  have  only  begun  to 
emerge;  while  the  intellectual  evolution  from  which  arise 
the  programmes  of  social  demands  has  not  even  begun.”  2 

Other  observers  of  Indian  industrial  conditions,  how¬ 
ever,  do  not  share  M.  Metin’s  opinion.  Says  the  British 
labor  leader,  J.  Ramsay  Macdonald:  “To  imagine  the 
backward  Indian  laborers  becoming  a  conscious  regiment 
in  the  class  war,  seems  to  be  one  of  the  vainest  dreams 
in  which  a  Western  mind  can  indulge.  But  I  some- 

1  Albert  M6tin,  UInde  d’aujourcThui:  Etude  sociale,  p.  276  (Paris,  1918). 

2  Ibid.,  dp.  339-345. 


332  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


times  wonder  if  it  be  so  very  vain  after  all.  In  the  first 
place,  the  development  of  factory  industry  in  India  has 
created  a  landless  and  homeless  proletariat  unmatched 
by  the  same  economic  class  in  any  other  capitalist  com¬ 
munity;  and  to  imagine  that  this  class  is  to  be  kept 
out;  or  can  be  kept  out,  of  Indian  politics  is  far  more 
vain  than  to  dream  of  its  developing  a  politics  on  West¬ 
ern  lines.  Further  than  that,  the  wage-earners  have 
shown  a  willingness  to  respond  to  Trades-Union  meth¬ 
ods;  they  are  forming  industrial  associations  and  have 
engaged  in  strikes;  some  of  the  social  reform  movements 
conducted  by  Indian  intellectuals  definitely  try  to  es¬ 
tablish  Trades-Unions  and  preach  ideas  familiar  to  us 
in  connection  with  Trades-Union  propaganda.  A  capi¬ 
talist  fiscal  policy  will  not  only  give  this  movement  a 
great  impetus  as  it  did  in  Japan,  but  in  India  will  not  be 
able  to  suppress  the  movement,  as  was  done  in  Japan, 
by  legislation.  As  yet,  the  true  proletarian  wage-earner, 
uprooted  from  his  native  village  and  broken  away  from 
the  organization  of  Indian  society,  is  but  insignificant. 
It  is  growing,  however,  and  I  believe  that  it  will  organ¬ 
ize  itself  rapidly  on  the  general  lines  of  the  proletarian 
classes  of  other  capitalist  countries.  So  soon  as  it  be¬ 
comes  politically  conscious,  there  are  no  other  lines  upon 
which  it  can  organize  itself.”  1 

Turning  to  the  Near  East — more  than  a  decade  ago 
a  French  Socialist  writer,  observing  the  hard  living  con¬ 
ditions  of  the  Egyptian  masses,  noted  signs  of  social 
unrest  and  predicted  grave  disturbances.  “A  genuine 
proletariat,”  he  wrote,  “has  been  created  by  the  multi- 

1  J.  Ramsay  Macdonald,  The  Government  of  India ,  pp.  133-134  (London, 
1920). 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


333 


plication  of  industries  and  the  sudden,  almost  abrupt, 
progress  which  has  followed.  The  cost  of  living  has 
risen  to  a  scale  hitherto  unknown  in  Egypt,  while  wages 
have  risen  but  slightly.  Poverty  and  want  abound. 
Some  day  suffering  will  provoke  the  people  to  com¬ 
plaints,  perhaps  to  angry  outbursts,  throughout  this 
apparently  prosperous  Delta.  It  is  true  that  the  influx 
of  foreigners  and  of  money  may  put  off  the  hour  when 
the  city  or  countiy  laborer  of  Egyptian  race  comes 
clearly  to  perceive  the  wrongs  that  are  being  done  to 
him.  He  may  miss  the  educational  influence  of  Social¬ 
ism.  Yet  such  an  awakening  may  come  sooner  than 
people  expect.  It  is  not  only  among  the  successful  and 
prosperous  Egyptians  that  intelligence  is  to  be  found. 
Those  whose  wages  are  growing  gradually  smaller  and 
smaller  have  intelligence  of  equal  keenness,  and  it  has 
become  a  real  question  as  to  the  hour  when  for  the  first 
time  in  the  land  of  Islam  the  flame  of  Mohammedan 
Socialism  shall  burst  forth.”  1  In  Algeria,  likewise,  a 
Belgian  traveller  noted  the  dawning  of  a  proletarian 
consciousness  among  the  town  working  men  just  before 
the  Great  War.  Speaking  of  the  rapid  spread  of  West¬ 
ern  ideas,  he  wrote:  “ Islam  tears  asunder  like  rotten 
cloth  on  the  quays  of  Algiers:  the  dockers,  coal-passers, 
and  engine-tenders,  to  whatever  race  they  belong,  leave 
their  Islam  and  acquire  a  genuine  proletarian  morality, 
that  of  the  proletarians  of  Europe,  and  they  make  com¬ 
mon  cause  with  their  European  colleagues  on  the  basis 
of  a  strictly  economic  struggle.  If  there  were  many  big 
factories  in  Algeria,  orthodox  Islam  would  soon  disap- 

1  Georges  Foucart.  Quoted  in  The  Literary  Digest ,  17  August,  1907, 
pp.  225-226. 


334  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


pear  there,  as  old-fashioned  Catholicism  has  disappeared 
with  us  under  the  shock  of  great  industry.”  1 

Whatever  may  be  the  prospects  as  to  the  rapid  emer¬ 
gence  of  organized  labor  movements  in  the  Orient;  one 
thing  seems  certain:  the  unrest  which  afflicted  so  many 
parts  of  the  East  in  the  years  preceding  the  Great  War; 
though  mainly  political;  had  also  its  social  side.  To¬ 
ward  the  end  of  1913;  a  leading  Anglo-Indian  journal 
remarked  pessimistically:  “We  have  already  gone  so 
far  on  the  downward  path  that  leads  to  destruction  that 
there  are  districts  in  what  were  once  regarded  as  the 
most  settled  parts  of  India  which  are  being  abandoned 
by  the  rich  because  their  property  is  not  safe.  So  great 
is  the  contempt  for  the  law  that  it  is  employed  by  the 
unscrupulous  as  a  means  of  offense  against  the  innocent. 
Frontier  Pathans  commit  outrages  almost  unbelievable 
in  their  daring.  Mass-meetings  are  held  and  agitation 
spreads  in  regard  to  topics  quite  outside  the  business 
of  orderly  people.  There  is  no  matter  of  domestic  or 
foreign  politics  in  which  crowds  of  irresponsible  people 
do  not  want  to  have  their  passionate  way.  Great  griev¬ 
ances  are  made  of  little,  far-off  things.  What  ought  to 
be  the  ordered,  spacious  life  of  the  District  Officer  is 
intruded  upon  and  disturbed  by  a  hundred  distracting 
influences  due  to  the  want  of  discipline  of  the  people. 
In  the  subordinate  ranks  of  the  great  services  them¬ 
selves,  trades-unions  have  been  formed.  Military  and 
police  officers  have  to  regret  that  the  new  class  of  re¬ 
cruits  is  less  subordinate  than  the  old,  harder  to  dis¬ 
cipline,  more  full  of  complaints.”  2 

1  A.  Van  Gennep,  En  Algerie ,  p.  182  (Paris,  1914). 

2  The  Englishman  (Calcutta).  Quoted  in  The  Literary  Digest ,  Febru¬ 
ary  21,  1914,  p.  369. 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


335 


The  Great  War  of  course  enormously  aggravated 
Oriental  unrest.  In  many  parts  of  the  Near  East; 
especially,  acute  suffering,  balked  ambitions,  and  furi¬ 
ous  hates  combined  to  reduce  society  to  the  verge  of 
chaos.  Into  this  ominous  turmoil  there  now  came  the 
sinister  influence  of  Russian  Bolshevism,  marshalling  all 
this  diffused  unrest  by  systematic  methods  for  definite 
ends.  Bolshevism  was  frankly  out  for  a  world-revolu¬ 
tion  and  the  destruction  of  Western  civilization.  To 
attain  this  objective  the  Bolshevist  leaders  not  only 
launched  direct  assaults  on  the  West,  but  also  planned 
flank  attacks  in  Asia  and  Africa.  They  believed  that 
if  the  East  could  be  set  on  fire,  not  only  would  Russian 
Bolshevism  gain  vast  additional  strength  but  also  the 
economic  repercussion  on  the  West,  already  shaken  by 
the  war,  would  be  so  terrific  that  industrial  collapse 
would  ensue,  thereby  throwing  Europe  open  to  revolu¬ 
tion. 

Bolshevism’s  propagandist  efforts  were  nothing  short 
of  universal,  both  in  area  and  in  scope.  No  part  of  the 
world  was  free  from  the  plottings  of  its  agents;  no  possi¬ 
ble  source  of  discontent  was  overlooked.  Strictly  “Red” 
doctrines  like  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  were 
very  far  from  being  the  only  weapons  in  Bolshevism’s 
armory.  Since  what  was  first  wanted  was  the  over¬ 
throw  of  the  existing  world-order,  any  kind  of  opposition 
to  that  order,  no  matter  how  remote  doctrinally  from 
Bolshevism,  was  grist  to  the  Bolshevist  mill.  Accord¬ 
ingly,  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe,  in  Asia,  Africa, 
Australia,  and  the  Americas,  as  in  Europe,  Bolshevik 
agitators  whispered  in  the  ears  of  the  discontented  their 
gospel  of  hatred  and  revenge.  Every  nationalist  aspira- 


336  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


tion,  every  political  grievance,  every  social  injustice, 
every  racial  discrimination,  was  fuel  for  Bolshevism’s 
incitement  to  violence  and  war.1 

Particularly  promising  fields  for  Bolshevist  activity 
were  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  Besides  being  a  prey 
to  profound  disturbances  of  every  description,  those 
regions,  as  traditional  objectives  of  the  old  Czarist  im¬ 
perialism,  had  long  been  carefully  studied  by  Russian 
agents  who  had  evolved  a  technic  of  “  pacific  penetra¬ 
tion”  that  might  be  easily  adjusted  to  Bolshevist  ends. 
To  stir  up  political,  religious,  and  racial  passions  in  Tur¬ 
key,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  India,  especially  against 
England,  required  no  original  planning  by  Trotzky  or 
Lenine.  Czarism  had  already  done  these  things  for 
generations,  and  full  information  lay  both  in  the  Petro- 
grad  archives  and  in  the  brains  of  surviving  Czarist 
agents  ready  to  turn  their  hands  as  easily  to  the  new 
work  as  the  old. 

In  all  the  elaborate  network  of  Bolshevist  propaganda 
which  to-day  enmeshes  the  East  we  must  discriminate 
between  Bolshevism’s  two  objectives:  one  immediate — 
the  destruction  of  Western  political  and  economic  su¬ 
premacy;  the  other  ultimate — the  Bolshevizing  of  the 
Oriental  masses  and  the  consequent  extirpation  of  the 
native  upper  and  middle  classes,  precisely  as  has  been 
done  in  Russia  and  as  is  planned  for  the  countries  of  the 
West.  In  the  first  stage,  Bolshevism  is  quite  ready  to 
respect  Oriental  faiths  and  customs  and  to  back  Orien- 

1  For  these  larger  world-aspects  of  Bolshevik  propaganda,  see  Paul 
Miliukov,  Bolshevism:  An  International  Danger  (London,  1920);  also, 
my  Rising  Tide  of  Color  against  White  World-Supremacy ,  pp.  218-221, 
and  my  article,  “Bolshevism:  The  Heresy  of  the  Under-Man,”  The 
Century ,  June,  1919. 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


337 


tal  nationalist  movements.  In  the  second  stage,  re¬ 
ligions  like  Islam  and  nationalists  like  Mustapha  Kemal 
are  to  be  branded  as  “ bourgeois’ ’  and  relentlessly  de¬ 
stroyed.  How  Bolshevik  diplomacy  endeavors  to  work 
these  two  schemes  in  double  harness,  we  shall  presently 
see. 

Russian  Bolshevism’s  Oriental  policy  was  formulated 
soon  after  its  accession  to  power  at  the  close  of  1917. 
The  year  1918  was  a  time  of  busy  preparation.  An 
elaborate  propaganda  organization  was  built  up  from 
various  sources.  A  number  of  old  Czarist  agents  and 
diplomats  versed  in  Eastern  affairs  were  cajoled  or  con¬ 
scripted  into  the  service.  The  Russian  Mohammedan 
populations  such  as  the  Tartars  of  South  Russia  and 
the  Turkomans  of  Central  Asia  furnished  many  recruits. 
Even  more  valuable  were  the  exiles  who  flocked  to  Rus¬ 
sia  from  Turkey,  Persia,  India,  and  elsewhere  at  the 
close  of  the  Great  War.  Practically  all  the  leaders  of  the 
Turkish  war-government — Enver,  Djemal,  Talaat,  and 
many  more,  fled  to  Russia  for  refuge  from  the  vengeance 
of  the  victorious  Entente  Powers.  The  same  was  true  of 
the  Hindu  terrorist  leaders  who  had  been  in  German 
pay  during  the  war  and  who  now  sought  service  under 
Lenine.  By  the  end  of  1918  Bolshevism’s  Oriental 
propaganda  department  was  well  organized,  divided 
into  three  bureaux,  for  the  Islamic  countries,  India, 
and  the  Far  East  respectively.  With  Bolshevism’s 
Far  Eastern  activities  this  book  is  not  concerned,  though 
the  reader  should  bear  them  in  mind  and  should  remem¬ 
ber  the  important  part  played  by  the  Chinese  in  recent 
Russian  history.  As  for  the  Islamic  and  Indian  bu¬ 
reaux,  they  displayed  great  zeal,  translating  tons  of  Bol- 


338  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


shevik  literature  into  the  various  Oriental  languages, 
training  numerous  secret  agents  and  propagandists  for 
“field-work,”  and  getting  in  touch  with  all  disaffected 
or  revolutionary  elements. 

With  the  opening  months  of  1919  Bolshevist  activity 
throughout  the  Near  and  Middle  East  became  increas¬ 
ingly  apparent.  The  wave  of  rage  and  despair  caused 
by  the  Entente’s  denial  of  Near  Eastern  nationalist 
aspirations1  played  splendidly  into  the  Bolshevists’ 
hands,  and  we  have  already  seen  how  Moscow  sup¬ 
ported  Mustapha  Kemal  and  other  nationalist  leaders 
in  Turkey,  Persia,  Egypt,  and  elsewhere.  In  the  Mid¬ 
dle  East,  also,  Bolshevism  gained  important  successes. 
Not  merely  was  Moscow’s  hand  visible  in  the  epidemic 
of  rioting  and  seditious  violence  which  swept  northern 
India  in  the  spring  of  1919, 2  but  an  even  shrewder  blow 
was  struck  at  Britain  in  Afghanistan.  This  land  of 
turbulent  mountaineers,  which  lay  like  a  perpetual 
thunder-cloud  on  India’s  northwest  frontier,  had  kept 
quiet  during  the  Great  War,  mainly  owing  to  the  Anglo¬ 
phile  attitude  of  its  ruler,  the  Ameer  Habibullah  Khan. 
But  early  in  1919  Habibullah  was  murdered.  Whether 
the  Bolsheviki  had  a  hand  in  the  matter  is  not  known, 
but  they  certainly  reaped  the  benefit,  for  power  passed 
to  one  of  Habibullah’s  sons,  Amanullah  Khan,  who  was 
an  avowed  enemy  of  England  and  who  had  had  dealings 
with  Turco-German  agents  during  the  late  war.  Ama¬ 
nullah  at  once  got  in  touch  with  Moscow,  and  a  little 
later,  just  when  the  Punjab  was  seething  with  unrest, 
he  declared  war  on  England,  and  his  wild  tribesmen, 
pouring  across  the  border,  set  the  northwest  frontier 

1  See  Chapter  V.  2  See  Chapter  VI. 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


339 


on  fire.  After  some  hard  fighting  the  British  succeeded 
in  repelling  the  Afghan  invasion,  and  Amanullah  was 
constrained  to  make  peace.  But  Britain  obviously 
dared  not  press  Amanullah  too  hard,  for  in  the  peace 
treaty  the  Ameer  was  released  from  his  previous  obliga¬ 
tion  not  to  maintain  diplomatic  relations  with  other 
nations  than  British  India.  Amanullah  promptly  aired 
his  independence  by  maintaining  ostentatious  relations 
with  Moscow.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Bolsheviki  had 
by  this  time  established  an  important  propagandist 
subcentre  in  Russian  Turkestan,  not  far  from  the  Af¬ 
ghan  border,  and  this  bureau’s  activities  of  course  en¬ 
visaged  not  merely  Afghanistan  but  the  wider  field  of 
India  as  well.1 

During  1920  Bolshevik  activities  became  still  more 
pronounced  throughout  the  Near  and  Middle  East. 
We  have  already  seen  how  powerfully  Bolshevik  Russia 
supported  the  Turkish  and  Persian  nationalist  move- 

1  For  events  in  Afghanistan  and  Central  Asia,  see  Sir  T.  H.  Holdich, 
“The  Influence  of  Bolshevism  in  Afghanistan,”  New  Europe,  December  4, 
1919;  Ikbal  Ali  Shah,  “The  Fall  of  Bokhara,”  The  Near  East,  October  28, 
1920,  and  his  “The  Central  Asian  Tangle,”  Asiatic  Review,  October, 
1920.  For  Bolshevist  activity  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East  generally, 
see  Miliukov,  op.  cit.,  pp.  243-260;  295-297;  Major-General  Sir  George 
Aston,  “Bolshevik  Propaganda  in  the  East,”  Fortnightly  Review,  August, 
1920;  W.  E.  D.  Allen,  “Transcaucasia,  Past  and  Present,”  Quarterly  Re¬ 
view,  October,  1920;  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  “Conflicting  Policies  in  the 
Near  East,”  New  Europe ,  July  1,  1920;  L.  Dumont- Wilden,  “Awakening 
Asia,”  The  Living  Age,  August  7,  1920  (translated  from  the  French); 
Major-General  Lord  Edward  Gleichen,  “Moslems  and  the  Tangle  in  the 
Middle  East,”  National  Review,  December,  1919;  Paxton  Hibben,  “Russia 
at  Peace,”  The  Nation  (New  York),  January  26,  1921;  H.  von  Hoff,  “Die 
nationale  Erhebung  in  der  Tiirkei,”  Deutsche  Revue,  December,  1919; 
R.  G.  Hunter,  “Entente — Oil — Islam,”  New  Europe,  August  26,  1920; 
“Taira,”  “The  Story  of  the  Arab  Revolt,”  Balkan  Review,  August, 
1920;  “Voyageur,”  “Lenin’s  Attempt  to  Capture  Islam,”  New  Europe, 
June  10,  1920;  Hans  Wendt,  “Ex  Oriente  Lux,”  Nord  und  Slid,  May, 
1920;  George  Young,  “Russian  Foreign  Policy,”  New  Europe,  July  1, 
1920. 


340  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


ments.  In  fact,  the  reckless  short-sightedness  of  Entente 
policy  was  driving  into  Lenine’s  arms  multitudes  of  na¬ 
tionalists  to  whom  the  internationalist  theories  of  Mos¬ 
cow  were  personally  abhorrent.  For  example,  the  head 
of  the  Afghan  mission  to  Moscow  thus  frankly  expressed 
his  reasons  for  friendship  with  Soviet  Russia,  in  an  inter¬ 
view  printed  by  the  official  Soviet  organ,  Izvestia:  UI  am 
neither  Communist  nor  Socialist,  but  my  political  pro¬ 
gramme  so  far  is  the  expulsion  of  the  English  from  Asia. 
I  am  an  irreconcilable  enemy  of  European  capitalism 
in  Asia,  the  chief  representatives  of  which  are  the  Eng¬ 
lish.  On  this  point  I  coincide  with  the  Communists, 
and  in  this  respect  we  are  your  natural  allies.  .  .  . 
Afghanistan,  like  India,  does  not  represent  a  capitalist 
state,  and  it  is  very  unlikely  that  even  a  parliamentary 
regime  will  take  deep  root  in  these  countries.  It  is  so 
far  difficult  to  say  how  subsequent  events  will  develop. 
I  only  know  that  the  renowned  address  of  the  Soviet 
Government  to  all  nations,  with  its  appeal  to  them  to 
combat  capitalists  (and  for  us  a  capitalist  is  synonymous 
with  the  word  foreigner,  or,  to  be  more  exact,  an  English¬ 
man),  had  an  enormous  effect  on  us.  A  still  greater 
effect  was  produced  by  Russia’s  annulment  of  all  the 
secret  treaties  enforced  by  the  imperialistic  governments, 
and  by  the  proclaiming  of  the  right  of  all  nations,  no 
matter  how  small,  to  determine  their  own  destiny.  This 
act  rallied  around  Soviet  Russia  all  the  exploited  nation¬ 
alities  of  Asia,  and  all  parties,  even  those  very  remote 
from  Socialism.”  Of  course,  knowing  what  we  do  of 
Bolshevik  propagandist  tactics,  we  cannot  be  sure  that 
the  Afghan  diplomat  ever  said  the  things  which  the  Iz¬ 
vestia  relates.  But,  even  if  the  interview  be  a  fake, 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


341 


the  words  put  into  his  mouth  express  the  feelings  of  vast 
numbers  of  Orientals  and  explain  a  prime  cause  of  Bol¬ 
shevik  propagandist  successes  in  Eastern  lands. 

So  successful^  indeed;  had  been  the  progress  of  Bol¬ 
shevik  propaganda  that  the  Soviet  leaders  now  began 
to  work  openly  for  their  ultimate  ends.  At  first  Moscow 
had  posed  as  the  champion  of  Oriental  “ peoples”  against 
Western  “imperialism”;  its  appeals  had  been  to  “peo¬ 
ples/’  irrespective  of  class;  and  it  had  promised  “self- 
determination/’  with  full  respect  for  native  ideas  and 
institutions.  For  instance:  a  Bolshevist  manifesto  to 
the  Turks  signed  by  Lenine  and  issued  toward  the  close 
of  1919  read:  “Mussulmans  of  the  world;  victims  of  the 
capitalists;  awake !  Russia  has  abandoned  the  Czar’s 
pernicious  policy  toward  you  and  offers  to  help  you  over¬ 
throw  English  tyranny.  She  will  allow  you  freedom  of 
religion  and  self-government.  The  frontiers  existing 
before  the  war  will  be  respected;  no  Turkish  territory 
will  be  given  Armenia;  the  Dardanelles  Straits  will  re¬ 
main  yours,  and  Constantinople  will  remain  the  capital 
of  the  Mussulman  world.  The  Mussulmans  in  Russia 
will  be  given  self-government.  All  we  ask  in  exchange 
is  that  you  fight  the  reckless  capitalists;  who  would 
exploit  your  country  and  make  it  a  colony.”  Even 
when  addressing  its  own  people,  the  Soviet  Government 
maintained  the  same  general  tone.  An  “Order  of  the 
Day”  to  the  Russian  troops  stationed  on  the  borders 
of  India  stated:  “Comrades  of  the  Pamir  division,  you 
have  been  given  a  responsible  task.  The  Soviet  Repub¬ 
lic  sends  you  to  garrison  the  posts  on  the  Pamir,  on  the 
frontiers  of  the  friendly  countries  of  Afghanistan  and 
India.  The  Pamir  table-land  divides  revolutionary  Rus- 


342  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


sia  from  India,  which,  with  its  300,000,000  inhabitants, 
is  enslaved  by  a  handful  of  Englishmen.  On  this  table¬ 
land  the  signallers  of  revolution  must  hoist  the  red  flag 
of  the  army  of  liberation.  May  the  peoples  of  India, 
who  fight  against  their  English  oppressors,  soon  know 
that  friendly  help  is  not  far  off.  Make  yourselves  at 
home  with  the  liberty-loving  tribes  of  northern  India, 
promote  by  word  and  deed  their  revolutionary  progress, 
refute  the  mass  of  calumnies  spread  about  Soviet  Russia 
by  agents  of  the  British  princes,  lords,  and  bankers. 
Long  live  the  alliance  of  the  revolutionary  peoples  of 
Europe  and  Asia!” 

Such  was  the  nature  of  first-stage  Bolshevik  propa¬ 
ganda.  Presently,  however,  propaganda  of  quite  a 
different  character  began  to  appear.  This  second-stage 
propaganda  of  course  continued  to  assail  Western  “  capi¬ 
talist  imperialism.”  But  alongside,  or  rather  inter¬ 
mingled  with,  these  anti-Western  fulminations,  there 
now  appeared  special  appeals  to  the  Oriental  masses, 
inciting  them  against  all  “  capitalists ”  and  11  bourgeois,” 
native  as  well  as  foreign,  and  promising  the  “  proleta¬ 
rians”  remedies  for  all  their  ills.  Here  is  a  Bolshevist 
manifesto  to  the  Turkish  masses,  published  in  the  sum¬ 
mer  of  1920.  It  is  very  different  from  the  manifestoes 
of  a  year  before.  “The  men  of  toil,”  says  this  interest¬ 
ing  document,  “are  now  struggling  everywhere  against 
the  rich  people.  These  people,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  aristocracy  and  their  hirelings,  are  now  trying  to* 
hold  Turkish  toilers  in  their  chains.  It  is  the  rich  peo¬ 
ple  of  Europe  who  have  brought  suffering  to  Turkey. 
Comrades,  let  us  make  common  cause  with  the  world’s 
toilers.  If  we  do  not  do  so  we  shall  never  rise  again. 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


343 


Let  the  heroes  of  Turkey’s  revolution  join  Bolshevism. 
Long  live  the  Third  International !  Praise  be  to  Allah !” 

And  in  these  new  efforts  Moscow  was  not  content 
with  words;  it  was  passing  to  deeds  as  well.  The  first 
application  of  Bolshevism  to  an  Eastern  people  was  in 
Russian  Turkestan.  When  the  Bolsheviki  first  came  to 
power  at  the  end  of  1917  they  had  granted  Turkestan 
full  “  self-determination/’  and  the  inhabitants  had  ac¬ 
claimed  their  native  princes  and  re-established  their  old 
state-units,  subject  to  a  loose  federative  tie  with  Russia. 
Early  in  1920,  however,  the  Soviet  Government  con¬ 
sidered  Turkestan  ripe  for  the  “  Social  Revolution.” 
Accordingly,  the  native  princes  were  deposed,  all  politi¬ 
cal  power  was  transferred  to  local  Soviets  (controlled 
by  Russians),  the  native  upper  and  middle  classes  were 
despoiled  of  their  property,  and  sporadic  resistance  was 
crushed  by  mass-executions,  torture,  and  other  familiar 
forms  of  Bolshevist  terrorism.1  In  the  Caucasus,  also, 
the  social  revolution  had  begun  with  the  Sovietization 
of  Azerbaijan.  The  Tartar  republic  of  Azerbaijan  was 
one  of  the  fragments  of  the  former  Russian  province 
of  Transcaucasia  which  had  declared  its  independence 
on  the  collapse  of  the  Czarist  Empire  in  1917.  Located 
in  eastern  Transcaucasia,  about  the  Caspian  Sea,  Azer¬ 
baijan’s  capital  was  the  city  of  Baku,  famous  for  its  oil¬ 
fields.  Oil  had  transformed  Baku  into  an  industrial 
centre  on  Western  lines,  with  a  large  working  popula¬ 
tion  of  mixed  Asiatic  and  Russian  origin.  Playing  upon 
the  nascent  class-consciousness  of  this  urban  proletariat, 
the  Bolshevik  agents  made  a  coup  d’etat  in  the  spring  of 
1920,  overthrew  the  nationalist  government,  and,  with 

1  Ikbal  Ali  Shah,  op.  cit. 


344  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


prompt  Russian  backing,  made  Azerbaijan  a  Soviet 
republic.  The  usual  accompaniments  of  the  social  rev¬ 
olution  followed:  despoiling  and  massacring  of  the 
upper  and  middle  classes,  confiscation  of  property  in 
favor  of  the  town  proletarians  and  agricultural  laborers, 
and  ruthless  terrorism.  With  the  opening  months  of 
1920,  Bolshevism  was  thus  in  actual  operation  in  both 
the  Near  and  Middle  East.1 

Having  acquired  strong  footholds  in  the  Orient,  Bol¬ 
shevism  now  felt  strong  enough  to  throw  off  the  mask. 
In  the  autumn  of  1920,  the  Soviet  Government  of  Rus¬ 
sia  held  a  “ Congress  of  Eastern  Peoples”  at  Baku,  the 
aim  of  which  was  not  merely  the  liberation  of  the  Orient 
from  Western  control  but  its  Bolshevizing  as  well. 
No  attempt  at  concealment  of  this  larger  objective  was 
made,  and  so  striking  was  the  language  employed  that 
it  may  well  merit  our  close  attention. 

In  the  first  place,  the  call  to  the  congress,  issued  by 
the  Third  (Moscow)  International,  was  addressed  to 
the  “ peasants  and  workers”  of  the  East.  The  summons 
read: 

“ Peasants  and  workers  of  Persia!  The  Teheran 
Government  of  the  Khadjars  and  its  retinue  of  provin¬ 
cial  Khans  have  plundered  and  exploited  you  through 
many  centuries.  The  land,  which,  according  to  the  laws 
of  the  Sheriat,  was  your  common  property,  has  been 
taken  possession  of  more  and  more  by  the  lackeys  of 


1  For  events  in  the  Caucasus,  see  W.  E.  D.  Allen,  “Transcaucasia,  Past 
and  Present,”  Quarterly  Review ,  October,  1920;  C.  E.  Bechhofer,  “The 
Situation  in  the  Transcaucasus,”  New  Europe ,  September  2,  1920;  “D. 
Z.  T.,”  “L’Azerbaidjan:  La  Premiere  R6publique  musulmane,”  Revue  du 
Monde  musulman,  1919;  Paxton  Hibben,  “Exit  Georgia,”  The  Nation 
(New  York),  March  30,  1921. 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


345 


the  Teheran  Government;  they  trade  it  away  at  their 
pleasure;  they  lay  what  taxes  please  them  upon  you; 
and  when,  through  their  mismanagement,  they  got  the 
country  into  such  a  condition  that  they  were  unable  to 
squeeze  enough  juice  out  of  it  themselves,  they  sold 
Persia  last  year  to  English  capitalists  for  2,000,000 
pounds,  so  that  the  latter  will  organize  an  army  in  Per¬ 
sia  that  will  oppress  you  still  more  than  formerly,  and 
so  the  latter  can  collect  taxes  for  the  Khans  and  the 
Teheran  Government.  They  have  sold  the  oil-wells  in 
South  Persia  and  thus  helped  plunder  the  country. 

“ Peasants  of  Mesopotamia!  The  English  have  de¬ 
clared  your  country  to  be  independent;  but  80,000  Eng¬ 
lish  soldiers  are  stationed  in  your  country,  are  robbing 
and  plundering,  are  killing  you  and  are  violating  your 
women. 

“ Peasants  of  Anatolia!  The  English,  French,  and 
Italian  Governments  hold  Constantinople  under  the 
mouths  of  their  cannon.  They  have  made  the  Sultan 
their  prisoner,  they  are  obliging  him  to  consent  to  the 
dismemberment  of  what  is  purely  Turkish  territory, 
they  are  forcing  him  to  turn  the  country’s  finances  over 
to  foreign  capitalists  in  order  to  make  it  possible  for 
them  better  to  exploit  the  Turkish  people,  already  re¬ 
duced  to  a  state  of  beggary  by  the  six-year  war.  They 
have  occupied  the  coal-mines  of  Heraclea,  they  are  hold¬ 
ing  your  ports,  they  are  sending  their  troops  into  your 
country  and  are  trampling  down  your  fields. 

“ Peasants  and  workers  of  Armenia!  Decades  ago 
you  became  the  victims  of  the  intrigues  of  foreign  capi¬ 
tal,  which  launched  heavy  verbal  attacks  against  the 
massacres  of  the  Armenians  by  the  Kurds  and  incited 


346  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


you  to  fight  against  the  Sultan  in  order  to  obtain  through 
your  blood  new  concessions  and  fresh  profits  daily  from 
the  bloody  Sultan.  During  the  war  they  not  only  prom¬ 
ised  you  independence,  but  they  incited  your  merchants, 
your  teachers,  and  your  priests  to  demand  the  land  of 
the  Turkish  peasants  in  order  to  keep  up  an  eternal  con¬ 
flict  between  the  Armenian  and  Turkish  peoples,  so  that 
they  could  eternally  derive  profits  out  of  this  conflict, 
for  as  long  as  strife  prevails  between  you  and  the  Turks, 
just  so  long  will  the  English,  French,  and  American 
capitalists  be  able  to  hold  Turkey  in  check  through  the 
menace  of  an  Armenian  uprising  and  to  use  the  Arme¬ 
nians  as  cannon-fodder  through  the  menace  of  a  pogrom 
by  Kurds. 

“ Peasants  of  Syria  and  Arabia!  Independence  was 
promised  to  you  by  the  English  and  the  French,  and 
now  they  hold  your  country  occupied  by  their  armies, 
now  the  English  and  the  French  dictate  your  laws, 
and  you,  who  have  freed  yourselves  from  the  Turkish 
Sultan,  from  the  Constantinople  Government,  are  now 
slaves  of  the  Paris  and  London  Governments,  which 
merely  differ  from  the  Sultan’s  Government  in  being 
stronger  and  better  able  to  exploit  you. 

“You  all  understand  this  yourselves.  The  Persian 
peasants  and  workers  have  risen  against  their  traitorous 
Teheran  Government.  The  peasants  in  Mesopotamia 
are  in  revolt  against  the  English  troops.  You  peasants 
in  Anatolia  have  rushed  to  the  banner  of  Kemal  Pasha 
in  order  to  fight  against  the  foreign  invasion,  but  at  the 
same  time  we  hear  that  you  are  trying  to  organize  your 
own  party,  a  genuine  peasants’  party  that  will  be  willing 
to  fight  even  if  the  Pashas  are  to  make  their  peace  with 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


347 


the  Entente  exploiters.  Syria  has  no  peace,  and  you, 
Armenian  peasants,  whom  the  Entente,  despite  its 
promises,  allows  to  die  from  hunger  in  order  to  keep  you 
under  better  control,  you  are  understanding  more  and 
more  that  it  is  silly  to  hope  for  salvation  by  the  Entente 
capitalists.  Even  your  bourgeois  Government  of  the 
Dashnakists,  the  lackeys  of  the  Entente,  is  compelled 
to  turn  to  the  Workers’  and  Peasants’  Government  of 
Russia  with  an  appeal  for  peace  and  help. 

“ Peasants  and  workers  of  the  Near  East!  If  you 
organize  yourselves,  if  you  form  your  own  Workers’ 
and  Peasants’  Government,  if  you  arm  yourselves,  if 
you  unite  with  the  Red  Russian  Workers’  and  Peasants’ 
Army,  then  you  will  be  able  to  defy  the  English,  French, 
and  American  capitalists,  then  you  will  settle  accounts 
with  your  own  native  exploiters,  then  you  will  find  it 
possible,  in  a  free  alliance  with  the  workers’  republics 
of  the  world,  to  look  after  your  own  interests;  then  you 
will  know  how  to  exploit  the  resources  of  your  country 
in  your  own  interest  and  in  the  interest  of  the  working 
people  of  the  whole  world,  that  will  honestly  exchange 
the  products  of  their  labor  and  mutually  help  each  other. 

“We  want  to  talk  over  all  these  questions  with  you  at 
the  Congress  in  Baku.  Spare  no  effort  to  appear  in 
Baku  on  September  1  in  as  large  numbers  as  possible. 
You  march,  year  in  and  year  out,  through  the  deserts 
to  the  holy  places  where  you  show  your  respect  for  your 
past  and  for  your  God — now  march  through  deserts, 
over  mountains,  and  across  rivers  in  order  to  come  to¬ 
gether  to  discuss  how  you  can  escape  from  the  bonds  of 
slavery,  how  you  can  unite  as  brothers  so  as  to  live  as 
men,  free  and  equal.” 


348  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


From  this  summons  the  nature  of  the  Baku  congress 
can  be  imagined.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  social  revolution¬ 
ist  far  more  than  a  nationalist  assembly.  Of  its  1,900 
delegates,  nearly  1,300  were  professed  communists. 
Turkey,  Persia,  Armenia,  and  the  Caucasus  countries 
sent  the  largest  delegations,  though  there  were  also 
delegations  from  Arabia,  India,  and  even  the  Far  East. 
The  Russian  Soviet  Government  was  of  course  in  con¬ 
trol  and  kept  a  tight  hand  on  the  proceedings.  The 
character  of  these  proceedings  was  well  summarized  by 
the  address  of  the  noted  Bolshevik  leader  Zinoviev,  presi¬ 
dent  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Third  (Moscow) 
International,  who  presided. 

Zinoviev  said: 

“We  believe  this  Congress  to  be  one  of  the  greatest 
events  in  history,  for  it  proves  not  only  that  the  pro¬ 
gressive  workers  and  working  peasants  of  Europe  and 
America  are  awakened,  but  that  we  have  at  last  seen  the 
day  of  the  awakening,  not  of  a  few,  but  of  tens  of  thou¬ 
sands,  of  hundreds  of  thousands,  of  millions  of  the  labor¬ 
ing  class  of  the  peoples  of  the  East.  These  peoples  form 
the  majority  of  the  world’s  whole  population,  and  they 
alone,  therefore,  are  able  to  bring  the  war  between 
capital  and  labor  to  a  conclusive  decision.  .  .  . 

“The  Communist  International  said  from  the  very 
first  day  of  its  existence:  ‘ There  are  four  times  as  many 
people  living  in  Asia  as  live  in  Europe.  We  will  free  all 
peoples,  all  who  labor.’  ...  We  know  that  the  labor¬ 
ing  masses  of  the  East  are  in  part  retrograde,  though 
not  by  their  own  fault;  they  cannot  read  or  write,  are 
ignorant,  are  bound  in  superstition,  believe  in  the  evil 
spirit,  are  unable  to  read  any  newspapers,  do  not  know 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


349 


what  is  happening  in  the  world,  have  not  the  slight¬ 
est  idea  of  the  most  elementary  laws  of  hygiene.  Com¬ 
rades,  our  Moscow  International  discussed  the  ques¬ 
tion  whether  a  socialist  revolution  could  take  place  in 
the  countries  of  the  East  before  those  countries  had 
passed  through  the  capitalist  stage.  You  know  that 
the  view  which  long  prevailed  was  that  every  country 
must  first  go  through  the  period  of  capitalism  .  .  .  be¬ 
fore  socialism  could  become  a  live  question.  We  now 
believe  that  this  is  no  longer  true.  Russia  has  done 
this,  and  from  that  moment  we  are  able  to  say  that 
China,  India,  Turkey,  Persia,  Armenia  also  can,  and 
must,  make  a  direct  fight  to  get  the  Soviet  System. 
These  countries  can,  and  must,  prepare  themselves  to 
be  Soviet  republics. 

“I  say  that  we  give  patient  aid  to  groups  of  persons 
who  do  not  believe  in  our  ideas,  who  are  even  opposed 
to  us  on  some  points.  In  this  way,  the  Soviet  Govern¬ 
ment  supports  Kemal  in  Turkey.  Never  for  one  mo¬ 
ment  do  we  forget  that  the  movement  headed  by  Kemal 
is  not  a  communist  movement.  We  know  it.  I  have 
here  extracts  from  the  verbatim  reports  of  the  first  ses¬ 
sion  of  the  Turkish  people’s  Government  at  Angora. 
Kemal  himself  says  that  The  Caliph’s  person  is  sacred 
and  inviolable.’  The  movement  headed  by  Kemal 
wants  to  rescue  the  Caliph’s  1  sacred’  person  from  the 
hands  of  the  foe.  That  is  the  Turkish  Nationalist’s 
point  of  view.  But  is  it  a  communist  point  of  view? 
No.  We  respect  the  religious  convictions  of  the  masses; 
we  know  how  to  re-educate  the  masses.  It  will  be  the 
work  of  years. 

“We  use  great  caution  in  approaching  the  religious 


350  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


convictions  of  the  laboring  masses  in  the  East  and  else¬ 
where.  But  at  this  Congress  we  are  bound  to  tell  you 
that  you  must  not  do  what  the  Kemal  Government  is 
doing  in  Turkey;  you  must  not  support  the  power  of 
the  Sultan,  not  even  if  religious  considerations  urge  you 
to  do  so.  You  must  press  on,  and  must  not  allow  your¬ 
selves  to  be  pulled  back.  We  believe  the  Sultan’s  hour 
has  struck.  You  must  not  allow  any  form  of  autocratic 
power  to  continue;  you  must  destroy,  you  must  annihi¬ 
late,  faith  in  the  Sultan;  you  must  struggle  to  obtain 
real  Soviet  organizations.  The  Russian  peasants  also 
were  strong  believers  in  the  Czar;  but  when  a  true  peo¬ 
ple’s  revolution  broke  out  there  was  practically  nothing 
left  of  this  faith  in  the  Czar.  The  same  thing  will  hap¬ 
pen  in  Turkey  and  all  over  the  East  as  soon  as  a  true 
peasants’  revolution  shall  burst  forth  over  the  surface 
of  the  black  earth.  The  people  will  very  soon  lose  faith 
in  their  Sultan  and  in  their  masters.  We  say  once  more, 
the  policy  pursued  by  the  present  people’s  Government 
in  Turkey  is  not  the  policy  of  the  Communist  Inter¬ 
national,  it  is  not  our  policy;  nevertheless,  we  declare 
that  we  are  prepared  to  support  any  revolutionary  fight 
against  the  English  Government. 

“Yes,  we  array  ourselves  against  the  English  bour¬ 
geoisie;  we  seize  the  English  imperialist  by  the  throat 
and  tread  him  under  foot.  It  is  against  English  capi¬ 
talism  that  the  worst,  the  most  fatal  blow  must  be  dealt. 
That  is  so.  But  at  the  same  time  we  must  educate  the 
laboring  masses  of  the  East  to  hatred,  to  the  will  to  fight 
the  whole  of  the  rich  classes  indifferently,  whoever  they 
be.  The  great  significance  of  the  revolution  now  start¬ 
ing  in  the  East  does  not  consist  in  begging  the  English 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


351 


imperialist  to  take  his  feet  off  the  table,  for  the  purpose 
of  then  permitting  the  wealthy  Turk  to  place  his  feet 
on  it  all  the  more  comfortably;  no,  we  will  very  politely 
ask  all  the  rich  to  remove  their  dirty  feet  from  the  table, 
so  that  there  may  be  no  luxuriousness  among  us,  no 
boasting,  no  contempt  of  the  people,  no  idleness,  but 
that  the  world  may  be  ruled  by  the  worker’s  horny 
hand.” 

The  Baku  Congress  was  the  opening  gun  in  Bolshe¬ 
vism’s  avowed  campaign  for  the  immediate  Bolshevizing 
of  the  East.  It  was  followed  by  increased  Soviet  ac¬ 
tivity  and  by  substantial  Soviet  successes,  especially 
in  the  Caucasus,  where  both  Georgia  and  Armenia  were 
Bolshevized  in  the  spring  of  1921. 

These  very  successes,  however,  awakened  growing 
uneasiness  among  Soviet  Russia’s  nationalist  proteges. 
The  various  Oriental  nationalist  parties,  which  had  at 
first  welcomed  Moscow’s  aid  so  enthusiastically  against 
the  Entente  Powers,  now  began  to  realize  that  Russian 
Bolshevism  might  prove  as  great  a  peril  as  Western 
imperialism  to  their  patriotic  aspirations.  Of  course 
the  nationalist  leaders  had  always  realized  Moscow’s 
ultimate  goal,  but  hitherto  they  had  felt  themselves 
strong  enough  to  control  the  situation  and  to  take  Rus¬ 
sian  aid  without  paying  Moscow’s  price.  Now  they 
no  longer  felt  so  sure.  The  numbers  of  class-conscious 
“  proletarians  ”  in  the  East  might  be  very  small.  The 
communist  philosophy  might  be  virtually  unintelligible 
to  the  Oriental  masses.  Nevertheless,  the  very  exist¬ 
ence  of  Soviet  Russia  was  a  warning  not  to  be  disre¬ 
garded.  In  Russia  an  infinitesimal  communist  minority, 
numbering,  by  its  own  admission,  not  much  over  600,- 


352  THE  NEW  .WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


000,  was  maintaining  an  unlimited  despotism  over 
170,000,000  people.  Western  countries  might  rely  on 
their  popular  education  and  their  stanch  traditions  of 
ordered  liberty;  the  East  possessed  no  such  bulwarks 
against  Bolshevism.  The  East  was,  in  fact,  much  like 
Russia.  There  was  the  same  dense  ignorance  of  the 
masses;  the  same  absence  of  a  large  and  powerful  mid¬ 
dle  class;  the  same  tradition  of  despotism;  the  same 
popular  acquiescence  in  the  rule  of  ruthless  minorities. 
Finally,  there  were  the  ominous  examples  of  Sovietized 
Turkestan  and  Azerbaidjan.  In  fine,  Oriental  nation¬ 
alists  bethought  them  of  the  old  adage  that  he  who  sups 
with  the  devil  needs  a  long  spoon. 

Everywhere  it  has  been  the  same  story.  In  Asia 
Minor,  Mustapha  Kemal  has  arrested  Bolshevist  propa¬ 
ganda  agents,  while  Turkish  and  Russian  troops  have 
more  than  once  clashed  on  the  disputed  Caucasus  fron¬ 
tiers.  In  Egypt  we  have  already  seen  how  an  amicable 
arrangement  between  Lord  Milner  and  the  Egyptian 
nationalist  leaders  was  facilitated  by  the  latter’s  fear 
of  the  social  revolutionary  agitators  who  were  inflam¬ 
ing  the  fellaheen.  In  India,  Sir  Valentine  Chirol  noted 
as  far  back  as  the  spring  of  1918  how  Russia’s  collapse 
into  Bolshevism  had  had  a  “sobering  effect”  on  Indian 
public  opinion.  “The  more  thoughtful  Indians,”  he 
wrote,  “now  see  how  helpless  even  the  Russian  intel¬ 
ligentsia  (relatively  far  more  numerous  and  matured 
than  the  Indian  intelligentsia )  has  proved  to  control  the 
great  ignorant  masses  as  soon  as  the  whole  fabric  of 
government  has  been  hastily  shattered.”  1  In  Afghani- 

xSir  V.  Chirol,  “India  in  Travail,”  Edinburgh  Review ,  July,  1918. 
Also  see  H.  H.  The  Aga  Khan,  India  in  Transition ,  p.  17  (London,  1918). 


SOCIAL  UNREST 


353 


stan,  likewise,  the  Ameer  was  losing  his  love  for  his  Bol¬ 
shevist  allies.  The  streams  of  refugees  from  Sovietized 
Turkestan  that  flowed  across  his  borders  for  protection, 
headed  by  his  kinsman  the  Ameer  of  Bokhara,  made 
Amanullah  Khan  do  some  hard  thinking,  intensified  by 
a  serious  mutiny  of  Afghan  troops  on  the  Russian  bor¬ 
der,  the  mutineers  demanding  the  right  to  form  Soldiers’ 
Councils  quite  on  the  Russian  pattern.  Bolshevist 
agents  might  tempt  him  by  the  loot  of  India,  but  the 
Ameer  could  also  see  that  that  would  do  him  little  good 
if  he  himself  were  to  be  looted  and  killed  by  his  own 
rebellious  subjects.1  Thus,  as  time  went  on,  Oriental 
nationalists  and  conservatives  generally  tended  to  close 
ranks  in  dislike  and  apprehension  of  Bolshevism.  Had 
there  been  no  other  issue  involved,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  Moscow’s  advances  would  have  been  repelled 
and  Bolshevist  agents  given  short  shrift. 

Unfortunately,  the  Eastern  nationalists  feel  them¬ 
selves  between  the  Bolshevist  devil  and  the  Western 
imperialist  deep  sea.  The  upshot  has  been  that  they 
have  been  trying  to  play  off  the  one  against  the  other — 
driven  toward  Moscow  by  every  Entente  aggression; 
driven  toward  the  West  by  every  Soviet  coup  of  Lenine. 
Western  statesmen  should  realize  this,  and  should  re¬ 
member  that  Bolshevism’s  best  propagandist  agent  is, 
not  Zinoviev  orating  at  Baku,  but  General  Gouraud, 
with  his  Senegalese  battalions  and  “ strong-arm”  meth¬ 
ods  in  Syria  and  the  Arab  hinterland. 

Certainly,  any  extensive  spread  of  Bolshevism  in  the 
East  would  be  a  terrible  misfortune  both  for  the  Orient 
and  for  the  world  at  large.  If  the  triumph  of  Bolshe- 

1  Ikbal  Ali  Shah,  op.  cit. 


354  THE  NEW  WORLD  OF  ISLAM 


vism  would  mean  barbarism  in  the  West,  in  the  East  it 
would  spell  downright  savagery.  The  sudden  release 
of  the  ignorant,  brutal  Oriental  masses  from  their  tra¬ 
ditional  restraints  of  religion  and  custom,  and  the  sub¬ 
mergence  of  the  relatively  small  upper  and  middle 
classes  by  the  flood  of  social  revolution  would  mean  the 
destruction  of  all  Oriental  civilization  and  culture,  and 
a  plunge  into  an  abyss  of  anarchy  from  which  the  East 
could  emerge  only  after  generations,  perhaps  centuries. 


CONCLUSION 


Our  survey  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East  is  at  an  end. 
What  is  the  outstanding  feature  of  that  survey?  It  is: 
Change.  The  “ Immovable  East”  has  been  moved  at 
last — moved  to  its  very  depths.  The  Orient  is  to-day 
in  full  transition,  flux,  ferment,  more  sudden  and  pro¬ 
found  than  any  it  has  hitherto  known.  The  world  of 
Islam,  mentally  and  spiritually  quiescent  for  almost  a 
thousand  years,  is  once  more  astir,  once  more  on  the 
march. 

Whither?  We  do  not  know.  Who  would  be  bold 
enough  to  prophesy  the  outcome  of  this  vast  ferment — 
political,  economic,  social,  religious,  and  much  more 
besides?  All  that  we  may  wisely  venture  is  to  observe, 
describe,  and  analyze  the  various  elements  in  the  great 
transition. 

Yet  surely  this  is  much.  To  view,  however  empiri¬ 
cally,  the  mighty  transformation  at  work;  to  group  its 
multitudinous  aspects  in  some  sort  of  relativity;  to  fol¬ 
low  the  red  threads  of  tendency  running  through  the 
tangled  skein,  is  to  gain  at  least  provisional  knowledge 
and  acquire  capacity  to  grasp' the  significance  of  future 
developments  as  they  shall  successively  arise. 

“To  know  is  to  understand” — and  to  hope:  to  hope 
that  this  present  travail,  vast  and  ill  understood,  may 
be  but  the  birth-pangs  of  a  truly  renascent  East  taking 
its  place  in  a  renascent  world. 


355 


THE  WORLD  OF  ISLAM. 


/ 


INDEX 


Aali  Pasha,  Pan-Islam  agitation  of,  65 
Abbas  Hilmi,  Khedive,  pro-Turkish 
views  of,  185;  deposition  of,  185; 
Pan-Arabianism  supported  by,  202 
Abd-el-Kader,  French  resisted  by,  49 
Abd-el-Malek  Hamsa,  Pro-Germanism 
of,  186 

Abd-el-Wahab,  Mohammedan  revival 
begun  by,  26,  48;  birth  of,  26;  early 
life  of,  27  ff. ;  influence  of,  28;  death 
of,  28 

Abdul  Hamid,  despotism  of,  39;  as 
caliph,  48;  Senussi’s  opposition  to, 
48,  56;  Djemal-ed-Din  protected  by, 
63  ff. ;  Pan-Islam  policy  of,  65  ff.; 
character  of,  65  ff.;  government  of, 
66;  deposition  of,  67,  142;  tyrannical 
policy  of,  138;  nationalism  opposed 
by,  166,  196;  Arabs  conciliated  by, 
169  ff. 

Abu  Bekr,  28;  policy  of,  135  ff. 
Abyssinian  Church,  Mohammedan 
threat  against,  60 

Afghanistan,  religious  uprisings  in,  50; 
nineteenth-century  independence  of, 
140;  Bolshevism  in,  338  ff. ;  rebellion 
of,  339  ff. 

Africa-Mohammedan  missionary  work 
in,  59  ff.  See  also  North  Africa 
Agadir  crisis,  69 

Ahmed  Bey  Agayeff,  Pan-Turanism 
aided  by,  197 

Alexandria,  massacre  of  Europeans  in, 
177 

Algeria,  French  conquest  of,  49,  188; 
Kabyle  insurrection  in,  50;  compul¬ 
sory  vaccination  in,  113;  liberal  politi¬ 
cal  aspirations  in,  140  ff.;  need  for 
European  government  in,  145 
Allenby,  General,  Egypt  in  control  of, 
211 

Amanullah  Khan,  Bolshevism  of,  338; 
war  on  England  declared  by,  339; 
present  policy  of,  353 
Anatolia,  Bolshevist  manifesto  to,  345 
Anglo-Russian  Agreement,  terms  of, 
189  ff. 

Arabi  Pasha,  Djemal-ed-Din’s  influ¬ 
ence  on,  176;  revolution  in  Egypt 
headed  by,  176 

Arabia,  description  of  natives  of,  27; 
Turks  fought  by,  28;  defeat  of,  29; 
political  freedom  of,  135;  democracy 
in,  151;  nationalist  spirit  in,  167  ff.; 


Turkish  rulers  opposed  by,  167  ff.; 
suppression  of,  170;  1905  rebellion  of, 
170;  effect  of  Young-Turk  revolu¬ 
tion  on,  172  ff.;  1916  revolt  of,  174; 
Pan-Arabism  in,  172;  religious  char¬ 
acter  of  Pan- Arab  movement  in, 
201  ff.;  effect  of  Great  War  on,  202, 
218  ff. ;  Allied  encouragement  of,  218; 
peace  terms  and,  219;  English  agree¬ 
ment  with,  219  ff. ;  revolt  against 
Turks  of,  220;  secret  partition  of, 
220  ff.;  Colonel  Lawrence’s  influence 
in,  221;  secret  treaties  revealed  to, 
222;  France  and  England  in,  222  ff. ; 
Mustapha  Kemal  aided  by,  230  ff. ; 
English  negotiations  with,  235;  Bol¬ 
shevist  manifesto  to,  345 
Arabian  National  Committee,  creation 
of,  170 

Archer,  William,  on  overpopulation  in 
India,  312 

Argyll,  Duke  of,  overpopulation  in 
India,  311 

Armenia,  Bolshevist  manifesto  to,  345 
Arya  Somaj,  247 
Atchin  War,  50 

Azerbaidjan,  Bolshevist  revolution  in, 
343  if. 

Babbist  movement  in  Persia,  324 
Baber,  Mogul  Empire  founded  by,  243 
Baku,  Congress  of  Eastern  Peoples  at, 
344,  351 

Balkan  War,  68;  Mohammedans  roused 
by,  70 

Barbary  States,  French  conquest  of,  188 
Berard,  Victor,  on  the  enmity  of  Turks 
and  Arabs,  167  ff.;  France’s  Syrian 
policy  criticised  by,  236 
Bertrand,  Louis,  anti-Western  feeling 
in  Orient  described  by,  114  ff.;  on 
social  conditions  in  the  Levant,  319, 
321 

Be  van,  Edwyn,  nationalist  views  of, 
149#. 

Bin  Saud,  Ikhwan  movement  led  by,  86 
Bolshevism,  effects  on  Orient  of,  208; 
Mustapha  Kemal  aided  by,  232  ff. ; 
the  East  a  field  for,  335  ff. ;  propa¬ 
ganda  of,  336  ff .,  341  ff.;  Oriental 
policy  of,  337 ;  in  Afghanistan,  338  ff. ; 
manifesto  to  Mohammedans  issued 
by,  341  ff.;  manifesto  to  Turks  issued 


358 


INDEX 


by,  342  ff.;  “Congress  of  Eastern 
Peoples”  held  by,  344  ff. 

Bombay,  English  character  of,  120; 

social  conditions  in,  320  ff. 

Bose,  Pramatha  Nath,  on  economic 
conditions  in  India,  291  ff. 
Brahminism,  illiberalism  of,  143 
Brailsford,  H.  N.,  on  modern  industry 
in  Egypt,  280  ff. ;  on  social  conditions 
in  Egypt,  318  ff. 

British  East  India  Company,  244 
Buklish,  S.  Khuda,  reform  work  of, 
38  ff.',  nationalism  in  India  opposed 
by,  148  ff.\  on  Indian  social  condi¬ 
tions,  299  ff. 

Caetani,  Leone,  76 
Cahan,  Leon,  Turanism  and,  194 
Cairo,  revolt  in,  211 ;  modern  women  ini 
306 

Calcutta;  English  character  of,  120; 

social  conditions  in,  320 
Caliphate,  Islam  strengthened  by,  46 
ff. ;  history  of,  47;  Turkey  the  head 
of,  47  ff. 

Chelmsford,  Lord,  report  of,  257  ff. 
China,  Mohammedan  insurrection  in, 
50,  61  ff.’,  Mohammedan  missionary 
work  in,  61;  number  of  Moham¬ 
medans  in,  62;  Mohammedan  agita¬ 
tion  in,  73 

Chirol,  Valentine,  Western  influence  in 
Orient  described  by,  94  ff. ;  on  Egyp¬ 
tian  situation,  212  ff.;  Montagu- 
Chelmsford  Report  approved  by, 
261;  on  Egyptian  conditions  since 
the  war,  321  ff.;  on  Bolshevism  in 
India,  352 

Congress  of  Eastern  Peoples,  344  ff. 
Constantine,  King,  recalled,  230 
Constantinople,  Allied  occupation  of, 
228  ff.;  changes  since  1896  in,  297  ff.; 
status  of  women  in,  306 
Cox,  Sir  Percy,  English-Arabian  nego¬ 
tiations  made  by,  235;  influence  of, 
237 

Cromer,  Lord,  on  Islam,  36,  39;  West¬ 
ern  influence  in  Orient  described  by, 
96;  ethics  of  imperialism  formulated 
by,  101,  122,  143  ff.;  Egyptian  ad¬ 
ministration  of,  177;  resignation  of, 
181;  on  western-educated  Egypt, 
304;  on  overpopulation  in  India,  312 
Curtis,  Lionel,  nationalism  in  India 
supported  by,  154  ff.;  Montagu- 
Chelmsford  Report  approved  by,  261 
Curzon-Wyllie,  Sir,  assassination  of, 
252 

Damascus,  French  in,  226  ff. 
Dar-ul-Islam,  203  ff. 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowes,  on  Eastern  eco¬ 
nomics,  295 


Djemal-ed-Din,  birth  of,  63;  character 
of,  63;  anti-European  work  of,  63; 
in  India,  63;  in  Egypt,  63;  Abdul 
Hamid’s  protection  of,  63  ff.;  death 
of,  64;  teachings  of,  64  ff. ;  national¬ 
ism  taught  by,  164;  Egypt  influenced 
by,  176;  in  Russia,  337 

Dutch  East  Indies,  Mohammedan  up¬ 
risings  in,  50;  Mohammedan  mis¬ 
sionary  work  in,  62 

Egypt,  nationalism  in,  39,  140  ff. ; 
Mahdist  insurrection  in,  50;  1914 
insurrection  of,  73;  exiled  Arabs  in, 
170;  characteristics  of  people  of,  174 
ff. ;  early  European  influences  in,  175; 
nationalist  agitation  in,  176  ff.;  in¬ 
fluence  of  Djemal-ed-Din  in,  176; 
1882  revolution  in,  176  ff.;  Lord 
Cromer’s  rule  of,  177;  France’s  in¬ 
fluence  in,  178  ff.;  failure  of  English 
liberal  policy  in,  181  ff.;  Lord  Kitch¬ 
ener’s  rule  in,  182  ff.;  effect  of  out¬ 
break  of  World  War  on,  185  ff.;  made 
English  protectorate,  185  ff.;  Pan- 
Arabism  in,  201;  Versailles  confer¬ 
ence’s  treatment  of,  207;  nationalist 
demands  of,  210;  Allenby  in  control 
of,  211;  rebellion  of,  211  ff. ;  martial 
law  in,  212;  situation  after  rebellion 
in,  213  ff.;  English  commission  of 
inquiry  in,  215;  English  compromise 
with,  216;  opposition  to  compromise 
in,  216  ff. ;  modern  factories  in,  277, 
280;  industrial  conditions  in,  280  ff.; 
social  conditions  in,  319;  social  revo¬ 
lution  in,  332  ff. 

El-Gharami,  36 

El  Mahdi,  51 

England,  Egypt’s  rebellion  against,1 
208  ff.;  Commission  of  Inquiry  into 
Egyptian  affairs  appointed  by,  215; 
Egyptian  compromise  with,  216; 
opposition  to  compromise  in,  216; 
Arabia  and,  219  ff. ;  in  Mesopotamia, 
219  ff.;  in  Palestine,  220;  French  dis¬ 
agreement  with,  223  ff. ;  at  San  Remo 
conference,  225;  Mesopotamian  re¬ 
bellion  against,  227  ff. ;  Sevres  Treaty 
and,  229;  Greek  agreement  with,  229; 
Arabian  negotiations  with,  235;  in 
India,  243  ff. 

Enver  Pasha,  Pan-Turanism  and,  199; 
in  Russia,  337 

Feisal,  Prince,  at  peace  conference,’ 
222  ff. ;  peace  counsels  of,  223;  made 
king  of  Syria,  226 

Fisher,  on  social  conditions  in  Indian 
319  ff. 

France,  Morocco  seized  by,  69;  anti- 
British  propaganda  of,  178  ff.;  Arabia 
and,  219;  Syrian  aspirations  of,  219 


INDEX 


359 


ff. ;  at  San  Remo  conference,  225; 
Syrian  rebellion  and,  226  ff.',  SSvres 
Treaty  and,  229;  Greek  agreement 
with,  229;  present  Syrian  situation 
of,  235  ff. 

Gandhi,  M.  K.,  boycott  of  England  ad¬ 
vocated  by,  266 

Gorst,  Sir  Eldon,  Lord  Cromer  suc¬ 
ceeded  by,  181;  failure  of  policy  of, 
181 

Gouraud,  General,  Feisal  subdued  by, 
227;  danger  in  methods  of,  353 
Greece,  anti-Turk  campaign  of,  229; 
Yenizelos  repudiated  by,  230;  Con¬ 
stantine  supported  by,  230 

Habibullah  Khan,  Ameer,  England  sup¬ 
ported  by,  338;  death  of,  338 
Haifa,  to  be  British,  220 
Hajj,  Islam  strengthened  by,  46  ff. 
Halil  Pasha,  Pan-Turanism  and,  200 
Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  69 
Harding,  Lord,  Indian  nationalist 
movement  supported  by,  256 
Hedjaz,  Turkish  dominion  of,  167 
Hindustan,  Islam’s  appeal  to,  72;  anti- 
Western  feeling  in,  118  ff.’,  illiberal 
tradition  of,  143 

Hunter,  Sir  William,  on  overpopulation 
in  India,  311  ff. 

Hussein  Kamel,  made  Sultan  of  Egypt, 
185 

Ikhwan,  beginning  of,  86;  progress  of, 
86 

Imam  Yahya,  237 

India,  reform  of  Islamism  in,  37 ;  Eng¬ 
lish  mastery  of,  49;  Islam’s  mission¬ 
ary  work  in,  62;  1914  insurrection  in, 
73;  English  towns  and  customs  in, 
120;  effect  of  Russo-Japanese  War 
in,  126,  250  ff. ;  liberal  political  aspira¬ 
tions  in,  140  ff.;  democracy  intro¬ 
duced  by  England  in,  146  ff. ;  opposi¬ 
tion  to  nationalism  in,  147  ff.,  259  ff.; 
support  of  nationalism  in,  154  ff., 
162  ff. ;  history  of.  239;  Aryan  inva¬ 
sion  of,  239  ff.;  beginning  of  caste 
system  in,  240  ff.;  Mohammedan  in¬ 
vasion  of,  242  ff.;  Mogul  Empire 
founded  in,  243;  British  conquest  of, 

244  ff.;  beginning  of  discontent  in, 

245  ff. ;  Hindu  nationalist  movement 
in,  247  ff.,  252  ff.;  English  liberal 
policy  in,  253  ff.;  result  of  outbreak 
of  war  in,  255;  Montagu-Chelmsford 
Report  in,  257  ff.;  militant  unrest  in, 
262  ff.;  effect  of  Rowlatt  Bill  in,  263 
ff.;  English  boycotted  by,  265  ff.; 
present  turmoil  in,  267 ;  industries  in, 
276  ff.;  industrial  conditions  in,  281 


ff. ;  industrial  future  of,  283  ff. ;  agri¬ 
culture  in,  288  ff. ;  Swadeshi  move¬ 
ment  in,  289  ff.;  social  conditions  in, 
299  ff. ;  status  of  women  in,  301, 
305  ff. ;  education  in,  302  ff. ;  over¬ 
population  in,  311  ff.;  condition  of 
peasants  in,  319;  city  and  rural  life 
in,  325  ff.;  economic  revolution  in, 
327  ff. ;  attitude  of  Bolshevists 
toward,  341  ff. 

Indian  Councils  Act,  terms  of,  253; 
effect  of,  254 

Indian  National  Congress,  245 

Islam,  eighteenth-century  decadence  of, 
25 ff.;  revival  of,  26  ;'Christian  opin¬ 
ions  of,  32  ff. ;  present  situation  of,  33 
ff. ;  agnosticism  in,  39  ff. ;  fanatics  in, 
40  ff. ;  solidarity  of,  45  ff. ;  Hajj  an  aid 
to,  46  ff. ;  caliphate  an  aid  to,  46  ff. ; 
Western  successes  against,  49;  prose- 
lytism  of,  58  ff. ;  effect  of  Balkan  War 
on,  70  ff.;  effect  of  Russo-Japanese 
War  on,  71,  126  ff.;  Western  influ¬ 
ence  on,  90  ff.;  anti-Western  reaction 
of,  105  ff. ;  race  mixture  in,  122  ff.; 
tyranny  in,  132  ff.;  early  equality  in, 
135  ff.;  political  reformation  in,  137 
ff.;  birth  of  nationalism  in,  163  ff.; 
Bolshevist  propaganda  in,  336  ff. 
See  also  Pan-Islam 

Ismael  Hamet,  on  scepticism  among 
Moslems,  40 

Ismael,  Khedive,  tyrannical  policy  of, 
139;  Egypt  Europeanized  by,  175  ff. 

Italy,  Tripoli  attacked  by,  68;  San 
Remo  Treaty  opposed  by,  226,  229 

Japan,  Mohammedan  missionary  work 
in,  71  ff. 

Jowf,  Sennussi  stronghold,  55  $ 

Kabyle  insurrection,  50 

Khadjar  dynasty,  Persian  revolution 
against,  190 

Kharadjites,  Islamic  spirit  preserved 
by,  324 

Khartum,  capture  of,  50 

Kheir-ed-Din,  attempt  to  regenerate 
Tunis  made  by,  107 

Kitchener,  Lord,  Mahdist  insurrection 
suppressed  by,  50 ;  antinationalist  be¬ 
liefs  of,  146;  nationalism  in  Egypt 
suppressed  by,  182  ff. 

Krishnavarma,  S.,  assassination  com¬ 
mended  by,  251 

Lawrence,  Colonel,  influence  of,  221; 
Arab-Turk  agreement  views  of, 
230  ff. ;  Mesopotamia  views  of,  234 

Lebanon,  France’s  control  of,  219 

Lenine,  manifesto  to  Mohammedans 
issued  by,  341  ff. 


360 


INDEX 


Low,  Sidney,5  modern  imperialism  de¬ 
scribed  by,  103  ff. ;  on  Egyptian  situa¬ 
tion,  183 

Lyall,  Sir  Alfred,  on  Western  education 
in  India,  303  ff. 

Lybyer,  Professor  A.  H.,  democracy  in 
Islam  described  by,  136,  151 

Macdonald,  J.  Ramsay,  on  economic 
conditions  in  India,  291;  on  social 
revolution  in  India,  331  ff. 
Mcllwraith,  Sir  M.,  on  Egyptian  situa¬ 
tion,  214 

McMahon,  Sir  Henry,  agreement  with 
Arabs  made  by,  220  ff. 

Madras,  English  character  of,  120 
Mahdism,  definition  of,  50  ff. 

Mahdist  insurrection,  50 
Mahmud  II,  Sultan,  liberal  policy  of, 
137 

Mahmud  of  Ghazni,  India  invaded  by, 
242 

Mecca,  decadence  of,  26;  Abd-el- 
Wahab’s  pilgrimage  to,  27;  Saud’s 
subjugation  of,  28;  Turkish  recon¬ 
quest  of,  29;  aid  to  strength  of  Islam, 
46  ff. ;  post-cards  sold  at,  297 
Medina,  decadence  of,  26;  Abd-el- 
Wahab’s  studies  at,  27;  Saud’s  subju¬ 
gation  of,  28;  Turkish  reconquest  of, 
29;  electricity  at,  297 
Mehemet  Ali,  army  of,  29 ;  Turks  aided 
by,  29;  Wahabi  defeated  by,  29; 
liberal  policy  of,  137;  Egypt  Eu¬ 
ropeanized  by,  175 

Mesopotamia,  Turkish  dominion  of, 
167;  England  in,  219  ff .;  rebellion 
against  England  of,  227  ff. ;  denuncia¬ 
tion  of  English  policy  in,  234;  Bol¬ 
shevists’  manifesto  issued  to,  345 
Metin,  Albert,  on  nationalist  move¬ 
ment  in  India,  330  ff. 

Midhat  Pasha,  liberal  movement  aided 
by,  39 

Milner,  Lord,  Egyptian  inquiry  com¬ 
mission  headed  by,  215;  character  of, 
215;  compromise  agreed  on  by,  216 
ff.-,  resignation  of,  217;  influence  of, 
237 

Mogul  Empire,  foundation  of,  243 
Mohammed  Abdou,  Sheikh,  liberal 
movement  aided  by,  39;  Djemal-ed- 
Din’s  influence  on,  176;  conservative 
teachings  of,  178 

Mohammed  Ahmed,  Sennussi’s  scorn  of, 
56 

Mohammed  Farid  Bey,  anti-English 
policy  of,  180;  mistakes  of,  180  ff.; 
pro-German  policy  of,  186 
Mohammedan  Revival.  See  Pan- 
Islam 

Mollahs,  antiliberalism  of,  37 
Montagu-Chelmsford  Report,  258  ff. 


Montagu,  liberal  policy  of,  256  ff. 
Morison,  Sir  Theodore,  on  Moslem 
situation,  81,  84  ff.;  on  modern  indus¬ 
try  in  India,  277  ff.;  290 
Morley,  John,  liberal  policy  of,  253 
Morocco,  French  seizure  of,  69,  188; 

in  nineteenth  century,  140 
Motazelism,  rediscovery  of,  32;  influ¬ 
ence  of,  36 

Moulvie  Cheragh  Ali,  reform  work  of, 
38 

Muhammed  Ali,  Shah,  revolt  in  Persia 
against,  142 

Muir,  Ramsay,  European  imperialism 
described  by,  100 

Mustapha  Kemal,  character  of,  179; 
beliefs  of,  179  ff.;  death  of,  180; 
Allies  defied  by,  226;  Turkish  de¬ 
nunciation  of,  229;  Greek  campaign 
against,  229  ff.;  Arab  aid  given  to, 
230  ff. ;  policy  of,  232;  Bolshevists 
allied  with,  232  ff.;  French  negotia¬ 
tions  with,  236;  Bolshevist  support 
of,  338,  349 
Mutiny  of  1857,  244 

Nair,  Doctor  T.  Madavan;  anti¬ 
nationalist  opinions  of,  148,  260 
Nakechabendiya  fraternity,  50 
Namasudra,  antinationalist  organiza¬ 
tion,  147,  260 

Nejd,  birth  of  Abd-el-Wahab  in,  26  ff.; 
description  of,  26  ff. ;  return  of  Abd- 
el-Wahab  to,  27;  conversion  of,  28; 
consolidation  of,  28 

Nitti,  Premier,  San  Remo  Treaty  op¬ 
posed  by,  225  ff. 

North  Africa,  “Holy  Men”  insurrec¬ 
tion  in,  50;  lack  of  nationalism  in^ 
187  ff.;  races  in,  187  ff. 

Nyassaland,  Mohammedanism  in,  59  ff. 

Orient.  See  Islam 

Pal,  Bepin  Chander,  on  Montagu- 
Chelmsford  Report,  259;  on  social 
revolution  in  India,  328 
Palestine,  Sykes-Picot  Agreement  and, 
220;  England  in,  220 
Pan-Islam,  fanatics’  schemes  for,  40  ff. ; 
definition  of,  45  ff.;  Hajj  an  aid  to, 
46  ff.;  caliphate  an  aid  to,  47  ff.; 
anti-Western  character  of,  49  ff.; 
fraternities  in,  52  ff. ;  Abdul  Hamid’s 
support  of,  65  ff.;  Young-Turk  inter¬ 
ruption  of,  68;  renewal  of,  68  ff.; 
effect  of  Balkan  War  on,  70  ff.;  Great 
War  and,  73  ff.;  Versailles  Treaty 
and,  74  ff.;  press  strength  of,  80; 
propaganda  of,  80;  menacing  temper 
of,  84  ff. ;  economic  evolution  in,  86  ff. 
Pan-Syrian  Congress,  226 
Pan-Turanism.  See  Turanians 


INDEX 


361 


Pan-Turkism.  See  Turkey,  rise  of 
nationalism  in 

Persia,  1914  insurrection  in,  73;  an 
English  protectorate,  75;  tyranny  in, 
139;  independence  of,  140;  liberal 
movement  in,  140;  1908  revolution 
in,  142,  189  ff.;  need  for  European 
government  in,  145;  nineteenth-cen¬ 
tury  conditions  in,  189;  Versailles 
conference’s  treatment  of,  206  ff. ;  war 
conditions  in,  233;  Bolshevism  in, 
233  ff.,  339  ff.;  Bolshevist  manifesto 
issued  to,  344 

Population  Problem  of  India,  The,  313 

Ramsay,  Sir  William,  on  economic 
conditions  in  Asia  Minor,  285  ff. 
Bealpolitik,  treatment  of  Orient.by,  103, 
127 

Reshid  Pasha,  liberal  movement  aided 
by,  39 

Roushdi  Pasha,  nationalist  demands 
of,  210  ff. 

Rowlatt  Bill,  nationalist  opposition  to, 
263  ff. 

Russia,  Turanian  antagonism  for,  198 
ff.  See  also  Bolshevism  and  Soviet 
Russia 

Russo-Japanese  War,  Islam  roused  by, 
71,  126 

Salafl,  rise  and  growth  of,  86 ;  spirit  of, 
86 

San  Remo,  conference  at,  225  ff. 

Saud,  Abd-el-Wahab  succeeded  by,  28; 
power  and  character  of,  28;  govern¬ 
ment  of,  28,  49;  holy  cities  subdued 
by,  28;  death  of,  28 
Saud,  clan  of,  converted,  29 
Schweinfurth,  Georg,  Egyptian  na¬ 
tionalism  described  by,  177  ff. 
Sennussi-el-Mahdi,  leadership  won  by, 
54;  power  of,  54 

Sennussiya,  foundation  of,  52  ff. ;  lead¬ 
ership  of,  54 ;  present  power  of,  54  ff. ; 
government  of,  55 ;  policy  of,  55  ff. ; 
proselytism  of,  58  ff. 

SSvres  Treaty,  229,  236 
Seyid  Ahmed,  state  in  India  founded 
by,  30;  conquest  of,  30 
Seyid  Ahmed  Khan,  Sir,  reforms  of,  37 
Seyid  Amir  Ali,  reform  work  of,  38 
Seyid  Mahommed  ben  Sennussi,  in 
Mecca,  30,  47 ;  Abdul  Hamid  opposed 
by,  48,  53;  birth  of,  53;  education  of, 
53;  “Zawias”  built  by,  53;  power  of, 
53  ff. 

Shamyl,  Russia  opposed  by,  49 
Shiah  Emir,  237 

Shuster,  W.  Morgan,  Persia’s  political 
capacity  described  by,  152  ff. 

South  Africa,  Mohammedan  threat 
against,  60 


Soviet  Russia,  Afghanistan  allied  with, 
340  ff.;  Kemal  supported  by,  349; 
success  of,  351  ff. 

Sun-Yat-Sen,  Doctor,  73 
Sydenham,  Lord,  Montagu-Chelmsford 
Report  criticised  by,  261 
Swadeshi  movement,  289  ff. 

Sykes-Picot  Agreement,  terms  of,  220 
ff.;  French  opposition  to,  225  ff. ; 
fulfilment  of,  225 

Syria,  Turkish  dominion  of,  167;  na¬ 
tionalist  agitation  in,  169  ff.;  France 
in,  219  ff.;  declaration  of  indepen¬ 
dence  of,  226;  French  suppression  of, 
227;  present  situation  in,  235  ff.; 
Bolshevist  manifesto  issued  to,  346 

Tagore,  Rabindranath,  on  economic 
conditions  in  India,  294 
Talaat,  in  Russia,  337 
Tartars,  liberal  movement  among,  39; 
Mohammedan  missionary  work 
among,  60  ff.;  nationalist  revival  of, 
194  ff. ;  Bolshevism  among,  337 
Tekin  Alp,  on  Pan-Turanism,  199 
Tel-el-Kebir,  battle  of,  177 
Tewfik  Pasha,  anti-English  feeling  of, 
110 

Tilak,  Bal  Gangadhar,  nationalist 
work  of,  250,  259 

Townsend,  Meredith,  anti-Western  feel¬ 
ing  in  Orient  explained  by,  122,  125 
Transcaucasia,  Russian  conquest  of, 
49;  after-the-war  situation  in,  232; 
Mustapha  Kemal  supported  by,  232 
Tripoli,  Italy’s  raid  on,  68;  Moham¬ 
medan  resistance  in,  69;  1914  insur¬ 
rection  in,  73 

Tunis,  Kheir-ed- Din’s  reforms  in,  106  ff. 
Turanians,  peoples  composing,  192  ff. ; 
nationalist  movement  among,  193  ff.; 
effect  of  Young-Turk  Revolution  on, 
196;  effect  of  Balkan  Wars  on,  197  ff. ; 
effect  of  Great  War  on,  199  ff. 
Turkestan,  Bolshevism  in,  339;  social 
revolution  in,  343 

Turkestan,  Chinese,  Mohammedans  in, 
61;  revolt  of,  62 

Turkey,  Islam  conquered  by,  28; 
Arabs  war  against,  28  ff.;  Mehemet 
Ali’s  aid  of,  29;  liberal  movement  in, 
38  ff.;  1908  revolution  in,  39,  142; 
Balkan  attack  on,  68  ff. ;  anti-Western 
feeling  in,  108  ff.;  effect  of  Russo- 
Japanese  War  in,  126;  independence 
of,  140;  liberal  movement  in,  140; 
democracy  in,  151 ;  birth  of  national¬ 
ism  in,  164;  language  of,  165;  Pan- 
Turanism  in,  166  ff.,  192  ff.,  217  ff.; 
Arabian  rebellion  against,  168  ff. ; 
Allied  treaty  with,  229;  Arab  aid 
given  to,  230  ff.;  Western  educational 


362 


INDEX 


methods  in,  303;  status  of  women  in, 
306;  Bolshevists'  manifesto  to,  342  ff. 

Turkish  and  Pan-Turkish  Ideal,  The, 
199 

Vambery,  Arminius,  warning  against 
Mohammedans  uttered  by,  78  ff., 
127;  Moslem  politics  described  by, 
136,  150;  Young-Turk  party  de¬ 
scribed  by,  140;  Turanism  and,  194; 
on  changes  at  Constantinople,  297  ff. ; 
on  native  officials  in  East,  304  ff. ;  on 
status  of  woman  in  East,  306 

Venizelos,  Allied  agreement  with,  229; 
Greek  repudiation  of,  230 

Versailles  Peace,  Islam  affected  by, 
128  ff.,  206;  secret  treaties  revealed 
by,  206  ff. 

Victoria,  Queen,  made  Empress  of 
India,  244 


Wacha,  Sir  Dinshaw,  on  Montagu- 
Chelmsford  Report,  258  ff. 

Wahabi,  formation  of  state  of,  28,  48; 
government  of,  28,  49;  successful 
fighting  of,  28;  defeat  of,  29;  end  of 
political  power  of,  29;  spiritual  power 
of,  29;  in  India,  30;  English  conquest 


of  in  India,  30;  influence  of,  30; 
characteristics  of,  31  ff. 

Wattal,  P.  K.,  on  overpopulation  in 
India,  313  ff. 

Willcocks,  Sir  William,  on  Egyptian 
situation,  212 

Yahya  Siddyk,  on  pre-war  Moham¬ 
medan  situation,  81  ff. 

Yakub  Beg,  Turkestan  insurrection  led 
by,  62 

Young  Arabia,  171  ff. 

Young-Turk  party,  rise  of,  139  ff.',  na¬ 
tionalist  policy  of,  166;  Arabian 
nationalism  and,  172  ff. 

Young-Turk  revolution,  68,  142 

Yuganlar,  anti-English  organ,  250  ff. 

Yunnan,  Mohammedan  insurrection 
in,  50,  61  ff. ;  Chinese  Mohammedans 
in,  61 

Yusuf  Bey  Akchura  Oglu,  Pan-Tura¬ 
nian  society  founded  by,  196 

Zagloul  Pasha,  Milner’s  discussions 
with,  215;  Milner’s  compromise  with, 
216;  opposition  to,  216  ff. 

Zaidite  Emir,  237 

Zawia  Baida,  Sennussi’s  founding  of,  53 

Zinoviev,  on  Third  International,  348  ff. 


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